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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
A STUBBORN COURAGE: MEAN AND ORNERY JOURNALISTS IN EASTERN 
KENTUCKY 
In most ways, The Mountain Eagle is an ordinary community oriented weekly 
newspaper, and indeed, a close examination of the paper will reveal that it focuses mostly on 
community news in Letcher County Kentucky, a small county in the mountains of eastern 
Kentucky. It carries holiday recipes, neighborhood news, and coverage of local government, 
school boards and sporting events. But a closer examination of the paper and its history reveals a 
different kind of community weekly. The Mountain Eagle is one of the most recognized, 
commented upon, and decorated community newspapers in the United States. Since Tom and Pat 
Gish took the paper over in 1957, the Gishes and their newspaper have been shunned by their 
neighbors, boycotted, and the paper’s offices were fire-bombed in 1974. And yet, the paper 
survived and continues to report the news, honesty and without bias. 
Although Tom Gish was born and raised in the coal fields of Letcher County both Gishes 
were “city journalists” when they came to Whitesburg. Pat worked for The Lexington Leader 
and Tom managed the United Press Desk in the state capital of Frankfort. They met while 
studying Journalism at the University of Kentucky, and pursued careers in the field. Their desire 
to run a small-town newspaper brought them to Whitesburg, Tom’s hometown. Their insistence 
on doing their jobs the way they had been trained soon put them at odds with the Fiscal Court, 
the School Board, the coal operators, and the elites who ran Letcher County.  Coal mining drove 
the economy, and the county operated on a near feudal basis, with people owing fealty to elected 
officials and coal companies, and none of the controlling interests liked the idea of seeing their 
activities on the front page. 
This dissertation is a chronological examination of The Mountain Eagle and its publishers 
during period between 1957, when the Gishes took over the newspaper, to 1977, when the 
Federal Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act was signed into law. During that period, 
Letcher County and the United States experienced the assassination of a president, the War on 
Poverty, the Vietnam War, and the widespread use of strip mining to gouge rich veins of coal out 
of the Appalachian Coalfields. Strip mining soon became the most common method of extracting 
coal in the country, and its effects on the steep hillsides of eastern Kentucky became the focus of 
much of The Eagle’s news and editorial activity.  
Both Gishes said many times that it had never been their intention to become crusaders or 
to take on any particular group. But as they began to undertake what they saw as their primary 
job, that of reporting on the news of the county, they began to experience obstacles in reporting 
on civic activities, which by Kentucky law were supposed to be open to the public. In an 
introductory speech delivered to the Rotary Club in the county seat of Whitesburg, Tom Gish 
pointed out that while there were a lot of things about the newspaper that he liked and intended 
to keep, there were other areas where he thought the paper could be improved. One of those 
areas was in the coverage of civic events, primarily the meetings of the fiscal court, the various 
city councils, and the board of education, the first of the controlling bodies to come into conflict 
with the newspaper. 
Pat Gish did most of the reporting, and when she started attending school board meetings, 
she learned that while she might be tolerated, she would certainly not be welcomed. The board 
initially told the paper that their meetings were closed, only one person at a time was allowed 
into the board chamber, and they were there to discuss their business with the board and then 
leave. Tom Gish informed them that the Kentucky Open Meetings Law gave the press access to 
public meetings and grudgingly, the board allowed Pat to attend. But they refused to provide her 
with a chair, so she had to stand during meetings that often lasted for several hours, even while 
she was pregnant with her second child. Tom Gish also began to attend meetings to provide a 
basis for the editorials he wrote asking for improvements in county-wide education. This came 
during a period when Kentucky Schools were under investigation by the state legislature and 
Whitesburg Attorney Harry Caudill, who represented the county in the General Assembly, 
chaired a committee that delivered a scathing report on Kentucky schools, and called particular 
attention to education in eastern Kentucky. Caudill’s guest editorials and Letters to the Editor 
began to appear in The Mountain Eagle during this period and marked the first phase of a long 
collaboration between Caudill and Gish that addressed a broad range of issues that affected the 
region. Not long afterward, one of the board members, the physician who had delivered Tom 
Gish and owned several businesses in the county, announced that he would withdraw his 
advertising from the paper and the “word went out” that teachers had been forbidden to purchase 
the paper. Tom Gish later said that newsstand sales had skyrocketed during this and subsequent 
boycotts. 
 Tom Gish joined his wife in covering the Letcher County Fiscal Court and they soon 
angered the judge and magistrates by reporting that magistrates had voted themselves a 
substantial pay raise. Although the court had initially welcomed the newspaper at meetings, they 
soon passed an ordinance to make at least part of their meetings closed. This was another 
violation of the Open Meetings Act and the Attorney General weighed in on the newspaper’s 
behalf. A long-running feud developed between The Eagle and the court that included several 
efforts to de-certify the paper as the newspaper with the largest circulation. This meant that all 
legal documents, including ordinances and other court actions had to be published in The Eagle 
before they became law. These publications, along with bond advertisements from coal 
companies and other legally required publications were a significant source of the newspaper’s 
income. The feud with the court finally came to a head in 1974 when the County Judge 
Executive and Sheriff ignored threats to blow the newspaper’s offices up just weeks before the 
paper was fire-bombed by a former Whitesburg City Police officer, who had resigned after being 
named in several articles concerning police brutality. 
The Mountain Eagle’s involvement with the War on Poverty and its advocacy for strip 
mine regulation brought the paper into the national spotlight. Many of the national reporters who 
published articles on Appalachian poverty that captured the nation’s imagination and sympathy 
came directly through the offices of The Mountain Eagle, and the Gishes often served as their 
guides to eastern Kentucky. The New York Times’ initial report on the endemic poverty that 
plagued eastern Kentucky, which captured Senator John F. Kennedy’s attention during his 
campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, came after Times Reporter Calvin 
Trillen spent time at the Gish home in Whitesburg and toured the region with them. Tom and Pat 
Gish became deeply involved in efforts to alleviate suffering in the region and spent so much 
time testifying before congressional committees and on other poverty related activities during the 
War on Poverty, the paper often came out late and suffered financially. Tom Gish frequently 
wrote editorials that praised the federal government’s efforts, but just as often, his editorials were 
among the most scathing in the country, when he felt that it was too little, too late. 
The newspaper had a complex relationship with the coal industry. Tom Gish’s father was 
a mine superintendent with South East Coal Company, one of the larger companies in the 
county. Tom saw underground coal mining as the logical basis for the economy in the region, but 
he also advocated for diversifying the economy so it would not be entirely dependent on a single 
industry. When he visited a strip mine in eastern Letcher County with his father Ben, both men 
were horrified at the destruction visited on a small community there and Tom began to call for 
strip mining to be outlawed all together or at the very least, strictly regulated. This began a 
twenty-year struggle that finally came to fruition with the 1977 Federal Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Control Act. But the legislation was far from perfect and not only codified strip 
mining in federal law, but also opened the door for the even more destructive practice of 
mountain top removal. 
The Mountain Eagle’s involvement with the War on Poverty, along with their opposition 
to strip mining, angered some people in Letcher County, and the Gish family was shunned by 
many of their neighbors, and the paper was boycotted by some advertisers. Efforts to undermine 
them were rampant and threats from coal operators were frequent. When a Molotov Cocktail was 
finally thrown through the window of the newspaper’s offices in 1974, many of the residents of 
Whitesburg turned their backs on the Gishes. They still managed to get the next edition out the 
week following the fire, although the paper was put together in the family’s living room, and the 
family moved their home to a rural part of the county, but kept the offices in Whitesburg because 
it was the county seat. For the next three years, the paper devoted a significant amount of space 
to the events surrounding the prosecution of the arsonists, but they still focused heavily on 
county news. The 1976 Scotia Mine disaster, when two methane explosions claimed the lives of 
26 men at Oven Fork in Letcher County took their full attention for much of the entire following 
year. 
The Mountain Eagle has survived into the 21st Century, and the Gishes and their paper 
won a number of national awards for excellence and courage in journalism, along with several 
major awards for their contribution to freedom of the press. Both Tom (2008) and Pat (2014) 
have since died and their son Ben is the Editor and the only member of the Gish family still 
working at the newspaper. Letcher County has experienced many of the same changes as the rest 
of the country, but the economy never expanded past coal mining, so when the coal industry 
collapsed in 2015, the rest of the county economy failed with it. Unemployment is high now and 
many of the younger families have left seeking employment elsewhere. Tom Gish’s prediction 
that eastern Kentucky could eventually find itself mostly with very young and very old recipients 
of government assistance living there has come true and the region is currently struggling to find 
a way to manage. The Mountain Eagle has suffered too, but it still manages, and it still adheres 
to the masthead slogan, “It Screams.”  
William A. Farley 
June 21, 2017 
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Introduction 
Newspapers across America in 1974 were consumed with the Watergate Scandal and the 
demise of Richard Nixon’s presidency.  The press, of course, had not just reported on the scandals 
but because of the investigative journalism of the Washington Post and other papers, it had been 
essential to exposing the dark side of the Nixon White House.  The Post in particular had famously 
pursued the story in spite of the administration’s threats to retaliate against it.  It waged its battle day 
after day, week after week with the American public and the nation’s political institutions caught up 
in the drama.  Ultimately, the Post, led by Katherine Graham, the paper’s matriarch, triumphed and 
emerged from the crisis as one of the world’s most respected and powerful newspapers. 
In the eastern Kentucky county of Letcher, meanwhile, another newspaper was waging its 
own battle against what it saw as the abuse of public authority.  This was The Mountain Eagle, a 
weekly published out of the county seat of Whitesburg in the heart of the Appalachian coalfields.  
The paper had existed since 1907 and for much of its history it was typical of most weekly papers in 
that it carried news of births, weddings, deaths, and graduations; it passed along items about local 
schools, and it advertised county businesses.  For many years, its slogan was “A Friendly Non-
Partisan Weekly Newspaper Published Every Thursday,” and until 1957 this aptly stated The 
Mountain Eagle’s modest aspirations.   In 1957, however, Tom and Pat Gish bought the paper and 
began building it into a nationally admired community newspaper.  The Gishes did not consider 
themselves crusaders, but they aimed to make The Mountain Eagle something more than a weekly 
shopper.  With a new slogan – “It Screams” – the paper began investigating and reporting on 
Letcher County’s Fiscal Court, the Board of Education, and just about every public institution 
within the county.  These bodies for years had been dominated by coal operators and local political 
elites who did public business behind closed doors free of the scrutiny of the county’s voters or its 
few newspaper reporters.  Appalled by the region’s high level of poverty, its isolation, and its limited 
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public resources, the Gishes also began to press for economic and political change, and this meant 
open access to public meetings, addressing health and environmental issues, and advocating for 
intrusive state and federal policies to develop the eastern Kentucky economy. 
By the 1974, the Gishes and The Mountain Eagle had become both deeply admired and 
bitterly reviled, reviled in particular by elected officials who despised the paper’s demands for open 
meetings and public transparency.  As the Watergate crisis raged, the Gishes launched still more of 
their own investigations.  One concerned the refusal of county officials to enforce the mandated 
weights of coal trucks, a regulation despised by the coal operators.  Another involved city, county, 
and state police officers, who, the paper charged, had long engaged in unlawful intimidation and 
even brutality.  Most recently, local officers had begun harassing and arresting Whitesburg teenagers 
(including the Gishes’ son) for “smarting off.”  The combination of Tom Gish’s editorials and 
contentious public meetings produced a toxic atmosphere and when one police officer resigned over 
the harassment charges, he vowed revenge.  He carried through with this a few weeks later when he 
hired two young men to send a fire bomb through the glass door of The Mountain Eagle offices.  The 
building survived, but the fire destroyed thousands of dollars of equipment and the newspaper’s 
files. 
Tom Gish was shaken by the fire, but he would not back down.  A stubborn, courageous 
man, he quickly began typing out copy for the paper’s next edition, which when it appeared carried a 
slightly revised slogan on its masthead.  Instead of “It Screams,” it now defiantly proclaimed: “It Still 
Screams.” 
The story of the firebombing was briefly national news, in part because it was so unusual for 
such a dramatic act of destruction to be aimed at a weekly newspaper with a circulation of about 
5,000.  But it also made news because Tom Gish had emerged since 1957 as one of Appalachia’s 
most respected advocates for reform and social activism.  The Gishes had taken over The Mountain 
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Eagle at a time when Kentucky’s coal economy was struggling with declining demand, the 
consequences of mechanized production, and the emergence of low-cost strip mining.  At the time, 
Appalachia was a largely forgotten region, but this would soon change, and the Gishes would play an 
important role in this.  When New York Times reporters Homer Bigart and Ben Franklin brought the 
plight of Appalachian coal miners to the attention of the nation, they sought out Tom Gish for 
guidance.  When John F. Kennedy toured Appalachia in the 1960 presidential campaign, he met with 
the Gishes.  When Harry Caudill, the Whitesburg lawyer, state legislator, and author of the searing 
expose Night Comes to the Cumberlands (1963) needed a forum for one of his many attacks on the 
powerful of eastern Kentucky, he knew that his friend Tom Gish would publicize his views in the 
pages of The Mountain Eagle.  Through his newspaper and his advocacy, Gish fought battle after 
battle – Black Lung compensation, curbs on strip mining, improved public schools, accountability 
for public officials, and much more.  He was a central figure in the “rediscovery” of Appalachian 
poverty in the 1960s and an important supporter (and critic) of federal programs of efforts to lift 
Appalachia out of its poverty. 
And perhaps above all else, Tom Gish was an editor and journalist.  Together with his wife 
Pat, he made an obscure weekly paper a voice of reform and serious news in an isolated part of 
eastern Kentucky.  He maintained the paper’s independence in the face of boycotts, threats, angry 
confrontations, and, ultimately, a fire-bombing.  The Mountain Eagle would never remotely achieve 
the circulation numbers of the Washington Post or even of Kentucky’s larger daily papers, but the 
Gishes and their newspaper were nationally recognized and respected by their peers for their fierce 
integrity and gritty perseverance. 
This dissertation will examine the first two decades of the Gishes and The Mountain Eagle.  It 
covers their move to Whitesburg and the early history of their tenure as publishers and editors, their 
role in the rediscovery of Appalachian poverty, their alliance with mountain activists such as Harry 
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Caudill, the advent of area development programs and the War on Poverty, and emerging concerns 
over the environmental consequences of coal mining.  It aims to make three major contributions:  1) 
to tell the story of how the Gishes made The Mountain Eagle a distinguished rural community paper; 
2) to explore the challenges of how a small paper confronts the powerful in a region where the
powerless have few resources; 3) and to explore the Gishes role in encouraging a new generation of 
activists.  In doing so, I hope to contribute to the recent literature on post-World War II Appalachia, 
including John Gaventa’s 1980 Power and Powerlessness, and Ron Eller’s 2013 Uneven Ground, both of 
which cover a broad span in addressing issues of inequality in Appalachia, and Henry D. Shapiro’s 
Appalachia on Our Mind: The Southern Mountains and Mountaineers in the American Consciousness, 1870-
1920, which addresses the mythology of Appalachia, I hope to offer a fuller understanding of the 
place of community newspapers in rural America for the period of the 1950s to the 1970s. One 
thing to note in reading, I was born in Jenkins Kentucky and have lived in Letcher County most of 
my life. I worked for Beth-Elkhorn Mines for almost ten years and have worked as a reporter 
covering local government for The Mountain Eagle since 2004, so the local references come from that. 
Call it hometown knowledge. 
The dissertation is organized largely in a chronological fashion.  Chapter one examines 
Letcher County when the Gishes arrived during the terrible 1957 flood that did an enormous 
amount of damage, although Whitesburg was mostly spared. It moves from his initial coverage of 
the flood to his introductory talk to the Whitesburg Rotary Club, when he outlined his goal of more 
open and comprehensive coverage of local government, and into the newspaper’s first controversy, 
when the Letcher County Fiscal Court voted to defy Kentucky law and close portions of future 
meetings after Gish criticized magistrates who had voted a raise for themselves. The stage was set 
for the struggle for open access. 
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Chapter two continues through the early years, when media attention focused on Central 
Appalachia during the 1960 presidential campaign. Following President Kennedy’s election, 
Kentucky Governor Bert Combs became an important figure in economic development efforts in 
the region, and Gish frequently addressed his hopes for development through job creation, tourism, 
and road construction, and a partly farcical “secession” of eastern Kentucky from the rest of the 
state, which highlighted the real perception that state government ignored eastern Kentucky. The 
Letcher County School Board joined the court in their own attempt to deny the newspaper access to 
their meetings, and educational reform, spurred by the (Harry) Caudill Commission Report on 
Education from the Kentucky House of Representatives, became an important topic for The 
Mountain Eagle. 
Chapter three examines The Mountain Eagle’s efforts to focus attention on the stark reality of 
the region’s rural poverty. As they became acquainted with the depth of the situation, both Gishes 
began their efforts to alleviate the hunger and poverty that plagued many in the region, through 
reporting and editorials, and occasionally by testifying before congressional committees. Chapter 
three also marks the early days of the collaboration of Tom Gish and Harry Caudill. As the federal 
government began its efforts in the region, the differences became apparent between their approach 
and those of the (Governor Bert) Combs Administration as both Combs and his top state poverty 
warrior John Whisman figured prominently in the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission. 
Chapter four moves into Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and the many changes new 
federal programs brought to eastern Kentucky. As The Eagle continued to advocate for the region’s 
poor, the Gishes faced resentment from city-dwelling neighbors over the portrayal of eastern 
Kentucky as uniformly poor. Gish also became frustrated by the paucity of aid to the region and the 
slow pace of bureaucratic efforts that were compounded by the slow-moving state and local 
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government agencies. During that period, both Gishes participated in developing anti-poverty 
programs while continuing to run the paper, but when the paper’s earnings fell, Pat took an 
administrative position in one of the Community Action Agencies.  Gish and Caudill worked with 
federal appointees and elected officials to use coal mining as a platform for expanded industrial 
development in eastern Kentucky, but both were frustrated and angered by official duplicity and 
broken promises. Gish began to suspect that the lack of local participation in programs designed to 
aid the area would be their downfall, and Caudill feared that the “dole” would lead to dependence in 
the people of the mountains. 
Chapter five is an examination of The Mountain Eagle’s relationship with the coal industry and 
how the newspaper became one of the region’s most vocal adherents for regulating strip mining. In 
the early days, Tom and Pat Gish were unaware of how destructive strip mining was to the steep 
hillsides in eastern Kentucky, but as The Eagle began to advocate for regulation, it was increasingly 
seen as anti-coal. As the anti-strip mining movement grew, Gish wrote some of his most powerful 
editorials in favor of its strict regulation, but the industry’s adherents in various legislative bodies 
helped design laws that normalized the practice. 
Chapters six and seven continue with The Eagle’s ever more strained relationship with the 
coal industry and its increasingly toxic relations with the fiscal court and Whitesburg’s city 
government. The newspaper’s opponents finally resorted to violence and terrorism while local 
officials ignored threats that led to the Molotov cocktail being thrown into the paper’s office. 
Coverage of the Brookside Mine Strike in Harlan County angered the Kentucky State Police and 
offended a powerful judge in Letcher County.  The Mountain Eagle’s reporting was also among the 
most incisive on the struggle for justice within the United Mine Workers.  A significant part of the 
conspiracy to murder UMW reform candidate Jock Yablonski, who sought to replace John L. Lewis’ 
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hand-picked successor Tony Boyle, involved local districts in eastern Kentucky, and reports and 
editorials in The Mountain Eagle made a strong case against Boyle. Along with its calls for strip mine 
regulation, the newspaper became a strong advocate for mine safety legislation, and in-depth 
reporting and editorials on mine explosions in Clay County and Letcher County helped lead to 
federal legislation that eventually resulted in the creation of the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration. 
The dissertation closes with a short examination of the Mountain Eagle during the period 
between 1977 and the present. It includes awards and honors made to the paper and the Gishes, as 
well as a some of the positive effects the newspaper had on Letcher County and eastern Kentucky. 
Chapter One 
In his recollection of the early years he and his wife Pat owned The Mountain Eagle, 
Tom Gish said neither had thought that by taking over the small Letcher County newspaper in 
Tom’s hometown would lead them to years of conflict with county government officials and the 
coal industry. After serving as Bureau Chief of the United Press Frankfort Bureau, Tom Gish 
turned down the London UPI Desk to return to his hometown and purchase The Mountain Eagle 
from W. Pearl and Martha Nolan.1  Although the Gishes wished to blend in with the local fiber 
of the community, their insistence on honest reporting and open government soon put them at 
odds with the local power structure. At the first presentation of the Gish Award in 2007, 
sponsored by the Institute for Rural Journalism and Community Issues at the University of 
Kentucky, Rudy Abramson recalled that after the Gishes began to examine the Letcher County 
Board of Education, the school board chairman, who had been the attending physician at Tom 
Gish’s birth, withdrew his advertising from the paper and told school board employees not to buy 
The Mountain Eagle any longer or they would be fired. The Mountain Eagle became a powerful 
voice for honest government and for the common people of Letcher County and this stance 
guaranteed an adversarial relationship with the county courthouse elites who, along with other 
elected officials and coal operators, dominated the county economically and politically. Freedom 
of the press came at a high price in Letcher County. 
Letcher County in 1957 was typical of many mountain counties in Central Appalachia, 
isolated by poor roads and the terrain, and almost totally dependent on coal mining. Covering 
339 square miles, the county was full of twisting curvy roads, more than a few of which were 
1 Writer’s note: W.P. Nolan always identified himself with his initials but his middle name was Pearl. He and his 
wife Martha owned The Hazard Herald and The Mountain Eagle. 
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unpaved. It was rich in resources, yet many of the people lived in poverty and as the coal 
economy continued on in its cycle of boom and bust, Letcher County lost large chunks of 
population every Census. By the time University of Kentucky Sociologist Thomas Ford edited 
his 1962 study, The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey, Appalachia had come to be 
recognized as a definite problem area in the national economy, and Ford and others who 
participated in the study pointed to population loss as a major problem for the Appalachian 
region.2   George A. Hillary and James Brown presented statistical evidence that eastern 
Kentucky, southwest Virginia, and southern West Virginia were the biggest losers in regional 
population shifts, and Ford wrote that the most striking feature of his study had been the large 
number of people, particularly young people, leaving the region. The largest losses in Kentucky 
came in Harlan County, Letcher County, Perry County, and Bell County.3  In 1950, the 
population of Letcher County stood at 39,5224, and in 1960 it was 30,012.5 The loss of 9,510 in 
Letcher County represented a loss of 25 percent of the county’s total population in ten years. 
Letcher County was economically dependent on the coal industry, with several large 
mining companies in the county, along with many smaller ones.  Southeast Coal Corporation, the 
independent coal company where Tom Gish’s father worked, still employed just over 280 union 
workers at the two mines it operated in Letcher County in 1962, when Southeast began its 
2 Thomas Ford, The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey, (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, 
1962), 3. 
3 George A Hillary and James Brown, “The Great Migration, Thomas Ford, The Southern Appalachian Region: A 
Survey, 67. 
4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION  
ADVANCE REPORTS, April 11, 1951 Washington 25, D. c. Series PC-8 1 No. l6A, POPULATION OF 
KENTUCKY, BY COUNTIES APRIL 1, 1950, https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1950/pc-
08/pc-8-16.pdf. 
5 KENTUCKY, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: Population Division     
  US Bureau of the Census, https://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ky190090.txt.
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attempt to modify its contract with the United Mine Workers of America.6 Blue Diamond 
Mining operated several mines as well, including  Scotia Coal Company, the site of the terrible  
methane explosion that claimed the lives of 15 miners on March 9, 1976 and a second explosion 
that killed 11 more including three federal mine inspectors two days later.7  Blue Diamond had 
other mines including one in Leatherwood, just over the Perry County line.  The largest mining 
operation was Bethlehem Steel’s Beth-Elkhorn Division in Jenkins, which had been purchased 
from Consolidation Coal Company in 1956, and employed 1,400 people.8 The county seat of 
Whitesburg had no mining operations within the city limits but had a thriving middle class made 
up of bankers, lawyers, county government employees, elected officials, teachers, and other 
school board employees. Although Jenkins had a significantly larger population, 3,202 in 1960 
against 1,774 for Whitesburg, as county seat Whitesburg was the center of political power and 
housed the courthouse and the Letcher County Board of Education, which had tremendous 
purchasing power and was the largest non-coal employer in the county. 
There were three incorporated cities in Letcher County, Jenkins, Whitesburg, and Neon. 
All three had city councils and under the ownership of the Gishes, The Mountain Eagle covered 
events in all three cities, including city government meetings. The Gishes did their best to cover 
meetings of the Fiscal Court and the Letcher County Board of Education as well, although both 
groups sometimes tried to keep their meetings closed to reporters or to make it difficult and 
uncomfortable to cover them. In a 2000 interview for Kentucky Educational Television’s 
6, Tom N. Bethel, Conspiracy in Coal, Reprint of an Article originally published in Washington Monthly, re-
published by Appalachian Movement Press, Huntington, WV, 1970, 28. 
7 Dori Hjalmarson, “Scotia Mine Disaster Remembered,”  http://www.kentucky.com/2010/03/10/1174671/scotia-mine-disaster-
of-76-remembered.html.     
8David A. Zegeer biography, http://www.coaleducation.org/zegeer/bio.htm.  
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“Kentucky Life,” Tom Gish referred to a ten-year struggle to force the fiscal court and board of 
education to adhere to open meeting and record laws, saying “happily, we won that battle.”9 
Jenkins was something of an anomaly in Letcher County in that it was not only a union 
town, but a company town as well, and most of its needs were addressed by Beth-Elkhorn. 
Jenkins was the headquarters of Beth-Elkhorn Corporation, a division of Bethlehem Steel’s coal 
mining arm, and as such, it was not as dependent on the county government as the rest of the 
county. Jenkins had been built as a model town by Consolidation Coal in 1912, and after Consol 
signed a contract with the United Mine Workers, the miners living in Jenkins enjoyed union 
wages and benefits. Dave Zegeer, Beth-Elkhorn Division Superintendent, had served as assistant 
superintendent for Consolidation Coal Company before it was sold to Bethlehem Steel in 1956, 
and under his direction, Beth-Elkhorn followed a very similar relationship with Jenkins.  The 
“Company,” as Beth-Elkhorn was called, took care of most of Jenkins’ needs and Jenkins had an 
excellent independent school system under the direction of nationally recognized educator 
Charles Victor Snapp. Jenkins was located in the far eastern end of Letcher County and the 20-
mile drive to the county seat took nearly an hour, winding alongside three different “forks” of the 
Kentucky River. The combination of isolation, an independent school system, and the presence 
of Zegeer and Beth-Elkhorn kept Jenkins out of a good deal of the county’s political 
machinations. However, that is not to say that Jenkins was not politically connected. Jenkins City 
Police Judge and sometimes Letcher County Democratic Party Chairman Jesse Bates was a long- 
time operative in the Democratic Party as well as being the uncle of three-term County Judge 
Executive Robert Collins. 
9 Whitesburg Mountain Eagle, Producer, Charlee Heaton Pagoulatos, Kentucky Life, Kentucky Educational 
Television, 2000.  
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Neon was a bustling mining town during the 1950s as well, with a number of businesses, 
including the original store of the Dawahares department store chain. Workers from Beth- 
Elkhorn, Southeast, and a number of smaller mining companies lived in Neon, and its closest 
neighbor Fleming also housed mostly coal miners and their families. The two towns combined in 
1977 to form the City of Fleming Neon.10 
The county the Gishes chose for their new home was unlike anything they had expected, 
even though Tom had grown up in Seco. While Kentucky is one of the northernmost states in the 
upper south, Letcher County had a good deal in common with the post-Reconstruction deep 
south, and like the Cotton Belt counties, Letcher County, and most of hard core Central 
Appalachia, were totally dependent on a single "crop" economy. In the deep south, it was cotton, 
but in eastern Kentucky, southwest Virginia, and most of West Virginia, the "single crop" was 
coal. The economic life of the region was totally dependent on the cyclical nature of coal mining, 
and like the old south, most of the investment dollars went into coal. Like cotton in Mississippi, 
coal was as close to a sure thing in eastern Kentucky as a man with money to invest could find. 
It didn’t take a lot of capital to start a small underground mine, if mining rights were available, 
but developing other industry was less certain. The amount of capital it would take to develop an 
industry unrelated to coal mining would vary according to the industry, and the regional 
infrastructure was already in place for mining. So, like cotton in the south, coal enriched a few in 
Central Appalachia, but it kept many more living in poverty, subject to the boom and bust nature 
of the industry.  The miners lived and died in much the same way as the poor whites and African 
American share-croppers of the post-war south. Debt peonage put the same yoke on them, 
whether it was the plantation store, or the company store, or the coal company that owned their 
10 Fleming Neon City Charter, located in Fleming Neon City Hall, Fleming Neon, Kentucky. 
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poor-quality housing. When Tennessee Ernie Ford sang, "I owe my soul to the company store," it 
was a lot more than a country song to most Appalachian coal miners. 
The nature of the coal economy, with a few big companies and a few more big men, 
contributed to economic dependence on one set of employers, another similarity with the post-
war south. The coal operators ran the county, either directly or through elected officials who 
were beholden to them, and they brooked no dissention. Alliances came through economic 
bonds, and when favors were called in, the county officials knew where their fealty lay. Most of 
Central Appalachia was on the wrong side of capitalism, and sent its extremely valuable raw 
material out on the coal trains that carried the wealth out, while the region was dependent on the 
northeast and Midwest for manufactured goods, processed foods, and capital. The coal 
companies' need for a docile and relatively dependent work force made it advantageous to keep 
competition for labor low and most of the industrial operations that existed in Central Appalachia 
were those that co-existed easily with the coal industry and served it in some manner. 
 The company-built model towns like Jenkins in Letcher County and Benham and Lynch 
in Harlan County, were built close to the thick coal seams and the residents enjoyed advantages 
their neighbors in the rural parts of the county had little or no experience with. Municipal utilities 
such as electricity, along with city water and sewer treatment systems, comfortable company 
owned housing, independent schools, and theaters and recreation centers kept the miners and 
their families comfortable and happy. Company-owned or company-sponsored businesses like 
bakeries and dairies provided bread and milk, and company stores or commissaries brought in 
the latest fashions and conveniences for the miners' wives and children. This largess developed 
strong loyalties to the company and created a relatively happy work force.  However, it came at a 
cost. When everything served the interests of the coal company, it had the effect of retarding the 
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normal development of a small business economy in the company towns, and it created strong 
feelings of dependence on the company. The railroads provided a way to move the coal out and 
the workers in. Stone quarries, brickyards, and lumber mills met construction needs and provided 
mine timbers. Rebuild shops for mining machinery and service industries such as dairies and 
water works all combined to serve the mining communities. Even in the model towns, the 
corporate socioeconomic model was implemented so that every business either put money 
directly into the company's pocket or served its interests.  From bakeries to bus lines, coal was 
the business of eastern Kentucky, and trouble makers and slackers paid a high price if they found 
themselves outside the protective umbrella of the company for various reasons, sometimes 
including organizing or supporting labor unions. 
Prior to the arrival of the Gishes, The Mountain Eagle had not been a troublesome 
newspaper to the county elites or to the coal companies. According to Tom and Pat Gish: 
The Mountain Eagle in 1957 was like many other community newspapers in that it was 
owned by publishers who first and foremost made their living as printers and not as 
reporters. They made their living printing letterheads and business forms. The newspaper 
was put together after all the orders for printing had been taken care of. Little or no 
reporting was done. Instead there were long columns of weekly meeting reports from the 
Rotary Club, the Lions Club, the Garden Club, 4H, and other clubs, and endless 
obituaries, often half a newspaper page long, in which every sermon was reprinted.  
News consisted mostly of columns of items from local community correspondents, 
mailed in from volunteer writers at Jenkins, Mayking, UZ, Ice, Hot Spot, Kingdom 
Come, and a dozen other places around the county.11 
In a valedictory editorial in the January 10, 1957 edition, W. Pearl Nolan wrote that he 
and his wife Martha had started in Letcher County publishing the Neon News, which was 
absorbed into The Mountain Eagle when he purchased the paper in 1938. Mr. Nolan referred to 
himself and his wife in the article as printers and publishers more frequently than as newspaper 
people but he also expressed great pride in the newspaper. He did not mention any adversarial 
11 “We Still Scream: The Perils and Pleasures of Running a Small-Town Newspaper,” ed. William Serrin, The 
Business of Journalism: 10 Leading Reporters and Editors on the Perils and Pitfalls of the Press, (The New Press, 
New York, 2000), 9. 
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relationships within Letcher County and said he and his wife had been happy to be considered 
part of the overall community. He wrote that although the paper had struggled before he took 
over, it had expanded during his tenure as owner and had gone from a four-sheet paper published 
irregularly to one that was published weekly with as many as sixteen sheets and a few over 
twenty.  “We have done our best to publish clean, wholesome, constructive issues, always trying 
to build for a greater citizenship and a progressive county…. We have been happy in the thought 
that we were part of the community performing a public service and doing something worthwhile 
for our people here in the mountains.”12 
The Mountain Eagle’s first month under the ownership of Tom and Pat Gish did not lack 
for news. Eastern Kentucky and Letcher County were hit by devastating floods not long after the 
New Year, and flood coverage and pictures of the high water and the destruction it wrought 
dominated the paper for the first few weeks of 1957. These floods or “tides” were common 
features of life in the steep mountain counties of eastern Kentucky, but while the flooding itself 
was commonplace, the damage that was done to the lives of the residents, businesses, and towns 
in the mountains in 1957 was remarkable. 
Flood waters reached a depth of thirty-nine feet in nearby Hazard, Kentucky, nineteen 
feet above flood stage. Many of the city’s businesses were under water for days, a number of 
homes near the river were flooded, and over fifty houses were swept away. An explosion at the 
city’s power plant shut the city’s electricity off for several days and the UMWA Hospital was 
without electricity or fresh water.13 According to a report prepared by the United States 
Geological Survey, twelve and a half inches of rain fell between January 27 and February 1 in 
12 W. Pearl Nolan, Editorial, The Mountain Eagle, January 10, 1957, 2. 
13“ Devastating Flood Hits Hazard,” January 29, 1957, A Year in Our Lives, 1957  Time Capsule, 
http://1957timecapsule.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/january-29-1957-devastating-flood-hits-hazard/. 
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the headwaters area of the North Fork (running through Whitesburg), the Middle Fork, and the 
South Fork of the Kentucky River. Letcher County is home to the headwaters of the Kentucky 
River, the Cumberland River, and Big Sandy River, and flooding was at its peak near Hindman 
in neighboring Knott County. Although the rains inundated most of Appalachia, the heaviest 
flooding of the 1957 Flood was in Kentucky, and roads, houses and towns running along the 
rivers and situated in the flood plain flooded so rapidly many of the residents were never warned 
because the rapid rise of the water so disrupted communications. In some cities and towns water 
supplies were contaminated and food shortages developed as well. The death toll for Kentucky 
was nine and the Red Cross reported that 597 homes were destroyed and 2,932 suffered major 
damage. Roads were washed out and thirty state and federal highways were blocked by rock and 
mudslides. Ninety percent of the coal mines in Pike, Floyd, Letcher, and Perry Counties were 
forced to close by the flooding and 900 mines in the twelve counties, employing 28,000 people, 
either shut down or curtailed operations.  Schools were closed either due to damage or high 
water and the $373,000 vocational school at Hazard in Perry County was a total loss. While 
Hazard was hardest hit, “damage was particularly notable,” in Whitesburg, Fleming Neon, and 
Blackey, and forty bridges were washed out in Letcher County. Areas adjacent to the many 
tributary streams in Letcher County were also flooded with heavy damage along Leatherwood 
Creek, Line Fork, Rockhouse Creek, Troublesome Creek, and Carr Fork.14 
The mountains had witnessed winter and spring “tides” before but rarely with the 
destruction and loss of life of the 1957 floods. Strip mining and logging had ravaged much of the 
countryside in the most severely devastated counties, and there was little vegetation on the 
14 “Floods of January – February 1957 in Southeastern Kentucky and Adjacent Areas” Geological Survey Water-
Supply paper 1652-A, Prepared in Cooperation with the states of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee 
with the United States Government, United States Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1964, online 
access at http://pubs.usgs.gov/wsp/1652a/report.pdf. 
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hillsides to absorb the heavy rains.15  By the 1870s, selling timber had become an important 
source of revenue in the mountains of southeastern Kentucky but had been limited by the 
necessity of moving the logs in the spring tides. That changed when speculators in northern 
commercial centers became aware of the massive stands of yellow poplar and hardwoods around 
the same time geologists had begun to report rich seams of bituminous coal in the region. By the 
advent of World War I, railroad construction had begun in earnest and agents of speculators 
began to search the region for the best stands of timber as well as the richest coal seams. New 
companies were organized to extract the timber, and existing companies began to look at the 
railroads as an easier means of getting the timber out of the mountains. The poplars, some as tall 
as one hundred and seventy-five feet and eight feet in diameter, were great prizes to the timber 
men, and tens of thousands of acres were clear-cut. In 1937, a poplar measuring eleven feet in 
diameter was felled in Leatherwood.16 Strip mining came to the region after World war II, 
bringing heavy equipment and "augers," large corkscrew machines that drilled into the exposed 
side of mountains to extract coal.  The augers, which ranged in size from 24 inches to six feet, 
required a flat "bench" to sit on. The bench also provided a haul road for the coal trucks that 
carried the coal to "tipples" to be loaded on to trains. Bulldozers removed top soil and the rock 
was blasted so it could be removed in order to create the bench. Coal seams were also uncovered 
on the benches by the bulldozers, and the coal would be loaded directly into trucks with front 
end-loaders. The strip mine companies usually pushed the rock and dirt, which they referred to 
as overburden, over the hillside. The long benches that ringed the sides of the mountains were as 
flat as table tops with no trees or grass to control rainwater, so the topsoil was lost and the 
                                                 
15 Ron Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945, (The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, Kentucky, 
2008), 40. 
16 Harry Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography of a Depressed Area, (Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1963), 65. 
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overburden was carried into valleys during the rains, often reducing the depth of the streams by 
several feet. The U.S. Forest Service Survey conducted after the flooding blamed poor logging 
practices and strip mining for the excess sedimentation and the erosion that had exacerbated the 
flooding.17 
The response by federal and state relief agencies as well as the Red Cross were subjects 
for articles and editorials, as was the flooding itself, and The Mountain Eagle immediately 
reported on programs and plans laid out by Kentucky’s U.S. Senator John Sherman Cooper and 
Governor A.B. “Happy” Chandler. Cooper attended a meeting of the Whitesburg City Council 
on Monday, February 4, and Chandler met with Letcher County Judge Executive James Caudill 
that week as well. Chandler estimated Kentucky had suffered damages in the one billion dollar 
range and promised to send highway engineers to Letcher County to supervise bridge 
construction, road clearing, and re-construction work. Cooper released a three step Civil Defense 
Administration program which promised to lend the equipment and supplies necessary to rebuild 
to state and local governments and to distribute food, medical supplies, and other necessary aid 
thorough the American Red Cross. Step three involved lending and donating equipment and 
supplies.18 
The February 14 edition of The Mountain Eagle also carried flood-related stories, 
including headlines such as “Whitesburg Water Termed Safe: Shots still needed” and “Red Cross 
Seeks Children’s Clothing: Workers to be in County Several Weeks.” In an insert titled “Letcher 
Damage,” details of the flooding included 125 homes damaged in Letcher County with ten being 
destroyed. Fifteen to twenty cases of extreme hardship were reported by the Red Cross. The City 
                                                 
17 Ron Eller, Uneven Ground, 40.  
18 “Senator, Governor Visit County and Promise Disaster Recovery Aid,” The Mountain Eagle, February 7, 1957, 1. 
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of Blackey was listed as hardest hit.19  The editorial page praised the Red Cross and said the 
organization should never have any trouble collecting donations in the county again. Gish 
detailed the efforts of Red Cross workers from across the country and their efforts in restoring 
communications in the county.  
For some time, Red Cross communications were the only connection between Letcher 
County and other parts of the state. Red Cross even used its facilities to carry messages 
between the Bank of Neon and its correspondent banks so checks could be cashed at 
Neon. That’s only a brief picture of the work of the Red Cross as it applied to Letcher 
County. It was multiplied many times for our harder hit friends and neighbors in Hazard, 
Pikeville, Barbourville, and other places. It’s one thing to give to a fund drive when 
you’ve never seen where the money goes. It’s quite another when you’ve seen how the 
money can be spent to help you or your friends or your family.20 
Flooding had been common in the steep mountain valleys of Central Appalachia well 
before strip mining came along, and the federal and state responses had been adequate by the 
standards of the day. But America in 1957 was flush with the successes of World War II and the 
social programs of the New Deal. The 1956 National Interstate and Defense Highways Act had 
shown that the Eisenhower Administration was willing to spend money on infrastructure, and the 
repetitive cycle of flooding showed that mountain towns would never be secure as long as they 
sat in the flood plain. Most of commercial centers in eastern Kentucky, including Whitesburg, 
Hazard, Harlan, and Pikeville, had all been hit hard and property losses were high. Kentucky also 
had long-serving and powerful representatives in Congress, so the possibility of federal aid to 
address flooding was likely if not inevitable. It came in ways that were standard and those that 
were not anticipated. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had eyed the region for hydroelectric dams well 
before the floods, and the idea of flood control lakes that could generate electricity as well 
                                                 
19 “Letcher Damage,” The Mountain Eagle, February 14, 1957, 1. 
20 “The Red Cross,” The Mountain Eagle, February 14, 1957, 2. 
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surfaced not long after the waters went down. Various plans for flood control dams were floated 
around eastern Kentucky for years afterward calling for everything from electricity generation 
and tourism development to supplying drinking water to the growing cities of Central Kentucky. 
Tom Gish saw the need for flood control as well as anyone, but he also understood the effects of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority on the area, including the changes wrought in the coal fields as 
TVA turned toward coal-generated electricity, and the subject of flood control dams was one that 
appeared frequently in The Mountain Eagle for many years. The complexities placing the overall 
public good against individual property rights was fodder for a number of editorials.  
All the flood reporting took place as the Gish family was setting up housekeeping in 
Whitesburg. Tom Gish later said he had actually believed that he was buying The Hazard 
Herald, which the Nolans also owned, and had intended to move his family to Hazard.  
However, Nolan decided to keep the Hazard paper, which was later totally destroyed by the 
spring floods. When the Gishes took over The Mountain Eagle, it was a hectic period for the 
family. Pat Gish stayed in Frankfort with the children and Tom lived with his parents until he 
could find a house for his family. Much of the early part of 1957 was devoted to getting settled, 
and Pat continued to work at The Lexington Leader until they got everything set up. By the time 
the family finally moved to Whitesburg, the changes to The Mountain Eagle had created a good 
deal of interest in Letcher County and the business community of Whitesburg.21 
In an introductory address to the Whitesburg Rotary Club Tom Gish promised the 
Rotarians that he would address local government and identified the lack of attention to civic 
matters as the paper’s greatest weakness. “We have set ourselves a very high goal down at The 
                                                 
21 Tom and Pat Gish, August 1995 Interviewed by Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kenney, at the office of The 
Mountain Eagle, Tape 1, Interviews Deposited at Appalshop in Whitesburg, Kentucky. 
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Eagle," Gish said. "We want to make it into a newspaper.” He went on to say he wanted to build 
the paper into one that would serve Whitesburg and Letcher County as well as The Courier 
Journal served Louisville and the Herald Tribune and New York Times served New York. 
Gish told his audience that he had been approached by people who wanted more out of 
the paper as well as by people who liked it just the way it was, and for those reasons, most of the 
changes he intended for the paper would be in adding to it rather than changing or deleting 
features, to make it a complete paper. “By a complete paper we have in mind one that will 
entertain you, inform you about everything that goes on in the county that can be printed in a 
family paper…and somewhere along the line, stimulate the county and its officials into taking 
action where action is needed. I am convinced that you cannot have a great community without a 
great newspaper.” Gish said that the cities and counties in Kentucky that had made the most 
progress were those that had good newspapers to “gently prod them along.” 
Gish added that his most important goal was to draw attention to civic issues. He told his 
audience that the weakest point he had found in The Mountain Eagle was common to many 
weeklies: the coverage of public affairs, “such things as the doings of the mayor and city council, 
the various county officials and the courts.”  He added that it was in the area of local and county 
government that the additions would be seen, covering Whitesburg and the county government 
first and then expanding to Jenkins and Neon. “As we do more detailed reporting we 
undoubtedly are going to start stepping on toes. We will be a very poor newspaper unless we 
do.” 
He closed by saying he had no axes to grind and had no vendettas but was pro-Letcher 
County and would support whatever was in the common interest. “We have many problems in 
15 
the county. I think the best thing we can do is face them realistically and try to do something 
about them, and not just shut our eyes and hope they go away.”22 
Pat Gish was a full partner in The Mountain Eagle, and like other married women of her 
time who worked outside the home, in addition to reporting, copy editing, typesetting and all the 
other tasks it took to put out a newspaper in the days before computers, she was also responsible 
for household duties and raising the children. The Gish children grew up in the offices of the 
newspaper and stayed late with their parents on the night of press runs. When economic 
circumstances eventually made it difficult for them to make ends meet, Pat took a job at a War 
on Poverty agency that eventually led to her becoming the director of an agency that built 
hundreds of homes for low income Appalachians. This carried over until the Reagan 
Administration, when funding was terminated and she returned full time to the newspaper, but 
she was usually present in the office after her “day job” at HOMES was over anyway, reading 
copy and doing whatever she was needed for. 
The Gishes hadn’t come to Whitesburg to stir things up, but they had come to practice 
their craft, and practicing their craft would mean stepping on a few toes and airing some things 
that been kept quiet in the past. Their insistence on doing their job the way they saw fit put them 
in harm’s way economically and sometimes physically, and unlike the newspaper's previous 
owners, they were never embraced by the power brokers in Whitesburg. They would eventually 
be called radicals and communists, and they endured boycotts, threats, and attempts to either 
keep them out of fiscal court and school board meetings or attempts to make it as uncomfortable 
and inconvenient as possible for them to do their jobs. When Pat Gish was pregnant with her son 
Ben, the current editor of The Mountain Eagle, she was forced to stand while covering school 
22 "Tom Gish address to the Whitesburg Rotary Club," reprinted in The Mountain Eagle, August 8, 1957, 2. 
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board meetings. She was told that there was only one chair aside from the board members’ chairs 
and that was for whichever guest was in the session at the particular time.23  
With what we now recognize as either stupidity or ignorance, we set about doing what 
we knew how to do. We started reporting on public affairs in the county. As reporters, we 
attended meetings of two school boards, three city councils, and the county governing 
body, known as the fiscal court. We wrote and printed detailed stories of what happened 
at those meetings. There were quotes of what public officials said, accounts of how they 
voted, and explanations of what was being considered – the kind of reporting 
commonplace in newspapers everywhere.24 
The Mountain Eagle’s approach to journalism was definitely not the approach the county 
elites were used to, and the paper paid a high price for it. The relationship between the paper and 
the school board went sour early on when editorials about low teachers’ salaries and articles 
about the decrepit and filthy schools in the outlying areas of the county began to appear, 
complete with pictures. This set up a running confrontation between Tom Gish and Dr. Benjamin 
(B.F.) Wright, one of the leading Democrats in the county and a member and later chairman of 
the Letcher County Board of Education. As the doctor who had presided at Tom Gish’s birth, 
Wright was a powerful man, and not used to opposition. He was not only a major political figure 
in the county, he was an economic force as well and operated his own clinic in Neon. 
 B.F. “Doc” Wright was elected chairman of the Letcher County School Board in 1959, 
but he had been a powerful figure in county politics for years. Although Wright had an 
unsuccessfully run for county judge in 1949, he was considered one of the leading figures in 
Democratic politics in the region.  He was a member of a powerful political family and served as 
a board member with the UMWA Hospital in Whitesburg, which was dedicated in 1956. And 
Wright and "his people" held their offices once they got them. His nephew, Charlie Wright, 
23 William Farley, “Award Formally Given to Eagle Publishers,” The Mountain Eagle, March 2, 2005, 12. 
24 “We Still Scream: The Perils and Pleasures of Running a Small-Town Newspaper,” ed. William Serrin, The 
Business of Journalism: 10 Leading Reporters and Editors on the Perils and Pitfalls of the Press, (The New Press, 
New York, 2000), 9. 
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served as County Court Clerk from 1954 through 1998, and his brother, S.T. was the director of 
the probation and parole office. “Doc” Wright initiated his first of several boycotts by the school 
board when he issued a statement telling teachers and staff in the county school system they 
would be fired if they were found to have purchased a copy of the newspaper, and withdrew 
advertising from the hospital and from several local businesses he controlled. However, 
according to Ben Gish, the current editor of The Eagle, Tom Gish always said the boycotts never 
hurt the paper. “Dad always said that anytime somebody tried to boycott us, or to force other 
people to stop buying the paper, our sales would go up by a thousand a week.”25 
The Mountain Eagle’s reporting opened eyes and shone a light not only on the county’s 
problems, but on the lack of impetus on the part of county officials to solve them. If it was a 
breath of fresh air to Letcher County residents who had long been in the dark about the workings 
of their county government, it was not so well received by the officials who had done so little to 
alleviate the situations being revealed in the newspaper, and a number of elected officials found 
great fault with the paper’s habit of covering meetings, reports, and news stories just as they had 
taken place. The first confrontation with the Letcher County Fiscal Court came in the form of an 
attempt to force Gish to take back supplies that had been purchased from The Mountain Eagle 
during the administration of former Judge James M. Caudill, because the paper had aroused the 
court’s ire by reporting on a feud between Sheriff Robert Collins and the fiscal court. Collins 
served three terms as county judge executive in addition to his term as sheriff and one in the state 
legislature. Neither the court nor Collins were friends to The Mountain Eagle and when the paper 
reported on accusations made by court members against Collins, the court refused to continue 
purchasing paper and other supplies from The Mountain Eagle and attempted to force Gish to 
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take back supplies which had been purchased by James M. Caudill, whose term had ended in 
1957. The report of the conflict appeared on the front page, much to the agitation of the 
magistrates.26  
 The issue that angered court members was the newspaper's coverage of their refusal to 
pay a $4,000 claim Collins had submitted for money he said he was owed.  County Attorney 
Gordon R. Lewis said Collins had failed to show he was entitled to all the money he claimed. 
The claims were presented over a period of two years in differing amounts, but Lewis 
recommended not paying any of the claims because he said not all of them were valid.27 The 
paper had reported on the court’s claim that the county’s audit proved that Collins had not 
presented the necessary receipts to validate his claim.28 Very little else transpired in the case for 
several months until, like so many issues involving elected officials in eastern Kentucky, it “went 
to court,” and Collins sued the fiscal court for his legal fees. The August 15, 1957 issue reported 
that Judge Ray Shehan had been named special judge in the matter when Letcher County Circuit 
Judge Courtney Wells declined to participate in the case. The issue was settled later in the year, 
and in October The Eagle reported that the county would have to pay Sheriff Collins $2,500 in 
back fees, but Judge Shehan had ruled that an additional $1,639 in Collins’ claims were not 
valid.29  
Early in 1958, Collins told the court the paper should be “required to repossess an excess 
of supplies bought by former County Judge James M. Caudill and that The Mountain Eagle 
should be required to refund the money ($1,500) from those supplies.” The court formed a 
committee of two magistrates, along with Letcher County Attorney F. Byrd Hogg, to look into 
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the matter.30 The article in The Mountain Eagle describing the incident stated that “The court’s 
action followed a Mountain Eagle editorial attacking the court’s January decision to hold its 
meetings partly in private.” The court’s move to hold meetings in private had come not long after 
The Eagle reported in December 1957 that the magistrates had voted to increase their salaries 
from $15.00 per month to $150.00 per month.31 
Gish responded by inviting the court to inspect his records and by saying he had only 
furnished those supplies requisitioned by the court. He also pointed out that County Judge Arthur 
M. Dixon had recently paid The Superior Printing Company of Cromona, Kentucky, which 
published The Community Press, $21.25 for 1,000 letterheads and $24.95 for 1,000 printed 
envelopes, which was substantially higher than The Mountain Eagle’s price of $7.61 for printed 
envelopes and $11.50 per 1,000 for bond paper. The March 6 edition reported that The Mountain 
Eagle had been exonerated of charges of selling an excess amount of supplies to the fiscal 
court.32 
The ill feelings from these beginnings led to a long-running confrontation between The 
Mountain Eagle and the Letcher County Fiscal Court, one that lasted almost 40 years and led to 
several attempts to have The Mountain Eagle decertified as the county’s newspaper with the 
greatest circulation. In December, an article detailing a dispute between outgoing County Judge 
Executive James M. Caudill and the magistrates over a salary increase they had voted in further 
fueled tension between the court and the newspaper. The raise was the result of a 1957 ruling 
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals that magistrates could no longer try traffic and minor 
30 Hogg later gained notoriety in Barbara Kopple’s film “Harlan County USA,” about the 1973 Brookside Mine 
Strike in Harlan County. 
31 “Fiscal Court to Investigate Supply Buys from Eagle,” The Mountain Eagle, February 13, 1958, 1. 
32 “No Surplus of Supplies Bought From Eagle, Fiscal Court Committee Says,” The Mountain Eagle, March 6, 
1958, 1. 
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criminal cases in their role as Justice of the Peace. The magistrates felt this denied them their 
chief means of earning a living although they could still act try minor civil cases, for which they 
received $4.50 each. At the court’s December meeting, the magistrates voted to increase their 
salaries from $15.00 per month to $150.00 per month, which Judge Caudill said would cost the 
county an additional $14,400 a year.33 This was exactly the type of story that would probably 
have never seen the light of day in the pre-Gish Mountain Eagle, and it created a good deal of 
public interest. Although the magistrates eventually backed down on the matter of the raise, they 
were infuriated that the newspaper had revealed their action to the public. At the next meeting of 
the fiscal court, the magistrates voted to hold their sessions partly in private, by adopting all the 
rules of procedure from the previous court, including one calling for private sessions to transact 
parts of the county’s business. After each individual who wanted to bring something before the 
court had his or her say, County Court Clerk Charlie Wright would ask, “all the public to leave after 
everyone who wanted to bring something before the court had been heard.” Most spectators left, 
with the exception of Sheriff Robert Collins and “a Mountain Eagle reporter,” both of whom 
remained in the courtroom for the entire session. The motion to adopt all the previous court’s 
rules was approved unanimously even though Magistrate Cleamond Scott said he had nothing to 
hide and did not believe the court could legally have a private session. The article, “Squires Vote 
To Hold Sessions Partly in Private,” concluded by saying that the Kentucky Constitution called 
for all voting by elected officials to be conducted by voice vote, and that “the State Court of 
Appeals has interpreted the voice vote provision to mean that votes must be taken in the public 
session in order for the action of the voting body to be legal.”34 
33 “Magistrates Vote Themselves Pay Raise; Judge Says Illegal,” The Mountain Eagle, December 12, 1957, 1. 
34 “Squires Vote To Hold Sessions Partly in Private,” The Mountain Eagle, January 16, 1958, 4. 
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Gish responded to the privacy vote with a pointed editorial in the same issue, writing: 
“We are sorry that the Letcher Fiscal Court decided this week that the business of Letcher 
County is private and of no concern to you…..Members of the court appear to have forgotten just 
exactly who and what they are. We should like to remind them.” He went on to remind the 
“squires” that they were elected officials and served at the pleasure of the public, a public which 
had the right to expect their business to be conducted honestly and openly. Gish wrote that he 
understood the court was just following the example of previous courts, but added that being 
customary doesn’t equal being right. “Members of the court indicated by their action that they 
have forgotten that a free and open discussion of public issues – and anything affecting our 
county government is a public issue – is basic to our way of life. It is the stuff that democracy is 
made of.”35  
Gish stated that each and every citizen had the right to participate in his government and 
to witness its operation, and asked the court members if they wanted to bring four years of doubt 
and mistrust on themselves by holding secret sessions. He finished by describing other instances 
of censorship in the United States and abroad. This public criticism of the fiscal court set a 
precedent that The Mountain Eagle would stand firm for the rights of the people and the 
principles of the United States Constitution.  
In February 1958, after Gish filed a complaint with the Attorney General’s Office, The 
Mountain Eagle reported that Attorney General Jo. M. Ferguson had ruled the previous week in 
favor of Tom Gish in the dispute over public meetings, and that the fiscal court must conduct its 
meetings in public. The Attorney General also ruled that all actions taken in the private portions 
35 "Your Right to Know, The Mountain Eagle, January 16, 1958, 2. 
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of the meetings were invalid.36 The next week’s paper led with the headline, “Dixon Will Ask 
Fiscal Court to Revoke Rule Making Its Meetings Closed to Public.”37 
Several different fiscal courts attempted to deny The Mountain Eagle’s status as the 
newspaper with the greatest circulation over the years.  If they could make this stick, it would 
mean all government notices, ordinances, and other public documents, including city, county, 
and school board budgets, which by law had to be published before they became official would 
no longer appear in The Mountain Eagle and would result in a significant loss in revenue. The 
county's other newspaper, The Community Press in Cromona, had less than one quarter of The 
Eagle’s circulation, which Tom Gish estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000 in 1958.38  
(Circulation varied because in addition to mail subscribers, the newspaper derived a good deal of 
its sales from newspaper stands and from racks placed at local businesses.) This was the first of 
several attempts by the Fiscal Court to supplant The Mountain Eagle as the county's newspaper 
of record. 
As relations continued to deteriorate, some court members began to openly question the 
integrity of The Mountain Eagle's reporting, and at the May 1958 Fiscal Court meeting, several 
of the magistrates accused Pat Gish of lying in her coverage of court proceedings. Magistrate 
J.C. Day said that less than half of what was in the paper was true and accused her of reporting 
on things before they had been addressed by the court. Day did not say what he meant, but Pat 
Gish wrote that he was apparently referring to reports that the county might have to cut services 
in order to pay the raise the magistrates had recently given themselves. Another magistrate who 
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was not identified, said "that Mountain Eagle woman has been making false reports," and 
another said that if it was not for the court, the paper would have nothing to write about.39  
The same tactic was adopted by the Board of Education later that year, when Letcher 
County Schools Superintendent William B. Hall accused Tom Gish of being a “liar by the 
clock,” and said “75 percent of what you’ve had in the last two issues of the Eagle is a lie.”  
When the accusation was made at the September 1958 school board meeting, Gish told Hall he 
would let the people of the county judge the accuracy of what had been written and added that 
Hall did not specify which 75 percent of what the paper had to say was lies. Neither man defined 
what “lying by the clock” meant.”40  
Like the school board, the fiscal court didn't like to see its affairs made public. For years, 
the judges and magistrates had cultivated their power and had made themselves into a powerful 
agency with the ability to reward their friends and punish their enemies, and the ordinary citizens 
of eastern Kentucky were expected to show a good deal of deference to fiscal court officers. This 
was illustrated by the custom of referring to county officials as squires, an antiquated term for 
young men of noble birth apprenticing to be knights, harkening back to feudal England. The 
Mountain Eagle also used the term in several instances when reporting on the fiscal court. A 
number of Kentucky governors had seen the power of the fiscal courts and county officials, often 
to their chagrin, and federal and state officials in programs from the New Deal through the War 
on Poverty ran into the political power of the fiscal courts. Long-serving state and federal 
legislators who cheerfully voted to send federal money to create infrastructure or make-work 
jobs to their states’ poorest regions also saw opportunities to pay back political debts by insisting 
that program funding and the distribution of jobs be either run directly through the courts or set 
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up so the squires and judges played integral roles in the various programs and sat on the boards 
that administered them. The county judge sat as probate judge per se, acted as judge of the 
juvenile court, and tried all civil and penal matters that fell under the jurisdiction of the county 
court. He was also a board member for all county agencies and sat on the board of the local and 
regional Area Development Districts established by the Appalachian Regional Commission. The 
judge executive also exercised executive and legislative powers within his county.41  
Each county was ruled by a czar into whose hands power had been devolving for a 
 quarter of a century and who called the governor, the congressmen, and the United States 
 Senators his friends.  These czars and their retainers had grown rich and comfortable with 
 things as they were and desired above all things to preserve the status quo…. The general 
 run of the people …were in the main, satisfied with their political overlords and thought 
 of them as their friends, and sometimes, as their close and powerful kin as well.42 
The courthouse elites controlled machine politics, regardless of party, in most 
Appalachian counties, and were closely allied with the coal companies to protect their interests 
and to prevent them from being taxed or regulated too heavily on the county level. The eastern 
Kentucky machines were described by gubernatorial candidate Louie Nunn in 1963 in the 
following manner: “The political system (in eastern Kentucky) is probably comparable to a 
fiefdom…it’s like a consortium of various chiefs and clans, they join together for their own 
benefit. This is reflected in the elected leadership that stays on and on.”43   
With the exception of judicial offices, state officials had little power over county 
governments in eastern Kentucky. Power was centered in the county courthouse and the ability 
of any given official to deliver votes determined his or her place in the pecking order. Most 
salaries, especially those in the sheriff's office, were paid by fees and state officials lacked the 
means to remove "fee grabbers" from office or to punish them for wrongdoing. Magistrates, or 
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"squires," held court in their own districts for misdemeanors and traffic offenses and received a 
fee from whatever fine was levied. The County Judge Executive sat at the center of power in the 
county as chief executive, and in addition to presiding over the Fiscal Court, he also directed the 
spending of county funds and had the ability to hire and fire county employees, although well 
connected squires could generally get their candidate hired as well. The judge was inundated 
with favor seekers all day long and his secretary would go to great lengths not to offend voters. 
By the 1950s, many eastern Kentucky citizens had come to look not so much to the national 
government for help, but to the county judge, from whom all favors flowed in the county. Many 
of the favors were determined by how a person voted and how many votes they could deliver, 
and county jobs were apportioned accordingly. The spoils system was fully in effect in county 
governments in eastern Kentucky, and with the exception of elective offices, the court was all 
powerful in apportioning county jobs. As the federal programs came in, judges and magistrates 
were able to expand their patronage to federal make-work and training programs.44 
The county business and courthouse elites also influenced the hiring and appointment of 
functionaries, such as attorneys, who were dependent on county judicial officials for their 
courtroom success, or for appointments as Master Commissioners and other lucrative judicial 
appointments. County businessmen did business with county agencies and the school board, and 
at meetings of both the fiscal court and boards of education when bids were opened, the stakes 
were no less important than in larger counties where bidding procedures were followed 
according to state statutes. Bids for coal to heat schools and county buildings, milk for school 
lunches, fuel, gravel, asphalt, and other road supplies, and a score of other supplies could mean a 
profitable year for county businesses, and political favor and expanded patronage were part of 
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the process. Those business elites who regularly did well from the largess of county officials had 
little interest in changing the status quo or shaking things up, and the others looked for ways to 
get themselves on the gravy train. 
A 1973 report on elites in Appalachia, conducted by H. Dudley Plunkett and Mary Jean 
Bowman surveyed the attitudes of the “Appalachian Elite,” including changes resulting from the 
War on Poverty. The study measured the attitudes of doctors, bankers, elected officials, teachers, 
and clergy and sought their opinions on a wide range of topics. It found that resistance to change 
took various forms, including economic, attitudinal, and cultural.45   
The elites opposed the involvement of the poor and the young in affairs they had come to 
regard as their own particular reserve, such as government and community affairs, and they had a 
low opinion of their competence. They also believed representation by the poor on local 
economic development boards would retard economic progress. Not surprisingly, the elites 
strongly defended local institutions against outside intrusions and expressed a pervasive 
resentment of national institutions and outsiders who came to look, advise, or help. Three-
quarters of the respondents agreed that “One of the biggest problems in trying to plan and 
coordinate local development efforts is that the Feds don’t understand the situation here.”  They 
viewed change primarily as growth in yield from natural resources and from the development of 
physical infrastructures. There was limited support for programs that concentrated on the 
development of human beings.46 
Tom Gish learned early that taking on the local elites would bring quick retaliation, and 
the lack of sympathy for the poor and downtrodden in Letcher County, as well as the willingness 
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to punish the paper for pointing out uncomfortable facts extended to many in the medical 
community. When the Gishes came to Letcher County, there was a groundswell among local 
physicians against the United Mine Workers Hospital because the excellent medical care the 
UMW hospitals provided for union workers and their families smacked of “socialized medicine” 
in the minds of the local doctors who were not affiliated with the union hospital, even though no 
one but union members and their families received the free medical care. Tom Gish’s willingness 
to travel to Frankfort with a group of United Mine Workers and speak in behalf of the hospital 
set off one of many boycotts and incidences of advertising pulled from the paper. 
That kind of thing just goes on and on. It also happened with the UMWA Hospital. 
 Local doctors were upset about the hospital, and said it could move in on our physicians. 
 The largest automobile agency in the county was owned by a guy, a local doctor, who 
 was a supporter of private physicians and opposed “socialized medicine,” which is what 
 he thought the UMWA hospital was. So an effort was made in Frankfort to outlaw it. I 
 was just here from Frankfort and a group of UMWA people asked me to go to Frankfort 
 with them to help them save the hospital. We met with state officials and (Lt. Governor) 
 Waterford and he agreed to ask the Senate to refuse to allow the issue to come to a 
 commission for study and a vote. The next session was in two years so it killed the issue. 
 It cost us big. The financial impact was we lost all advertising from the Goodyear Tire 
 Distributor, the Ashland Oil Distributor, the Buick dealer, the Pontiac dealer. It was a 
 huge loss. We had run ads from most of them but we haven’t had a nickel from them 
 since. We made up for it by moving in with my parents. They fed us for a while.47 
Ray Collins, who ran the local RC Cola Distributorship, was a great friend to the paper 
and to the Gish family. During the hard times that came as the paper stood up to the local 
political elites and the coal industry, along with the Gish’s advocacy for the poor, Collins proved 
to be a savior, as the boycotts started to take their effect. 
 We were saved by Ray Collins. He was an Old Regular Baptist minister who happened 
 to believe strongly in free speech, freedom of the press, and our right to editorialize, 
 express opinions, attend meetings, and report the news. The Old Regulars don’t pay their 
 ministers and Ray made his living as the RC Cola bottler. He saw to it that RC bought a 
 four-page ad in The Eagle every week for years. It bought enough newsprint to do that 
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 week’s paper. It kept us in business, and we had all the RC Cola we could drink.  He 
 didn’t waste his money though. They (the Whitesburg RC plant) got special recognition 
 from RC nationally because their per capita RC sales were the highest in the nation.48 
The reference to Ray Collins’ belief in a free press was mirrored in everything the Gishes 
and The Mountain Eagle did. A large part of the obligation they felt to provide clear and concise 
reporting concerning the activities of local government agencies and businesses was anchored in 
their knowledge that a free press is necessary to a democratic form of government. In order for 
the people of Letcher County to overcome the deficiencies they faced from incompetent and 
often corrupt local governments as well as predatory coal companies, they would need to have 
free access to the facts. The Mountain Eagle reported on all the issues in the county, and 
regardless of their relationship with the power structure, the paper was a tireless supporter of 
local business. While that support included the coal industry, the advent of surface mining 
caused rifts with the paper and those mining companies in the county that were operating strip 
mines. Tom Gish had come back to Letcher County with the idea that a solid tourism industry 
could be established there and was one of the most vocal supporters of tourism initiatives for the 
county. This included advocating for a state park to be located in Letcher County as well as 
“Cloud City,” a hotel project which was to be located on top of Pine Mountain above 
Whitesburg, and feature first class accommodations. Gish felt that strip mining would ruin the 
tourism potential of Letcher County and fought a bitter print war against it. 
The coal industry dominated Letcher County in every way.  Not only were coal mines the 
largest employers in the county, they were by far the biggest consumers of products sold by a 
number of satellite businesses. There had been little resistance to anything the coal industry had 
done to the people of Letcher County or to eastern Kentucky, so the idea that a small county 
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weekly would take it on, in a county almost totally dependent on coal mining, came as quite a 
shock, particularly to the industry. By the end of World War II, the coal industry completely 
dominated politics in Kentucky and there was very little anybody could do about it. But in the 
1950s, the industry itself was in a state of transition,  
While much of life in the coalfields and in Letcher County in particular had gone on in 
the boom and bust cycles and rhythms of extractive industry, 1957 found both the country and 
the coal industry poised on the cusp of change.  
Despite the re-entrenchments (between the UMWA and coal operators) mining 
 corporations fell like weeds before a sickle…. In hollow after hollow, trains ceased to 
 run, tipples rotted and rusted, boarded up country stores sagged into ruin, and entire rows 
 of houses were abandoned to bats and vandals. Never in American history was an 
 industry as battered as was Appalachian coal in the decade of the 1950s.49 
The leading chronicler of this transition was Harry Monroe Caudill, who was prominent 
in Whitesburg well before he wrote Night Comes to the Cumberlands in 1962.  Caudill practiced 
law in Whitesburg for twenty-nine years, and he served three terms in the Kentucky House of 
Representatives before becoming a professor of history at the University of Kentucky in 1977. 
He was a colorful speaker, and in his trials as well as in the state legislature, he frequently quoted 
Shakespeare, Dickenson, and The Bible. In addition to writing nine books, he was published in 
The Atlantic Monthly, Audubon Monthly, and The Nation among others.50 Caudill also 
contributed numerous articles, and “letters to the editor” to The Mountain Eagle. Tom Gish re-
published a number of articles Caudill wrote for other publications as well as several arguments 
he made on legal issues in The Mountain Eagle.  Gish and Caudill had a collaboration that lasted 
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through Caudill’s death in 1990, and the two obviously shared a number of ideas as an 
examination of their respective works reveals. 
Caudill based his perspective on poverty in eastern Kentucky on the post-war decline in 
coal caused by the scaling back of the smokestack factories that had powered the American war 
machine. He also attributed this decline on the move to diesel fuel rather than coal to power 
trains, a transition that had been encouraged by federal funds that had gone to improve the 
locomotives. As the engine fuel market for coal declined, the market for eastern Kentucky coal 
began to fail.  Caudill wrote that “A measure of coal’s decline and of the depression that rumbled 
in the coal country can be gained from the abrupt fall of production. In 1947 United States pits 
produced 631 million tons. In 1949 the total was 438 million tons. Kentucky’s drop was even 
more precipitous."51 
While this string of events led to massive cutbacks in the underground mining economy 
that had so long sustained the eastern Kentucky and Central Appalachian coalfields, the push for 
rural electrification in the upper south led to the advent of strip mining. The Tennessee Valley 
Authority had originally been created during the New Deal years to control the fast-flowing 
rivers of Kentucky, Tennessee, and other states in the mountain south, and to use the powerful 
waters to generate electricity for the region. However, after the first twenty years of its creation, 
the TVA had moved beyond the capacity of water-generated electricity and decided to turn to 
coal to generate the electricity the rural south now demanded. As a result, TVA became the 
largest consumer of coal in the United States and burned about five percent of the total coal 
output in America.52 
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Although TVA had initially been conservation-oriented, it changed its direction in the 
1950s after it became apparent TVA could not operate as a government owned electricity 
company for much of the American south. At that point, concerns with people and the 
environment became secondary to profit, and TVA became cost conscious, using gigantic coal 
fired furnaces to generate steam for electricity. The deep mines of Central Appalachia could no 
longer meet its price demands, even after wages fell to six or eight dollars a day with companies 
willing to settle for little more than operating expenses, yet TVA demanded even cheaper coal.53  
In truth, relentless exploitation and oppression stared down from every ridge. The  hills 
 were gashed and scarred by strip mining and the “spoil” rolled and washed onto     
 yards and agriculture patches, polluted wells and desecrated family cemeteries. Huge 
 land companies combined with the mining companies to drive wages to the rock bottom 
 levels so that their prime customer, the Tennessee Valley Authority could continue to 
 generate the world’s cheapest electricity54 
The demand for cheap coal by TVA did not mean the end of deep mining in central 
Appalachia. The “captive” mines attached to big corporations like United States Steel, 
Bethlehem Steel, International Harvester, and Ford, among others, continued to mine the high 
grade metallurgical coal they turned to coke to burn in their blast furnaces. They not only 
prospered, as the steel industry and associated industries prospered, they continued to operate 
under contracts with the United Mine Workers of America. The model towns like Jenkins, 
Lynch, Benham, and others that had been built for the captive mines’ workers prospered and 
produced lifestyles appropriate to the industry with the highest paid union workers in the world.  
It was a different story for the underground mines that sold their coal on the open market 
or on the risky and fluid spot market. They withered and died, but their deaths did not mean the 
death of Appalachian coal. They just led to the strip and auger mining that was common in the 
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western United States, but had not been practiced in the steep hollows and narrow mountain 
ridges of the Appalachian highlands. In the 1950s a new breed of miner came to Appalachia. 
Again, as Caudill described them: 
They were strip miners who used immense diesel powered shovels, augers, and 
 bulldozers to take a mountain apart for its coal in an inexpensive operation requiring few 
 employees. Since TVA was willing to sign long term contracts, the machinery makers 
 could afford to sell their costly tools on credit. New corporations sprang up with millions 
 of dollars worth of contracts and a burning desire to get rich. TVA thus cold-bloodedly 
 decreed the destruction of a broad region adjacent to the territory it was mandated to 
 protect in order to supply its customers with the cheapest electricity in the world.55 
The invasion of the strip miners into eastern Kentucky did untold environmental damage 
to the region, and it also set the table for Tom Gish to carry a battle against unchecked and 
unregulated strip mining in Letcher and surrounding counties that lasted for over twenty years. 
Gish’s original complaint with strip mining was that it was unregulated, but as The Mountain 
Eagle continued to document the ravages to Letcher County, it became apparent it was 
antithetical to one of Gish’s pet projects, using tourism as an engine for economic development 
and job creation.  But the new strip mining went well beyond the ruination of tourism 
opportunities. As the old mineral rights deeds were- reinterpreted to allow surface rights, once 
the property of the land owner, to become subservient to the mineral rights, new meanings were 
attributed to the old mining deeds.  
 After all, the old deed that bore his grandfather’s X contained a covenant that the    
 surface of the land was reserved to the grantor for such agricultural purposes as were not 
 inconsistent with the right to mine. This produced a clash of interests with coal winning 
 every round in the contest. The courts ruled that the surface rights were “subservient” so 
 that the minerals could be extracted without any obligation to compensate the landowner 
 for the ensuing ruin.”56 
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The Mountain Eagle was painted by the coal companies as anti-coal and anti-business, 
but Tom Gish had coal in his family DNA. His father Ben had risen through the ranks of 
Southeast Coal Corporation (SECO) from a regular miner to become the superintendent of the 
SECO mine. Gish was born in a coal camp and had a real feeling for the working miner. In the 
KET documentary, he described his relationship with the coal industry as one of oversight, with 
the interests of miners at heart, by describing the working man in eastern Kentucky as “the 
victim of the coal industry.” “I always felt that if the paper has an obligation, it is to look after 
the miner and his family.”57 
The Mountain Eagle’s first brushes with the industry were not over strip mining. Rather it 
happened through the ongoing struggle for better schools, and the need for local school revenue, 
which almost certainly would have to come from taxes on coal property and production.  Raised 
and educated in the schools of Letcher County, Tom Gish was always deeply concerned with 
educational issues in the county, and he and his wife made important contributions to education 
in Letcher County as well as in the rest of Kentucky through their reporting, editorials, and later 
through Tom Gish’s participation with the Kentucky Department of Education during the 
Kentucky Educational Reform Act of 1990. One of the first things that came to the attention of 
the paper in 1957 and later years was that the coal companies that controlled such huge chunks 
of mineral wealth in Kentucky paid very little in local and state taxes. The low tax base in 
Letcher County deprived the county schools of much needed funds and led to a repeating cycle 
of poor infrastructure and poorly paid teachers. Harry Caudill described the effects of the under-
taxation of coal companies and the unmined minerals they owned, stating that the coal 
companies used their political clout to keep property taxes low, a practice that dated back to the 
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initial opening of the Big Sandy Valley for exploitation by the coal companies. It became the 
standard for dozens of east Kentucky counties and blighted education and county infrastructure 
projects. Poor schools, bad roads, shoddy medical services, and poorly educated, embittered and 
cynical educators were the fruit of the tax policies.58 
Like so many of the issues that brought the wrath of courthouse elites and coal operators 
down on The Mountain Eagle, the issue of a tax increase was first addressed by reporting, and 
while the reporting opened eyes, the editorials made them water. Tom Gish was one of the finest 
editorial writers of his time, and the most telling trait of his writing was that it just made sense 
and was deeply seated in traditional American values like self-reliance and personal dignity. In 
the October 13, 1957 editorial, “Is There Nothing We Can Do,” Gish assumed a congratulatory 
note concerning a county meeting which sought to address problems with county schools, where 
“200 concerned individuals, mostly parents, met to discuss the crisis faced by those who want 
their children to have a good education.”  
Gish wrote that the meeting clearly demonstrated that the citizens of Letcher County 
were concerned about the state of the schools and recognized the need for improvement in 
buildings and curriculum. Then he added that almost everyone also agreed with Schools 
Superintendent William B. Hall that, “there’s nothing wrong with our school system that money 
won’t cure.”  Gish wrote that ideas about federal aid had been floated, along with sales and 
occupational taxes, and some had even broached the idea of state-owned liquor stores in the 
notably dry county, but “there was a noticeable lack of suggestions that at least part of the money 
might be raised locally.” He also wrote that Letcher County Schools and many other schools 
nationally had hoped for federal aid, but “the proposed federal aid program fell victim during the 
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last session of Congress to the North-South integration-segregation problem,” and federal aid 
remained a dead issue. Gish then mentioned Governor A.B. “Happy” Chandler’s plan to further 
lower taxes in the coming legislative session and added that “if state taxes are reduced the 
chances of any substantial state aid automatically go out the window.” 
It narrows down to this, if we in Letcher County are going to have better schools, then 
 we are going to have to pay for them ourselves. Those who attended the courthouse 
 meeting shied away from the question of increased local taxes, except to voice belief that 
 the people of Letcher County would never vote for an increase in school taxes. We are 
 not convinced the people of the county would turn down a school tax proposal, assuming 
 the need is fully understood. It is no solution to decide that something can’t be done, and 
 then stop there without so much as making an effort to see if it could be done. Do the 
 people of Letcher County want new school buildings and better teachers? If so, are they 
 willing to pay for them? Let’s ask and see.59 
Letcher County Schools were generally in poor condition and The Mountain Eagle 
reported on studies done on county schools by state agencies as well as those conducted by local 
groups appointed by the Fiscal Court. The results were not pleasing to the school board nor did 
they please coal operators when the paper reported and editorialized on the need to raise taxes, 
particularly taxes on coal property, in order to provide more support to the schools. Like school 
boards in most other Appalachian counties, the Letcher County Board of Education, had a great 
amount of power in the local political arena. The sheer number of employees gave the board a 
large block of voters that was either beholden or easily intimidated, and the purchasing power of 
the school board made the members very popular among local businesses. In 1957 The Mountain 
Eagle published the school board’s 1957 – 1958 budget of $1,067,110. Property tax revenues for 
1957 – 1958 were estimated at $165,000 against receipts of $159,844.58 the previous year.60 At 
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the same time, coal production rates for the Big Sandy Coalfields stood at 5,224,620 tons in 1957 
and 4,961,770 in 1956.61 
Two weeks later the paper revealed that a high number of teachers in the Letcher County 
system did not possess college degrees, and less than seven percent of teachers held graduate 
degrees. In the 1957 – 58 school year, Letcher County Schools employed three teachers with 
Rank One (twenty-four hours or more beyond a Master’s Degree), twelve with Master’s Degrees 
at Rank Two (bachelors and masters’ degree), and 68 with bachelors’ degrees. This stood against 
thirty-five teachers at Rank Four, 112 to 128 hours of college credit without a degree and 100 
teachers at Rank Five, teachers with 68 to 95 hours, which the paper termed the equivalent of 
achieving junior class standing in college. Out of 218 teachers, more than half (135) had not 
graduated from college.62 
In an article that was originally published in "The Appalachian Review" in 1966, Peter 
Schrag, former editor of Change Magazine and a contributing editor to “The Saturday Review,” 
wrote that “Education in the mountain counties of Appalachia is the product of a nearly perfect 
system. Poverty, politics, and the catatonic consequences of depravation and exploitation have 
left most of the mountain schools generations behind the rest of the nation.”63  Schrag wrote that 
schools in Appalachia educated their students to the standards of the community rather than by 
the standards of the nation and that many Appalachian schools lacked the personnel and facilities 
for modern instruction. He found that instruction in foreign language and science was 
particularly lacking. Many schools had no libraries or laboratories and he laid the blame at the 
feet of regional politicians, finding that they had appointed unqualified relatives and supporters 
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to positions in schools. While there were good and conscientious school administrators and 
school boards, these leaders had not addressed the roots of the problem and had conducted 
“rescue operations” rather than opposing the “system.” 
Schrag described the system as a self-contained social mechanism that was isolated 
physically and culturally, although it was also sustained at least partially by public funding. The 
elements, perpetuated by the educational and political system in the Central Appalachian area, 
included chronic unemployment in an industrial population, a historic neglect of formal 
education, lack of cultural capital, and a paternalistic political system based on family 
connections and nepotism, with an exploitative coal industry controlled by absentee owners as 
the sole means of relatively high wage employment. In that system, education was a sideline, but 
schools were a source of power and income. Political dynasties were founded on the offices of 
school superintendents who controlled not only jobs within the school system but other county 
offices as well.64 
The region’s school systems were hopelessly bogged in politics with elected board 
members hiring superintendents who were themselves not subject to popular election. The 
superintendents were among the most powerful political figures in the county, with budgets of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars at their disposal, and very little state oversight. The budgets 
could be spent on education or for political purposes, and the three percent sales tax enacted by 
Kentucky General Assembly in 1960 for the purpose of funding education had enabled the 
superintendents to “fortify themselves with massive patronage dispensations.”65 
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School board cliques were often interwoven with courthouse political machines that spent 
county funds and oversaw the local management of state aid programs with the main objective of 
perpetuating political control. Schools were continually enmeshed in political disputes and 
political allies were so well financed that they were very difficult to dislodge. Political tensions 
were reflected in highly cynical teachers who knew their job security lay more with their ability 
to deliver votes than in their classroom performance. Palatial gymnasiums that catered to the 
public's desire for sports success revealed the cynicism of the system, with the expenditure 
reflected in dilapidated school buildings, tattered and outdated textbooks and libraries and 
generations of educationally stunted high school graduates.66    
The Mountain Eagle became an ongoing advocate for better education in Letcher County, 
and that brought the paper into a contentious relationship with the Board of Education. The 
reporting that informed Letcher County residents about problems in education, teacher quality, 
and school infrastructure was taken as a challenge by the school board, and several 
superintendents and board members took exception to articles in The Mountain Eagle. Among 
the early articles concerning the schools were reports of complaints by citizens about the 
physical state of the schools and reports such as the annual budget and financial statement that 
were required by Kentucky law. While these legal documents had been buried in the back pages 
before, they now had front-page status and were often the subject of editorials such as one that 
appeared in the August 22, 1957 edition calling attention to teacher's salaries listed in the school 
board’s financial statement.  
We doubt that anyone concerned about Letcher County, its youth, and its schools can 
 read the financial statement published by the school board this week with anything but a 
 feeling of shame. 
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Looking over the list of teachers and the salaries they received last year, it is obvious that 
 we are asking our teachers to live on salaries hardly large enough to buy food for an 
 average sized family. 67 
 
Gish went on to compare the salary of a teacher in eastern Kentucky with that of a truck 
driver or coal miner and said that if the trend continued, eastern Kentucky would eventually be 
without qualified teachers. He wrote that while it was not likely the county could ever match the 
national or state average, Letcher County Schools must find some way to increase teachers’ 
salaries. Gish also pointed out that only a small portion of the teachers’ salaries came through 
local taxation and suggested “asking ourselves if we are doing all we can locally.” 
The Mountain Eagle also published state and national reports on education and compared 
conditions elsewhere with those in the county. The results were rarely pleasing to local school 
board officials or to the other forces of the status quo. Gish was relentlessly local in his approach 
to solving problems and always relished community action to address the problems of Letcher 
County. For example, in October 1957 The Mountain Eagle reported that a seven-person 
committee was appointed by a citizen's group that had come together the previous year to study 
the county schools. The panel, which included both Harry Caudill and Pat Gish, was formed 
during a meeting held at the courthouse the previous week that had been called by a group of 
concerned citizens to continue the work of a citizens' committee that had been formed the 
previous year to examine conditions in county schools. The new group was charged with 
bringing back a more comprehensive report on the state of the schools. In his coverage, Gish 
drew attention to the glaring lack of tax revenue coming into county schools. Coy Holstein, a 
local businessman who had resigned as chair of the committee appointed the previous year, told 
the meeting that the old committee’s major accomplishment had been to develop a new formula 
for assessing coal land that increased the amount of the school system’s tax revenues.  
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Nevertheless, Gish noted that Property Tax Revenue receipts for Fiscal Year 1956 and 1957 
stood at $159,844.68, down slightly from the 1955 – 1956 total of $162,502.72.68 
County Tax Commissioner Otis Amburgey told the committee that the school rates of 
$.42 per $100 of real and personal property were considerably higher than in neighboring 
counties and that Letcher County’s school tax rates were in the top 75 in the state. Amburgey 
added that a state sales tax would be a good solution to the problem and told the meeting that 
what little there was to tax in Letcher County had been taxed to death.  
“It sounds simple to go into a tax appraisal,” he (Amburgey) said. “But actually, it didn’t 
bring in much money. One thing that impressed us most was the magnitude of the problem.”69 
Reverend John R. Howard told the group that he had recently spoken with several former 
residents who had left the county because of the poor condition of the schools. “Responsible 
citizens are coming to me every day and saying, ‘I’m getting out of Whitesburg because of the 
schools…Ten years from now your property won’t be worth half what it is today if people keep 
moving out as they have been, and your store income will be down also.” The Mountain Eagle 
helped to draw attention to this issue 24 years before the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition 
unsuccessfully lobbied the state legislature to raise the unmined minerals tax. The Coalition later 
won in a Kentucky Supreme Court decision that set tax rates on unmined minerals at the same 
rate as other real property.70 
 Letcher County Superintendent of Schools William B. Hall was at the meeting too, and 
said that school consolidation should take care of most of the county’s problem. He said the 
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school system was short of classrooms in some buildings but had more room than it needed in 
others, and that the system failed to meet guidelines for full Minimum Foundation Aid and lost 
about $99,000 a year on that account. Hall also told the meeting that he did not believe the 
residents of Letcher County would be willing to vote in an additional $1.50 tax on real property, 
an amount he said would be necessary to solve the system’s financial problems under the current 
conditions.71 
The intensity of school board politics in Letcher County was not surprising. As a result of 
job reductions resulting from the mechanization of the coal industry, the county board of 
education in many Appalachian counties was often the largest and most stable employer in the 
entire county.  Economic decisions made at school board meetings often meant profit or loss to 
county and regional businesses and the superintendents and board members, who sometimes 
served in more than one public position, operated patronage machines that had the power to 
reward loyalty and punish political enemies. Steve Daugherty, Field Coordinator for the 
Appalachian Volunteers, wrote that in Harlan County, School Superintendent James A. Cawood 
controlled not only the Harlan County Board of Education, but also the Harlan County 
Community Action Program, and the Harlan County Planning and Development Board, both of 
which funneled state and federal funds into projects in the county.72 
In mining areas, coal companies took a special interest in boards of education since the 
board had the power to assess school taxes and could influence overall property taxes. Due to 
this threat to the power base, the industry made every effort to expand its influence onto the 
school boards and school systems in Central Appalachia where schools were chronically 
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underfunded, primarily because coal companies influenced board members to keep property 
taxes low.73  
Due to concerns over the undue influence coal companies had over regional politics as 
well as the boom and bust nature of mining, The Mountain Eagle began to advocate for a more 
diverse economy that would be partly industrial and partly based on natural attractions. This  
held a strong appeal for Tom Gish, and he became a keen advocate for developing the tourism 
industry in the region as part of an overall plan for economic development that would move east 
Kentucky away from a one industry economy. Most of his tourism-related plans and efforts were 
directed toward using the stunning skyline views rather than damming the rivers and streams to 
develop recreational lakes, but he also recognized the need for flood control. Gish was a true 
believer in the New Deal ethic of public works programs, and The Mountain Eagle carried 
numerous articles on tourist possibilities as well as other economically and environmentally 
sustainable development ideas. Accounts of every development conference held in or about the 
region appeared in The Mountain Eagle, and plans were endorsed and condemned in editorials 
and in articles written by Harry Caudill and others who had taken Central Appalachia as their 
area of concern.  
Regardless of the topic, The Mountain Eagle was relentlessly dedicated to providing 
factual information to its readers. While the paper often included coverage of national issues and 
editorials concerning them,  Gish was always aware of how important local news coverage was 
to his paper, and he learned early on that it wasn’t just courthouse or school board news that 
interested his readers. They wanted to hear about themselves, and the people who had followed 
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the highways of the Appalachian Diaspora to the industrial cities of the Midwest and Atlantic 
Coast wanted to know not just what was happening in the county seat, but in their community 
right down to the hollow in which they were raised. The community correspondents, who wrote 
the neighborhood news stories that appeared in  the paper each week, were not as polished as the  
young reporters who came under the tutelage of Pat Gish and were sent at a staggering rate to 
larger papers, but the Gishes soon learned that their columns were cherished by Letcher County 
transplants living in Detroit, Cleveland and the other “big towns” where many of the locals had 
moved looking for work.   
The learning curve was sharp in the early years and the Gishes made lots of mistakes, but 
they never let go of the principles that drove their work, or of the basics of journalism. The 
stubborn idealism that drove their efforts made them heroes to a generation of journalists, but 
there was a price for that idealism and although they had felt the pinch in the first years of 
operation, it was just the beginning. Just as the Gishes got better at understanding the rhythm of 
life in Letcher County, their continued insistence on doing the work they were trained to do 
continued to exacerbate the differences between The Mountain Eagle and those who controlled 
the county for their own benefit.  
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
The advent of the 1960s brought challenges and opportunities to The Mountain Eagle.  A 
young president with different priorities, tragically murdered in Dallas, was followed by an 
experienced New Deal politician who managed to ram many of the reforms Kennedy had 
envisioned through Congress, and ushered in an era of change for Central Appalachia. As the 
War on Poverty brought federal largess to the mountains and the hollows it also brought renewed 
interest from federal agencies and the media. It was also a time of great challenge for The 
Mountain Eagle, as resentment from the Letcher County Board of Education and powerful local 
political groups and factions over reports in the newspaper and what they considered the 
newspaper’s encroachment on their private business caused relations to go from bad to worse. 
The increase in strip mining activity continued to drive a wedge between the newspaper and the 
coal interests. Freedom of the press would come at a high price and many of the adversarial 
relationships that developed in the 1960s came from the simple act of accurately reporting the 
news, and using words spoken by powerful men to reveal their intentions. Others came from 
editorials that were sharply critical of practices Tom Gish saw as destructive or improper, and 
some came from honest attempts by the Gishes to make better lives for their neighbors. The 
events that were reported and the editorials that appeared in The Mountain Eagle in the late 
1950s and early 1960s set a pattern that has continued to be the standard of the newspaper. 
Boycotts and other attempts at intimidation, shunning the family, and attempts to ruin the paper 
through financial means escalated until they culminated in violence, as powerful forces in the 
county and the region did their best to silence The Mountain Eagle. 
America was poised for change in the late 1950s and the changes that moved through the 
rest of the country were reflected in Central Appalachia and Letcher County. The Eisenhower 
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Administration was winding down and the nation found itself faced with the prospect of 
choosing a new leader. John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign placed Appalachia and 
eastern Kentucky in the national spotlight, and he made Appalachian poverty a major campaign 
issue, while criticizing Republicans for opposing programs designated to relieve poverty in 
America. Robert F. Munn, Director of Libraries for West Virginia University, wrote that 
Kennedy’s epiphany in the bleak coal camps of West Virginia marked the fourth “discovery” of 
Appalachia since the late Nineteenth Century.1 
The 1950s had been a time for America to flex its military and economic muscle and 
assume the position of leader of the free world. However, some parts of the country had not 
enjoyed the economic benefits or seen the dramatic rise of the middle class. With the passage of 
the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 and the media rediscovery of poverty in the United States, 
previously isolated areas came into view for mainstream America. The Highway Act improved 
public access to rural areas, and it opened up places that had been isolated by bad roads and bad 
politics. The national media's attention to poverty made America uncomfortably aware that parts 
of the country, particularly in Appalachia,  were not taking part in the American Dream or the 
great post-war prosperity. 
As national and international media sources began to focus on Appalachian poverty, 
conditions in the region became a public relations problem for the nation and an issue the Soviet 
Union could use as a propaganda whip against the United States. In the Cold War environment 
of the 1950s, the failure of the free market in places like Appalachia was a national 
1 Robert F. Munn, “The Latest Rediscovery of Appalachia,” Appalachia in the Sixties, eds. David S. Walls, John B. 
Stephenson, (University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 29. 
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embarrassment.2 Ideas about the American path to progress through modernization had already 
been widely applied to the third world in the Cold War client-state economic competition with 
the Soviet Union.  Earlier confrontations between modernity and tradition in Appalachia made 
the region an ideal proving ground for lessons that were potentially applicable to other 
“transnational” societies at home and abroad.3 Harry Caudill and others called for the creation of 
a southern mountain authority that would plan for the future and work like a more modern 
version of TVA, while providing electrical power for the rest of the country.4  The Eastern 
Kentucky Planning Commission, under the leadership of John Whisman, developed Project 60, a 
program designed to alleviate problems that plagued eastern Kentucky and bring improvements 
in infrastructure, roads, water systems, and industrial sites, as well as building human capacity in 
education, job training and housing.5 Eastern Kentucky native Bert Combs was elected as 
governor of Kentucky in 1959 after winning the Democratic primary over Harry Waterfield.  
Tom Gish supported Waterfield, with whom he had become friendly during his time with the 
Associated Press in Frankfort,  and served as his press representative during the campaign. In 
1960 Combs adopted Project 60 and became active in the Council of Appalachian Governors, 
convening the second Conference of Appalachian Governors in Lexington in October of 1960. 
At that time, Combs and four other Appalachian Governors, Luther Hodges of North Carolina, 
Buford Ellington of Tennessee, Lindsey Almond of Virginia, and Millard Tawes of Maryland, 
                                                 
2 Ron Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington Kentucky, 
2008), 43. 
3 James Brown and George Hillary, “The Great Migration,” ed. Thomas Ford, The Southern Appalachian Region: A 
Survey, (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, 1962), in John A. Williams, Appalachia, A History, 
(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2002), 327.  
4, Ron Eller, Uneven Ground, 44. 
5 Ibid, 48.  
47 
 
met to discuss problems facing Central Appalachia, including highway construction and flood 
control. At the meeting, Combs called for the passage of federal legislation to address 
unemployment in the region. 6  
 Many Appalachians hoped that building new roads and participating in other federally 
funded projects would put their towns and counties in a more competitive position and allow 
them better access to medical care and economic opportunities, but others were reluctant to 
accept federal and state funds and the oversight and legal requirements that came with them. A 
number of county governments also lacked the means to implement the programs. On the other 
hand, many county leaders hoped for new opportunities to exercise power by acquiring new 
methods of dispensing patronage. This included the enhanced ability to place men in jobs on 
roads and make work projects to solidify their political allegiance, to increase the value of land 
by determining rights of way for new roads, and by handling state and federal funds in the time- 
honored tradition of taking a little off the top. Other federally funded projects like flood control 
and building community colleges or satellite campuses for established colleges also offered 
opportunities for court officials and regional politicians to expand their power and enrich 
themselves and their friends.  The road issue served to illustrate one of many differences in 
approaching economic development in eastern Kentucky that Governor Combs and later, John 
Whisman had with Gish, Harry Caudill, and Carl D. Perkins. Combs and Whisman saw the 
development of an arterial system of highways to serve Appalachian Kentucky as the principle 
solution to the regions isolation and economic woes. However, although it was obvious that 
improvements to the highway system would do a great deal to relieve the isolation, Gish, 
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Caudill, and Perkins understood that the base economy of coal mining would have to be the 
principal building bock in creating a more diverse economy, and the starting point would be in 
developing new businesses that were related to coal, lumber, and other products of the extractive 
economy. And when the eastern Kentucky highway system was finally complete, they were 
eventually proven right, because by the time the roads Combs believed would bring new industry 
and jobs to the region were finished, both had already bypassed Kentucky and either moved to 
the "right to work" states in the south or re-located out of the United States. The "regional's," 
Gish, Caudill, and Perkins also understood that the rest of the infrastructure, education, treated 
water, sewer services and other quality of life issues would have to be strengthened to bring in 
the kind of jobs that would move the region away from its dependence on extractive industry, 
and particularly on coal. It's not that Combs and Whisman didn't understand these things, but 
they had to take a more expansive state-wide view and both placed a good deal of emphasis on 
the benefits of a modern road system to foster change. By the nature of Combs’ position, he was 
concerned with the entire state rather than one section. Gish also understood how the vagaries of 
government funding could extend the development of a complete system well past the point that 
it could really affect serious economic change and he wrote several editorials to that effect. One 
of his more bitter disputes with Governor Combs came when Combs acquiesced to a plan to 
allow for renewable funding by congressional and general assembly sessions rather than locking 
it in from the start, and he was proven right. The road plan commenced in the early 1960s and 
wasn't complete until the turn of the next century. 
In 1958, a headline in The Mountain Eagle summed up the problem for eastern Kentucky 
in graphic terms, warning the residents to “Change or Be Left Behind.” The headline illustrated 
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the consequences for counties like Letcher if they chose not to follow the path of counties with 
only slightly better economic bases but more progressive leadership. “We’re going to have to 
change in eastern Kentucky if we’re going to keep up with the rest of the United States and the 
world,’ said Hobart Wooten, city manager of Hazard in 1958.”7 
 Mr. Wooten touched on a subject that plagued many Appalachian communities and 
retarded change in Letcher County for generations, because it wasn’t just those who stood to 
benefit from retaining the status quo who opposed change. While the stereotypes of the apathetic 
mountaineer have proven to be largely untrue, many Appalachian people continued to cling to 
their own self-imposed stereotype of highly individualistic hill folk beholden to no one, even as 
many of the same people became caught up in cycles of dependence on the federal dole that 
lasted for generations. The mountaineer's philosophy was never more plainly revealed than in the 
belief that a person has the right to do what he wanted to do with his own land without oversight 
or interference. That belief went as deep as religion and patriotism and often led to reactionary 
opposition to even the most beneficial change. Throughout the Central Appalachian region, 
people who would benefit from zoning laws, flood insurance, the expansion of public utilities, 
and numerous other programs to benefit the general good, stood firm against change because of 
even the slightest possibility of interference from government of any kind in their affairs. 
“Letters to the Editor” in The Mountain Eagle often reflected a near primal fear of being told 
what to do with one’s own property and this attitude kept “city water” from being made available 
in Letcher County until the 21st Century because many feared that Federal Flood Insurance, 
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which would be required to obtain the bond issues and loans needed to extend water lines, would 
limit their ability to use their land as they wished. As late as September 1979, the Letcher County 
Fiscal Court's inability to pass a flood insurance ordinance threatened a $3 million HUD grant 
that would have allowed the City of Fleming Neon to complete the funding package for an $18 
million sewer project.8   
 The “Change or be Left Behind” article was one of many to appear in The Mountain 
Eagle that promoted economic development and change for the region but it was very frank 
about the need to accept outside funds, and along with them, outside supervision. City Manager 
Wooten addressed an audience of 50 eastern Kentucky leaders at a meeting of the Eastern 
Kentucky Planning Commission in 1958 and told them they could expect to receive criticism if 
they accepted federal aid as Hazard had accepted it under flood relief programs, because eastern 
Kentucky residents are “reluctant to accept aid,” and “reluctant to change.” After the downtown 
area was nearly destroyed by the 1957 floods, Hazard accepted the aid to allow for the 
introduction of low income housing, a new sewer system, and funding to build a new parking lot 
that Wooten said would relieve traffic congestion. He warned that getting funding for the 
projects would be hard work and would invite a lot of red tape but added that the red tape could 
be overcome. Planning Commission Chairman B.F. Reed of Drift, in Floyd County, told the 
meeting that poor roads and schools were the main objection he heard from industries 
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considering locating in eastern Kentucky. “I never saw any place (that was) prosperous that 
didn’t have good roads or transportation.”9  
 But in Letcher County and much of Kentucky, road funds were as tight as Governor A.B. 
“Happy” Chandler’s fist, and tighter still in light of a series of county road scandals that had led 
Chandler to nominate University of Kentucky Professor James W. Martin to replace Robert 
Humphreys as State Highway Commissioner, with the charge of reorganizing the State Highway 
Department and eliminating corruption and waste in relations with county road departments. One 
of Martin’s first acts was to restrict the use of state funds to state highways, and draw a line in 
the sand against their use on county or private roads. This went against previous policies that had 
allowed state workers to use county equipment to work county roads with the state picking up 
the cost of the fuel and paying the workers. Letcher County Judge Executive Arthur Dixon and 
County Road Foreman Homer Stamper travelled to Frankfort early in 1958 to meet with 
Chandler, Martin, and Rural Highways Commissioner J.B. Wells Jr. to discuss the situation. 
Stamper admitted that his record keeping for billing fuel for county road work to the state hadn’t 
been as accurate as it might have been and added that the county had paid a county employee to 
operate equipment.10  
 Judge Dixon said the county could not afford to staff an entire road department but the 
county owned enough heavy equipment to allow the court to work the roads with state help as 
they had in the past. But the reorganization of the State Highway Department under Martin 
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showed that Chandler would not stand by and allow counties to loot state funds. Chandler had 
run on a platform of cutting taxes and that would mean belt tightening and increased oversight. 
As plans for new roads in eastern Kentucky were drawn up and Letcher County was left out, 
editorials began to appear in The Mountain Eagle questioning Judge Dixon’s campaign claims 
that he had special inroads into the highway department. By 1959, Gish had become convinced 
that tourism was one of the keys to economic development in eastern Kentucky and began to 
promote the tourism industry heavily in articles and editorials. However, Gish understood that 
tourism would not be viable if the highways leading into eastern Kentucky were not significantly 
improved, and The Mountain Eagle became a strong proponent of including Letcher County in 
plans for new roads and for the development of a turnpike leading from Lexington to the West 
Virginia border. He continually prodded county and local leaders who were often reluctant to 
participate in meetings held by the Eastern Kentucky Development Commission to take part in 
them, along with other regional efforts to promote economic development and to make certain 
that Letcher County was included in the planning.   
Gish believed it was foolish to continue to ignore opportunities to obtain state and federal 
funding for economic development or infrastructure, and as a strong advocate for development, 
he believed the county and city leaders had an obligation to compete for programs that could 
provide opportunities to enhance the economy and diversify employment opportunities. And like 
Combs, he believed that improved highways would be a key to awakening the potential of 
eastern Kentucky.  In a 1958 editorial, Gish wrote that people who had participated in a recent 
Eastern Kentucky Development Conference had been impressed with the determination of some 
city leaders to take positive action to better their communities. Although Judge Executive Arthur 
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Dixon of Letcher County had been there, no one from Whitesburg, Jenkins, or Neon had 
bothered to attend the meeting. Gish came away from the meeting with the feeling that while 
some of Letcher County’s neighbors would take positive action to improve their lot, Letcher 
County would just fall further behind, and he pointed to numerous federal aid programs available 
to the counties for development and renewal, although no city in Letcher County had indicated 
any interest in participating in them. His greatest concern was a report from Forrest Johnson, 
head of the state highway department’s Division of Planning indicating that long range plans for 
Highway 15 would bypass Letcher County entirely, further increasing its isolation. 
 The plan, if carried through, would by-pass Letcher County completely. Virtually all 
 traffic would be routed around the county. We don’t want and can’t afford to have that 
 happen to us. The only way we can do anything about it is to start speaking out and 
 making our wishes known. But if we in Letcher County can’t find the time to start 
 attending meetings and showing an interest in state and federal help when it was offered 
 to us, then we shouldn’t be surprised if we are forgotten.11 
 Gish believed that if there were federal and state programs that could move Letcher 
County forward by providing jobs and improving roads, the county’s leaders should compete for 
them. Their unwillingness to participate in these programs, for whatever reason, was one of the 
primary reasons he was often critical of the quality of leadership in Letcher County, which 
contributed to the ongoing animosity between the paper and the county’s leaders, primarily 
because Gish saw the failure of leadership as the driving force to Letcher County's lack of 
progress. In a scathing June 1958 editorial concerning Letcher County’s exclusion from a 
$750,000 five year state road construction plan, Gish laid the blame squarely at the feet of Judge 
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Arthur Dixon and was unsparing in his criticism of the job Dixon had done to secure the 
county’s share of road funds. 
 Because this program is what it is – a once in a lifetime affair – it is tragic that Letcher 
 County is being left out. Beyond question, schools and roads are the county’s greatest 
 needs. Without an adequate through highway connecting Letcher County and the rest of 
 the world we have no hope of either tourists or new industry. Our economy stands to 
 continue its gradual decline as our coal mines work out. 
  
Gish blamed Dixon for losing access to a share of the overall $750 million in state 
funding for new roads, and wrote that Dixon had made roads and his alleged influence in 
Frankfort the centerpiece of the previous year’s campaign when he (Dixon) said, “Either we get 
roads or we don’t, depending on who is elected county Judge.”  Dixon had had circulated a letter 
from Deputy State Highway Commissioner J.B. Wells saying that Letcher county would have “a 
road program second to none” if Dixon was elected.  Dixon also boasted of support from other 
state officials for roads in Letcher County, if he got elected, and claimed that his opponent could 
not get the same cooperation. The editorial closed by noting that while the county had bought 
into Dixon's promises, “it is getting less from the state highway department than any other 
county in the state. We would be interested in hearing an explanation from the judge.”12 
 In the next edition, Gish addressed recent criticism of the newspaper when he wrote an 
editorial to clear up any possible misunderstanding that readers might have between “Editorials, 
Advertisements and News,” in which he said some readers and officials had a lack of 
understanding of the three functions of a newspaper. He wrote that in a news story, it was not the 
job of a reporter to pass judgment on what he or she wrote, but that an editorial was the means 
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through which a newspaper expresses its opinion. “What you are reading now is an editorial, 
appearing on the editorial page. It is mostly a matter of opinion.” He used coverage of the fiscal 
court as an example and said the paper had a duty to express its opinions of the court’s actions on 
the editorial page and not in news coverage. He described advertisements as something that had 
been paid for by a business or an individual in order to promote a product or an idea,  and make 
it attractive to others. It may seem strange that Gish felt it was necessary to make these 
distinctions to his readers, but the previous editor had done little in the way of editorializing or 
any kind of controversial reporting, and part of the friction with the fiscal court and school board 
came from accusations that the paper gave opinions in news articles rather than reporting facts.13  
Editorial descriptions of the county’s elected leadership as ineffective and self-serving in 
The Mountain Eagle editorials frequently angered the fiscal court and city councils, while Pat 
Gish’s reporting continued to reveal individual incidences of greed, incompetence, and a strong 
desire to keep the people’s business out the view of the people, and leadership, particularly on 
the local level, was an ongoing issue. Not long before the 1960 presidential election, the paper 
featured the call for effective local leadership issued by a group of governors from the upper 
southern states, which later became known as the Council of Southern Governors. In an informal 
1960 meeting set up to discuss ways to solve common regional problems, the governors  
identified “alert local leadership” as the Appalachian area’s greatest need in the push for 
redevelopment. It must have pleased Tom Gish to be able to report the words of North Carolina 
Governor Luther Hodges, who said that effective local leaders were not necessarily elected 
officials but were people who had already started accomplishing things for the public good and 
                                                 
13 “Editorials, Advertisements and News,” The Mountain Eagle,” June 12, 1958, 3. 
56 
 
not “as people who declare themselves to be leaders and then just sit with their hands out, doing 
nothing.”  Hodges concluded that the right kind of leadership in a community could help to bring 
industry and added that tourism couldn’t be accomplished in dirty areas. Along with cleaning up 
the region, Hodges called for educating locals in effective tourism etiquette and pointed to the 
necessity of accommodations for tourists when they came.14 
 The Mountain Eagle rarely endorsed candidates in local races but it was vocal in 
criticizing the failures of local and state leaders. In national races, the candidate who was 
perceived as doing the most to help eastern Kentucky would generally receive the most favorable 
editorial mentions. In the statewide election year of 1961, Gish's editorial castigated Letcher 
County’s current political leadership and begged for voters to do the right thing and elect leaders 
who would actually serve the public rather than serving county elites and filling their own 
pockets while feeding at the public trough. It started by telling Letcher County voters they only 
had a short while to decide what they wanted out of their leaders and warning them that the 
coming election was crucial in determining what the future would hold for the county. Without 
mentioning names, Gish cautioned voters against continuing to elect the semi-literate and 
backward lot that currently held many county offices and urged them to elect men who would 
have the vision to work with President John F. Kennedy, and the education and the intelligence 
to work with federal representatives to make positive change a reality. Gish told his readers they 
really had two choices, to maintain the status quo or to accept change and move ahead. 
Actually, Letcher County has but two choices during the years ahead. We can sit idly as 
 the county continues to lose jobs at the rate of more than 1,000 a year. Or we can enter 
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 wholeheartedly in whatever programs of aid are offered to us by private groups, the state, 
 or federal government, hoping thereby to reverse the present downward trend. 
It doesn’t matter too much what type of program President Kennedy works out for 
 depressed areas unless we in the first instance have enough determination, willpower, and 
 leadership to participate actively in the president’s program.15 
 
By 1960 the county’s population had “soared” to 30,012 according the 1960 Census and 
the increase in population meant that magistrates could, under Kentucky law, be paid $200 a 
month. But under a recent redistricting order, the county would only have three magistrates 
rather than the eight previously seated.16  The magistrates finally had their long-desired pay raise 
and the paper had very little to say about it. However, Gish did hold businessmen in Whitesburg 
who had refused to take part in efforts to obtain help from state and federal officials for 
economic development to account. He also castigated the citizens and business people for their 
poor attendance at meetings of the Whitesburg Community Development Association, saying 
that four previous development groups had already failed for lack of interest. Only three people 
had attended the most recent meeting and that included a Mountain Eagle reporter and a 
representative of the state Department of Economic Development.17 Later that year, State 
Representative Harry Caudill was the only person who attended another meeting of the 
Community Development Association, and the same week, only Chamber President Cossie 
Quillen showed up for a meeting of the Whitesburg Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors. 
The meeting had been called to develop plans to send a motorcade delegation to meet with 
Governor Bert Combs to make the city’s case for a state park, a junior college, and road aid.  The 
editorial stated that although Governor Combs was generally sympathetic to eastern Kentucky, 
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the business and political leaders of Letcher County were unwilling to take the trouble to meet 
him halfway. Other cities had secured projects they had asked for, but Letcher County had 
received only a single bridge, to replace one that was no longer safe. By 1961, the paper’s 
relationship with many local businessmen had deteriorated and increasingly larger numbers had 
withdrawn their advertising at the behest of powerful political and business leaders who took 
exception to The Mountain Eagle’s insistence on doing its job.18  
While Gish did not blame Governor Bert Combs for Letcher County’s lack of access to 
state largess, he was by no means a fan, and in September, just over a month from the 1961 
elections, he called on Letcher Countians to show the Democrats in Frankfort they were not 
going to take their neglect any longer by taking the radical step of voting Republican. It was a 
bold proposal but one the paper saw as justified, especially since Hazard and Perry County had 
announced, “presumably with the knowledge of Governor Combs that they wanted to ‘steal’ the 
proposed Junior College at Blackey and locate it in Hazard.”  Following a meeting of the Hazard 
Chamber of Commerce, a Hazard radio announcer had reminded Perry Countians that Harlan 
had wanted a college and Cumberland had stolen it. According to the editorial, the only logical 
reason to move the college to Hazard was political, because while Hazard and Perry County were 
politically in play, Letcher County was “safe” for Combs. If that  was true there was no reason 
for Combs to do the county any favors and Gish said that while Letcher County had stayed 
“safe” for Democrats, Combs had done nothing for the county, but had used state funds and 
projects to sway counties that were not so secure. “As Democrats we believe there should be 
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some other answer to Letcher’s problems than voting Republican. But right now we can think of 
none.”19   
 As it became apparent that Letcher County had not benefited very much from local or 
state elected leadership, a number of businessmen and other non-elected leaders became 
increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress in eastern Kentucky, particularly the lack of 
state involvement in economic and infrastructure development. In August 1958, a group of those 
community leaders got together in the City Café in Whitesburg for what started with a cup of 
coffee and ended in a fully-fledged secession movement. In a rare article bearing Tom Gish’s 
byline, The Mountain Eagle reported that a new state of East Kentucky had been proposed by a 
local group including Harry Caudill, Bill Adams, Dexter Dixon, Ray Collins, Pearl Dixon, Steve 
Adams, Emmet Fields, Steve Caudill, Lindsey Webb and Jesse Holbrook. The group’s motto 
was, “Roads or a New State” and they pointed to separation of West Virginia from the rest of 
Virginia during the Civil War as an example of the possibility of a group of counties separating 
from their state. The primary targets for secession were the Seventh and Eighth Congressional 
Districts, which included most of Eastern Kentucky and were represented by Eugene Siler (8th) 
and Carl D. Perkins (7th.).  
 The fact that Gish used a byline for the article is of note, because he rarely did. He made 
it plain that he wrote the editorials but neither he nor his wife Pat, who did most of the reporting, 
used bylines, except on rare occasions. But the secession issue was just the kind of thing that 
appealed to Gish and it revealed his sense of humor and his willingness to use a not entirely 
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serious issue in order to draw attention to other very serious ones. The problems that led to such 
a radical step were real and important, so it allowed him to make important points, and it was just 
far out enough to fall between the realms of humor and serious reporting. In a later discussion 
with U.S. senators holding hearings on poverty in the region, Gish said the movement’s intent 
had not been to form a new state, but was a device to draw attention to problems that had been 
ignored by Frankfort and Washington. But the articles Gish wrote were serious, and it is obvious 
that the participants had serious intentions, whether they actually meant to form a new state or to 
showcase how badly eastern Kentucky had been ignored. And there was always an element of 
possibility in each article, a “what the hell” attitude that maybe if the movement actually took 
off, America would gain another state from the Appalachian counties of Kentucky and later, 
from Virginia. 
 A plan by the state to erect cabins without toilet facilities at Dewey Lake (which later 
became Jenny Wiley State Park) was the tipping point for the Letcher County men and Ray 
Collins, who was later elected chairman of the secession committee, said that eastern 
Kentuckians had been treated like second class citizens long enough. He initially suggested a 
motorcade to Frankfort to protest the lack of progress on roads, particularly since Letcher County 
residents had paid over $1 million in road taxes the previous year.20  The article drew national 
attention and was featured in the August 13, 1958 edition of The New London Connecticut 
Evening Day, which quoted Kentucky Governor A.B. Happy Chandler as saying that as far as he 
was concerned, eastern Kentucky was in the Commonwealth to stay. “I am obliged to keep 
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them.”  Whitesburg was identified as the center of the secession movement and the article 
reported that about 100 people had recently met to protest a 125 year state pattern of taxing the 
residents of eastern Kentucky “to the benefit of the lush bluegrass area and the wealthy western 
counties.” Ray Collins said the movement was gaining momentum, but Chandler, with his 
characteristic lack of modesty, said, “I have just returned from a wonderful program in Hazard 
(the proposed capitol of the new state). Several thousand citizens turned out at the courthouse for 
a special day they gave for me. I never saw a finer spirit or people in a better humor.”21 
 Gish promoted the second meeting and printed a statement from Chairman Ray Collins, 
who owned the Whitesburg RC Cola Bottling Plant. In his statement, Collins hinted that the true 
purpose of the movement was to wake state officials up to eastern Kentucky’s problems by 
saying unless state officials ended their discrimination against eastern Kentucky the region 
should break away.22 Gish also mentioned the meeting in an editorial and said that the 
importance of the effort had become clear when Letcher County wasn’t even mentioned in a 
discussion on roads at the prior week’s meeting of the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning 
Commission. Regardless of the seriousness of the secession movement, the possibility that 
Letcher County would be entirely bypassed by Route 15 when it was rebuilt was very serious 
and represented a potential disaster to the county. 
 Collins said that eastern Kentucky had never received the necessary funding from 
Frankfort for roads or other projects and called for Letcher County to present a united front with 
a large turnout at the coming meeting. He said secession and the formation of a new state would 
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be a last resort but he also emphasized that eastern Kentucky had never received its fair share 
from the state. 
 This would be the worst tragedy that could happen to us. We can’t sit idly by and let it 
 happen. But it is almost certain to happen unless we speak up loudly and effectively for 
 ourselves. 23 
 Another article reported that an argument had broken out between Hazard and Pikeville 
as to which city would be the capital of the new state. Ray Collins said he was receiving a lot of 
support from other eastern Kentucky counties but there were numerous legal arguments as to the 
ability of the counties to actually break away and form a new state, along with other debates 
concerning whether the region would be better off as an independent state or would do better to 
join with Virginia. Pat Gish was named as secretary of the secession group and State 
Representative Hilliard Kincer of Neon was named vice chairman. The group was described as 
non-partisan and a planning committee was appointed that included Whitesburg businessman 
Archie Craft (later elected to the state Senate), Dee Dawahare of the Dawahare’s chain of 
clothing stores, and Attorney Lindsey Webb of Whitesburg, who was asked to see how much 
Letcher County was paying into state road funds compared to the amount the county received 
from the state.24 
The lack of good roads in eastern Kentucky and the failure of the state to plan for 
building them in the southeastern part of the state near the borders with Virginia and West 
Virginia quickly emerged as the dominant issue driving the secession movement. Ray Collins 
made that clear when he said “if we set up our own capital and our own officials, we can dare 
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them to take our east Kentucky tax money and spend it to build roads in the Bluegrass.”  Gish 
wrote that “there is not a single good mile of road in Kentucky east of Winchester,” and 
complained that out of a $100 million bond issue, no plans had been made for roads in eastern 
Kentucky. He also mentioned the neglect of the area in plans for the interstate highway system, 
which left eastern Kentucky south of Ashland and east of London completely out.  
Eastern Kentucky’s entire economy for years has been hampered by a lack of highways. 
 We are isolated to a degree that is almost unbelievable in this day of the hydrogen bomb 
 and rocket trips to the moon. Roughly half of eastern Kentucky’s geographic area and at 
 least a third of its population are a part of that isolation.25  
 The secession group drew up a list of objectives that focused on roads, developing 
Kentucky Route 15 into a “good road” to Winchester, and building good high speed roads into 
the Cumberland River and Big Sandy areas. Kentucky Attorney General, Jo M. Ferguson issued 
an opinion stating that while it would be legally possible for the eastern counties to withdraw 
from the state, it would not be easy. Ferguson quoted the establishment clause of the Kentucky 
Constitution as evidence that it was possible but also wrote that the process of secession would 
have to originate in the state legislature, which meant the state would have to grant permission 
for secession. Ferguson also opined that the state could submit a constitutional amendment to 
cede the counties to the state of Virginia. Happy Chandler said it was not true that eastern 
Kentucky was being mistreated and showed that he was decidedly unhappy with the whole thing 
by refusing to comment on the “peeves of one disgruntled citizen,” although he neglected to 
identify the disgruntled citizen. 
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 The second secession meeting drew an estimated 300 participants who voted by show of 
hands to proceed with the efforts to secede, unless the east Kentucky counties received more 
state support. The motto, “Something specific soon or secede,” was adopted and Ray Collins said 
that instead of promises, “We want contracts.”  Collins presented figures to the meeting showing 
that Letcher County residents paid approximately $650,000 each year into the state road fund but 
were slated to receive only about $400,000 per year in the next five year road plan. He also 
complained that the region had been shortchanged in schools and particularly in the development 
of colleges. “They put in a college called Eastern State and located it in Richmond only 25 miles 
from Lexington. It’s 150 miles from here,” said Collins, who also charged that eastern Kentucky 
had been exploited by “outsiders” who had stripped the region of its coal and timber until, 
“We’ve got nothing left.”26 
Harry LaViers Sr., president of South East Coal Company and a member of the East 
Kentucky Planning Commission, issued an apology to “his friends and neighbors in Letcher 
County” for the omission of county roads in the planning document. LaViers said he had 
intended no slight to the county when he proposed a road to serve the region and that when the 
road was proposed, he “picked up a yardstick and drew a line from a point near Winchester to 
the Eastern most tip of Eastern Kentucky, in Pike County.” He said he understood the road 
would miss a lot of cities but added that access roads should alleviate the problem. LaViers said 
he would “perhaps be the last person in Kentucky to deliberately slight Letcher County on roads 
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or any other matter,” but added that he believe that a centrally located road was the best plan and 
that tourism and satellite roads and factories would follow.27  
  At what turned out to be the secession group’s final meeting, Chairman Ray Collins 
defined the movement as one of the people and not one for politicians. “It seems like most 
politicians start running for cover whenever the subject is mentioned,” said Collins. He told the 
gathering that the chief aim of the movement was to “let the rest of Kentucky know that the 
mountains of Kentucky exist,” and said the movement was really designed to get the attention of 
the governor and state legislators and to remind them they had neglected the region of eastern 
Kentucky for over 150 years, adding that he expected the movement to attract attention from 
different parts of the state. The participants also discussed the possibility of petitioning the 1960 
(biennial meeting) of the Kentucky legislature to allow the counties in eastern Kentucky to break 
away and set up a new state as well as the possibility of trying to get the east Kentucky counties 
to cross the state line and join Virginia.28 
 The movement added the weight of the voice of Charles Victor Snapp, Superintendent of 
Schools in the Jenkins Independent School System and a nationally recognized leader in 
education. Snapp said that although the area’s physical beauty was second to none, he agreed 
with the secessionists that the region could not prosper due to bad roads and poor education 
facilities.  He said the purpose of the secession group was giving “to every child in the mountains 
an education the equal to that of the Bluegrass City of Lexington or the river city of Louisville,” 
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and warned that if the education of the children was neglected they would lose the entire 
generation, and he challenged the county to “cast aside all lethargy.”29 
Orby Cantrell a member of the Virginia House of Delegates from neighboring Pound, 
Virginia, also met with the secessionists and told them his state congressional district in Wise 
County had received $1,500,000 in the previous session of the House of Burgesses and pointed 
to similarities between  Letcher County and Wise County, including a common border and a 
similar coal based economy. Cantrell also asked the citizens of Letcher County to join him in 
seeking a skyline drive along the state border from Cumberland Gap to the Breaks of the 
Mountains in Elkhorn City, Kentucky. The map Cantrell proposed would run along the state line 
on Black Mountain and cross Pine Mountain at Jenkins. This was significantly different from a 
similar project proposed by gubernatorial candidate Wilson Wyatt, whose map stayed on Pine 
Mountain and was mostly in Kentucky. He said the cost as estimated by the Virginia Department 
of Highways would be $80,000,000. Cantrell was the first Virginia official to speak to the 
secession group and told them that regardless of the outcome of their efforts, the residents of 
eastern Kentucky and Southwestern Virginia should voice their dissatisfaction and “show their 
neighbors in the Bluegrass and Tidewater regions.”30 
Other newspapers, as well as the Associated Press showed interest in the secession issue 
and published several articles in support of secession as well those that spoke out against it or 
just saw it as a novelty. The Mountain Eagle featured the reprint of a Floyd County Times article 
which included secession-related comments from a number of Floyd County residents. The 
29 “Secession group seeking good things of life for hills,” Snapp says,” The Mountain Eagle, October 2, 1958, 1. 
30 Ibid, 1. 
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comments ran in both directions but most expressed frustration with the treatment of the east 
Kentucky counties by Frankfort, and a number of them expressed a deep resentment over the 
mountain counties’ outcast status. One resident pointed out that Kentucky would have two 
additional senators if a new state was created and that possibly many of those who had left the 
region might return to help build the new state. A common theme that generally summed up the 
feelings of those who favored secession was suggested by Forrest Burchett, a construction 
worker, who said “We are a forgotten section. The rest of the state remembers us only at election 
time.” Businessman Blaine Hall summed up the opposition, saying, “It’s not practical to form a 
new state. We don’t have the industry and resources to form a new state.” Prestonsburg Mayor 
Bill Napier was decidedly unique in his honesty when he said, “We can’t blame anyone for our 
troubles but ourselves. We had a chance to elect a governor (Bert Combs, elected in 1959) and 
we didn’t. We failed ourselves.”31 
 The issue drew advice and opinions from as far away as Daytona Beach Florida, in an 
article from The Daytona Beach Evening News that said while it was no surprise to see secession 
rear its head in the United States, it was something of a surprise for it to be coming from 
Kentucky, “which stayed in the Union in the War Between the States.”  While the article did 
admit that Kentucky wasn’t actually looking to secede from the United States, it narrowly 
attributed eastern Kentucky's discontent to being from the excess taxation of the mountain region 
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to benefit the Bluegrass and tied it to taxation issues in Florida, ignoring the general neglect that 
had permeated the secession conversation.32 
The Dickensonian (newspaper) of Clintwood, Virginia became interested in the issue and 
wrote that joining Virginia would be a mistake for the eastern Kentucky counties, and that 
Virginia’s mountain counties should join their Kentucky counterparts in forming a new state. 
Orby Cantrell said that while he did not endorse the proposal, he admitted the Tidewater and 
Bluegrass residents did not understand the mountaineers either. He advised the group to “camp 
on the doorstep of Frankfort and Washington” and to cooperate with their neighbors in Virginia 
to work cooperatively for road and flood control projects. The secession group voted to invite all 
the Kentucky candidates for governor to meet with them, and Lt. Governor Harry Waterfield was 
invited to come to the next meeting. The group also expressed its desire to meet with senators 
John Sherman Cooper and Thurston Morton during their visit to eastern Kentucky that was 
planned for later in October.33  Gish wrote later that he was disappointed that Morton had not 
chosen to take part in “The Eastern Kentucky Development Tour,” and that Cooper had left it 
after attending “Cooper/Morton Appreciation Day” in Hazard. 
The Mountain Eagle took its first plunge into state-wide politics in 1959, when Tom Gish 
agreed to travel with Lt, Governor Harry Lee Waterfield as press representative during 
Waterfield’s tour of Kentucky as he sought the Democratic nomination for governor.34 When he 
announced that he was taking a couple of weeks off to join Waterfield on his tour, Gish said “the 
32 “Dividing a state is no answer,” The Mountain Eagle, “1958, 2. 
33 “Secession group seeking good things of life for hills,” Snapp says,” The Mountain Eagle, October 2, 1958, 1. 
34 “Editor of Eagle to serve as aide to Waterfield," The Mountain Eagle, January 15, 1959, 3. 
69 
newspaper would maintain a neutral editorial policy concerning the gubernatorial race” and 
would make every effort to give equal news coverage to all the candidates. On the editorial page, 
it was another matter, and The Eagle published a number of editorials in favor of Waterfield and 
a few that were critical of Combs. 
The Democratic primary at that time usually served as the de-facto governor’s election in 
Kentucky and many other southern states, so great was the power of the Democratic Party in the 
post-Civil War south. Two weeks before the primary, Gish wrote an editorial claiming that 
Waterfield was eastern Kentucky’s only chance for the future and outlined Waterfield’s three 
point “line of attack” to alleviate some of the region’s problems.  He endorsed Waterfield and 
wrote that Combs had nothing but the “usual trite phrases and promises” to offer the region, and 
went into detail to outline Waterfield’s “three-point plan” of road development, lowering freight 
rates on coal hauled out of Kentucky by rail, and building flood control dams. He finished by 
saying Combs had not come up with any new ideas or positive approaches for eastern Kentucky 
and accused him of getting ahead of issues before taking care of the fundamentals. “First things 
first Mr. Combs.”35 
Then, five days before the May 26 primary, The Mountain Eagle reprinted an editorial 
from The Kentucky Post and Times Star in Frankfort that sharply criticized Combs for attempting 
to tie Waterfield to outgoing governor A.B. Happy Chandler. The writer said he had known both 
Combs and Waterfield for a long time, and in his opinion, Waterfield, would be his own man and 
would not take orders from Chandler. Then he explained the rivalry that split the Democratic 
35 “Eastern Kentucky’s one chance for the future is Harry Lee Waterfield,” The Mountain Eagle, May 14, 1959, 2. 
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Party in Kentucky by emphatically tying the “Combs-(Wilson) Wyatt faction” to former U.S. 
Senator Earle Clements. 
We have observed Mr. Waterfield when he served with distinction in the Kentucky 
 House of Representatives for 12 years and more recently as presiding officer of the 
 Senate. We have known him to be a man who thought for himself, made decisions for 
 himself and was HIS OWN MAN. We are sure he is HIS OWN MAN…A lot of heat-
 generated and trumped up hatred against the present governor, A.B. Chandler has been 
 used by the bitterly opposing Combs-Wyatt faction of the Democratic Party against Mr. 
 Waterfield….As everybody knows, this state is torn in the campaign by the old rivalry 
 that has existed for years between the forces led and dominated by former U.S. Senator 
 Earle Clements and what has been dubbed the Chandler faction of the Democratic Party. 
 When one digs to the bottom of this argument, that unfortunately is what this 
 governorship race is about – a lot of personal and selfish ambition for power. Shall the 
 shadow of Earle Clements return to Frankfort or shall the wisdom and the experienced 
 judgment of Mr. Waterfield, the man who is HIS OWN MAN, prevail.36 
Even after Combs secured the Democratic nomination, The Eagle had a little fun by 
reprinting an editorial cartoon in the May 30 issue (just after Combs won the primary) titled 
“Small Boy on an Elephant.” The cartoon showed Combs dressed in a sailor suit trying to ride an 
elephant with “Clements” written on its side. The caption read, “Bert Combs is riding on the 
shoulders of the wily, burly, ‘whispering Earle’ Clements….Like a small boy on an elephant, 
Mr. Combs rides uneasily.” Then not long before the November election, Gish once again made 
fun of the Combs campaign, accusing Combs of not knowing anything about Letcher County, 
including its name, after Combs’ campaign chairman John C. Watts congratulated the Democrats 
in Boone County for uniting the Democratic forces in the county to support Combs. The 
announcement mentioned the appointment of Letcher County Judge Executive Arthur Dixon, 
Banker and former judge executive James M. Caudill, and businessman J.S. Holbrook as county-
                                                 
36 “Waterfield’s the man,” reprinted from The Kentucky Post and Times Star,in The Mountain Eagle, May 21, 1959, 
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co-chairmen for the Combs campaign in Boone County in northern Kentucky. While Gish 
probably understood it was a mistake, he took the opportunity to skewer the Combs campaign 
nevertheless. 
Any day now we expect to receive an announcement from Watts that he has appointed 
 three co-chairman from Boone County to work together for Letcher County.  We just 
 hope that if Combs is elected, somewhere along the line he and his manager will learn a 
 few lessons in geography. We hate to think that all those roads promised to Letcher 
 County will be built in Boone County.37  
Gish never really warmed up to Combs and in December, an editorial summed up his 
position when he wrote that he had been approached by a group of Letcher County businessmen 
asking him to write an editorial “pointing out to Governor Bert Combs that Letcher County 
should not be left out of his plans for new highway construction.”  He expressed his reluctance to 
write such an editorial, writing that the paper had supported Waterfield in the primary that year 
because it believed he would do more for Letcher County and eastern Kentucky and finished by 
writing, “And now, even though the evidence points to the conclusion that we were right, we are 
reluctant to say ‘We told you so."  Gish pointed out that the state highway department couldn’t 
build roads connecting eastern Kentucky with the rest of the state without generally following 
the riverbeds of the three main rivers, the Kentucky, the Big Sandy, and the Cumberland Rivers, 
and since all three had their headwaters in Letcher County, the terminus of the roads would have 
to be situated there. A new US 119 would have to run along the Cumberland River, a new US 23 
would have to follow the Big Sandy and the new Route 15 planned by Combs to run from 
Campton to Hazard as a two-lane road was the same road laid out by the Eastern Kentucky 
                                                 
37 "What’s that again?” The Mountain Eagle, September 17, 1959, 2. 
72 
 
Planning Commission and promised by Waterfield except that Combs planned to stop in Hazard 
instead of Whitesburg.  
This newspaper says to Governor Combs, Come on Governor. Nothing would make us 
 happier than for you to prove we were wrong in the primary. Build us that road. Don’t let 
 anybody tell you the road should stop in Hazard.38 
The timing of the governor’s race coincided with efforts by regional businessmen to 
promote tourism as a vital part of the eastern Kentucky economy, and when the East Kentucky 
Planning commission proposed a $25 million project to create “Skyline Drive” on the ridge of 
Pine Mountain from Elkhorn City to Pine Mountain State Park near Pineville in Bell County, The 
Mountain Eagle was enthusiastic in supporting the idea.39  The possibility of a state park running 
the length of Pine Mountain was appealing to Gish but he was also interested in a state park that 
took advantage of the old trail between Letcher and Harlan Counties, which he felt would be 
much easier and less expensive to accomplish. The trail crossed the historic Scuttle Hole Gap, 
and had the appeal of the panoramic view from Pine Mountain, the waterfall at Bad Branch Falls, 
and endless caves running through the limestone in Pine Mountain. It would require the dual 
efforts of Letcher and Harlan Counties and would only require slight improvements to the 
existing trail, later called “The Little Shepherd Trail.”40 
The construction of the luxury hotel, “La Citadelle,” in nearby Hazard also excited Gish 
and he praised the developer, Lawrence Davis for his vision and for his faith in the region. 
                                                 
38 "We hate to say it," The Mountain Eagle, December 17, 1959, 7. (Route 15 was finally completed in the late 
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39 “Proposal for Skyline Drive along Pine Mountain gets tentative approval of East Kentucky Planners,” The 
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Davis’ comments at the hotel’s opening struck a chord with Gish, particularly Davis’ statement 
that the only thing wrong with eastern Kentucky was the people that live in it. He said the people 
who lived there had no faith in themselves or in Eastern Kentucky, concluding “They are not 
willing to invest their own money in it. The people in Hazard laughed at me when I started this 
motel, and they wished it would fall off the cliff.”41 
To Gish, La Citadelle was much more than a motel, it was “the foundation stone for 
development of the long dreamed of tourism industry in Kentucky.” He saw it as a step that 
would help tourism to become an important piece of the economy and help to provide the badly 
needed jobs that were lost when underground mining failed.  An earlier editorial had assumed a 
similar note, saying that most eastern Kentuckians failed to see the beauty of their home region 
and that “We can’t see the forest for the trees,”  when he wrote that while other counties in the 
region were starting to see the possibilities of a tourist economy, Letcher County 
characteristically lagged behind, “Other areas are turning scenery into a profitable business. We 
could do the same.”42 
Tourism was an ongoing theme in The Mountain Eagle and when a bus tour of state and 
national leaders, sponsored by the east Kentucky Planning Commission, visited Letcher County 
in 1958, Gish was quick to point to the possibilities offered by tourism. The front page article on 
the visit quoted National Parks Service official Allyn P. Bursley as saying that “he saw no reason 
Eastern Kentucky could not be developed into a top tourism center.” Bursley, who served as 
Regional Chief of Recreational Resource Planning, must have been impressed by what he saw 
41 “Big need of Eastern Kentucky is faith of residents,” The Mountain Eagle, August 21, 1958, 2. 
42 “We’re Beautiful Too,” The Mountain Eagle, May 15, 1958, 3. 
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because he repeated Gish’s mantra, “All the area has to do is to develop what it has.” Another 
federal official said he was sure Whitesburg would qualify for federal assistance under Urban 
Renewal and low income housing programs.  Williamsburg Congressman Eugene Siler, a 
Republican from Kentucky’s 8th Congressional District who accompanied Bursley, was a strong 
advocate for the Depressed Areas Legislation that was currently being debated in Congress and  
was enthusiastic about helping Letcher County increase tourism opportunities, particularly to 
generate job opportunities. He was quoted as saying he was “proud that the area had no 
communism,” adding that he had consistently voted against foreign aid since he had entered 
congress, preferring to spend Congressional funds in eastern Kentucky.43 
 Gish knew tourism and highway development would have to run hand in hand and often 
expressed doubts that tourists would be willing to follow the winding mountain roads to Letcher 
County. He also knew that without highway development there would be no opportunity to 
expand industry in the county past the already prevalent coal mining. The Mountain Eagle began 
to report and editorialize heavily on the marriage of road development and tourism in the late 
1950s and it was a constant theme for years. Gish’s most common complaints with the Combs 
Administration were that Combs did not see Letcher County as the logical center for road 
development in southeastern Kentucky, and the governor did not support locating a state park in 
the county. Gish  wrote several editorials expressing doubts about Combs’ State Highway 
Commissioner Henry Ward’s assurances that the Whitesburg-Hazard section of the “Eastern 
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Kentucky Turnpike” would ever be built, and editorials expressing his disappointment that state 
parks were located in other eastern Kentucky counties but not in Letcher.   
In 1961 Gish stung Ward to the point that the Highway Commissioner wrote a long letter 
to the editor in defense of Combs’ plans for building the Eastern Kentucky Parkway. Ward took 
exception to Gish’s allegation that the use of federal funds would cause too many delays after 
Gish wrote that the announcement that Kentucky would share the costs of the highway with the 
federal government meant the possibility of long delays due to congressional debate and meant 
that the work would extend through several administrations. It also predicted the downscaling of 
the stretch from Campton to Prestonsburg to a two lane road with portions of it following the 
existing roadbed, and accused Combs of misleading the voters of eastern Kentucky who had 
supported the $100 million in state road bonds approved in the 1959 election.44  Ward wrote that 
the estimated $50 million cost of the road would be too much for Kentucky to bear and also 
promised that the road from Hazard to Whitesburg (Route 15) would be rebuilt.45 Gish replied 
with a short editorial saying he appreciated Ward’s assurances, and that he welcomed “Ward’s 
firm insistence that we have been wrong – that the Whitesburg – Hazard section of the East 
Kentucky Turnpike would be built.” With tongue in cheek, he said Ward had convinced him that 
the road would be built and added the he would also go along with Mr. Ward in his statement 
that Kentucky was among the national leaders in statewide highway construction, with the 
caveat,  
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We doubtless were blinded by the conditions of roads leading out of Letcher County. 
 They are so bad we seldom get beyond the county limits, and our eyes tell us that 
 highway construction has been at an all-time low under Governor Combs.46 
The selection of state park sites was another bone of contention for The Mountain Eagle. 
As much as Tom Gish lobbied for a park in Letcher County it was not until late in his lifetime 
that a state park was located there and that was the linear Pine Mountain Trail State Park in 2003. 
The paper’s first expression of disappointment over Combs reluctance to locate a park in Letcher 
County came in the last edition before the new year of 1961, when Gish told his readers that 
bitter past experiences with Kentucky governors had taught Letcher County residents not to 
expect anything from Frankfort “except higher taxes,” and excoriated Combs for a broken 
campaign promise to locate a state park in Letcher County as part of the road and parks bond. 
As we all should have known when Governor Combs stood before a community-wide 
 meeting here a few months ago, and assured the county he wanted us to have a park, 
 Letcher County was completely left out in the cold…. So much for Combs’ promise to 
 build a new Eastern Kentucky.47 
Gish’s disappointment was even more bitter because the Kentucky State Senate had 
passed a proposal earlier that year, introduced by Senator Archie Craft of Whitesburg, to urge the 
Department of Conservation to “give all consideration to the establishment of a state park on 
Highway 119 between Whitesburg and Cumberland at the top of Pine Mountain.”48 In an 
editorial in the same edition, Gish praised the appointment of Kentucky Journalist John Ed 
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Pearce as “Our friend on the parks board,” and said Letcher Countians could be assured that 
Pearce would “speak every good word possible on our behalf.”49  
In early December of 1960, Governor Combs announced what he called the "greatest 
parks expansion and construction program ever undertaken by any state at any time." The 
announcement was part of a project that Combs called "our plans for developing Kentucky into 
the recreational center of America."  Five new parks were to be developed initially in Grayson 
County, Breckinridge County, Perry County, Greenup County, Boyd County, Pendleton County, 
and Boone County. Three others, in Bell County, Floyd County, and Russell County were to be 
expanded, but nothing for Letcher County. However, Combs said that other parks might be in the 
making, but the projects he presented had been given priority because of "a long and careful 
survey" which had been underway since the previous spring.  "I want to make it crystal clear that 
the program now being developed is not the entire parks expansion program.......The many parks-
minded Kentuckians who have proposed state development beyond this program should not 
assume that their proposals are not under consideration." Combs also tied the parks to highway 
development and clean-up efforts, as well as lakes and a vacation development program.50 But 
the writing was on the wall, and at least, for Gish, it was plain that Combs had no plans for any 
recreational development in Letcher County.   
The first indication that the park issue might not go Letcher County’s way had come in 
May when Governor Combs spoke at a meeting in Letcher County and said that while he wanted 
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to see a park located there, it would be up to a commission to decide. Combs said he didn’t know 
what the commissioners would recommend “but I can tell you one thing, I’m on your side.” The 
speech came after a tour of the area on top of Pine Mountain.51  The final decision excluded 
Letcher County as well as Cumberland in Harlan County. The article announcing the decision 
stated that a source had told The Eagle there had been considerable feeling that a park should be 
located on Pine Mountain and that the competition between Whitesburg and Pineville as the park 
site had much to do with both towns being left out.52 Gish and many Letcher County residents 
felt that Combs had betrayed them and the feeling lingered throughout his term. Combs' 1961 
announcement that a new state park would be located in Cumberland didn’t ease the tension. 
The failure to obtain a park was not the end of the tourism issue and the announcement 
by Lt. Governor Wilson Wyatt in May 1961 that construction of a “Skyline Drive” along the 
ridge of Pine Mountain in Letcher County would begin soon brought renewed hope. Wyatt made 
the announcement at the commencement speech he gave to the Whitesburg High School Senior 
Class and said it was the result of an idea “born in Letcher County three years ago in a 
conversation with Tom and Pat Gish.”  The route would follow the logging road leading from 
US119 at the peak of Pine Mountain to Baxter in Harlan County, a route Wyatt said he planned 
to travel the next day with several representatives of the highway department.  He said he hoped 
to eventually extend Skyline Drive all the way to the Breaks of the Mountains in Pike County. 
Gish was enthusiastic about the prospect and said that the possibility of tying Whitesburg and 
Cumberland together with the trail would “offer the state the rare opportunity to tie two highly 
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desirable park areas into one major site.” He wrote a series of editorials through the rest of 1961 
endorsing the idea and offering advice but he warned that the park by itself would not bring 
industry to Letcher County, reminding his readers that Florida’s prosperity had initially come 
through tourism and that industry had come later.53 
Gish had become so disgusted with Bert Combs that even when Combs was doing 
something Gish thought desirable, it was very difficult for him to praise the governor, so meeting 
with President John F. Kennedy, who Gish supported and admired, didn’t gain Combs any praise 
from The Mountain Eagle.  In a 1961 editorial, Gish criticized Combs a for spending too much 
time in Washington meetings with Kennedy and for his appearances before Senate Committees 
examining poverty in eastern Kentucky, by saying that Combs and Lt. Governor Wilson Wyatt 
had the means to “do something of vast importance for Eastern Kentucky” without taking a 
single trip to Washington.  Several weeks before the editorial was written, Combs and Wyatt, 
amidst great fanfare, had held the groundbreaking of the “East Kentucky Turnpike” at 
Winchester.  
The start was made at the Winchester end of the project, in the heart of the Kentucky 
 Bluegrass, one of the richest areas in the United States. The money being spent on the 
 turnpike, and the jobs that will be provided may be great for Winchester, but they don’t 
 do a thing for depressed Eastern Kentucky.54 
 
Gish argued that Combs could create a minor construction boom in eastern Kentucky if 
he would just go ahead and build the roads that would bypass the downtown areas of Hazard, 
Whitesburg, Jackson, Pikeville and other cities in the region and that the newly opened areas 
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would also provide a boon for business development.  He also blamed the lack of business 
development in the eastern Kentucky cities on Combs’ decision, saying that until solid plans for 
the bypasses were in place it would be foolish for motels, restaurants, or businesses to go ahead 
and build, since they might build on the wrong site and miss out on the bypass traffic. By then, 
Gish had given up on Combs and turned his attention to an issue that placed The Mountain Eagle 
in the middle of a power struggle between two powerful political factions. 
Education was always at the top of the list of The Mountain Eagle’s main concerns and 
the conditions of Letcher County Schools not only affected economic development, the poor 
quality of the schools concerned the Gishes as parents. Indeed, Tom Gish later admitted that the 
poor educational opportunities in the county had been one of the worst things about his decision 
to move back to Whitesburg. One of the prices the Gish family paid...,.and it was a cost borne by 
his children.55  
The Letcher County school board was not accustomed to public scrutiny and positively 
detested the idea of having a reporter present during meetings. The board went to extraordinary 
lengths to keep all except carefully chosen visitors out of its meetings and treated Pat Gish 
particularly poorly during her pregnancy with her son Ben, when she was forced to stand during 
entire meetings as she covered them. There was only one chair aside from those used by board 
members and it was assigned to whoever was addressing the board at that time. 56   
Problems with Letcher County schools had long been an issue in the county and had 
recently drawn the attention of state officials as well. The act of reporting the business at school 
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board meetings and publishing reports from county and state oversight groups, as well as re-
printing reports from the Kentucky Department of Education, caused a rift between the 
newspaper and the school board that didn’t go away. The Mountain Eagle started 1959 with an 
editorial concerning an article that had appeared in the New Year’s Day edition that listed 
Letcher County teachers’ salaries as being fifth from the bottom in Kentucky, 211 out of 215. 
The editorial added that out of the then 48 states, Kentucky stood at 47th in teachers’ salaries and 
referenced the familiar and ironic “thank God for Arkansas and Mississippi,” mantra that 
permeated Kentucky educational circles for years.  
And according to (Courier Journal columnist) Allen M. Trout’s figures Letcher County 
 is at the bottom of Kentucky’s scale, which puts us at the bottom of the bottom. We can’t 
 get much lower…. How can these things happen, you ask with the minimum foundation 
 program in effect to help the poorer school districts? Apparently, the answer lies in the 
 qualifications of the teachers we are hiring, lack of adequate classroom space and the lack 
 of ‘extra’ programs in our schools. When officials of the State Department of Education 
 spoke here last year they told us we were losing thousands of dollars every year because 
 we made no provisions for ‘extras’ such as art, music, etc., for which the state will pay 
 extra salaries. And they said we are losing because we do not have enough classroom 
 space to hire the teachers we really need...The question is, what are we going to do about 
 it? 57 
The struggle that split the board was not one of reformers replacing corrupt officials or a 
dispute between progressives and the forces of the status quo. Rather, it was an all-out fight 
between two political factions for control of the school board, the county school superintendent, 
and all the opportunities for patronage that came with that control. Much to the disgust of both 
parties, that struggle played out in the pages of The Mountain Eagle. The struggle between the  
(Dr. Benjamin) Wright faction and the (Superintendent William B.) Hall faction had gone on for 
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quite a while, with Hall in the ascendancy, by way of wielding the considerable powers of the 
superintendent over Wright, who was merely a board member. It came to a head when Dr. 
Wright, a longtime board member and Democrat political operative in Letcher County, was 
elected as Chairman of the Letcher County Board of Education in January 1959 as part of a 
reorganization of the board that resulted from the November 1958 election.  
Wright replaced the former Board Chairman, Daniel Johnson, at a special meeting and 
two new board members who were both Wright allies came in as well. With the help of Basil 
Hall, who had defeated Johnson in November, and Kern Whitaker, Dr. Wright immediately 
called a special meeting and recommended laying off 12 maintenance workers who he said were 
mostly idle during the winter months. He also heard an appeal from a cook who had been fired 
by Superintendent William B. Hall. At the last meeting of the old board, Dr. Wright, Daniel 
Johnson, and Superintendent Hall had argued about several matters including the firing of the 
cook, Lillian Raleigh, whom Hall had fired for insubordination. Wright had responded, “wasn’t 
that insubordination on account of how she voted? Wasn’t she told her bread and butter 
depended on how she and her family voted?”  Hall denied the accusation and said the woman 
hadn’t attended cooking school.58  Mrs. Raleigh was reinstated in a 3 – 0 vote with Wright and 
the two new members voting yes, over Hall’s objection that they couldn’t re-hire her without his 
recommendation.59 Regardless of affiliation in the intra-board disputes, the school board 
members did not care for Pat Gish’s in-depth coverage, or for seeing themselves quoted in the 
county newspaper, and they obviously didn’t like what it revealed about their intentions. It was 
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far more to their liking for their squabbles over control of the school system to be done in private 
so they could present a more favorable picture of the board in public. When The Mountain Eagle 
covered the meeting in detail, Wright took it as a personal affront.  
The factional dispute showed no signs of cooling off, and at the February school board 
meeting, another clash erupted between Hall and Wright over teacher placement in county 
schools. This time both sides asked the paper to report on the dispute, although each side wanted 
to see the paper support their position. When board member Arnold Hall asked that each teacher 
be asked to list “her” preference of schools in which to be placed as 1,2, or 3, it initiated a bitter 
exchange between Wright and Superintendent Hall. When Hall reminded the board "that the 
superintendent places the teachers,” Wright responded, “You’re immune to the request of the 
board are you? I wish the paper would say that.” Hall said he wished the paper would report that 
the superintendent is attempting to preserve the superintendent’s authority and Wright replied 
“Well, you may as well get ready. There are a few little things left to the board, and you’re not 
going to get any emergency teachers until you place the qualified teachers.” Hall replied, “Old 
righteous Doc.”60 
Later that year, another messy dispute was carried out in the pages of The Mountain 
Eagle over the employment of Superintendent Hall’s wife Nora Hall as County Lunchroom 
Director.  Although it was presented by the Wright faction as simply Superintendent Hall’s 
attempt to hire his wife Nora, the situation involved a good deal more.  By 1959, even rural 
schools in Kentucky usually had budgets of over $1 million, and a significant portion of that 
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budget ran through the lunchrooms. But the money involved was insignificant when compared to 
the opportunity to expand patronage and cement relationships in the old boy system that 
permeated purchasing agreements in school board politics. The Lunchroom Director oversaw the 
day to day operations and made recommendations to the board on where to purchase foodstuffs 
and supplies. Although the items were generally required to be bid out, there were ways to 
influence the bids including making requirements for quantities and sizes that would influence 
who received the final bid. One of the most prized was the highly lucrative milk contract, 
through which schools regularly purchased thousands of gallons of milk in half pint cartons each 
year. Regional dairies competed feverishly for the bids and getting a county school system’s bid 
could guarantee a profitable year. Collusion between the Lunchroom Director and superintendent 
could make that happen and guarantee a very grateful bid recipient. The Lunchroom Director 
also had a good deal of influence in hiring and firing cooks and other cafeteria workers and in 
purchasing food other than the institutionally packaged items that came through state contracts. 
The Lunchroom Director, when working with the board and superintendent, had considerable 
power and influence, controlled a significant budget, and offered many opportunities to enhance 
patronage. 
School Superintendents serve as Board Secretary and keep minutes in Kentucky and at 
the May board meeting, Dr. Wright pointedly told Superintendent Hall he was very adept at 
coloring board minutes to suit himself. Wright’s comments carried over from an argument about 
the purchase of coal to heat schools from the April meeting when Dr. Wright had said coal could 
be bought cheaper than the $5.50 a ton the board was paying. At that meeting, Hall had said the 
coal was not “mine run” but was hand-picked block coal. Wright said he had visited every school 
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in the county and had not found a single lump of hand-picked coal in any coal house.61 Hall then 
said Wright had promised to find coal companies that would sell the board its coal for $3.80 per 
ton but Wright said he hadn’t made that promise, prompting a heated exchange in which both 
men questioned the other’s integrity.  The question of Superintendent Hall’s wife serving as 
Lunchroom Director was again raised and Hall told Wright, “I don’t have too much respect for 
what you think is right.” Wright replied, “Nor I for you.” Board member Arnold Hall then told 
the superintendent he was not capable of running the schools, which led to an exchange between 
the two in which each called the other “a dirty liar” and Board Member Hall told Superintendent 
Hall that if he would take off his glasses, he would hit him, but the superintendent refused to 
remove his glasses.62 
It became clear why the board wanted to keep their disputes over money and power out 
of the public eye. As the conflict with the board continued, The Mountain Eagle revealed an 
embarrassing attempt to remove board member and Hall supporter Arnold Holbrook from his 
position on the grounds that he could not prove he had at least an eighth grade education. Under 
Kentucky law at the time, this disqualified him for board membership. In June the Holbrook 
matter came to a head with a second dispute concerning a paycheck for Kingdom Come 
Principal Reuben Watts.  Holbrook and his family had moved to Cumberland in Harlan County 
earlier that year, and other board members indicated that between the residence dispute and the 
lack of an eighth-grade certification, they did not believe Holbrook should continue to serve. 
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62 “Verbal exchanges punctuate board meeting,” The Mountain Eagle, May 7, 1959, 3. 
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Over Holbrook’s objection, the board voted to hold a special meeting to determine if his seat was 
open. The Mountain Eagle raised the question of implications for Superintendent Hall because 
Holbrook was a consistent vote in favor of Hall’s positions. Holbrook filed a lawsuit and 
obtained a temporary restraining order funded by a $500.00 bond put up by former Sheriff 
Robert Collins that prevented the board from holding the meeting. Dr. Wright and the other 
board members were represented by Harry Caudill. The Mountain Eagle noted: 
The hearing holds implications for County School Supt. William B. Hall as well as for 
Holbrook. Three members of the board - (Dr. B.F.) Wright, Arnold Hall, and (Kern) 
Whitaker - make no bones about the fact they want someone other than Hall as 
superintendent. Warfare at board meetings has been open since (Arnold) Hall and 
Whitaker took office in January. But under state law, a vote of four members is required 
to remove a school superintendent from office and even then, he may only be removed 
for cause. With Holbrook, a supporter of the superintendent out of office, the anti-Hall 
board members, who are in the majority, could name someone of their own choosing to 
replace Holbrook and thus be assured of the four votes necessary to remove Supt. Hall if 
they could sustain charges against him.63 
Once again both sides set out to bring the paper into the issue and each side wanted it to 
promote their own version of events. The board sent a letter to The Mountain Eagle stating that 
while it objected to Nora Hall serving in the lunchroom position, board members did not object 
to her serving as a classroom teacher at Whitesburg High School. The letter alleged that Hall had 
sent out a letter to his supporters asking them to come to board meetings and instigate in his 
behalf. Then Wright, Arnold Hall, and Kern Whitaker sent another letter to the paper stating that 
Hall and his wife were receiving $13,000 annually in salaries and expenses from the school 
system and accused Mrs. Hall of using her position as County Lunchroom Director to influence 
the outcome of county school board elections. The letter from Hall was included in the statement 
63 “School board membership dispute taken to court,” The Mountain Eagle,” June 18, 1959, 1. 
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and hinted that if the Lunchroom Director’s position was abolished, the entire county lunch 
program would be threatened. In the letter, Hall had reminded his supporters that “The schools 
are yours and the lunch programs are yours. The health of our boys and girls is important. You as 
citizens owe it to yourselves not to stand by and see our Lunch Program destroyed.”  Wright’s 
statement reminded the citizens that the letter had been mailed at taxpayer expense and explained 
his position.64 
Whitesburg physician Dr. Lundy Adams wrote “Letters to the Editor” in support of Mrs. 
Hall and alleged that the board had failed to make its case for removing her, saying that the only 
charge the board had made stick was that Mrs. Hall was the wife of the superintendent, but it did 
little to change the board’s mind.65 At the next meeting, Dr. Wright and his supporters said they 
would vote to do away with the Lunchroom Director position rather than hire Nora Hall for the 
job, and Superintendent Hall said he would not recommend anyone else. Mrs. Hall requested that 
sheriff’s deputies be present at the special called Saturday meeting, which had drawn so much 
interest it had to be moved to the Whitesburg High School gym instead of the superintendent’s 
office, where the board usually met. The board had already been forced to hold its May meeting 
in the board’s reception room, due to size of the crowd when it voted to abolish the lunchroom 
job and to employ Mrs. Hall as a teacher at Whitesburg High School. The change in venue 
prompted Superintendent Hall so send letters to his supporters urging them to attend the meeting, 
where he read a recommendation that the board rescind its vote to abolish the lunchroom 
position. After Hall concluded, Alvin Holbrook moved that the board accept Hall’s 
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65 Ibid, 2. 
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recommendation, and Wright said, “We are not opposed to a lunch director but we are opposed 
to Mrs. Hall,” adding that if Hall would recommend someone else for the job the board would 
reinstate the position. Wright went on to say that the county had been misled by Hall’s 
suggestion that the lunchroom program would be abolished if Mrs. Hall was not re-appointed, 
but that was not the case.66   
This contentious exchange revealing the power struggle between the two factions was the 
kind of thing that had gone unreported before the Gishes came to town. Although both sides 
acknowledged the newspaper's right to report, and attempted to use the paper to present partisan 
positions on other matters, it was an embarrassing example of something that would have 
previously been handled behind closed doors. Whether or not the board members actually felt 
any embarrassment is unknown, but the board continued to make efforts to keep The Mountain 
Eagle out of meetings and failing that, to make it as uncomfortable as possible for the reporters 
to cover the meetings. The important point that came from the newspaper’s ongoing coverage of 
the bitter and contentious wrangling of the board meetings was that it represented a clash 
between two political factions who sought control of the board and with it, control of the school 
system and all the employees for political power and personal gain. The Mountain Eagle paid a 
heavy price for its insistence on First Amendment rights, as Dr. Wright used his considerable 
influence to limit advertising in the paper even though his attempts to boycott the paper caused 
an increase in circulation. Circulation is important, but advertising pays the bills for newspapers. 
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The chairman of the board of education ordered the teachers not to buy The Mountain 
 Eagle or to read The Mountain Eagle. We printed that little fact in the paper. The end 
 result was that we sold more papers than we had in a long time.67 
A July report concerning an audit initiated by former Kingdom Come Principal Reuben 
Watts was considerably more serious than wrangling for position among board members and the 
superintendent. Watts hired an auditor from his own funds after Superintendent Hall’s wife had 
reported a shortage in lunchroom funds of nearly $400 and accused Watts of failing to correctly 
report the number of lunches served at his school. This turned out to be the reason Watts’ check 
had been held up and the board ordered it to be released at the June meeting.68  In the August 
board meeting Dr. Wright and Superintendent Hall accused each other of trying to be the (Soviet 
Premier Nikita) Khrushchev of the school board. Superintendent Hall also criticized Dr. Wright’s 
cousin, County Court Clerk Charlie Wright, for becoming involved in the job search to replace 
Hall’s wife as Lunchroom Director. In a separate article, Reuben Watts was mentioned along 
with several others as having been hired to teach at Jenkins Independent Schools.69 Later that 
month the paper printed an editorial which featured a letter from Cora Addington, who had left 
for a higher paying job at a school in Florida. Addington had been one of the minority of 
teachers in the school system with a college degree, and had written that “It is no longer funny to 
be kicked around or to have to bow to someone for a particular job you are qualified to hold 
when everyone is pleased with your work, except this particular clique.”70 
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A more serious report concerning an audit conducted by State Auditor Mary Louise Foust 
revealed that the board was not following state laws concerning competitive bidding. At that 
time any public funds over $250 spent by a government entity required the submission of 
competitive bids and the audit reported 21 instances where bid laws had been ignored, including 
coal purchases and the legal services of Board Attorney Harry Caudill. State law was changed 
after the period the audit covered to make the amount requiring a bid $500.71 The audit also 
revealed that mileage and other expense records for employees who traveled on school business 
were not itemized and that the employees got gas out of the school system’s main gas tank for 
their private vehicles in lieu of mileage payments. The audit showed that two high school 
principals had gotten their jobs through emergency certification and each one had teachers 
working under him who were more qualified for the position. It also revealed that no records had 
been kept for rent being received for two apartments at Kingdom Come School, which were 
rented by teachers. Another revelation showed that the board had been paying federal tax 
(although the school system was exempt) on gasoline at several local dealers.72  
Much of the contentious nature of the board meetings dissipated when Superintendent 
Hall’s tenure in office ended with his resignation in June 1961 to become Superintendent of 
London City Schools, and Sanford Adams was hired as Letcher County superintendent.  The 
Hall/Wright feud came to an end, and The Mountain Eagle began to report on state as well as 
local education issues. Harry M. Caudill was appointed to head a Senate Committee 
investigating education in Kentucky, that delivered a scathing report on educational problems in 
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the state.  Many of the problems identified by the report mirrored problems in Letcher County. 
Caudill was elected to the Kentucky Senate in 1959 after replacing the established Democratic 
candidate Hillard Kincer, who died following a heart attack five days before the November 3 
election. Over 2,000 ballots had already been printed and stickers bearing “Harry  M. Caudill” 
were placed over Kincer’s name on the ballots. Kincer had been the incumbent State Senator 
from Letcher County and according to The Mountain Eagle, was “closely identified with the 
Chandler-Waterfield faction of the Democratic Party.”73 
From his days in Frankfort, Gish understood that rural areas in Kentucky had been left 
out of state funding for schools and that the entire state needed educational reform.  The 
Kentucky Senate understood this as well and in the 1960 biennial session, a special investigating 
committee was convened to examine education throughout the state.  One of the members of the 
Caudill Committee was Marlow Cook, a Republican from Webster County, who ran successfully 
for the United States Senate in 1968, becoming the first Catholic to win statewide office in 
Kentucky. Cook was defeated in 1974 by Wendell Ford but played a major role in the Watergate 
Scandal as one of the first Republicans to call for President Richard Nixon’s resignation. The 
Mountain Eagle covered the committee report and follow-up legislation in depth and Gish wrote 
a number of editorials concerning the issue of statewide education. 
The Caudill Committee recommended a complete overhaul of public education in 
Kentucky, including changes in the way state education leaders were chosen, and asked 
Governor Bert Combs to call a special session to enact their recommendations into law. The 
73 “Hillard Kincer’s death puts Harry M. Caudill on Democratic ticket,” The Mountain Eagle, October 29, 1959, 1. 
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report called for the election of board members by district within the county rather than at-large, 
and recommended that the Attorney General be empowered to proceed in Franklin Circuit Court 
against local board members who misused public funds or violated other laws, removing them 
from the friendly confines of their local courts. The committee found widespread and continued 
misuse of school funds and indicated that removal procedures were inadequate. Other 
recommendations were for the creation of citizens’ committees in every school district to 
“exercise constant surveillance over school activities,” a requirement that board members have at 
least two years of high school, the use of merit and quality of performance as determined through 
testing to determine teachers’ salaries, and the creation of an advisory committee on public 
education at the state level. The Caudill Committee also recommended that teachers have the 
right to appeal local transfers to the school board and that it would require a vote of at least three 
board members to uphold the transfer. The committee found that superintendents frequently used 
transfers to penalize teachers for political or personal purposes by assigning them to remote 
schools.74 
The reaction from what Tom Gish referred to as the state’s “organized school lobby” was 
swift, and The Mountain Eagle printed a long editorial condemning the lobby and calling for 
reform. Since many of the findings from the committee were issues that had been raised in 
Mountain Eagle reports, it is no surprise the paper took the stance it did. 
The Kentucky public school system is infested with politics, to the degree that 
corruption appears to be the hallmark of education in Kentucky. School superintendents 
connive to elect their supporters to school board membership thus perpetuating a school 
system spawned in corruption and fed on blood let from Kentucky teachers and their 
pupils. The level of instruction and curriculum in Kentucky has been weakened to the 
74 "Lawmakers call for change in Kentucky’s education setup,” The Mountain Eagle, March 17, 1960, 1. 
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point that high school graduates often are not fit for college training or even for ordinary 
jobs in industry.  
Kentucky educators have reacted in a manner predictable. Instead of attempting to 
answer the charges with cold facts they have resorted to name calling. The chief of the 
name calling cult is Dr. Harry Sparks, head of the Department of Education at Murray 
State College and head of the Kentucky Education Association. Dr. Sparks, in fearless 
fashion, charged that it was all Catholic propaganda….Actually by making such a wild 
charge of Catholicism, Dr. Sparks proved dramatically that indeed there is much 
wrong with education in Kentucky. He had the rope and he hanged himself.75  
The editorial also criticized Governor Combs because he made the comment that he had 
traveled throughout Kentucky for two years (during his gubernatorial campaign) and had heard 
no comments complaining about the quality of the schools, although Combs had later asked the 
legislature to appropriate an extra $103 million for education. It went on to say that unless the 
sales tax program Combs had pushed through produced significant results in highways, medical, 
and educational programs, he would go down in history as Kentucky’s worst governor. It named 
schools as Kentucky’s number one problem and warned that Kentucky school superintendents 
would use the additional funds as a slush fund to build an empire such as no one had seen. The 
committee report had noted there was no indication that the extra funds would result in a 
significant improvement of education or in the quality of public instruction. The editorial pointed 
to the fact that the average rural school system had a budget of over $1 million already, which 
made it possible for the superintendent and his allies on the school board to “derive a tremendous 
amount of political benefit from the sagacious expenditure of these funds.”  It closed by asking 
for further study on the committee’s recommendations and stating that it was no surprise that 
75 “Every man, woman and child in Kentucky has a personal stake in battle over schools,” The Mountain Eagle, 
March 17, 1959, 5. 
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large amounts of taxpayer money were being spent with no positive effect on education and that 
“if any area of government should be non-political, it is in the public schools.”76 
The committee's finding that there was no indication that additional funding would result 
in the improvement of public education in Kentucky, and the call for keeping politics separate 
from education in the final paragraph of The Mountain Eagle editorial were both important 
points. Although officials at any Kentucky school would have no doubt told state officials that 
they could produce better results with additional funding, very few could honestly say they were 
immune from the corrosive effect of politics. That was particularly true in eastern Kentucky 
where stories of school board bag men and county school superintendent's slush funds 
influencing the outcome of elections were common. The real finding of the Caudill Commission 
and conclusion drawn by Tom Gish was that no matter how much money could be funneled into 
education in Kentucky, it would never be enough until politics and political corruption could be 
removed from public education. 
The Mountain Eagle eventually printed the entire Caudill Committee Report and featured 
a number of editorials supporting its findings. The paper was particularly interested in the 
committee’s findings on rural schools and while the editorials did not use problems mentioned in 
other school systems as examples of similar problems in Letcher County, the comparisons were 
there for readers to make. During the remainder of the year and into 1961, the paper continued to 
report on issues in Letcher County Schools as well as in Jenkins Independent Schools, which was  
in the midst of a prolonged drama over replacing long time Superintendent Charles Victor (C.V.) 
Snapp.   Gish admired Snapp, whom he credited with making the Jenkins system “one of the 
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finest in Kentucky – one that is known and respected throughout the state,” but Snapp had lately 
experienced a contentious relationship with the Jenkins School Board over the board’s desire to 
hire less qualified, and less costly teachers. Gish's editorial on the possibility that Snapp would 
be dismissed observed: 
Reports we have heard indicate that many of Mr. Snapp’s difficulties with the board 
 stem from his outright refusal to hire teachers of lesser qualifications to fill posts when 
 better qualified personnel is available. We feel sure that Snapp will continue to insist that 
 quality be the first consideration of the school personnel—even if his insistence does cost 
 him his position. Eastern Kentucky has produced no more outstanding public servant 
 than Snapp, whose judgment and experience have earned him statewide and national 
 respect as an administrator and as a true citizen.77 
The Jenkins board declined to renew Snapp’s contract at their next meeting and hired Lee 
Johnson, from Pike County as superintendent. To add fuel to the fire, the discussion took place in 
a closed meeting. The process was contentious and Snapp was hired almost immediately as 
superintendent by the highly-rated city Pikeville Independent Schools, in nearby Pike County.  
There was a good deal of backlash in Jenkins and the three board members who went against the 
legendary Jenkins physician and school board chairman Dr. T.M. Perry in removing Snapp 
received a good deal of public and private criticism. The Mountain Eagle saved its most scathing 
condemnation for the closed door meeting. In an editorial in the same issue as the article 
featuring Snapp’s termination, Gish was adamant that public entities did not have the right to 
conduct their business in private. 
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Regardless of the particular merits of C.V. Snapp, members of the Jenkins Board of 
 Education should be condemned for the manner in which they ousted Snapp as 
 superintendent of schools and the manner in which they have conducted business since.  
 To our way of thinking, no public agency, charged as the school board is with spending 
 thousands of dollars of money belonging to the taxpayers, has the right to conduct any 
 business except in an open, public manner. We always suspect the worst when we see a 
 public agency hide behind closed doors to conduct its business---and long experience in 
 many situations has convinced us of the wisdom of that suspicion. The result of the 
 closed door, meet-in-secret procedure of the Jenkins Board is that no one in Jenkins has 
 yet heard a full public explanation of the board’s reasons for not re-employing Snapp. 
The editorial explained that the lack of public disclosure raised speculation about the 
board’s motives, and while the closed door meeting may have been legal since it was on a 
personnel matter, Gish pointed out that “Board actions taken in secrecy are generally believed to 
be illegal.” In what must have seemed like high irony to Gish, he used the Letcher County Board 
of Education as the counter-balance to Jenkins in the area of open meetings. 
By contrast the Letcher County Board of Education now conducts all its business in open 
 public session. This, we believe has much to do with the air of harmony that now hovers 
 over the public school system and the general public. By hiding nothing, the Letcher 
 County board has done away with the widespread distrust that used to exist.78 
While the newspaper and the Letcher County School Board reached a temporary 
accommodation, at least on open meetings, the board’s dislike of The Mountain Eagle hadn’t 
diminished and was one of the issues that dominated the rest of the decade. Neither did the 
contentious relationship with the fiscal court subside. But as national policies increasingly 
engulfed the mountains in the War on Poverty, The Mountain Eagle's role in challenging 
traditional institutions, practices, and power structures would continue to grow. 
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Chapter Three 
As poverty became a national issue, dozens and then hundreds of reporters, 
photographers, and agency workers streamed into eastern Kentucky, and a significant number 
made The Mountain Eagle their first stop. However, politicians and reporters were not the only 
ones who were shocked by the endemic poverty they saw in eastern Kentucky. When Tom and 
Pat Gish relocated to Letcher County in 1957 to purchase The Mountain Eagle, they were 
altogether unprepared for the destitution they were greeted with, even though Tom Gish had 
grown up there. President Johnson told America that he would prosecute a "war on poverty" 
during his state of the Union Speech in 1964, but the main announcement came later in the year 
when Johnson, followed by herds of reporters and TV cameramen, finally declared his war at an 
unemployed sawmill worker's home in Martin County Kentucky.  Tom and Pat Gish may well 
have wondered if the announcement would have been made in Letcher County if John F. 
Kennedy was still president, since Homer Bigart's New York Times report which had galvanized 
Kennedy to actually do something about Appalachian poverty had been written following his 
visit to Letcher and surrounding counties and in consultation with The Mountain Eagle.  Indeed, 
much of the reporting that alerted Kennedy to the crisis of Appalachian poverty came from 
reporters who had visited The Mountain Eagle. 
In an interview conducted by Appalshop filmmakers Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kinney 
in 2005, Tom Gish commented he and Pat were shocked when they were confronted with the 
extreme poverty in the region firsthand. Gish grew up in Seco, a relatively prosperous coal 
mining community where his father was the superintendent of the of the Southeast Coal 
Company, which the town was named for.  Gish had a comfortable life, which included a college 
education at the University of Kentucky. Most of the people in Seco worked for Southeast Coal, 
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and the miners were members of the United Mine Workers, who at that time were among the 
best paid industrial workers in the nation. After college, the Gishes lived and worked as reporters 
in Central Kentucky for ten years. When they returned to live in Letcher County, the reality of 
the situation in Letcher County came as a shock. Tom Gish said that although he had been raised 
in eastern Kentucky, he knew very little about the region as a whole. “I grew up not knowing 
how people were struggling. I thought I knew something about the mines, but in fact I knew 
absolutely nothing. Eastern Kentucky was a vast unknown in Frankfort.”1  But, Kennedy's 1960 
primary campaign had shown the national media spotlight on poverty, and a number of the 
academics who had been able to do graduate work at American universities through the GI Bill 
began to address racial, ethnic, and class based issues as they moved through American 
universities.  
When anthropologist Oscar Lewis introduced the term “culture of poverty.” it completely 
changed the discourse on poverty.2  Lewis’ studies of Chicanos and Mexican - Americans 
informed later studies on poverty in both rural and urban America and the idea of a distinct 
culture of poverty in America became a watchword in the social sciences.  Within the economic 
boom that drove American domestic expansion through the 1950s and 1960s, there was a 
growing awareness of pockets of economic decline and isolation that an otherwise thriving 
economy had left behind.3  This was true in rural as well as urban areas. It wasn’t long until 
Lewis’ term was applied to Appalachia as well as the inner-city poor. Later studies show that 
culture of poverty theories are misapplied in greater Appalachia, which was too large and diverse 
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for a narrow description to apply, although some similarities to Lewis’ theory did exist in the 
coalfields.  His indicators of poverty, a cash economy, absence of bank accounts, low wages, and 
frequent periods of unemployment were all shared by many of the eastern Kentucky poor, but 
these were primarily the result of economic conditions rather than part of their culture. The 
eastern Kentuckians who were able to relocate and find jobs in smokestack industries such as 
steel mills, auto plants, and their subsidiary industries often found their way to a middle-class 
life.   
Lewis was not writing about eastern Kentucky when he coined the term “culture of 
poverty,” and his study was conducted in a very different place, although some others including 
Harry Caudill applied cultural applications to Appalachian poverty. In 1963, Caudill linked his 
globalizing treatment of Appalachia as a culture of despair in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, 
but other Appalachian scholars have found active forms of resistance and struggle that are 
ignored in culture of poverty accounts.4  While some of Lewis’ hallmarks applied as evenly in 
eastern Kentucky as they did elsewhere in 1957, the culture of Appalachia was not monogamous 
in the coalfields of Central Appalachia, and although they had been hard hit by the decline in 
coal production, the culture was still very diverse. The poverty that America saw in Appalachia 
was not rooted in the culture, which had been based in subsistence agriculture and extractive 
enterprises. This poverty was structural, since coal mining, which was by far the most lucrative 
element of the economy, had supplanted other forms of enterprise and also led to land 
distribution patterns that left displaced miners without the means to return to agriculture, even if 
it had been sufficient to support their families.5  
                                                 
4 Karen Tice, Dwight Billings, “Appalachian Culture and Resistance,” The Journal of Human Services, Volume 2, 
1991. 
5 Ibid. 
100 
 
In Appalachia on our Minds: The Southern Mountains and Mountaineers in the American 
Consciousness, 1870 – 1920, Henry D. Shapiro’s 1978 study of the American idea of 
Appalachia, he pointed out that while the “myth of Appalachia” might embrace the idea that an 
area as geographically, economically, and ethnically diverse as the Appalachian Mountains can 
be seen as a monogamous region with one culture, it is not realistic, and is part of a stereotype 
that dates back to local color fiction.6  Since the opening of the coalfields, migrants from rural 
areas in the upper south, and a substantial number of African-Americans had made their way into 
the coalfields to seek work. Newly arrived immigrants from eastern and southern Europe had 
been recruited “off the boat,” as they came into America, and there were ethnic neighborhoods in 
most coal towns, along with “colored” neighborhoods and segregated schools in the Jim Crow 
states like Kentucky and Virginia. One feature of the migrations out of the coalfields was that 
when jobs became scarce in Central Appalachia, the economic migrants from other regions or 
nations who lacked the deep roots of the native born Appalachians were among the first to move 
on and the most likely to stay away, either along the more common routes of U.S. 23 or other 
highways to the Midwest, or to the Atlantic seaboard. Later migrants also traveled south, to the 
burgeoning industry of the sunbelt, to Atlanta and Charlotte, or to growing cities such as in 
Knoxville and other areas in the upper south. These economic migrants followed age old patterns 
of kinship or community networks by helping those who came to cities to find work, and 
relatives or neighbors often were happy to “lend a hand,” by letting recent arrivals sleep in a 
spare room or basement until they got established, or to help them get a job at their own place of 
work. Others, who remained in the coalfields did not adopt patterns of passivity more common in 
a culture of poverty. Some of those who stayed took lower wage jobs and other patterns of 
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resistance emerged, including the micro economic enterprises of flea-marketing and quilting 
circles, and militancy developed among retirees who opposed corporate and union indifference 
to their plight, along with activism in the Miners for Democracy movement which sought to 
retake the UMW from the corruption of the Tony Boyle era.7 
 Although there were pockets of persistent poverty in Central Appalachia, they existed 
alongside areas of middle class affluence in the cities and towns.  The rediscovery of 
Appalachian poverty in the late 1950s brought increased scrutiny from outside the region, and it 
wasn’t news to the poor people who made eastern Kentucky their home. Many of the middle 
class union miners and residents of county seats did not see themselves as poor and came to 
bitterly resent the coinage of poverty related language to describe their homeland.  The poor of 
Appalachia were very similar to the poor of other areas in some ways, the old, the sick, and those 
who were unable to adapt when the post war boom  bypassed the mountains of Central 
Appalachia. The decline in coal mining jobs was brought on by the changeover from coal to 
diesel fuel to power trains, along with a large reduction in the coal mine workforce as 
mechanization replaced men with machines and displaced thousands of coal miners in mines too 
small to adapt. As coalfield residents left the region, those who were unwilling or unable to take 
part found themselves working at low wage jobs in other extractive industry such as quarrying, 
or timber, and some found it difficult to provide even the basics of  food and shelter for their 
families. As state governments began to expand the qualifications for state-administered 
programs for the poor, it led to even greater opportunities for patronage for county elites as relief 
increasingly came through county governments.8  However, these slight efforts were not 
sufficient to address the deep seated poverty of the coalfields, and the boom and bust cycles of 
7 Karen Tice, Dwight Billings, “Appalachian Culture and Resistance.” 
8 Ron Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington Kentucky, 
2008), 33. 
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coal mining and the lack of diversity in other job producing businesses made steady jobs that 
paid a living wage difficult to find for the unskilled miners. 
The rise of national interest in Appalachian poverty produced a predicable response from 
many middle-class Appalachians who were not poor themselves and who resented the picture 
painted by national studies depicting their home region as a pocket of poverty. When Tom Gish 
when he returned to Whitesburg with Pat, they were largely unaware of the depth of the problem. 
That was especially true for the residents of the larger towns, and for the union miners who lived 
in relatively prosperous coal towns and who rarely saw the grinding poverty of the smaller 
camps where work was scarce and surrounding land was owned by coal companies. Others, such 
as Harry Caudill deplored the welfare programs of the New Deal for the corrosive effect they 
saw on self-reliance among their mountain neighbors, even though Caudill worked for increased 
relief as a state legislator. He was torn between a desire to see people be able to feed their 
families and his fears of generational poverty exacerbated by the dole.  In Harry Caudill's 
campaign for the 1960 Kentucky House of Representatives election, a campaign ad stated that he 
had worked to bring what he referred to as the "Fourth Category" of funds, financial help paid 
for by the federal government for to people who were permanently and totally disabled. It also 
reminded voters that Kentucky was one of the few remaining states that did not take advantage 
of the "Fifth Category" of federal funding that would provide for medical assistance to old age 
pensioners, and Caudill called for the legislature to provide the matching funds which would 
allow the state to "help our aged people in their illness."9   
9 Political ad, "Harry Caudill, Democratic Candidate for Representative offers a progressive program to the voters," 
The Mountain Eagle, May 21, 1959, 11. 
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Yet, in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, Caudill wrote that “The administration of any 
system of aids, gifts, grants, or loans is fraught with peril to character or integrity." He believed 
that many recipients of federal and state benefits had not earned them and even if a person had 
earned benefits through a lifetime of labor, those benefits looked to others, and perhaps to the 
recipient, as "unearned gifts. "It is unthinkable that a rich and enlightened society should permit 
its unfortunate members to starve in the midst of plenty; but once the justifications are admitted 
the difficulties still stand undiminished.”10 
Caudill wrote that by providing cash, food, and clothing to the unemployed and their 
families, the government would establish a pattern of dependency that would deprive 
mountaineers of the drive to provide for themselves and create generations of people who would 
gladly subsist on the dole. Citing the prolific reproductive rates of the mountaineers, he wrote 
that he believed having children would become just another way to increase the government’s 
largess and that a WPA make-work program would be much preferable to direct welfare, 
because at least in the WPA, the recipient had to work for his check.11   
The Mountain Eagle took a personal view of the inequities involved in financial aid to 
poor and disabled people in a series of articles that addressed problems faced by Whitesburg 
resident Kelly Turner, who was forced to abandon his job selling The Eagle, which paid him 
$10.00 to $15.00, along with additional income from doing odd jobs, in order to obtain $43.00 a 
month in state aid after he qualified for permanent disability. After several articles concerning 
10 Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands, 275. 
11 Ibid, 279. 
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Turner's situation, a May 1959 editorial posed the question, "why does he have to quit his job in 
order to draw public assistance?"12   
When the Gishes began to address the county's problems in the pages of The Mountain 
Eagle, Harry Caudill was practicing law in Whitesburg and representing the county in the 
Kentucky House of Representatives. He had established himself as an attorney of exceptional 
skill and he had dabbled in writing, initially with a history of Letcher County. An unbound copy 
of his "History of Letcher County" in the Harry Caudill Library in Whitesburg contains some of 
the ideas he carried over into his later work, including his thesis that the extractive economies of 
coal and timber were not conducive to long term prosperity. Caudill was prosperous and had 
developed a reputation as a free thinker and he was not beholden to the power structure. He and 
his wife Anne became friendly with Tom and Pat Gish and the two couples enjoyed  many 
evenings drinking iced tea and exchanging ideas, a number of which found their way into 
Caudill's writing as well as Mountain Eagle editorials. Certainly Caudill and Gish understood 
that while economic diversity was vital to the long term future of eastern Kentucky, they also 
agreed that the beginnings of that diversity must be based around the coal industry. It simply 
made sense that the region's largest economic generator be used to develop other industry, by 
first basing development around coal mining, and then expanding the industrial base and 
developing a small business economy as well. 
The Gishes and Caudills also enjoyed entertaining out of town guests, and a steady 
stream of reporters, academics, and others came through both homes as each man's writings 
gained a national following. The Gishes and Harry Caudill served as tour guides and interpreters 
12 Editorial: "Why can't Kelly have both? "The Mountain Eagle, May 8, 1959, 2. 
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for the national press that descended on Letcher County as the rediscovery of Appalachian 
poverty made its way onto the front pages of The New York Times and Life Magazine. The 
teachers were also students, who learned by seeing the stark reality of poverty over and over, 
although poverty was a word that was rarely seen in The Eagle in the early years after the Gishes 
took over. When it was, it was used in articles like a 1959 editorial supporting "Clean-Up Week" 
in Whitesburg as an admonishment to county residents to clean up their cities and their own 
property.  When Gish praised the Jenkins Kiwanis Club for their  annual efforts to clean their 
city up and urged county residents to take advantage of the opportunity to have their old lumber 
and other large trash hauled away free during the cleanup efforts, the editorial ended by 
reminding readers that "Poverty is no excuse for dirtiness."13 Other references to the county's 
need included an article that appeared later in the same year to the effect that Social Security 
payments, old-age pensions, disability payments, and aid to families with dependent children 
added $1,485,264 to the Letcher County economy, and that amount not only helped the 
recipients, but "helps businesses in the community because generally most of the money is spent 
immediately on food."14 
Tom and Pat Gish became close to a number of Kennedy and later, Johnson 
Administration officials in their role of guide, host, and sometimes interpreter to visitors from 
Washington. Tom Gish carried on a regular correspondence with a number of officials, including 
Franklin Roosevelt Jr., who served as Undersecretary of the Department of Commerce. In 
January, 1963 Gish was forced to cancel a meeting with him in Lexington due to family 
circumstances, Gish wrote explaining his absence, and thanked Roosevelt for the administration's 
winter relief program for eastern Kentucky and invited him to consider Whitesburg to serve as 
13 "Our poverty is no excuse for our uncleanliness," The Mountain Eagle, May 7, 1959, 2.  
14 "$1,485,264 a year paid in Letcher by Social Security," The Mountain Eagle, November 17, 1959, 7. 
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headquarters for the program. He told Roosevelt that the city lay in the heart of eastern Kentucky 
spiritually as well as geographically, and suggested that Washington staffers would get a more 
accurate representation of the region in Whitesburg than more urban and prosperous areas. 
The further downstream you get from Letcher County, in any direction, the more you go 
from poverty to prosperity. The problems of eastern Kentucky reach a climax here and 
fade as you move downriver to Lexington, Ashland, or Bristol-Kingsport.15 
When Caudill published Night Comes to the Cumberland’s: The Biography of a 
Depressed Area, in 1963, it focused national attention on the problems of Appalachia and created 
what seemed like a cottage industry that brought well-meaning outsiders to the area to redeem 
the locals. Caudill was generous in spreading blame for the poverty and hopelessness he saw, 
and his explanation implied more structural roots to the poverty of the region instead of a culture 
of despair. His two main targets were the coal industry and the corrupt and ineffective county 
governments that were dominated by the coal operators and enthroned officeholders.  By the 
1920s, the coal industry had solidified its control over every aspect of life in the coalfields. The 
scrip system kept wages firmly in the hands of the company by issuing metal coins which could 
only be redeemed at the company store as all or part of the miners’ pay and easy credit for 
miners at company stores led to a system of debt peonage that was very similar to the system in 
the post war South that kept sharecroppers dependent on merchants and land owners. The coal 
companies' most important public interest lay in electing county officials who would do their 
will, especially those who set tax rates on coal property.16 This lack of fair tax assessment, 
Caudill argued, was one of the factors responsible for the poor quality of schools in the coal 
15 Tom Gish, Letter to Gordon Ebersole, Gordon Ebersole Congress of Appalachian Development papers, East 
Tennessee State University Library, Johnson City, Tennessee. 
16 Harry Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands: The Biography of a Depressed Area, (Boston. Little Brown and 
Co., 1962), 125. 
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producing counties, and one that led to the increasing poverty in the area, as the coal mines either 
played out or moved toward the mechanization that put thousands of miners out of work. 
Caudill pointed to the mechanization of the coal industry as a prime factor for the 
increase of poverty in central Appalachia, and he was emphatic in stating that it was 
accomplished with the full cooperation of UMWA President John L. Lewis. As cutting 
machines, hydraulic drills, shuttle cars, and continuous mining machines reduced the demand for 
labor, unemployment and poverty increased. Along with poverty came the relief programs, 
beginning in the Great Depression. Caudill wrote that "the Depression Dole was one of the most 
significant factors in the demoralization of the mountaineer," and  after the first ten years, it 
became the standard rather than the exception, as welfare replaced work,  and "giveaway lines 
ceased to be shameful.”17 According to Caudill, as institutionalized welfare replaced the dole, the 
process of demoralization continued and the mountaineers sunk deeper into depression and 
poverty. The lack of jobs in the only industry they knew led older miners into a life of 
dependence and caused younger and better educated mountaineers to leave the hills in search of 
work in industrialized cities.  Out-migration expanded throughout the region, and for many of 
those who remained, life on Public Assistance took hold. The high birth rate and low 
employment in the mountains caused the welfare economy to materialize, and taboos against 
unwed birth were put aside.18 Due to welfare rules concerning the availability of government 
assistance to families with fathers living at home, many families were split and Appalachian 
society became more tolerant of illegitimacy, although Caudill observed that mountaineers had 
always been rather relaxed in that respect. Social Security, Union Pensions, and medical cards 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 185. 
18 Ibid, 285. 
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became a cottage industry among mountain people and the easy availability of “nerve pills” and 
pain medication laid a pattern for later problems with drug addiction.19  
 Very few Americans embraced government welfare payments as the key to reducing 
poverty, and Tom Gish and Caudill both took the New Deal approach of promoting the creation 
of jobs and the diversification of economic opportunity through federal and state programs, 
which Gish promoted in  his editorials.  Both men believed that working for a paycheck was 
important to the quality of life for the individual and family as well as that of the community, 
even if the paycheck came from the federal government in the form of make-work programs like 
the Civilian Conservation Corps or the Works Public Administration that had built so many of 
the region's post offices and schools. And there was work along those lines that needed to be 
done in the region.  Gish wrote many editorials advocating that federal spending on economic 
development and job creation programs would alleviate poverty, and the money spent on welfare 
programs would be reduced if the government also invested in the region by developing  industry 
in Central Appalachia in order to put the people to work. Then, a small business economy could 
be developed around coal mining and the government sponsored industrial development. 
However, his point of view smacked of socialism and central planning in the Cold War decade of 
the 1960s, and many of the local businessmen and coal operators disliked it intensely. Others 
took exception to reports on state and federal economic development conferences, along with 
reprints of articles from state and national newspapers that highlighted the economic woes of the 
region, because it associated the county's middle class and business community with the poor. 
These grievances were reflected in Letters to the Editor and in the withdrawal of ads by local 
businesses. 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 291. 
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 Gish and Caudill were both aware of the poor quality of education in eastern Kentucky 
and how it handicapped the region’s youth. The Caudill Commission Report had made the 
inadequacy of education in Kentucky a major legislative issue and Gish conducted a long 
running editorial conversation concerning the need to improve education.  Both men also 
understood that simply providing money from welfare payments without helping the recipients 
develop skills that could be used in industrial applications would not alleviate poverty, whether 
industrial jobs became available in eastern Kentucky or they sought work in other places. John 
Kenneth Galbraith expressed a similar opinion in The Affluent Society when he wrote that simply 
increasing income would not eliminate poverty, but that improving the condition of the 
individual in poverty would be necessary whether they stayed in the region or not. Those who 
could not leave, due to poor education or a lack of skills, would be left to rot on the vine of the 
welfare state.  
"The most certain thing about this poverty is that it is not remedied by a general advance 
in income," wrote Galbraith.  Poverty would not disappear because the poor had inadequate 
skills and methods of coping with their situation which made it difficult to manage even after 
finding work. That was particularly true if the individual remained in the ghetto or could not get 
away from the rural slum. If they could not find jobs and build lives outside the zone of poverty, 
"none can escape."20 
 When Gish was called to testify before the U. S. Senate Special Committee on 
Unemployment Problems in 1959, which was convened in Pikeville and Harlan, he pointed to 
the tax assessment of Bethlehem Steel's vast holdings in Letcher County which were listed at $3 
million, although Bethlehem Steel had paid Consolidation Coal $25 million for their property. 
                                                 
20 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, (Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt Boston, 1958), 238. 
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He had first addressed the issue of taxation to pay for better education in an editorial that was 
published not long after he and his wife took control of the newspaper. When the Letcher County 
Board of Education released their budget for the 1957 - 1958 fiscal year in October 1957, an 
editorial titled "Is there nothing we can do," challenged the county's methods of property tax 
assessment and criticized county officials for failing to address the issue of raising property taxes 
to fund education.  The school budget for the entire county system was $1,067,110, while 
property tax revenues for 1957 – 1958 were estimated at $165,000 against receipts of 
$159,844.58 the previous year.21 At the same time, coal production rates for the Big Sandy 
Coalfields stood at 5,224,620 tons in 1957 and 4,961,770 in 1956.22 Harry Caudill and Pat Gish 
were appointed to serve on a citizen's board to examine the issue of increasing funding for 
county schools. In the report issued by the committee, it was revealed that property tax revenue 
receipts for 1956 and 1957 stood at $159,844.68, down slightly from the 1955 – 1956 total of 
$162,502.72.23 
As Appalachian poverty and how to address it became a political issue in the late 1950s,  
the political divide was much the same as it had been during the latter days of The New Deal, 
with conservative southern Democrats allying themselves with Republicans to oppose social 
welfare programs. An ambitious bill aimed at alleviating the severe poverty of the coal fields 
through economic stimulation and improvements in vocational education was passed by both 
houses of congress, but vetoed by President Eisenhower. When congress failed to override the 
veto, it became an important issue in the 1960 presidential campaign.  The bill had been 
introduced and was first passed in the Senate. In the House, it was championed by United States 
                                                 
21 “57-58 School Budget of $1,067,110 Set by County Board,” The Mountain Eagle, October 10, 1957, 1. 
22 “Coal’s Future Stable, Reed Tells Institute Members at Award Dinner,” The Mountain Eagle, May 30, 1957, 3.  
23 “57-58 School Budget of $1,067,110 Set by County Board,” The Mountain Eagle, October 31, 1957, 1. 
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Representative Eugene Siler, who initially brought the issue of poverty in eastern Kentucky up in 
a 1958 House floor speech proposing the enactment of the Depressed Areas Bill. Siler described 
eastern Kentucky by saying,  
 Such an area is one where the levee of misfortune is so high that the floodtide of 
 prosperity never spills over into its little valley of despondency. It is a place where the 
 jam is never quite down on the lower shelf. It is a hungry breadline in the midst of a land 
 flowing with milk and honey.   
His comments were delivered during the closing days of the 85th Congressional Session in 1958 
when he described the $375,000,000 Depressed Area package approved by the Senate as 
legislation that would “stimulate new factories, public facilities, technical help, and vocational 
training in hard hit areas.” 
 In language that has often been used to describe the paradox of eastern Kentucky poverty, 
Siler described eastern Kentucky as a place, that “rolls in verdant beauty, (and) rises high in 
magnificent mountain peaks. Yet paradoxically, it is something of a barren desert, that is to say it 
is a desert in the matter of employment opportunities for its citizens.”  Siler told his colleagues in 
the House that the region had lost about 92,000 in population (more than 10 percent of the total) 
between 1950 and 1956 and that joblessness had increased by 75 percent “during the very time 
when most of the remaining parts of America had so many jobs and so much currency their 
people were buying two TV sets for their homes, two cars for their garages, and two pots for two 
hens to cook on brand-new electric stoves.” He referenced foreign aid to Afghanistan and Great 
Britain against the paucity of help for eastern Kentucky and finished by asking “Then, why can 
we not approve this little measure to help our own flesh and blood…The wolf has not only been 
at the door in my part of the country, it has come inside and now has a full litter of pups.” 24 
                                                 
24 “Congress hears of poverty in mountains of east Kentucky,” The Mountain Eagle, August 21, 1958, 2. 
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 At the time of Siler’s speech, the House Rules Committee had not scheduled the 
corresponding measure from the House Banking Committee, on which Siler served, and 
Congress faced adjournment soon. The bill passed the House and passed again in committee, but 
was vetoed by President Eisenhower in May of 1959. The veto override failed, but all three 
candidates for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, Lyndon Johnson, John F. Kennedy, 
and Stuart Symington of Missouri voted to override. Kennedy said his campaign trip to West 
Virginia had shown him the need for the bill but Eisenhower, in his original veto message, said it 
was too broad and would waste taxpayer’s money.25 
 As the presidential campaigns gained momentum, and the media began to examine 
poverty and unemployment in Appalachia, differences in approach to the problem became an 
issue for the upcoming elections. The first of many hearings that were called by both houses to 
address the issue were held when the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Unemployment 
Problems convened hearings in Pikeville and Harlan, deep in the mountains of Kentucky, and  
Gish's testimony was reprinted in The Mountain Eagle with the caveat that the paper felt the 
people had a right to know what their spokesmen said to “a body as important to us potentially as 
the Senate Committee,” and because “what Gish had to say indicates again and with renewed 
emphasis the things The Mountain Eagle hopes to see take place in eastern Kentucky, the things 
the editorial policy stands for and the things it works for publicly and privately.”26  
 Gish began his testimony by saying that while he did not wish to be overly melodramatic, 
he wanted to tell a true story he that felt summed up the situation in eastern Kentucky. The story 
concerned a man he had known all his life, an unemployed coal miner with eight children who 
                                                 
25 “Depressed Areas Bill Veto by Eisenhower Upheld in Senate Vote,” Schenectady Gazette, May 25, 1958, 1. 
26 “Special government help needed to solve Eastern Kentucky’s problems,” The Mountain Eagle, December 17, 
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had shot and killed himself two weeks before Christmas the previous year. The man had been out 
of work for three years, displaced by the mechanization of the eastern Kentucky coal mines and 
at the age of 55, had been unable to find work in Ohio or Michigan. His wife had gone to work 
as a cook in a local restaurant for 25 cents an hour but the family couldn’t make it on that wage, 
and even if she worked 18 hours a day, they could just exist. The man watched this for two years 
and realized his family would be better off, and eligible for more assistance if he was dead. Then 
they would be able to qualify for any survivors benefits he had coming, as well as the widows 
and orphan benefits available from the state. With the father alive, there were very few benefits 
they could receive except charitable ones. 
 And so, as a Christmas present to his wife and eight children, the man took out his 
 shotgun and calmly shot and killed himself. It was the best Christmas present he knew 
 how to give. Living he was of no help to his family. By dying, he could feed them. That 
 man’s plight is typical of thousands of men in Eastern Kentucky. The only difference is 
 that he did figure out a way to feed his family. 
 Gish told the senators that out of a labor force of 12,000 in Letcher County, only about 
3,000 were gainfully employed, and that one-fourth of the population was carrying the burden 
for the rest of the county. He declared that capitalism, which had brought prosperity to the 
United States, had failed eastern Kentucky and that “we can’t ever really be sure of our system 
unless it is made to work everywhere.”  Gish pointed to eastern Kentucky as a place with a great 
abundance of natural resources which should make everyone in the region wealthy. Anticipating 
the words of Harry Caudill and many others in the 1960s, Gish added: 
 But to a degree that is shocking, Eastern Kentucky was robbed by eastern financial 
 interests and that robbery goes on today. Most of the coal lands in this area were 
 purchased fifty years ago by sharp talking Easterners who came in and purchased coal 
 rights for one dollar an acre even if the purchase had to be made at times at the point of a 
 gun.   
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 He then pointed out the true villain of the Appalachian epic, structural factors such as 
inadequate tax assessment and the lack of investment in a broad-based economy by absentee 
owners who drained the profits from the region and left it with the waste and spoil of extractive 
industry. This argument discredits culture of poverty arguments placing the fault with the 
residents of the coalfields, and places the blame on the political and economic structure. 
In my county of Letcher – one of the nation’s leading producers of coal – there is not a 
 single coal operator or coal land owner who makes his home there. They make their 
 money and they move out, taking the wealth of the county. Letcher County has built 
 some fabulous homes in Louisville, Lexington, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and on the French 
 Riviera or in Florida. But you won’t find a single one in Letcher County.27 
 Gish told the committee of the purchase of Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal’s Letcher 
County holdings by Bethlehem Steel, and reminded the group that both companies were located 
in Pennsylvania. Consol sold its holdings to Bethlehem Steel for $25,000,000, but Bethlehem’s 
Letcher County properties were only listed for tax purposes as being worth $3 million, which 
was $2 million more than Consolidation had listed it.28 
 Gish also spoke of the “rape of Letcher County by U.S. Steel Corporation,” with the strip 
mining of Black Mountain, Kentucky’s highest mountain, and how the overburden was dumped 
over the hill to eventually make its way into the Poor Fork of the Cumberland River, and create a 
situation ripe for flooding. 
 By the time U.S. Steel completes its stripping of the 40 mile length of Black Mountain, 
 the entire Upper Cumberland River area will be gutted and largely unfit for human 
 habitation. And enough mud and dirt will have been dumped into the Cumberland River 
 to create flood and navigation problems that will stretch from here to the mouth of the 
 Mississippi.29  
                                                 
27 Ibid, 7. 
28 Ibid. 
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Gish said it was a long way from Pittsburgh to eastern Kentucky and he suspected the 
executives of Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel either didn’t know or didn’t care about the misery 
they were causing. He pointed out the exploitation by the absentee owners because he considered 
it central to the problem of unemployment in the region and added that if only a fraction of the 
money taken out of eastern Kentucky had been reinvested in the region, ample opportunity for 
the unemployed would exist. He told the committee that the eastern Kentucky secession 
movement of the previous year had brought a good deal of attention to Letcher County and as 
one of the leaders of the movement, he wanted to make it clear that nobody actually wanted to 
secede, but to call attention to the ongoing poverty and unemployment in the midst of the 
depletion of billions of dollars of resources from the region. He said he still had faith in America 
and believed if the problems of eastern Kentucky were plainly laid out, solutions would come, 
but outside help would be the only way for the region to take its place at the American table. 
And while I would like to believe there is a way eastern Kentucky can pull itself up by 
 its bootstraps, I know that is not the case. Outside help on a vast scale is 
 needed….Eastern Kentucky is 50 years behind the rest of the United States in 
 development. Our children still go to school much in the manner of Abraham Lincoln but 
 they don’t receive as much education as Lincoln got. Eastern Kentucky people are not 
 equipped by training or by heritage to live in this age of rocket trips to the moon. There 
 is at least a 50 year gap between this area and the rest of the country -- and it is to close 
 that gap that we need outside help.30 
Gish painted regional education problems with a broad brush, neglecting to point out that 
there were also better performing schools in eastern Kentucky and other parts of Central 
Appalachia that were turning out students who were well suited to compete. He might have used 
this opportunity to reinforce his point that the tax structure was designed to keep taxes on 
property and minerals low, and conspired to deprive coal county schools of the revenue 
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necessary to keep them on a par with better funded independent city schools and those in urban 
areas. In making his case, he could have refined his aim to target the structural inadequacies of 
the system that favored the interests of coal corporations. But in presenting a solution, he called 
for outside funding, presumably from the federal government, and laid out a seven point program 
very similar to one developed by the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission in 
September 1959 to initiate positive changes in the region. He called for increases in funding for 
education that would help to bring eastern Kentucky schools up to par with the rest of the 
country and for a vocational education system to train young people to find jobs in other parts of 
the country, with a formal relocation bureau that would help the residents of eastern Kentucky 
relocate and including moving expenses. He also requested federal funding for flood control and 
the expansion of every federal program available to the residents of eastern Kentucky, including 
FHA loans, along with the heavy involvement of the Small Business Administration and the 
Department of Commerce to help develop sustainable models of business in Eastern Kentucky. 
Gish said that small business and economic diversity could develop a sound economy, but that 
the businesses that could be generated in eastern Kentucky would require capital and “know 
how” to be successful, and added that for far too long regional leaders had gone begging to state 
and federal government only to be told that nobody could do anything about eastern Kentucky, 
so many were left with the attitude of “why bother?” 
Somebody had better bother with Eastern Kentucky. It is sick, sick with a failure in our 
 national way of life. This area must either get well or die and if it dies, the United States 
 will die too, for our way of life in this country will have failed.31  
The programs Gish proposed were likely taken from a plan that was initiated by the 
Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission in September 1959, and was named Program 
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60 when it became the official state action plan for the region. The EKRPC was chaired by John 
Whisman and had been created by Gish's ally and friend Harry Waterfield. It was the result of 
cross agency planning with a series of two meetings to set the agenda, and Gish had not only 
participated in the planning sessions, but had been influenced by the results as well. In February 
1960, The Mountain Eagle carried the release of Program 60 in a front page article stating that   
EKRPC Executive Director John Whisman had released the entire program at a meeting in 
Frankfort that was attended by Governor Bert Combs, Lieutenant Governor Wilson Wyatt, 
Economic Development Commissioner E.B. Kennedy, and other officials.  The article carried a 
statement from Whisman referring to the 32 Appalachian counties in eastern Kentucky as an 
"underdeveloped but not under-populated region," and indicated that the reason for the chronic 
poverty that plagued the region was the lack of development, or under-development, which 
became a theme in the Whisman/Combs work to improve economic conditions. Program 60 
called for the establishment of a federal planning agency for the region and the establishment of 
an "Appalachian States Development Authority."  It asked for the broadening of the Kentucky 
state government's program to improve leadership in the region, a review of the criteria of federal 
programs that affected the construction of economic centers, the determination of Kentucky's 
resource evaluation and priorities, and special programs for planning and construction of 
highways.32 
In June 1960, at a conference of governors held in Montana, Governor Bert Combs called 
for federal assistance to Appalachia where he told the gathering that just as it had made sense to 
strengthen the economies of America's allies in western Europe through the Marshall Plan so that 
they might stand with the United States against communist aggression and develop the free 
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world economy, then "surely it makes equally good sense to rebuild the underdeveloped areas of 
our country, so that these people who are loyal Americans can become economic factors in our 
way of life." If it made sense to rebuild France and West Germany, surely it made sense to 
rebuild eastern Kentucky, which had an acute shortage of food and shelter. Combs also pointed 
out the decline in population in the ten state Appalachian area, with out-migration greater than in 
any other area in the nation, and referenced the 33 percent decline in coal production in the past 
ten years, with a corresponding 20 percent unemployment rate for eastern Kentucky. 
Substandard housing, under-employment, and a lack of trained medical personnel, were all 
reasons for the out-migration of eastern Kentucky residents, mostly to what Combs referred to as 
"the manufacturing belt," and he added that the immigration from Appalachia led to problems in 
the urban areas where they sought work as well.  Combs called for federal aid for flood control 
and for soil conservation but pointed to automation in farming and the coal industry as the two 
main reasons for the lack of jobs in the eastern region of the state.  He said he didn't want to 
criticize the men who had drafted the depressed areas legislation, but that it had failed to 
recognize the basic problems of the Appalachian Region.  "Trying to make one bill cover 
conditions in Nashua, New Hampshire and eastern Kentucky is like trying to mix a salve that 
will kill a dog's fleas and cure its distemper at the same time."33 
Combs also returned to the theme of underdevelopment in Appalachia at a conference 
called by John F. Kennedy "to consider the problem of new jobs and economic growth," during 
his presidential campaign. At that conference, Combs criticized the Eisenhower Administration, 
which included Kennedy's opponent Richard Nixon, describing them as having "no 
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understanding of our problems, and no desire to deal with them." He added that they regarded 
federal aid as something self-respecting people would not want, and referred to administration 
officials speaking scornfully of "handouts."  "But catchwords are of no help where people are 
hungry and children need clothing and families need homes."  Combs stated that although 
Kentucky had many prosperous areas, with an average income of $1,425 per annum, it also had 
areas with an average income of under $400 per year, where underemployment was well above 
the national average and that during a recession, it grew at a faster rate where the problem was 
already present. He gave the loss of 31.2 percent of the mining jobs in eastern Kentucky in the 
past 15 years as an example. Combs again referred to the problem areas in Kentucky as 
"underdeveloped," as opposed to being simply depressed, and called for a program with new 
vision to "realize the potential of these regions and their people rather than a program aimed 
primarily at relief." While Combs' speech was primarily intended as a campaign vehicle for 
Senator Kennedy, it affirmed his own programs and his belief that underdevelopment was the 
real problem that had to be addressed, and made a strong case for federal aid to Kentucky. 
"Underdeveloped areas -- I prefer to call them underdeveloped areas rather than depressed 
areas... But in eastern Kentucky, for example...it is almost impossible to obtain federal aid." 
Combs finished his speech by tying eastern Kentucky's future to the election of a Democratic 
administration on 1960, saying there was no alternative.34  
Two years after Program 60 was released, Whisman gave the keynote address at the 
Whitesburg Chamber of Commerce Banquet. He was listed as the state's Redevelopment 
Administrator on the agenda, although his official title was Coordinator of Appalachian 
                                                 
34 "Appalachia: Huntington West Virginia, September 19, 1960,” The Public Papers of Governor Bert T. Combs, 
1959 - 1963. 
120 
 
Development for Kentucky.35 In his speech, Whisman discussed Program 60 and talked about 
other development issues and told the Chamber that Kentucky would benefit from the Area 
Redevelopment Program. He also announced his plans for setting up Area Development 
Councils, adding that he hoped the upcoming legislative session would establish the councils on 
a statutory basis.36  
Issues concerning poverty were divisive in the mountains, and by calling attention to it, 
The Mountain Eagle angered a number of the courthouse elites as well as the coal industry, 
which touted coal as the economic force and job provider in the region. When statistics in 
national reports challenged their claims, many in the middle class resented the bleak portrayals 
they saw in federal reports and national publications. Industry leaders and local coal operators 
passed their disapproval down to the workers, and depictions of poverty, whether they appeared 
in The Mountain Eagle or the national media, were seen as an unfair portrayal of the of the 
region, and people who enjoyed good wages and middle class lifestyles deeply resented them. In 
the 2005 series of interviews with Tom and Pat Gish by Appalshop filmmaker Mimi Pickering 
and Radio Producer Maxine Kinney, Tom Gish said The Mountain Eagle's reporting on the 
conditions of poverty in Letcher County had been the issue that had first driven a wedge between 
the Gishes and their middle-class neighbors in Whitesburg.37  
Many of the courthouse elites and coal operators saw those who took advantage of relief 
programs as lazy. It was similar the view of many middle-class businesspeople in the cities and 
some union miners, and spoke to the willingness of people of adequate means to deny the 
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problems of the poor. The rural poor were particularly invisible to those who didn’t want to see. 
The willingness to look the other way prevailed even as the residents of Central Appalachia's 
more prosperous towns were reminded of the region’s poverty when poor people came to town 
to shop, to receive commodities, or to beg.  
The Mountain Eagle’s reporting on poverty was part of a larger desire to emphasize 
national issues as well as local ones. Gish frequently indicated that he was proud that the paper 
was seen as the main source of news on local and county issues, but he also realized that 
coverage of state and national news was difficult for many county residents to access. Before 
leaving for college, he had earned extra money as a “paper boy,” delivering the Pittsburg Press 
and the Knoxville News-Sentinel in Seco. The prominent Kentucky newspapers like The 
Louisville Courier- Journal and the Lexington papers didn’t circulate in far eastern Kentucky 
until later, although The Courier Journal was available in Letcher County by 1957.  The national 
news reported in The Mountain Eagle gave the paper a larger perspective and served as a source 
of information on national issues for the readers. Gish believed that the editorial page was an 
open space for discussion, and he was particularly proud of The Mountain Eagle's editorial 
diversity, where his editorials sat alongside national columnists. So although the reporting on the 
national recognition of poverty in eastern Kentucky may have discomfited some Letcher County 
residents, it did not exist in a vacuum, but ran alongside other issues including the Cold War, the 
War in Vietnam, and many of the same topics that appeared in newspapers with statewide 
circulations.  
The Lexington and Louisville papers never got in here during my childhood. There were 
 a couple of radio stations at some point that had local news. So it was a big responsibility. 
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 We brought in news columns that represented the fact that if any Letcher County adult is 
 to know anything about the world they will get TV news or The Mountain Eagle.38 
News about poverty in eastern Kentucky was intensely personal to local readers whether 
it was presented by in The Mountain Eagle or in national newspapers. Early in 1959, The Eagle 
featured an editorial that described a woman coming to a Letcher County Fiscal Court meeting to 
beg for money to feed and clothe her family. It ran alongside an editorial from the Chicago 
Tribune titled, “While the coal miners starve.” The Tribune editorial referenced starving coal 
miners in Harlan County, “where four out of five coal mines have shut down,”  and went on to 
say that the miners’ pleas for help from state and federal agencies were being inadequately 
addressed with shrugging references to red tape and lack of funds. It condemned President 
Eisenhower for vetoing the Depressed Areas Legislation and reminded readers that the United 
States had just lent “another $5 million to (Josip) Tito, the communist dictator of Yugoslavia, 
(to) buy locomotives for his state owned railway system, adding that the U.S. "may as well give 
money to Russia and compliment ourselves on keeping her from declaring war on us.”39 
In his editorial, Gish wrote that “there are a good many adults in Letcher County who 
don’t deserve much more than they’re getting because they’re not trying to help themselves." But 
he added that the situation of the woman who had come to a fiscal court meeting to ask for aid 
for her invalid husband and starving children should not go unanswered.  
How can we expect our county to improve if children can’t go to school because they 
 have no shoes to wear on their feet, no coat to keep them warm, no money to buy lunch?” 
 If a child grows up in a situation like that, how can we expect him to become anything 
 better? He’s licked before he starts.40 
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Gish went on to describe a story he had heard about a first grade teacher who had asked 
the students in her class to list what they had gotten for Christmas. One little girl hadn’t gotten 
anything. The teachers in the school had known of the child’s poverty and had thought that 
surely the neighborhood church would help the family, but it hadn’t. The young teacher was 
shattered by the realization and immediately went out and bought the child a doll, but the gift 
came after the holiday, and lacked the meaning of a Christmas gift. Gish wrote that for every 
story like the teacher's that came to his attention there were probably dozens that went unheard. 
He praised the citizens of Harlan County for banding together to set up a united relief fund to 
help people throughout the county, while criticizing the sectionalism that divided Letcher County 
as retarding similar efforts to help the poor there. 
The paper’s coverage of poverty that characterized life in Central Appalachia increased in 
1959, as the presidential primaries of that year gave the issue lots of national attention and drew 
interest from newspapers, magazines, and television networks. Their activism took so much of 
Tom and Pat Gish’s time that the paper often went out late and sometimes had only three or four 
pages, as both Gishes began to spend much of their time in Washington, testifying before 
congressional committees. When they were in town, the newspaper offices became a gathering 
place for newspaper and television reporters from all over the United States and the Gishes 
became frequent tour guides.   
 During it all, The Eagle was pretty much overwhelmed with visitors from around the 
 country and the world.  We got so busy, the paper became a secondary occupation and 
 sometimes we were four or five days late in getting it out. It became more or less our full 
 time occupation, but the advertisers became disgusted. Pat and I had been reporting for 
 10 years in Central Kentucky before we came to Letcher County, and the Kentucky press 
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 directed journalists and TV from around the nation our way. It is hard to underestimate 
 the shock of the national press at how bad it had become.41 
 
Many eastern Kentucky leaders hoped that the new decade beginning in 1960 would 
usher in a decade of progress for Appalachian Kentucky, and the Eastern Kentucky Planning 
Commission with newly appointed Executive Director John Whisman introduced “Program 60” 
late in 1959 to integrate planning and strategies to improve economic prospects for the region. 
The commission, which was originally known as the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning 
Commission, was formed in 1956 as a joint project of the Kentucky Jaycees and other civic 
groups as well as business and state government agencies during Whisman's term as president of 
the Jaycees. The following summer, the Kentucky Department of Economic Development 
released its Action Plan for Eastern Kentucky that called for the creation of a permanent 
development commission with objectives similar to those of the EKPRC. In the absence of 
Governor Happy Chandler, Acting Governor Harry Lee Waterfield responded to the flooding 
that had ravaged the region by creating the nine member Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning 
Commission, chaired by eastern Kentucky coal operator B.F. Reed. All the members of the 
commission had all been active in Whisman's initial group and when they hired Whisman as 
director in 1958, he shifted its focus to long term economic planning for "Strategic Area 
Development."42  The commission was designed to promote new economic programs in a 32- 
county area in eastern Kentucky and was introduced to high hopes and much fanfare at the 
EKPC meeting in Frankfort in February 1960.  
The plan called for the creation of economic agencies that could address issues such as 
key roads and water control facilities, the implementation of continuous overall planning and 
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development programs, and the organization of special programs on the state and federal level to 
work to eliminate the poverty that plagued the region.43 That spring, the United States 
Department of Agriculture introduced a seven point plan that according to an Eagle editorial, “is 
no different than a series of others which various other government officials have announced 
over the past five years.”44  Indeed, the USDA plan called for much that was familiar; the 
development of wood product usage, vocational education, luring small business into the area, 
water power from federal flood control dams,  tourism and recreation development, the 
diversification of agriculture, and better education and health programs. However, no federal 
funding was proposed for any of the programs and most had been discussed and rehashed for 
years. Eisenhower’s veto of the Depressed Areas Bill in 1959 made it clear that eastern Kentucky 
would have to wait until a different administration sat in the White House before significant 
federal aid would accompany promises and plans from Washington. 
Kentucky Lieutenant Governor Wilson Wyatt did not wait for the 1960 election to 
introduce his own plan for Central Appalachia. Wyatt was the former mayor of Louisville and 
had served in a number of New Deal posts during the Roosevelt Administration. Later, he had 
practiced law in Louisville, where he served as legal counsel to  The Courier Journal and other 
media interests owned by the Bingham family. Wyatt considered running for governor himself 
before joining the Combs ticket as the candidate for Lieutenant Governor. In his commencement 
speech to the Senior Class of Whitesburg High School, he outlined a plan that was very like 
Program 60, calling for the development or roads, dams, and work projects that he said “would 
require no new program, no new agency, and no relief.”  Wyatt said existing federal standards 
stood in the way of addressing many of the problems he saw and prevented “pockets of poverty” 
                                                 
43 “Planning Commission offers East Kentucky action plans,” The Mountain Eagle, February 11, 1960, 11. 
44 “We find little hope in this ‘new’ program,” The Mountain Eagle, June 23, 1960, 3. 
126 
 
from qualifying for federal assistance, but said he believed it was nothing new to apply “the 
principle of special treatment of special problems in order to bring about special results.” Wyatt's 
program included eastern Kentucky, parts of Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, West Virginia, 
and Maryland, and he called on senators and representatives from the Appalachian states to cross 
party lines to “join hands in a great national effort to initiate and carry forward” his plan. Much 
of the plan addressed in Wyatt’s speech had been part of the testimony he had given in a House 
and Senate Public Works Administration Subcommittee hearing, where he had appeared in an 
effort to seek additional funds for flood control and navigation.45  
A Gish editorial that appeared in the same edition as the Wyatt speech suggested that it 
might not be a bad idea to revisit the secession issue and said Eisenhower had “displayed an 
amazing ignorance of what is going on in the United States through his veto action,” and that 
ignorance was the only excuse, because the veto had been unforgivable.  
We do not believe he knowingly would sentence the millions of Americans who live in 
 the Appalachian Mountains to continued lives of poverty equaled only by the poverty 
 found in Asia. And yet that is what Eisenhower has done.  
The editorial contrasted Eisenhower’s veto to his largess in providing foreign aid for 
underdeveloped nations overseas and said that Richard Nixon would pay for “Eisenhower’s 
folly” in the November election. It also stated that  the Conference of Southern Governors was as 
discouraging as the veto had been and blamed the result on West Virginia's Republican Governor 
Cecil Underwood who had reacted to unfavorable national publicity about poverty in West 
Virginia by “denying that anything is wrong and attempting to paint life in West Virginia as a 
bed of roses.” Gish attributed Underwood’s denial as resulting from being bitten by the “vice 
presidential bug,” and wrote that he was unwilling to challenge Eisenhower or Nixon on the 
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issue. He didn't spare Kentucky Governor Bert Combs either, writing that residents of eastern 
Kentucky were becoming concerned about the lack of progress on the promised highway into the 
region.46 
After the election of John F. Kennedy as president, but prior to his inauguration, 
Governor Combs attended the groundbreaking for the Eastern Kentucky Resources Development 
Project building at Quicksand, in Breathitt County. It was a joint state/federal project, directed 
through the University of Kentucky. Combs announced that $147,000 was available for the 
building in the current fiscal year, with an additional $60,000 for an agricultural substation. He 
also promised another $100,000 in the coming year, as well as additional funds for the 
university's Cooperative Extension Service. Combs cited a 200-mile highway (the Mountain 
Parkway), along with other road projects, the expansion of parks and railroads, and water 
projects as evidence of progress for eastern Kentucky. He also mentioned Kennedy's proposed 
"special committee" that was tasked with preparing a program for "underdeveloped areas, some 
of which we have in eastern Kentucky due to the technological changes that have taken place in 
coal mining and agriculture." He promised to move quickly in implementing the projects and 
guaranteed the full cooperation of the federal government in implementing them. Combs credited 
Program 60 and John Whisman, director of the Eastern Kentucky Development Commission, for  
working to expedite the projects, saying that "The idea of bringing in teams of technicians to 
solve the problems of this area was included in the eastern Kentucky Development Commission's 
Project 60, and the commission has endorsed and recommended this important activity."47 
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Gish found the faith Combs and Whisman placed in technicians for development and 
studies to be distasteful. Although he understood that the process would be difficult and 
expensive, in his eyes, the answer was relatively simple. Build highways into the area, promote  
tourism, and develop industrial solutions around the coal industry, such as locating power plants 
in the region. Then work to develop a small business economy that would grow around tourism 
and the coal based industrial development. He and Harry Caudill had called for this kind of 
development many times. Combs and Whisman's approach of bringing in technicians from 
outside denied agency to the mountaineers the programs would serve and just created more 
delays. Although Gish understood that it would take time to accomplish his goals, he was less 
patient with Combs, particularly with the timeline and the necessity of crafting legislation that 
would pass in the General Assembly. Gish came to see the delays as broken promises on Combs' 
behalf, particularly in highway construction and Combs' failure to fulfill his campaign promise to 
locate a state park in Letcher County.  
In 1961 Whitesburg was named as one of 11 Kentucky cities to participate in a federal 
test program to determine if urban renewal programs could work in small cities. The article 
announcing the program stated that Whitesburg could expect to see faster movement in housing, 
urban renewal, and other development programs, and the city would be the subject of intense 
national and statewide interest and publicity. The Kentucky Department of Economic 
Development furnished planning consultants, and grants came in from the federal Housing and 
Home Finance Administration. Whitesburg was selected because it already had a federally 
approved housing program and it was a fifth-class city in eastern Kentucky, which was suitable 
for the size and location upon which federal officials wanted to focus. The other Kentucky cities  
chosen were Barbourville, Glasgow, Mt. Sterling, Ashland, Walton, Lebanon, Fulton, Mayfield, 
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Earlington, and Mayfield. The program initially addressed seven housing related elements 
including building, plumbing, gas and electrical codes, city administrative organization, a 
housing program, a study of city finances, and a plan for citizen participation with a state 
organized staff that included specialists in each area.48 An editorial that accompanied the 
announcement called the program “one of the best things that has happened in Letcher County in 
many years,” but added that being selected presented Whitesburg with responsibilities as well as 
opportunities.  It also cautioned that the outcome would be uncertain and said the city would find 
itself under considerable federal scrutiny. “And so it is ‘Whitesburg, Test City, U.S.A.’ and the 
beginning of what we sincerely believe will be a better day for all of us.”49 
Regardless of eastern Kentucky's hopes and needs, real relief came slowly to most of 
Appalachia. The Area Redevelopment Act authorized the creation of the Area Redevelopment 
Administration in the Department of Commerce, funded at $394 million over a four year period 
in order to provide low interest loans for industry, grants to local governments, and funds for 
worker training. The ADA was modeled on a "trickle down" approach and benefits mostly went 
to businesses. It did not distribute aid evenly and several states were left out entirely. But the 
national press kept the focus on Appalachian poverty and a flood of national writers and 
photographers made certain the American public never lost touch with the harsh realities of life 
there. In a 1960 essay Washington Post reporter Julius Duscha, echoed the Combs/Whisman 
theory that underdevelopment was the chief cause of Appalachian poverty, and was joined by 
other writers who followed up on the theme of an underdeveloped region in the midst of a 
prosperous and modern America.50  
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Governor Combs did his part to promote the Area Redevelopment Bill (Senate Bill One) 
by testifying in its behalf early in 1961, when he called the bill " a necessary and effective part of 
the solution to the nation's economic problem." Combs stated that the special economic problems 
that faced America were especially severe in "distressed areas," and called attention to 
Kentucky's programs of assistance to local communities. He emphasized the need for federal 
assistance and asked that Kennedy's program be pushed forward with "all possible speed," 
pointing to Kentucky's 11.5 percent unemployment rate, and adding that in some counties, the 
rate exceeded 20 percent. Combs defined distressed areas as urban, semi-rural, and 
"underdeveloped." He pointed out that "underdeveloped areas" were not being classified 
separately in pending legislation, and outlined measures specifically for their recovery. Combs 
called for a type of Marshall Plan for Appalachia and once again contrasted U.S efforts at foreign 
aid against the paucity of aid to underdeveloped areas in the United States. His remarks were 
almost identical to those he delivered at the 1960 Governor's Conference in Montana, but he also 
went over the provisions of Senate Bill One, chapter and verse and made a sweeping 
recommendation for passage. "I know that these are strong recommendations. But I urge them 
without hesitation.  The current flood of stories and pictures showing severe hardship suffered in 
many areas do not exaggerate the problems we have to face up to."51 
Just as the American south had been termed a problem area in New Deal economic 
studies, Appalachia emerged as the problem area of the post war economic boom, A 
photographic essay in Look Magazine, published in December 1962, showed the stark reality of 
poverty in the region and echoed the theme of underdevelopment as well. The essay focused on 
poverty in the mountains and showed photographs of ruined and abandoned automobiles and 
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destitute people living in an affluent nation.  The text that accompanied the article echoed Combs 
and Whisman, declaring that the people in "Appalachia, U.S.A." lived in an underdeveloped 
country, "No less than Latin Americans or Africans, and they can use more American aid. They 
are entitled to it because they are our own people."52   
Many middle and upper class residents of Appalachia, including businessmen and coal 
operators in Letcher County, were disgusted by the report and accused the media of focusing 
strictly on poverty and overlooking the middle class. While there was a relatively well situated 
middle class in the towns and county seats of eastern Kentucky, the endemic poverty in the rural 
areas and coal camps tied to the frequently idle truck mines was there for national cameras and 
reporters to see, and the cameras did not lie. Many of these national journalists passed through 
the offices of The Mountain Eagle on their excursions and the business people and county 
leaders reflected their bitterness for the portrayal of Appalachian poverty in decreased 
advertising in the newspaper, which resulted in lowered revenue. The frequent trips to 
Washington and Frankfort took time away from the newspaper as well.  By the time Pat Gish 
took a job with LKLP, a Community Action Program that was formed in 1966 during the War on 
Poverty, the Gish family desperately needed the extra income. In her work at LKLP Pat Gish was 
tasked with overseeing the construction and refurbishment of houses in Letcher, Knott, Leslie, 
and Perry Counties. Her new job also opened doors into the inner workings of the boards of 
directors of LKLP and other CAP programs. Most boards were dominated by county elites, judge 
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executives, magistrates, and other elected officials, and like the boards that administered funds in 
the New Deal, they all saw to it that their political patronage increased as part of the exchange.53 
The nation's attention was increasingly focused on eastern Kentucky, and when CBS 
made the announcement that a nationally televised news documentary focusing on the plight of 
unemployed miners would be shown in December 1962, the network was swamped with phone 
calls, even before the show was broadcast, offering aid in the form of food and clothing. CBS 
officials contacted Governor Bert Combs and told him that thousands of calls had come in to the 
network with offers of aid early in the week after the announcement of the program on the 
previous Friday evening broadcast of “Eye-Witness.” Combs designated Hazard as the main 
receiving point and said the aid would be distributed over a broad area including Letcher, Perry, 
Knott, Pike, and Floyd Counties. CBS Southeastern Bureau Manager Hughes Rudd reported that 
switchboards were flooded with calls in New York and Chicago for several days with offers of 
aid.54 
The Mountain Eagle had documented the various efforts to bring federal aid for 
Appalachia beginning with Kennedy’s campaign epiphany in West Virginia with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm. However, by 1962, Gish had become certain that a combined federal and 
state effort would be required to address the problems of the Appalachian coalfields. He also 
understood that local economies couldn’t bear the costs of economic development, and wrote 
that not only had the Area Development Program failed, new programs would also be doomed if 
they didn’t recognize the dual reality that new jobs would have to be created, and local 
government could not afford to contribute matching money to federal and state funds.  Gish 
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became adamant in his editorials that federally funded jobs, similar to those in New Deal 
programs, would be necessary if any real difference in the region's chronic unemployment was to 
be made, and federal funds should be spent on creating jobs, either with make-work programs to 
develop infrastructure such as trails and parks for tourism, or by the actual creation of industrial 
jobs by subsidizing corporations that would agree to locate in Central Appalachia. “Any new 
program that does not take the able bodied out of the welfare lines and food lines will be a 
mockery to our needs, just as any program that does not recognize the plight of local government 
will be a sham.”55 
Late in 1962, John Whisman presided over a gathering of economic development 
specialists and staff members associated with the Council of Appalachian Governors, although 
aside from a brief appearance by West Virginia Governor W. W. Barron, no other governors 
attended the conference. Whisman opened the gathering by saying that the conference was 
intended to move toward a joint program to alleviate "domestic underdevelopment, which is not 
too well understood."  Brook Hayes, Special Assistant to President Kennedy and George 
Levallee, Chief of the Appalachian Division of the ARA both attended the meeting. Paul 
Crabtree, special assistant to Governor Barron, added that there was a pressing need to continue 
the Appalachian public works program that had been set up in the last congress, which had 
authorized an overall expenditure of $900,000,000. The program offered both long term and 
immediate benefits by putting people to work as well as making the area more desirable to 
business and industry and  $400,000,000 of that allotment would be released in the coming year.  
The committee offered a list of suggestions, which they called amendments, asking for the 
inclusion of regional highways into planning for the federal highway system, the establishment 
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of an Appalachian Regional Institute, and underwriting increased technical assistance for the 
region through the Area Redevelopment Program56.  
Alternate expressions of doubt and hope concerning federal and state efforts toward 
economic development had come to mark many Mountain Eagle editorials, but the recognition 
of need was always evident. When President Kennedy announced a public works program early 
in 1962 that would provide funding for improvements in sewage systems, water supply, and 
other infrastructure improvements, Gish was cautiously optimistic. Then, when nothing had 
materialized in Kentucky by October, he questioned the fact that West Virginia was already 
receiving federal aid while “not a single public works project has been approved for the 
Bluegrass state.” His editorial initially asked if the fault lay in Frankfort or Washington, but laid 
the blame at the feet of state and local officials. It also suggested that competent state workers 
should be assigned to help with the paperwork for distressed counties that lacked staff workers 
with the necessary expertise.57 In a speech to the Conference of the Council of Southern 
Mountains earlier in the year, Governor Bert Combs had addressed unemployment and called for 
an increase in public works projects in the area, asking for the development of highways, water 
facilities, forests, and community facilities. Combs suggested an amendment to the ARA that 
would designate Appalachia as underdeveloped and called for a "supplemental development 
fund," from which key projects could be funded. Combs also asked for an increase in "self-
development" programs for young people, along with unskilled, unemployed, and under-
employed adults, and like Gish, he pointed to available remedies as being insufficient to the 
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need. "I am convinced that real solutions to the problems of our region require action far more 
comprehensive and intense than anything currently being contemplated." 58 
Gish was also frustrated by the lack of movement in public works and employment 
creation, and what he considered to be indifference shown by federal and state bureaucrats in the 
face of such great need.  Even though he had seen the slow pace of state government in his ten 
years as a UPI correspondent in Frankfort, he found it hard to justify the endless meetings, 
reports, and applications it took just to get in line for government aid.  When the City of Neon in 
Letcher County embarked on a program to seek federal aid for infrastructure improvements and 
public housing, Gish praised the mayor, department store owner Nicey Hazen, for his approach 
in attempting to halt the decline of the once booming coal town. But he noted that Hazen had 
been forced to abandon his private business in order to have time to deal with the mountains of 
paperwork and constant meetings with state and federal officials necessary to get the aid. He also 
cautioned the residents of Neon against becoming over-optimistic, pointing to similar efforts by 
Whitesburg that were only starting to pay off after eight years of planning. To address the issue, 
Gish called for state aid to small cities without full time mayors to file the necessary paperwork, 
and suggested that Governor Combs strip the Kentucky Department of Commerce and other state 
"promotional" agencies in order to provide "at least one state worker of reasonable intelligence to 
each depressed county on a full time resident basis for the next three to six months. Send 
someone full-time into each county until all the paperwork on each possible project gets done."59 
The Mountain Eagle was ahead of the curve when it came to advocating for the 
development of something more sustainable than the boom and bust coal based economy, and 
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Gish embraced efforts at sustainable agriculture and alternative economic development with 
considerable enthusiasm. He was also adamant that national models would not work well in the 
mountains and chided the ARA for its refusal to take the economic conditions created by an 
extractive economy based on absentee ownership into account, since the profits generated by 
coal and timber were not being re-invested in eastern Kentucky for the long term. In an editorial 
condemning the ARA for refusing to fund a greenhouse tomato production center based in Wolfe 
County because it didn’t fit in with the USDA model of a family farm, he pointed out that not 
only did eastern Kentucky lack an economy that actually manufactured anything, but the nature 
of absentee ownership guaranteed that money made from the extraction of coal, timber and oil 
would not be reinvested in the region.60  This contributed to the lack of development and 
corresponding poverty in the region by maintaining a single issue economy focused on coal 
without the benefits that a more diverse economy based on the entrepreneurial efforts of local 
business owners in addressing the economic needs of the region. Wages and revenue from 
business that went uncreated didn’t turn over in coal counties. The wealth generated in eastern 
Kentucky was not spent in eastern Kentucky, but was invested in Pennsylvania and the 
Northeast, and was not returned to Appalachia except as a further investment in the coal 
industry, mostly to replace worn out machinery or to further mechanize the industry and reduce 
the need for manpower even further.  
The lack of understanding of regional realities plagued government efforts to facilitate 
economic development throughout the 1960s, and Gish did not hesitate to point it out. Often, by 
showing the failures of local and state leaders, Gish found himself on the hot seat economically, 
either through boycotts, withdrawal of advertising, or attempts to decertify The Mountain Eagle 
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as the paper with the largest circulation. The paper was once again forced to defend its status as 
the county's newspaper of record in October 1962, when School Board Chairman Dr. Benjamin 
Wright said he would have to see a list of paid subscribers to both Letcher County Newspapers, 
The Mountain Eagle and The Community Press, in order to determine which was qualified to 
publish legal statements such as school board financial reports. Although Wright was surely 
aware that The Eagle regularly sold three or four times more papers than The Community Press, 
he also knew a large number of The Mountain Eagle's sales came through local outlets like 
newsstands and grocery stores and would be more difficult to document. The October 18, 1962 
edition carried a request that regular readers move from weekly purchases to subscriptions in 
order to be listed.61 
After a second round of record breaking floods in six years devastated eastern Kentucky, 
Gish described the region as "flat on its back," and said it would never "be able to stand tall 
again, by itself."  In a March editorial, he wrote that many eastern Kentucky businessmen, still 
heavily in debt from the 1957 floods, were ready to call it quits and leave the region. He pointed 
out that the people, and the businesses, were locked into eastern Kentucky, but while the 
business owners could cash out and leave, most of the people were stuck with no place to go and 
limited resources to take them there. He painted a bleak picture of the region without massive 
federal assistance and criticized past efforts at providing viable choices for the region. 
We do not believe we are unduly pessimistic when we say we see the day coming when 
 only the lame and blind, the old and the young, and those of limited intellectual and/or 
 educational attainment will be left.62   
Gish went on to write that he did not see the future as impossible but said it would take a 
combination of the Marshall Plan and the TVA to alleviate eastern Kentucky's problems. He was 
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sharply critical of President Kennedy's promises of aid to eastern Kentucky, writing that they had 
amounted to nothing except for "the Area Redevelopment Program, which is so vague in 
purpose, so broad in scope, and so incompetently administered, it is something of a national 
joke." The main solution to the problem was a national determination to set things right and the 
first step would be flood control. Gish wrote that with properly planned development,  the 
region's abundant water resources could be utilized by building a number of flood control dams  
that could also provide electricity. He wrote that TVA could serve as the agency in charge of the 
plan, but added that a new board of directors would have to be installed to replace the ones "who 
believe it is fine for the TVA to rape eastern Kentucky's landowners in the agency's insane 
search for cheap power by way of strip mined coal." The alternative would be to abandon eastern 
Kentucky and that option would show that "while the American system works fine in some parts 
of the country, it won't work in all the country."63   
As the national focus centered on poverty in eastern Kentucky, conditions in the 
mountains got worse. Bad winters and already low employment exacerbated conditions, and in 
1962, the United Mine Workers revoked the health care cards that had allowed miners and 
retirees to enjoy a standard of health care that was unavailable to most eastern Kentucky 
residents. Numerous truck mine operators found themselves unable to meet the 40 percent 
royalty they had agreed to in the last contract, and as a result, the union could no longer afford to 
maintain the Health Care and Retirement Fund or the chain of modern hospitals they had only 
recently built in the coalfields.  
Then in early 1963 spring floods devastated the region yet again, causing an estimated 
$80 million in damages, and the natural disaster of flooding combined with the bad winter and 
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general low unemployment to raise the level of poverty and misery in eastern Kentucky to a 
degree that became a national source of embarrassment. This finally prompted further action 
from Washington. In the spring of 1963, Kentucky Governor Bert Combs met with White House 
officials and requested a program specifically focused upon economic development in 
Appalachia. At a meeting called by President Kennedy, Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman 
proposed a regional planning effort in Appalachia and Kennedy approved the request and 
ordered programs that were already in effect to increase their efforts to feed and clothe the poor 
in Appalachia. During the meeting, Kennedy passed a note, delivered via a folded paper airplane, 
to Combs asking, “what do you really want Bert?” Combs' reply resulted in the creation of the 
President’s Appalachian Regional Commission.64 
Combs and Kennedy figured prominently in a front-page article concerning the Kennedy 
Administration's response to Combs' later trip to Washington, which had been at least partly to 
secure aid to help provide relief to communities affected by the flooding. According to the 
article, Combs was left waiting to confer with "lesser figures in the federal government at the 
White House" while the president entertained the King of Morocco. Combs told the officials, 
"We were in a hell of a fix to start with and now we've been hit by the most disastrous flood in 
the history of the Appalachians." Combs was upset upon learning that there was not enough 
money in the budget to fulfill his request for aid to build roads under an accelerated public works 
program, funds to dredge and widen streams clogged with debris from the flooding, and aid in 
restoring roads, bridges, and other infrastructure damaged or destroyed by the flooding. He was 
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quoted in the article as saying that the flooding had cost the state at least $75 million and over 
$26 million of that was from damage to roads.65 
An editorial in the same edition was severely critical of Kennedy's decision to ignore 
Combs' visit and the administration's lack of action on aid to help repair the flood damage. Gish 
was particularly unhappy about a suggestion from officials that yet another study of eastern 
Kentucky would be necessary, and wrote that the governor had wished to meet with the president 
"in the hope that Kennedy would remember his campaign trips and promises to the Appalachian 
region," but that Kennedy had been too busy with the King of Morocco. The discussions 
concerned an offer of foreign aid to Morocco, which had had also been hit by flooding but had 
already elicited aid from the United States and other wealthy nations, and had received $325 
million in U.S. military spending as well. Gish added that the president had told the King he 
hoped their visit would be "fruitful and beneficial," but "Obviously, the president did not hope 
that Kentucky's governor had a fruitful and beneficial visit in Washington." The editorial offered 
several suggestions to attract more attention from the administration, which included seceding 
from the union in order to apply for foreign aid, sending eastern Kentuckians to picket the White 
House, asking other wealthy nations for aid, petitioning the United Nations for aid, or a barrage 
of letters and phone calls to Congress asking for aid. "Surely, there is something short of armed 
revolt that will focus national attention and concern on the continuing crisis in Eastern 
Kentucky."66 
The Mountain Eagle's reaction apparently drew a response from the White House, 
because less than a week after the paper went out, John Whisman, in his dual roles as Special 
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Assistant to Governor Combs and Chairman of the Staff Committee to the Conference of 
Appalachian Governors, wrote a letter to Lee White, Assistant Special Counsel to President 
Kennedy to explain the situation. In his letter, Whisman wrote that The Eagle's response had 
stemmed from an incorrect report written by Richard Harwood in The Washington Post. 
Whisman wrote that Combs had not asked for an audience with the president at all, but had come 
to Washington to discuss several points that had already been settled by the Kentucky 
congressional delegation with White House staffers Ed McDermott, Director of the Office of 
Emergency Planning, and Administrative Assistant Henry Wilson, as well as Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture John Baker. Whisman also denied that any discussion of a study had taken place. 
Along with his letter, Whisman attached copies of the front-page article and the page two 
editorial from The Mountain Eagle in an effort to "clarify the current situation."67 
One month after the 1963 floods, President Kennedy named Undersecretary of 
Commerce Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr. to head a committee to find solutions to the problems 
of eastern Kentucky and the Appalachian coalfields. The committee was composed of 
representatives of the Appalachian states of Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky, along with various government departments, 
who were tasked with forming an overall economic development plan for the region. Kennedy 
specified developments in passenger and freight transportation, as well as education, research 
and training. He also called for the development of water and mineral resources and tourism, and 
ordered existing federal projects targeting the region to be sped up.68  
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The program was presented as an extension of the old Area Redevelopment Act, until the 
President's Appalachian Regional Commission could report back, but in June, the House of 
Representatives refused to approve $450 million in funding to pay for it.  The administration 
blamed Southern Democrats for making an anti-civil rights statement with their no votes and 
House Democrats blamed House Republicans as being the party of "recession, depression, and 
repression." But The Mountain Eagle saw a much more complicated picture, including the "split 
personality" of the initial ARA act which called for an industrial development approach in the 
nation's cities combined with a complete economic restructuring of eastern Kentucky. Gish 
joined his opinion with those of Harry Caudill and John Whisman when he wrote that the 
program should be split into two individual projects, with one that was specifically focused on 
the unique needs of the mountains of Central Appalachia and the other on urban areas. He also 
wrote that although the agency was underfunded and spread too thin, it was critically important 
that the ARA be maintained, even in an altered form.69 
The publication of Night Comes to the Cumberlands in July of 1963 changed the national 
conversation about the coalfields of eastern Kentucky to a degree that would have been 
impossible to predict. It was reviewed in national and regional publications and was labeled as 
magnificent by The Washington Star. The New York Herald Tribune  described it as a "merciless 
report on the Kentucky part of a  miserable area combined with a superb essay on its history," 
and The Lexington Herald-Leader wrote that "He (Caudill) can speak authoritatively as few 
other writers can and if his indictments are harsh, they are spoken in understanding and 
compassion."70 In the book's foreword, United States Secretary of the Interior Stewart  Udall 
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referred to Appalachia as a child, and to the nation as its mother, noting that there was statistical 
proof that the mother has a starving child in the house.  
What will move the mother? What will make her call in a doctor, so to speak, and ask 
 him to do all in his power to save her child? What will make her pray for the child's 
 recovery and ask everyone she knows to pray too? We hope that such books as "Night 
 Comes to the Cumberlands" will move the mother first to tears and then to action.71 
Pat Gish's review of the book was more critical, including her wish that Caudill had 
remarked on abuses of the welfare program by politicians who used it to enhance opportunities 
for patronage by allowing unqualified candidates to draw checks. "This is one coin to which 
there are certainly two sides and one is no dirtier than the other." She said that the bad, including 
the abuse of the system, had to be emphasized in order to impress the urgency of the situation of 
those who were not familiar with the problems in eastern Kentucky. She added that Caudill's 
writing was at its most moving when it expressed his anger at the state of affairs that allowed the 
abuses. She referred to Udall's description of the "forgotten backcountry people" and declared 
that if the book "succeeds in making us no longer forgotten, then any minor differences of 
opinion become unimportant" and that Caudill's book should be required reading for every 
resident of Kentucky.72 
Night Comes to the Cumberlands not only drew a great deal of national attention to the 
central Appalachian region, it created controversy within the region as well. Caudill's depiction 
of Central Appalachia as an island of third world poverty within an affluent nation drew 
reporters and photographers to his home in Whitesburg, and he was happy to show them the 
reality of what he had written. The large amount of media attention that followed Night Comes to 
the Cumberlands confirmed earlier reports on the area as a place with endemic poverty and drew 
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even more attention to the coalfields. In the last chapter, "The Case for a Southern Mountain 
Authority," Caudill gave a rather gloomy description that painted a picture of exploitation and 
neglect and made it plain that unless major efforts were made to change them, the problems 
would only continue to get worse.73 
Caudill joined Gish in calling for the creation of a federally financed regional 
organization akin to TVA that would pour billions of dollars into the Appalachian region in order 
to redress many of the wrongs done to the mountaineers and create a sustainable economy, 
moving away from total dependence on the inconsistent economy of coal. He also recommended 
embracing the region's other resources, stressing the value of the land and timber and 
recognizing future possibilities as a recreational and tourist area. Caudill also called for political 
reforms and a general depopulation of the area to reach a level that could be sustained by the 
economy. While he was not particularly optimistic about the future, neither was he ready to give 
up.  In the closing passages. he wrote that the mountaineer had become "defeatist in attitude and 
Company domination and paternalism and two decades of uninspired Welfarism have induced 
the belief that control of his destiny is in other hands."  Caudill expressed a need for programs to 
put idle men to work cleaning up the region and to engage in management of timber and land 
resources. While he saw an "infinity of desperately needed tasks," he also shared Gish's theme 
that the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to administer the needs of the region would be no 
more onerous, since the nation was already supporting it, and that with the right approach there 
could be real benefits that would pay off in the long run. "The present program sustains life but 
creates nothing. A works program could at least build stepping stones upward out of the abyss." 
Caudill finished by writing that the mountaineer was a challenge to the nation and "a material 
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and spiritual orphan on the nation's doorstep. He will not go away, and, unless he is helped, his 
situation will not improve."74 
Whether Gish and Caudill had discussed the possibility of an Appalachian Authority 
based on TVA before Night Comes to the Cumberlands was published or not, Gish had 
introduced the topic in the 1959 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems 
hearings in Pikeville and Harlan and in the article he wrote concerning his testimony.  Gish told 
the committee that the economic plight that plagued eastern Kentucky was shared by West 
Virginia and other Appalachian states and called for a meeting of governors from the affected 
states that would eventually result in a five state Appalachian Authority, which might do as much 
for this area as TVA has done for the south."75 The final release of "Program 60," from the  
Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission in 1960 had also carried a call for an 
Appalachian Authority. 
By 1963, the Southern Mountain Authority was a staple in Caudill's speeches and 
writing, and the warning Caudill had for his readers and listeners was ominous.  In a speech 
given at the Pine Mountain Settlement School in Bell County in 1963, he told the audience that 
without a meaningful development program as far reaching as TVA had been thirty years before, 
the PARC scheme would "expedite extraction without relieving the region's most pressing 
ills...and disillusionment was sure to follow. The older people are dying off, the young are 
leaving, and the middle-aged are on the dole. In the estimation of the corporations that control 
the resources, most of the inhabitants are simply superfluous. Their lands are worn out. They 
possess no skills that the nation needs ...Appalachia is becoming an island near the heart of 
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America peopled in large measure by benumbed human relics and totally despoiled for its natural 
resources."76 
Gish and Caudill agreed on many points and Gish was adamant concerning the necessity 
of creating jobs. He wasn't as convinced of the hopelessness of the mountaineers and wrote a 
number of editorials throughout the War on Poverty with the core theme that money spent on 
industrializing the region would be better used than money spent on welfare programs. There 
was a good deal of backlash from the local middle class over the portrait Caudill painted, and the 
attention the book drew to Whitesburg caused as many problems for the Gish family as it did for 
Caudill. The more affluent residents, particularly the residents of the "Upper Bottom" in 
Whitesburg and middle class neighborhoods in surrounding towns deeply resented the national 
picture of eastern Kentucky as a third world island of poverty, although as Gish described it, they 
refused to admit to structural issues as a possible root of  poverty, and tended to  blame the 
victims of poverty for their situation. As Gish recalled: 
 The Upper Bottom people, the social set, would tell you their houses were as good as 
 those in Lexington and that there was no difference in their standard of living. We wound 
 up losing our friends. They retreated from us and we retreated from them is what it came 
 down to. They never did, would never admit to the deep social and economic problems 
 except to say that people didn't want to work.77 
Harry LaViers Jr., president of South East Coal, and a close friend of the Gish family, 
wrote one of the few critical responses to Night Comes to the Cumberlands that appeared in the 
"Letters to the Editor" section of The Mountain Eagle. In his letter, LaViers wrote that a greater 
effort should be made to train young people to seek work in places outside the Appalachian 
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region, and that he and Caudill differed in their outlook partly because of the nature of their 
occupations, because Caudill was a lawyer and LaViers was an engineer who viewed the world 
through a scientific lens. He also wrote that he rejected Caudill's notion that everyone in the 
power structure of the region was "vile and self-serving," and that he believed that most of the 
harm done to the region had been done through well intentioned mistakes rather than by evil and 
selfish men.  He also indicated that he felt that the eastern Kentucky coalfields had been opened 
up too early, citing testimony given before a Congressional committee by John L. Lewis, 
President of the United Mine Workers, George Love, president of Consolidation Coal Company, 
and J.D.A. Morrow, president of Joy Mining Machinery, the largest coal mining equipment 
manufacturer in the nation. In their testimony, the three men agreed that eastern Kentucky coal 
should have been left undeveloped because at the time of the arrival of the coal giants, there was 
no real economic need for the increase in coal production. LaViers added that three technological 
developments were responsible for many of the problems that were faced by eastern Kentucky 
coal companies in 1963. The development of the large diameter seamless steel pipe had allowed 
for the large-scale transmission of natural gas and had eliminated what he called a "100 million 
ton market" for coal. The process of casting higher strength steel, which allowed for diesel 
engines to be made small enough to fit on trains, a theme echoed by Caudill in Night Comes to 
the Cumberlands, had eliminated another 100 million ton market, and the invention of the 
Tungsten Carbide bit, which allowed for the widespread use of the continuous mining machine 
was his third development. He wrote that when South East began to use Lee Norse continuous 
miners, it reduced employment at the mine where they were introduced from 900 to 200, and 
increased production over hand loading coal from 1,800 to 3,500 tons per day. Caudill had also 
addressed mechanization along with the shift from coal to diesel to fuel trains in Night Comes to 
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the Cumberlands, and both men agreed that the only the increased use of coal in generating 
electricity had offset the loss.78 So the men in LaViers’ reflection, the labor leader Lewis, the 
corporate CEO Morrow, and the coal boss Love had all testified that they believed there had 
been no real need to increase coal production in such a dramatic fashion. The desire to maximize 
profits by increasing efficiency through mechanization, along with Lewis’ willingness to allow it 
in order to achieve higher wages for UMW members and aid in developing regional UMW 
hospitals, had resulted in the displacement of a large number of miners, and a corresponding 
decline in the standard of living in the coalfields. 
Tom Gish's father Ben died in Florida in November 1963, not long after his retirement 
from Southeast Coal Company. Ben Gish had helped Tom and Pat in many ways when the town 
turned against them. Before his retirement, he laid the framework for Southeast Coal Corporation 
to continue to aid the Gish family, and The Mountain Eagle's current editor Ben recalls riding in 
company station wagons handed down to his father by Southeast when he was young. The elder 
Ben Gish died just weeks after moving to Florida with his wife Lucille, following a career that 
saw him become a pioneer in coal mine mechanization and safety.  He had served as mine 
superintendent at the South East Coal Company mine in Seco which was one of the first to 
switch to modern mining machinery. He was also a leader in safety and was one of the first mine 
managers to use modern expansion roof bolts in the mines he supervised, replacing timbers as a 
means of roof support.79  
A week after his father died, Gish wrote a letter to President Kennedy thanking him for 
responding to the need for a winter relief program for eastern Kentucky and telling the president 
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about a recent incident when a child in Letcher County had died from starvation. He also wrote  
that he was appalled by two editorials in The Hazard Herald which had stated that eastern 
Kentucky was not in need of relief. Gish wrote that this opinion was fairly typical of many of the 
area's businessmen "who seldom have gone beyond the boundaries of their own towns and don't 
know what exists in the creeks and hollows where the people and the problems are." He told 
Kennedy that the greatest service that could be performed for eastern Kentucky would be to take 
the businessmen out of the county seats for a two or three day tour of their own counties so they 
could see the problems first hand. The Hazard Herald editorial had urged its readers to send 
letters to their representatives telling them that eastern Kentucky did not need the $45 million 
emergency public works program and Gish wrote that he couldn't "imagine a more ill-advised or 
unfortunate action." He also informed Kennedy that he had a special edition planned for January 
which would be filled with pictures and editorials concerning eastern Kentucky and its problems 
and he planned to distribute copies to every member of Congress and the U.S. Senate to help 
pass the PARC program. This letter was dated November 19. It is not known if Kennedy 
received it before his death.80 
Eleven days after writing the obituary for his father, Tom Gish had to write a painful 
account of the assassination of President Kennedy. While Gish shared the nation's grief, it was 
compounded for him and many eastern Kentuckians who had taken hope from Kennedy's plans 
to alleviate poverty in the region along with the national attention he had helped to focus on the 
area.  Gish wrote that Kennedy had decided to visit eastern Kentucky for a first-hand look at the 
problems of the region just hours before he was killed. His plans had called for a trip to 
Cloverfork in Harlan County, an examination of the effects of strip mining on Black Mountain, 
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and a visit to Letcher County to see the devastation of strip mining on Beefhide. Kennedy had 
hoped that his visit would hasten congressional action to bring aid to the region, however, it took 
the ascension of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency to see real congressional efforts to begin the 
work of addressing poverty. 
His visit to eastern Kentucky would have been historic and without precedent, and it 
 well could have been the key that unlocked the door to progress in the area--the kind of 
 progress that someday would have permitted the area to take its place in the nation with a 
 just share of national prosperity and freedom from want and despair....And so, the loss to 
 Eastern Kentucky is beyond measure.81 
On the eve of the Kentucky gubernatorial election in 1963, President Kennedy had 
informed then candidate Edward T. Breathitt that he intended to visit Kentucky and other parts of 
Appalachia in the coming year. Breathitt mentioned the proposed visit when he delivered a 
eulogy for Kennedy that included an invitation to Lyndon Johnson to visit.  "Last week, had he 
lived, John F. Kennedy had planned to visit these areas, bringing to the people a message of hope 
and help, and I'm sure that President Johnson will sometime soon be making the visit as well."82 
Gish wrote that it did not matter who fired the fatal shot, because Kennedy had died 
because he believed in first class citizenship for every American, and he believed Cubans had a 
right to liberty and regarded Buddhists in Vietnam as human. Kennedy had insisted on equal 
treatment for African Americans and believed in the dignity of man regardless of race, color, or 
nationality. "Mr. Kennedy died because he was an American in the proudest sense of the word, 
something it appears it is un-American to be these days."83 
                                                 
81 "A TRAGIC LOSS," The Mountain Eagle, November 21, 1963, 2. 
82 Edward Breathitt, The Public Papers of Governor Edward T. Breathitt, 1963-1967, (The University Press of 
Kentucky, Lexington, 2015), 7. 
83 Ibid. 
151 
 
Although Kentucky lost a special friend when Kennedy was killed, his successor, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson carried on his vision of using government to alleviate poverty, and through his 
legislative expertise and years of accumulated influence, he had greater success in moving 
legislation through congress. Johnson was not so well acquainted with the poverty in Appalachia 
as he was with the conditions in the rural south, such as his home area of the hill country in 
Texas. He also believed that racial strife in America was rooted in poverty and that by reducing 
the terrible poverty that plagued African-Americans in the South and inner cities, whites would 
gradually begin to accept them, or at least allow them to exercise their civil rights when they saw 
them working in good paying jobs. Although Kennedy had believed that legislation would 
ultimately be necessary to address the civil rights problem, he had wanted to wait until his 
second term before touching off a firestorm over the issue.84 Johnson had been the Senate 
Majority Leader when he was chosen as Kennedy's running mate and he had enjoyed a 
successful career in the House of Representatives before going to the Senate in 1948. Johnson 
was a New Deal liberal and wanted to make his mark in social legislation. After he was sworn in 
as president, Johnson took Kennedy's chief economic advisor Walter Heller aside and told him 
that he wanted to make it clear that he was no conservative, saying he wanted Heller to share that 
information with his liberal friends.  “I’m no budget slasher,” said Johnson. “I understand that 
expenditures have to keep rising to keep pace with the population and help the economy. If you 
looked at my record, you would know that I am a Roosevelt New Dealer. As a matter of fact, to 
tell the truth, John F. Kennedy was a little too conservative for my taste.”85   
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 Johnson had tremendous faith in the power of government, and in December, just two 
weeks after taking the oath of office, he announced that he supported relief efforts for the 
Appalachian Region through the Winter Relief Program that Governor Combs had persuaded 
Kennedy to push through Congress, following the spring floods in 1963. However, he also 
wanted to avoid being labeled a "big spender" and in a joint announcement with Kentucky 
Governor Edward Breathitt, he said the program would not involve any new money.  It featured 
an expansion of food relief and school lunch programs, as well as a program to eliminate 
intestinal worms and other parasites. Johnson called on private organizations to respond as well, 
citing the "obvious need" of the region. He said he would present a frugal budget for the coming 
year and The Mountain Eagle carried the story, saying, "Presumably he could not advocate a 
multi-billion dollar program for the Appalachian area and still live up to his promise of 
frugality."86  
The remainder of 1963 was shrouded with doubts about the direction of Appalachian 
relief as Johnson struggled to accomplish anything with the lame-duck Congress, and eastern 
Kentucky counties continued to be hampered by their own inability to take advantage of many of 
the relief programs that were available to them.  Gish expressed his frustration with un-kept 
promises and the "grim joke" made of President Kennedy's Winter Relief Program in two 
editorials that accompanied the announcement that President Johnson supported area relief for 
the Central Appalachian region, by asking if Appalachia would be "frugaled out of effective 
help," and by stating what for him seemed to be obvious by that time, that "the gap between the 
bureaucratic mind in Washington and the harsh realities of life in Eastern Kentucky seem to be 
harsh and beyond belief."  He compared President Johnson's promise to be a frugal president 
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with Keen Johnson, who served as governor of Kentucky from 1939 through 1943, during which 
time, he said "the state slept for four years" due to his frugality in reducing the government to the 
point where it was nearly non-existent.  Gish wrote that even in the time of the most free 
spending of governors and presidents, there was rarely enough left over to get to eastern 
Kentucky and that in the time of economic crunch it was always easy to postpone building 
highways and dams or improving education in the region, in the name of frugality.87  
Gish also questioned the effectiveness of efforts by the United States Department of 
Agriculture in the Emergency Winter Relief Program that had been announced just before 
President Kennedy's death. The program was designed to assist with repairs to homes and beef 
up school lunch programs to feed free lunches to hungry children in eastern Kentucky so they 
would not have to go through the entire day hungry. Instead, the Washington bureaucracy had 
changed the program to the point that "it is a kind of grim joke upon the people of Eastern 
Kentucky."  The Farm Home Administration had also announced the availability of aid, even 
though it was done from Campton, 100 miles away from Whitesburg. The catch, as Gish 
described it, was that the loans would have to be repaid in the 1964 crop year at a rate of five 
percent interest and be "accompanied by supervision in farm and home management." Gish 
pointed out that maybe one family in 100 might have a crop in 1964 that could be mortgaged for 
a loan, and added that if such a crop was available it would probably be needed to keep the 
family fed. The grants were announced as being available to the seriously handicapped or elderly 
with small incomes and no other criteria of determining eligibility were released. To obtain a 
loan, the applicant would have to travel the 100 miles to Campton on any day except Wednesday 
or Saturday, so Gish estimated that a person from Letcher County would have to spend $10.00 
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on bus fare to go to Campton on the possibility they might receive a loan. He quoted Judge 
Executive James Caudill saying, "This program is not worth a nickel to Letcher County that 
way," and added, "How right he is!" Gish recommended that the bureaucrats leave their desks in 
Washington and Frankfort and actually go up every creek and hollow in the mountains to take 
the program to the people. He also criticized the USDA for "messing up" the school lunch phase 
of the winter relief program by sending federal officials to local schools to collect statistics that 
were already on file in Frankfort rather than actually assisting the county in setting up school 
lunch programs. He closed by saying that Undersecretary of Commerce Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Jr., who was in charge of the overall program, brought no honor to the family name by 
allowing such nonsense.88  
The year ended with a great deal of talk on the subject of poverty in eastern Kentucky, 
but little real action. A number of activists and politicians lobbied the President's Appalachian 
Regional Commission to make certain their viewpoint was included in its upcoming report and 
many recommended their own programs of public works, or in Caudill's case, a regional 
electrical power consortium set up like TVA to supply electrical power to the region  by 
damming some of the many streams and rivers there.  On December 13, 1963, Kentucky 
Governor Edward T. Breathitt, along with former Governor Combs, John Whisman, and U.S. 
Representative Carl D. Perkins met with President Johnson to request action and to remind him 
about conversations they had with President Kennedy on Appalachian poverty and all were 
anxious to get a similar commitment from Johnson.89   
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Gish also questioned the effectiveness of the winter relief program, saying it was too little 
too late and would likely become a summer relief program if it lagged any further behind, and 
criticized the considerable paperwork involved for individuals to obtain aid. County officials 
were frustrated with the sheer amount of documentation a father must show before qualifying for 
relief but were hesitant to go on record because "we have to keep working with those people."  
An emergency housing program was experiencing similar paperwork generated delays and Gish 
opined that it would no doubt take several years before the houses in Letcher County needing 
emergency repairs can all be cleared.90 
When Lyndon Johnson gave his 1964 State of The Union Address,  he told Congress he 
would be brief because time was short and his agenda was long. Without further preamble, he 
called for action on civil rights, a far reaching tax cut, asked that the coming session of Congress 
address the health needs of older people, and launch an all-out war on poverty in the United 
States.  Johnson's address outlined a generally ambitious agenda, one that he said would not 
increase spending, but would halve the federal deficit. He said his programs needed to be 
implemented in the summer, and he was prescient in saying that it could all go for naught if it 
fell into political and regional quarrels.  When Johnson announced that the United States would 
undertake a  war on poverty he requested legislative action in a wide range of areas including 
special aid to Appalachia, and expansion of the ARA, youth employment programs, an 
expansion of the food stamp program, a national service corps, and a higher minimum wage, he 
was interrupted by applause more than in any previous SOU message. Johnson referred to 
poverty as a national problem and said it would have to be addressed by national programs, but 
he added that in order for it to be effective it would have to be organized on the state and local 
                                                 
90 "Relief  - but when?" The Mountain Eagle, January 9, 1964, 2. 
156 
 
level, saying it would be won in "in the field, in every private home, in every public office, from 
the courthouse to the White House." The weapons in the war would be improvements and 
enhancements in education, public health, housing, training and job opportunities. He added that 
lack of jobs might be a symptom of the problem rather than the problem itself and promised 
special efforts in the Appalachian region. Ironically, his only mention of Viet Nam was that 
Americans of all races stood side by side there.91 
So now, the die was cast. The war was declared and for good or ill, the United States was 
committed to eradicate poverty within its borders. Or was it? Johnson's commitment to running 
the federal anti-poverty programs through state and local programs, through county courthouses 
and public offices, almost certainly meant that many of the same problems that had hampered 
New Deal programs, including factional squabbling and unequal racial appropriations, as well as 
the age-old practice of taking a little of the cream off the top would be inevitable. The House of 
Representatives and Senate would have to approve spending measures and as they had done with 
New Deal programs, the southern bloc in each body would be reticent to approve anything that 
would improve the lot of African Americans in their states. General opposition to spending 
federal funds to help the poor was a standing position among many Republicans and 
conservative Democrats as well, and for all his political acumen and knowledge of "where the 
bodies were buried," Johnson faced a daunting task in ramming through the necessary legislation 
to enact his War on Poverty. Although he started his presidency with promises and “good 
intentions,” Johnson faced an uphill struggle to get his program passed, and his ascendency to 
the presidency came in what would have been the last year of Kennedy’s term. So in addition to 
passing anti-poverty legislation and enacting societal changes to achieve racial equality in a 
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legislature that had resisted President Kennedy’s efforts, Johnson was faced with a presidential 
campaign of his own and American military involvement in Southeast Asia that had been passed 
down through his two immediate predecessors.      
Chapter Four 
The tragic ending of 1963 left America with conflicting messages as to President 
Johnson's intentions of continuing President Kennedys efforts to do something about poverty. 
Johnson alternated between announcing his plans to be a "frugal" president and restating his 
intentions to address poverty, but early in 1964, Lyndon Johnson declared war on poverty in his 
State of the Union Address. He did not go into great detail about his plans and he was elusive as 
to how he intended to pursue his war and still maintain a frugal posture when he submitted "The 
Economic Report of the President to Congress" on January 20. The report was vague as to the 
specifics, such as funding the War on Poverty, but he did lay out the assault in two main 
categories. Johnson stressed that the nation could not wait for gradual economic growth to lift the 
poor after pointing out that one fifth of the nation had annual per capita incomes of $590 against 
a national per capita income of $1,900. The general prosperity the rest of the nation had enjoyed 
in the years after World War II had not touched 20 percent of Americans, and Johnson 
established two target areas to bring the poor into the economic mainstream. The initial effort 
would focus on enabling every individual to increase his earning power to its highest capacity, 
but in cases where that was not possible, the government would do whatever was necessary to 
assure all citizens of a high standard of living regardless of economic reverse or poor health.1 
Upgrading education, particularly for the children of the poor, would increase earning 
capacity and good health care would be made accessible to the poor in order to stave off the 
effects of bad health. Job skill training would be implemented to allow them to acquire 
marketable skills. This would all be managed through community and area rehabilitation 
1 The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, “The Economic Report of the President to Congress," 
(United States Government Printing Office, 1964), January 20, 1964, 15. 
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programs targeting factors that contributed to poverty such as inadequate schools, poor health, 
and chronic depression. At the core of this concept was the Area Redevelopment Act, which 
would be renewed and improved. Johnson also promised a new program specifically to "deal 
with our nation's most distressed major region, Appalachia." Although he introduced no 
Appalachia specific programs at that time, he did call for equal opportunity, aid to the poor and 
those not able to fend for themselves, and for a versatile approach to the problem of poverty in 
America.2 
The Mountain Eagle's coverage of Johnson's plan and the report from the Council of 
Economic advisors included local and regional statistics and reported that eastern Kentucky 
would be the prime battleground in the War on Poverty. It also revealed that less than half the 
families in Letcher County made $3,000 per year, and according to the U.S. Census, at least half 
of that group made less than $1,750.  The paper also reprinted Johnson's strategy for "Building 
Individual Earning Power," which called for the congressional renewal of the Area 
Redevelopment Act, and referred to Appalachia as the "nation's most distressed major region."3 
 The backlash from local businessmen and elites in Letcher County against Johnson's 
proposal was immediate. At their first meeting of the New Year, the Whitesburg Chamber of 
Commerce denied the severity of poverty in the county and condemned the CBS television 
program "Christmas in Appalachia." The Chamber also wrote a letter to Tom Gish referring to 
"the terrible write up" that had appeared in the January 30, 1964 issue of Life Magazine about 
poverty in Appalachia that used photographs of Letcher County as the focal point. Others 
accused the magazine and national news media of making fun of Letcher County and two county 
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officials threatened to take a group of British television reporters and photographers to jail if they 
took pictures of Letcher County residents standing in the rain to receive their month commodity 
allotment. Tom Gish wrote that the threat to the British reporters was disgraceful in a country 
that “prides itself on having a free press” and that the county should welcome the exposure and 
the aid proposed for them, because it had been much the same sort of attention that had focused 
national attention on eastern Tennessee and led to the creation of TVA. "Instead of condemning 
the outsiders who come here to report, we should instead take advantage of their presence to 
point out to them how past and present federal programs have failed and explain where the 
programs have gone wrong."4 
While the editorial referred often to the letter from the Chamber of Commerce, it was not 
reprinted in newspaper, but the Chamber had a valid point so far as the lack of a balanced 
portrayal of life in Letcher County in Life Magazine. While the writers pointed out that the 
Appalachian region covered an area from Alabama to New York, all the photos were taken in the 
outlying areas Letcher County and not, as the Chamber had pointed out, in the middle-class 
neighborhoods of Whitesburg and Jenkins. The photos showed wrenching scenes of poverty with 
stricken families in drafty homes with newspapers for wallpaper, and the entire photo essay 
consisted of a graphic twelve-page section on the conditions of poverty in Appalachia. As the 
focus of the article, Letcher County was depicted: "In a lonely valley in eastern Kentucky, in the 
heart of the mountainous region called Appalachia, live an impoverished people whose plight has 
long been ignored by an affluent America." Photos by John Dominis, with captions from Neon, 
Line Fork, and other parts of the county depicted the terrible winter conditions that beset the 
county poor, and the people were described as "often disease ridden and unschooled," without 
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jobs, without hope, and living at a subsistence level on government handouts.  A caption from 
one section of photographs called "Solace in papered walls and religion," showed youngsters 
"lapping up a surplus commodity supper of pan fried biscuits, gravy and fried potatoes." In an 
accompanying article by Michael Murphy, Harry Caudill denounced the coming of the relief that 
had turned eastern Kentucky in to "a paleface reservation" where technology had reduced 
mountaineers to the status of surplus commodities, who were still being fed on commodities. 
Murphy wrote of mountaineers using dishonest methods to get a relief check, but said the 
devices they used to get on relief rolls were no more dishonest than the ways power flowed 
through county courthouses, allowing mountain politicians to use the programs they 
administered to generate patronage for their own purposes.5  
As the president's proposal began to encounter resistance in Congress, Gish questioned 
whether the needs of eastern Kentucky might fall prey to a government cutback to eliminate 
waste, a tactic all too familiar to residents of eastern Kentucky. He wrote that money always 
seemed to be delayed in getting to eastern Kentucky, even in times of relatively free spending, 
and while Johnson had made bold promises to end poverty, he had been less positive about 
providing the necessary federal funding. Even when the president moved to make his mark in the 
War on Poverty, he found that the state of Kentucky was unable to move with the same speed.  
Johnson and Kentucky Governor Edward Breathitt found themselves with a winter relief 
program crafted by their respective predecessors, and although Johnson drove the funding 
through Congress, he soon found it stuck in the bottleneck of local government. Congress 
allocated $20 million for relief in Kentucky but state and local agencies lacked the necessary 
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finances and staff to implement the distribution of the funds effectively. County officials 
complained that the sheer amount of documentation required by the federal agencies in order to 
qualify a family for aid had created a massive bottleneck that was preventing needy families 
from receiving even the most basic assistance, for food, housing, and heat. There had been no 
provision to speed the program up and it looked like winter would be over before any help came 
through.6  
The following month, Gish complained that three months had passed without relief being 
forthcoming, and stated that the program had already failed. He blamed poor administration in 
the programs and incompetence in local and state agencies, as well as the lack of a single top-
level office in Kentucky to administer the state-wide program. Gish's frustration was rooted as 
much in the lack of understanding of the severity of the problems by government workers as it 
was with the inadequate efforts made to solve them. He called the efforts to relieve poverty in 
eastern Kentucky "one of the great international stories of 1964," with reporters from all over the 
world flooding in only to be greeted by "little but misery and a fumbling inability on the part of 
the state and federal government to do anything effective."7  
At a February meeting in Hyden, when John Whisman, Kentucky's representative to the 
President's Appalachian Regional Commission, addressed a gathering of representatives from 
eastern Kentucky communities, he hinted that the yet to be released PARC Report had its 
"holes," and said the members of PARC were aware of them but they wanted to get started as 
soon as possible anyway. He added if the audience wanted to read a "virtual blueprint for the 
PARC Report," they could look at Program 60, which he and the Eastern Kentucky Regional 
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Planning Commission had released four years earlier. But when Whisman, said "All we have 
achieved is a program that gets your case to court," it exacerbated the fears of the unemployed 
miners and those men who were working in the grossly underpaid make work jobs created by 
government programs. The report listed five ambitious programs, including the creation of an 
extensive network of highways, with Jenkins as the hub, that would create a major transportation 
center in Letcher County. That had been referred to in the original Project 60 as a comprehensive 
development highway system, a network of roads specifically designed to enhance development, 
that would help alleviate the region's isolation and open the central part of Appalachia to 
economic growth and expansion8 It also proposed water and flood control projects, the creation 
of two national forest districts, and a massive effort in human resource development. The 
creation of a permanent Appalachian Regional Commission was also included in the plan. 
Whisman told his audience that "we do not want to be so politically foolish as to put in things we 
knew in advance would defeat the program," and that the legislative proposals accompanying the 
report had been "designed to get them passed." Several programs that had struggled in Congress 
had been left out for that reason and it would be up to eastern Kentuckians to get together and 
show a "unified front to Congress" to make the program succeed and grow. The report did not 
promise job creation in the region, and Whisman said it would be up to individual companies to 
bring industrial jobs to the region because the PARC lacked the ability to compel them to. 
However, he did predict that the PARC Report would help to move as much as a billion dollars 
into eastern Kentucky in the next five years.9 
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The week before the meeting in Hyden, a group of unemployed miners led by Chandler 
Berman Gibson had been quoted in The Mountain Eagle as saying that they would no longer 
participate in roving pickets that were conducted to showcase unemployment in the coalfields. 
The pickets were meant to convince the United Mine Workers to use some of their funds to aid 
the unemployed miners, but they had not been successful. Gibson said that rather than continuing 
the pickets, the miners would concentrate on efforts to persuade the federal government to work 
toward creating other opportunities for employment in eastern Kentucky, and the miners created 
the Appalachian Committee for Full Employment. The ACFE sent their own representatives to 
the Hyden meeting, and when they were not satisfied by what they heard, they initiated a 
political action committee to question the report presented the PARC with a list of five questions, 
including what provisions had been made to aid unemployed miners, and stimulate coal 
production. They asked what was being done for other unemployed industrial workers, and 
called for a decent wage scale for the men employed by government projects. The miners also 
suggested using unemployed men to rebuild the thousands of run-down homes in the region and 
asked about aid for local school systems. They called for programs to retrain miners for jobs on 
local federal projects, establishing a federal authority to develop small business, creating an 
agency to have authority over the dispersal of federal funds, and the allocation of funds for 
buildings to attract industry and establishing municipal power supplies.10   
Looking for other ways to stimulate the local economy, Gish became an enthusiastic 
proponent of the idea of developing electricity producing plants directly in the coalfields, where 
locally mined coal could be taken directly to the energy plant to be burned. He also favored using 
small dams in the stream rich area to create local power supplies, and The Mountain Eagle 
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carried a number of articles concerning the potential of using water to produce electricity for 
small communities. According to Gish, the enthusiasm came at a cost though. In the Appalshop 
Interviews, he said that he and Pat were labeled by some in the utilities business as Communists 
who were trying to substitute government run electrical programs for electricity produced by free 
enterprise, and The Mountain Eagle experienced another advertising boycott by local businesses. 
However, although the boycotts showed the risks involved with challenging the status quo, there 
is no evidence to corroborate Gish's statement that the utilities had been behind them.11   
Gish and Gordon K. Ebersole, Staff Assistant to Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall, 
carried on a series of letters and visits in 1963 discussing the possibilities of generating electrical 
power in the regions where coal is produced. Gish first broached the idea to Dr. Howard Forsyth 
of the Department of the Interior early in 1963 when he wrote concerning a conversation he had 
recently had with Roland Price, a coal operator with extensive truck mine operations in eastern 
Kentucky. Gish wrote that Price was prominent in the industry, and one of the leaders in the 
Hazard Coal Operators Association, who told Gish that "everyone in the industry knows that if 
coal has any real future it is in the field of power production, and Gish had several other 
prominent coal men on board. All were convinced that local power production was the future of 
the coal industry in eastern Kentucky.  
Ebersole became involved through Forsyth and was an enthusiastic proponent of local 
production of electrical power in areas where the means, such as coal or water power, were 
readily available. As an administration official, Ebersole was privy to information that already 
revealed the writing on the wall, as far as a backlash from big energy concerns, and in an April 
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1963 letter concerning an editorial Gish had written concerning flooding in Letcher County, he 
warned Gish that the issue of power generation was already moving away from local production 
and toward big power plant production. He wrote that the Federal Power Commission had 
authorized the Corps of Engineers to proceed with building power installations at Moores Ferry 
on the Clinch River in Virginia, and the Bluestone Dam on the New River in West Virginia. 
Ebersole told Gish this was fine, if it was the way the people of the region wanted it, but added, 
"how in thunder do you people expect to grow tall if you don't ever learn to stand up?  Moores 
Ferry and Bluestone are just as much a part of the problem as TVA and strip mining."12 
Ebersole had a close relationship with both Tom and Pat Gish and stayed at their home 
often when he visited Letcher County. Their collaboration was evident in the correspondence 
they shared, which included the initial invitation, a hand-written note from Pat Gish, for Ebersole 
to stay at the Gish home, "so we can talk all night if we want to."13 From this beginning, the 
Gishes and Ebersole formed a close working relationship and bond of friendship that allowed for 
a free exchange of ideas as well as an exchange of material that was used in the work they 
shared. In his response to Pat Gish's invitation, Ebersole informed her he would be bringing a 
film concerning economic development in the Northwest, which featured a Columbia River 
power plant and expressed the wish that the Gishes cold visit the area soon and "see how electric 
power has opened opportunities of a better life for millions.14 
The exchange was mutual and Gish sent a constant stream of editorials and articles from 
The Mountain Eagle to Ebersole, which Ebersole distributed to members of Congress, and The 
Mountain Eagle maintained a powerful presence in Washington through Ebersole and other like- 
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minded friends of the paper. A March 1963 editorial that called for the creation of a TVA like 
organization for Central Appalachia revealed the collaboration between Gish and Harry Caudill 
and just pre-dated the release of the PARC report with the idea. Gish's call for flood control, later 
echoed in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, was accompanied by an idea that "properly planned 
development could see the installation of hundreds of lakes and dams in eastern Kentucky that 
could be used for flood control and for the dual purpose of electrical generation. " In the process, 
power plants could be installed to utilize both coal and water, producing an at-home market for 
all the coal we can produce." Gish predicted the approach would bring badly needed stability to 
the coal industry and "with flood free industrial sites and cheap power, industrialization and an 
accompanying end to our economic ills could follow as night follows day." He referenced the 
establishment of conservancy-public utility districts like the ones in the Columbia River Valley 
in Washington and the Snake River Valley in Oregon, or an organization that resembled the 
TVA more closely.15 Gish foresaw the bleak future of the Appalachian Diaspora that might occur 
without development, warning that "we see the day coming when the lame and the blind, the old 
and young, and those of limited intellectual and/or educational attainment will be left." Caudill 
made a similar prediction in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, and Gish envisioned the 
population that was left would likely be composed of "80 percent unemployed and 
unemployable," along with a few teachers, government workers, and others who were on the 
public payroll.16 
A week after President Kennedy's death, Harry Caudill addressed the Electric Consumer's 
Information Committee in Washington and repeated his proposal for the creation of the 
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"Southern Mountain Authority," saying that the agency should be invested with the authority to 
build both hydro-electric and coal fired power plants in Central Appalachia. He told his audience 
it would serve as the first step in addressing the social and economic problems that plagued the 
region and said that there must be a sellable product developed within the mountain region that 
would bring in outside money and stimulate further investment. "If Eastern Kentucky is to be 
restored, it must find something to sell. It has been amply proved over the years that the 
extraction of raw coal will not do it." The commodity that could turn the eastern Kentucky 
economy around would be electric power, and the reserves of coal and water power in the region, 
along with a "little inspiration and a lot of work," could turn eastern Kentucky into a major 
power producer. With coal remaining as the nation's prime source of energy for the foreseeable 
future, Caudill told the gathering he saw no reason that electricity generated at the mine mouth, 
and transmitted through high voltage power lines, could not power large east coast markets like 
New York City and help to put the Kentucky miners back to work. "The example of TVA offers 
us the most successful avenue of attack," to address the issues of the lack of industry, 
unemployment, poor education, and the increasing desperation in the area. He went to say that he 
believed that within fifteen to twenty years, the foundation for a permanent solution could grow 
out of the mine-mouth plants, including a strong recreation industry from the hydro-electric lakes 
and light industry as well as a "coal using chemical industry."17 
The PARC introduced the possibility of a TVA like project to power Central Appalachia 
with a combination of coal and water power that could generate more than enough energy to 
provide for the electrical needs of the Appalachian region and surrounding areas. The report 
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stated that the potential power market for the surrounding region was approximately three times 
that of the Appalachian region itself, and indicated that with the proper development, a situation 
could develop "where low cost fuel and other minimum transmission costs would provide the 
major economies necessary for substantial development of mine mouth power."  The power 
would not only be exported from the region, but given Appalachia's strategic location in the 
central portion of the eastern United States, it could also attract industry dependent on low cost 
power and by doing so, it would also stimulate extensive growth of other small industry as well. 
The report went on to say that the power installations could be further enhanced by developing 
"water installations designed to provide peaking power, operating in conjunction with low cost 
base load thermal plants. Such developments would not reduce requirements for coal but would 
increase them "18   
 The United States Department of the Interior offered to undertake a study of the 
possibilities of using low cost coal to power the Appalachian Region when Interior Secretary 
Stuart Udall wrote a letter to ARC Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. offering Interior 
Department leadership to conduct the study. Udall said if his department was given the go-ahead, 
he would "ask the assistance and counsel of an advisory committee, including representatives of 
private utilities, electric cooperatives, municipal power systems, industrial and residential power 
consumers, federal and state agencies, and the public." Udall suggested that the study should 
concentrate on developing" large thermal plants of 1,000 to 2,000 megawatt capacity together 
with suitable peaking hydroelectric capacity."19    
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In response to the PARC Report that designated Appalachian coal as the prime source of 
power for the Appalachian Region and surrounding areas, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr. offered 
up the possibility of a giant electrical plant located close to the source of coal, describing it as a 
"mine mouth" electrical plant at the source, near large coal mines that would send power to the 
northeastern United States. However, the reaction from the large utility companies was swift, and 
the government quickly retreated. The ink was hardly dry on the report when Udall sent a letter 
to Roosevelt informing him that he was satisfied with an announcement by the American 
Electrical Power Company that they would soon embark on a seven-year expansion program to 
add five million kilowatts of new capacity in the Appalachian coalfields, and added that the 
acquisition of a new supply of power from Canada by Consolidated Edison had eliminated the 
need for the "mine mouth" plants.  Udall said it was welcome news that the expansion would 
include the annual use of about 12.5 million additional tons of Appalachian coal and made 
reference to a letter he had received from Congressman Carl D. Perkins of the Kentucky’s 
Seventh District, stating that the best way to reduce poverty was to create jobs in the coal 
industry. Udall informed Roosevelt that his department would henceforth take the lead in 
studying the electrical power production potential in Appalachia, and the study would be 
coordinated with the existing Federal Power Commission survey on national energy 
requirements.20 
Roosevelt disowned the plan even before he received the Udall letter, and later denied he 
had even made the "mine mouth" statement at a meeting in Logan, West Virginia sponsored by 
Appalachian Power Company and three chambers of commerce.  He even said he had never 
made any statement to the effect that he had plans to recommend locating the electrical plant in 
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Appalachia and emphasized that his report would contain no such proposal, adding that the 
government had not budgeted any funds to develop the project and would not permit the plant to 
be constructed anyway.21 In response to Udall's letter, Roosevelt thanked him for pointing out 
the "several steps that must be taken if the question of how to best utilize Appalachian coal is to 
be resolved." He also endorsed Udall's proposal to take over studying the matter and said he 
would personally urge the PARC to take appropriate action to implement Udall's plan22  
Gish reacted furiously to the denial of the mine mouth generating plants, writing that for 
a brief moment, it had looked as if the officials who were charged with plotting the destiny of 
eastern Kentucky were "about to overcome their own lack of courage and come up with a 
program with real guts," but, "it was all an illusion." In his scathing editorial response to the 
announcement, Gish excoriated Roosevelt, reminding readers that FDR Jr. had once been a 
lobbyist for "Dictator Trujillo of the Dominican Republic," and had so "successfully represented 
the poor and downtrodden of that woebegone country that he was hired to do something for the 
poor of the Appalachian area." He outlined the comprehensive power plan and wrote that 
Roosevelt had been quoted at an earlier meeting at Appalachian Power headquarters in West 
Virginia as saying he would recommend that the mine mouth plant be built. Almost as soon as 
the report was printed, Roosevelt issued a "total denial,” saying he wanted to make it clear that 
there would be no recommendation by the PARC relating to the construction of any coal 
generating plant. Bos Johnson, News Director of WSAZ TV in Huntington, West Virginia, stated 
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that WSAZ no longer had a transcript of the Roosevelt speech because the president of 
Appalachian Power had asked the station for all film footage and transcripts of the speech.23 
Gish wrote that the battle of the "plain people" of Eastern Kentucky had been hard, that is 
the people who were not associated with Appalachian Power Company or the Department of the 
Interior, because they had been ignored by Roosevelt as well as by the state governors, and had 
"never once been allowed to state their own idea," in relation to their own problems, to state or 
federal officials.  
Yet the idea of harnessing Eastern Kentucky Coal and Eastern Kentucky water to Eastern  
Kentucky manpower in a total development program has persisted, and has continued to 
 grow steadily, in acceptance and support.....Franklin D. Roosevelt himself and in person  
 was quoted as saying that he would recommend a giant electricity generating plant be 
 built in the heart of the Appalachian coalfields. Miracle of miracles, Roosevelt had seen 
 the light. What a short lived miracle it was. Scarcely had the program been printed when 
 Roosevelt issued a total denial.24 
Gish wrote that that when officials at Appalachian Power Company had expressed their 
disapproval or the plan, Roosevelt made it clear that the president of APC had been "needlessly 
disturbed," and that it was now obvious that nothing would be done to disturb the big 
private/public power companies "who have presided over the decline and fall of the Appalachian 
area as they have exploited it for all it was worth." He added that the Upper Kentucky River Area 
Development Council (now KRADD) had also been brought to heel by the subtle presence of the 
District manager of Kentucky Power in Hazard and a cohort of company employees at a 
development meeting in Jackson. 
The Hazard Herald also weighed in editorially on what had become known as the 
Yankee Dixie project not long after the Quicksand meeting. Referring to a front-page article 
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titled "Mine Mouth Generator Planned for Kentucky," which reported on a statement made by 
Hugh Spurlock, chairman of the Yankee Dixie steering committee, announcing the plan to build 
large electrical plants in the Appalachian coal fields, a Herald editorial asked if Yankee Dixie 
represented, "A Threat or a Hope?" The editorial stated that the impact of a such a large project 
could lead to the "re-birth" of the coal industry in eastern Kentucky, which carried the "old, 
original promise for complete development of the region, at the same time it carries a dread 
threat, of the continued rape of the mountains.” The author of the editorial, possibly Editor Oscar 
Combs, wrote that "The first life of the coal industry in Eastern Kentucky destroyed these 
mountains," and that while a couple of generations had benefitted, the "curse of absentee 
ownership" had starved county governments and school systems as enormous and untaxed 
wealth left the region. "Unless we are very diligent, our wealth may continue to be stolen at an 
even greater rate in the form of untaxed electricity." He praised the creation of new jobs but 
cautioned that it must do more than create jobs, and particularly to ensure that electricity must be 
subject to taxation by local governments and that the steam plant "must not be allowed to use 
coal derived from the strip mining method," which he called a "curse in itself," nor could it use 
coal mined by "cheap labor in unsafe working conditions." The editorial finished by demanding 
that "The safeguards for our future must be written into the initial concept of the new 
enterprise."25 
 Even though the Department of Interior had taken over the planning for developing steam 
plants to generate electricity in Central Appalachia, the plans for developing a power generating 
facility based on the TVA model that were submitted by John Sherman Cooper and initially 
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embraced by Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. did not die.  In 1965, The Courier Journal carried an 
article on the speech Caudill had delivered to the Southeast Center of the University of Kentucky 
and Pine Mountain Settlement School on Labor Day. The article showed Caudill's continued 
determination by his call to Congress to finance the construction of a major electricity generating 
system in eastern Kentucky and for the creation of the Southern Mountain Authority. As in the 
previous year's plan, Caudill also proposed tying hydroelectric energy to the project as well, and 
called for damming up four major eastern Kentucky streams, the Big Sandy River, the Poor Fork 
of the Cumberland, and the Licking and Kentucky Rivers. Of the four, three had their headwaters 
in Letcher County and the dams would impound water within a hundred miles of the headwaters 
of each one. Caudill estimated that each lake would be comparable in size and cost to Norris 
Lake in Tennessee and would be capable of "producing very substantial quantities of 
hydroelectric power." Below each dam, a coal generated power plant would create additional 
energy. He added that his proposal for Congress to finance the project was not novel, since the 
country was already dotted with other federally financed plants. "The only thing novel about my 
proposal is that it applies to the rivers and valleys of our own neglected and forgotten corner of 
our nation." Caudill also stated that adequate roads, schools, and other facilities like hospitals 
would rise from "the midst of abundant and inexpensive electricity," and that it was likely that 
other outside investment would flow into the region. His only concern was that the construction 
of coal fired power plants would encourage an increase in strip and auger mining and he called 
for both methods of extracting coal to be outlawed on mountainous terrain.26  
 The plan continued to gather momentum even after the Department of Interior withdrew 
its interest. A huge electrical blackout in the northeastern United States in November of 1965 
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highlighted the need for increased electrical capacity for the Atlantic seaboard, and the Yankee 
Dixie plan found new life as a possible solution to the energy shortage as well as a tool to help 
lift the Appalachian coal producing counties out of poverty. A Christian Science Monitor article 
reported that 21 states had united behind the idea and expressed the hope that private electrical 
firms would join municipal and consumer owned rural cooperatives to bring it into being. Frank 
H. King, president of the American Public Power Association, said the blackout highlighted the 
need for a new look at power distribution along the east coast. The blackout had been caused by 
the failure of a small relay in Queenstown, Ontario, and had left the urban centers in the 
northeast without electricity for up to 14 hours. King said that such a small thing shouldn't cause 
such a big problem and that Yankee Dixie could be a "step in the right direction."27 
 The American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electrical Co-operative 
Association announced their support for Yankee Dixie and co-sponsored the Washington 
meeting where Harry Caudill spoke about the possibility of developing a "system for the 
generating and transmission of electric power with almost six million kilowatts tied together with 
thousands of miles of double circuit 500,000 volt lines," as part of the Yankee Dixie Power 
project.  Caudill introduced the topic by saying that an article in Electrical World Magazine had 
stated that the investor owned electrical companies were winning over Congress on the decision 
as to where to locate a new large plant and the evidence of that attitude was seen when Congress 
refused to authorize the Devil's jump hydro(electric) project in Tennessee and Kentucky, which 
Caudill said would keep all electrical power projects out of Appalachia.  He questioned the 
evident pride the power interests took in their ability to continue to exploit the Appalachian 
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region by "encouraging the devastating methods of taking our coal, and at the same time, 
forbidding the fruits of this exploitation to be retained in this impoverished area."  
 Caudill told the group that engineers had predicted the Yankee Dixie project could be 
built "to the proper scale with relatively cheap money," and would produce annual revenues of 
around $10 million. That money could then go toward infrastructure improvements such as 
hospitals and roads or matching funds for school construction "when the Congress meets its 
responsibility to the public schools."  He said he believed that every dollar generated would turn 
over three to ten times if it could be kept in the region, and would create enough wealth that 
many of the area's problems could be alleviated without further allocations from Congress. 
Although private investor owned power companies had been invited to participate, Caudill said 
he saw little evidence of their willingness to do so and said it was evident to him that if the 
project was to be successful, the Yankee Dixie Group would have to do it alone. Caudill called 
the development of the Yankee Dixie project the difference between "enlightened self-interest on 
one hand and a brutal exploitation of natural resources on the other," touching his favorite 
themes concerning the exploitation of the region, and comparing it to Switzerland in its 
potential.28 
 Caudill also called for language in the charter to guarantee that the coal used to generate 
steam would not be obtained by environmentally destructive methods, and no stream or air 
pollution would result from the generation of electricity. "With this in mind, I suggest that we get 
up off our knees and stop begging for things from investor owned companies." Caudill's belief 
that the Appalachian region needed to be self-sufficient and not dependent on outside interests 
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was reflected in his call for the development of a Southern Appalachian Authority in Night 
Comes to the Cumberlands.29 He finished by loosely quoting Brutus' speech from Julius Caesar, 
from "the immortal bard of Avon,” "There is a tide in the affairs of men, when taken at the flood 
leads on to fortune: Omitted all the voyage of their life is bound in the shallows and miseries. 
And we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures."30 
 The vast wealth generated without additional appropriations by Congress would enable 
 the Appalachian region to preserve enough of the fruits of its own exploitation from a 
 poverty ridden area into a beautiful, rich and prosperous region.31 
 Objections to the plan had already been raised before the Washington meeting where 
Caudill spoke because of the lack of participation from "private" power firms. In April, W.A. 
Duncil, president of Kentucky Utilities, said that his company and others had been "disregarded 
by Yankee Dixie" in the development of the project and that it was of particular concern since 
Kentucky Power and the East Kentucky Rural Cooperative Corp had agreed in 1963 to 
coordinate their plans to address the needs of their service area.32 
 Gish had already taken a good deal of heat from Kentucky Power for his advocacy for 
regional power generation, but he was undeterred in his belief that it was part of an overall plan 
that could provide much needed income and jobs to the area. In 1966, the engineering firm of 
Larimore, Popham, and Douglas of New York presented a plan for four power stations with 
tentative locations in western Pennsylvania, eastern Kentucky, Southern Indiana, and Northern 
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Alabama. The estimated cost of the project was $1,884,000,000.00 and the engineers estimated 
that Yankee Dixie could supply electricity demands from Florida to New England.33  
 Before Caudill's speech had ceased to echo through Washington, the official wrangling  
began. Hugh Boswell, the staff representative for the 12 states of the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, questioned the proposal while the Department of Interior, which had dropped it in 
1963, joined the United Mine Workers in endorsing it. Michael F. Wildman Jr., the union's 
director of research and marketing was quoted as saying that the UMW's goals were linked 
directly with the Yankee Dixie plan and Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Power 
Development Kenneth Holum called it "the kind of creative thinking that is needed." However, 
Boswell said that he believed that the proposal would work to the advantage of metropolitan 
areas and to the disadvantage of "present and prospective growth areas in Appalachia," adding 
that convincing answers were needed before the 12 states should support the proposal. He also 
questioned how the expansion of what he referred to as "coal by wire" would affect the jobs of 
rail and barge workers in the region and whether the overhead transmission lines would retard 
the growth of adjacent areas. Boswell also asked if investor owned utilities "that pay taxes," 
would be able to meet the power needs of Appalachia without the government subsidies the 
nonprofit Yankee Dixie system would require, since it would not pay taxes and be financed with 
tax free revenue bonds. Boswell said it would be better to encourage growth in medium sized 
cities such as Morgantown, West Virginia "to relieve the pressure on megalopolis." rather than 
devote resources to the east coast metropolitan centers.  
 Speaking at the first general meeting of the Yankee Dixie Power Association, Boswell 
said, "There are madmen such as myself who refuse to believe that the majority of the nation's 
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population and almost all of its educational and cultural complexes must be concentrated in a 
few 'megolopilitan' areas, leaving the nation's center for a vast wasteland."34 
 The loss of the mine mouth/Yankee Dixie plants represented much more than simply the 
classic lost opportunity. The decision of the Department of Interior to keep the electrical power 
dynamic in the hands of big producers withdrew the possibility of changing the Central 
Appalachian Economy from a producer of sellable raw materials, coal, natural gas, and timber, to 
a manufacturer of a value-added commodity that might have seen the region bloom into a solid 
manufacturing economy with the accompanying boom in supporting business development.  
 As Gish and Caudill continued to make the case that eastern Kentucky could be a major 
source of electrical power for the eastern part of the nation, Lyndon Johnson boosted their hopes 
considerably during his visit to the Martin County home of Tom Fletcher in April 1964 to 
dramatize the need for Congress to pass his Appalachian Aid Plan. Fletcher was an unemployed 
sawmill worker who, along with his wife and eight children, existed on an income of $400.00 a 
year. While Johnson's visit was primarily intended to showcase the need for aid to Appalachia, 
he was also under pressure from Senator John Sherman Cooper and Representative Carl D. 
Perkins to aid the Kentucky coal industry. At the news conference that accompanied his visit to 
Martin County, he told reporters that his Appalachian tour had convinced him of the need and 
possibility of developing electric power in the Appalachian region.  
There is need for the careful scrutiny for the development of power resources, looking 
 toward action. That would mean specifically the possibility of steam plants, TVA, in 
 some of that area.35    
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 Historian John A. Williams later wrote that when Johnson declared the War on Poverty 
from the home of a disabled miner’s house in Martin County, Kentucky, the practical effort was 
to make Appalachia the theater for a two-front war, with the ARC directing the redevelopment of 
the region from the top down and the Office of Economic Opportunity remaking it from the 
bottom up.36  Although neither agency had been fully established in April 1964, both became 
important players in the overall activity in the War on Poverty.  
The Mountain Eagle reported on the announcement, and the $262,000,000 spending 
proposal Johnson made to Congress. Kentucky Senators John Sherman Cooper and Thurston 
Morton and Congressman Carl D. Perkins's co-sponsored the bill but Cooper and Perkins 
immediately said it wasn't enough, and Cooper called for the construction of a TVA steam plant 
to use eastern Kentucky coal. Perkins said a much broader program than what was contained in 
the Appalachian Redevelopment Bill was needed, adding that it would require much greater 
federal funding than what had been proposed, and the $71 million called for in the first year 
would not even be adequate to meet the need for health, education, and welfare services in the 
region. All three indicated an interest in developing electrical power in the Appalachian area and 
agreed there was a need for "careful scrutiny in the development of power resources, looking 
toward action that would mean the development of steam plants, TVA, in some of that area."37     
Tom Gish agreed with Perkins and Cooper that the president's program as it was 
introduced would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the region and both legislators urged the 
president to extend TVA activities into eastern Kentucky, with Cooper calling for his proposed 
TVA plant in eastern Kentucky to be a "self-financing" act. In his remarks following the 
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president's speech, Cooper was adamant in his support for coal. "Coal is still the basic industry in 
eastern Kentucky, and a steam plant built under the TVA self-financing act would do much to 
utilize resources here." Although he made certain to give Perkins credit for championing the 
steam plants as well, Gish ironically pointed out that many of the administration Democrats had 
ignored the issue, writing that, "It took a Kentucky Republican to point out the obvious 
concerning Eastern Kentucky, coal and the TVA, a subject that up until now had been ignored by 
all the expert Democratic federal planners."38 
Gish was generally enthusiastic about Johnson's visit to Martin County, using Johnson's 
description of the Appalachian Bill as a "Bright Highway of Hope" in the headline of his 
editorial. He also praised Johnson for expressing interest in developing the electrical power 
potential of eastern Kentucky, and the extension of TVA or the development of a TVA like 
program for the Appalachian region. "The president had the fortitude to speak out on this 
obvious point in the face of the fact that such a reasonable course of action had been ignored by 
the governors." However, he also found the $262 million appropriation the president had 
requested for the 340 Appalachian counties to be inadequate and wrote that the $770,000 it 
would provide for each county would build just about a mile of highway through any one of 
them.39  
 Gish also pointed out that a number of highly placed administration officials and 
congressmen had been dissatisfied with the work of the PARC program under the direction of 
John Whisman. He blamed Whisman and his "provincialism, his narrowness of view, and his 
political timidity" for preventing the commission from drafting an adequate program and wrote 
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that Whisman had been more interested in setting up a method to plan the program than he was 
in "doing anything about the problems of eastern Kentucky and the rest of Appalachia."  He 
finished by saying that the chief hope for the mountains lay not with Johnson but with Perkins 
and Cooper, both of whom had demonstrated an understanding of the mountains and the needs of 
the people.40   
In a September editorial, Gish pointed out the imbalance in the ranks of the Letcher 
County Economic Opportunity Committee, which he described as having a considerably larger 
number of generals than privates. That imbalance followed through the entire War on Poverty in 
every locally based Community Action Program and Area Development District, and while it led 
to a good deal of expanded patronage for the generals, it offered very little meaningful 
participation to the privates who were the actual stakeholders in the War on Poverty. The Letcher 
County Economic Committee, was locally administered and was not related to the Washington 
based Office of Economic Opportunity, which was established in August 1964, and was headed 
by Sargent Shriver. The fourteen members of Letcher County Committee included coal 
operators, bankers, elected officials, and merchants, but no poor or working-class people. "The 
people the poverty war was designed to help are not represented on the committee and so will 
have no voice in the planning of their future."41 
In June, with the fall election looming, Johnson had backed away from a confrontation 
with congress over the part of his bill that would have created the Appalachian Development 
Corporation, which had been designated in the PARC to lend substantial amounts of money to 
cities and counties that lacked the necessary credit qualifications in order to fund public works 
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projects. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, and several 
Appalachian governors opposed the program, and Whisman said supporters of the program had 
failed to make a good case for it.  Even after Congress officially launched the War on Poverty by 
passing the Economic Opportunity Act in August, Johnson still felt he needed a special act for 
Appalachia, and asked Congress to pass the Appalachian Recovery Act. The Senate finally 
passed its version of the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA) in September, but the 
House took no action, which meant that the bill's fate would be determined by the November 
elections. In January 1965, following Johnson's electoral sweep, it was reintroduced and Johnson 
signed it into law in March 1965.42 
As the fate of the Appalachian bill remained uncertain for the rest of 1964, The Mountain 
Eagle was visibly frustrated and as the year wound down, both Tom and Pat Gish took 
Washington and Frankfort to task. In separate essays, both written under the headline of "This is 
the war that is," the Gishes made their critiques of the War on Poverty and laid out many of the 
issues that plagued The Great Society through its short lifetime. Pat Gish was unsparing in her 
criticism in an essay subtitled "Concerning the Confusion that Exists in the Ranks,” and opened 
by warning that the war may be lost before the first battle was fought. She pointed to the 
confusion in applying for federal aid programs and gave examples of counties that had been 
required to resubmit applications while neighboring counties saw the same applications sail 
through. Confusion about how much to ask for, lack of coordination between federal and state 
officials, and sketchy information from Frankfort and Washington had led to the problems, and 
she wrote that if it continued, it would poison the efforts made by county and regional agencies. 
After stating that a group in Hazard had been turned down because it was not incorporated, 
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although they had been told six months before that incorporation would not be necessary, she 
pointed out that the cost of incorporation would prevent groups comprised of poor people from 
participating and would limit the program to elected officials and business leaders.  
He may as well have told the people to start flapping their arms and fly to the 
 moon...One feat is as impossible as the other. Why can't Washington understand that for 
 the most part, county officials in Eastern Kentucky are not going to do anything that will 
 permit the poor to become powerful enough to have a voice of their own? 
Pat Gish wrote that any committee which was required to have representatives from the 
poor would have a ten to one ratio of politicians, civic leaders, and federal officials to any one of 
the poor, and quoted from a Letter to the Editor from a Washington reader who had signed it 
"Bureaucrat." The writer pointed out that when the rich concern themselves with the business of 
the poor it was called charity, but it was called anarchy when the poor concern themselves with 
the business of the rich. He finished by saying that when bright young men in Washington 
concerned themselves with the business of the poor it was called "a good living."43 
In his piece, Tom Gish estimated that he had attended over 300 meetings in the past five 
years, all devoted to the subject of poverty in eastern Kentucky. He described the meetings 
where the work was actually done as being almost totally devoid of elected officials, 
businessmen, and community leaders.  Gish chose one particular meeting which was held in the 
"protective warmth and shelter" of the Kentucky Power Company auditorium in Hazard as an 
example of the futility that plagued many of the early sessions. He pointedly noted that 
references to public power, an issue that had cost The Mountain Eagle dearly when they 
embraced it, were no longer made at the meetings, because to do so would insult "one's host." It 
appeared at this meeting that everyone had made the wrong kind of application too, and they had 
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all been returned, because the officials from various counties and organizations had failed to 
make the case as to how it would relate to the Overall Economic Development Plan. That was a 
requirement from the federal government agencies responsible for approving the grants and 
everyone who had applied had made the same mistake. 
The announcement from (William)Miller (of the University of Kentucky Extension 
 office at Quicksand in Breathitt County), which says in effect that efforts on behalf of 
 Eastern Kentucky have been wasted, brings no response. This observer reflects that the 
 group is so conditioned to failure, that even one so monumental as this brings no spark of 
 anger, no spark of reaction, nothing but stolid acceptance.44 
In an effort to explain the problems eastern Kentucky was having in fitting into 
Washington programs, Gish pointed to an announcement from Sargent Shriver concerning a $32 
million grant covering 35 states, from which not one eastern Kentucky application was approved. 
Gish wrote that the failure was on the part of Washington and Frankfort but added that while the 
people charged with obtaining the grant funds in the mountain counties had been aware that they 
lacked the necessary skills to secure them all along, they had attempted to write them anyway. 
Neither Shriver's office nor officials in Frankfort had come to the aid of the eastern Kentucky 
agencies writing the proposals, and the result had been the loss of millions in funding. "We keep 
asking ourselves how could it possibly be that Kentuckians are so misinformed, so inept, that 
Shriver's office should feel compelled to return virtually all of our applications for want of 
adequate preparation?" He suggested that the most effective use of the initial funding would be 
to establish an office in each county to house individuals possessing the technical skills 
necessary to present effective applications to federal agencies, and that without assistance, 
eastern Kentucky was making use of about one third of the available opportunities for federal 
aid, and children were dying from hunger. The Area Program Office/Area Development Council 
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approach was not working in eastern Kentucky and few civic leaders or elected officials were 
even participating in the Area Councils. So, development responsibilities were placed on the 
shoulders of state and federal agencies that failed miserably. Local offices and citizens were 
isolated by the failures and "the end result is a kind of no-man's land in the field of 
development."45 
Although Johnson's Appalachian bill struggled in Congress for the rest of the year, it was 
eventually passed at the climax of his “honeymoon period" in March 1965 as the Appalachian 
Regional Development Act. But major changes had to be made to get the legislation passed, 
including the addition of South Carolina and New York as part of the Appalachian area to be 
served.  After nearly a year of wrangling with congressional Republicans, disinterested 
congressmen whose districts would not be helped by the legislation, and with conservative 
southern Democrats who were already unhappy over the 1964 Civil Rights Act and feared that 
the ARDA would move the south further along the road to equal rights, Johnson finally signed 
the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA), which established the Appalachian 
Regional Commission. 46   
While the Gishes were frustrated by the slow pace and bureaucratic makeup of the 
poverty programs, Harry Caudill was more concerned with the erosion of the independence he 
admired in the mountain people and with the patronage that would be enjoyed by those in charge 
of distribution the government benefits. In a December 1964 speech at Union College in 
Barbourville, Kentucky, he referred to mountaineers as a "kept population," whose ancient 
independence had "withered" by exchanging "wages for welfare." Caudill called the public 
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benefit programs a deadly narcotic that changed few of the deeply rooted problems in the 
mountains, except to increase their dependence on bureaucrats and to deepen the fatalism he saw 
as a growing cancer in the region. He did offer praise for new federal programs to finance public 
education, which he said had helped to "stave off the collapse of the public-school system" and 
increased the number of adequate school buildings. However, he said the small improvements in 
public education just flowed outward with the young people of the region as they left to find 
opportunity elsewhere, and while the region had "ceaselessly given its material resources to the 
world, it has given even more generously of its human resources." This exodus was exacerbated 
by a stagnant business climate, with bankers unwilling to lend and businessmen reluctant to 
invest in their homeland. All this had created two Appalachias, one of poverty and another of 
affluence which had prospered in the midst of decay. While he questioned if the Appalachian 
Bill that was before Congress in 1964 would change much, "it would start the broad fingers of 
super-highways to probing the landscape." These new roads would carry Appalachian youth to a 
better life in distant cities, but the reverse traffic would bring people with new ideas and new 
opportunities to the stagnant land. The roads would also "transmit to distant cities all the evil 
effects of Appalachian illiteracy and poor health," which would spur demands from the 
destination cities to upgrade public facilities in Appalachia as much for self defense as 
anything.47 
As 1964 passed into 1965, many of the doubts concerning the War on Poverty that had 
been expressed by The Mountain Eagle proved to be prescient. The war was chronically 
underfunded and allowing so many elected officials and political functionaries on the boards of 
the Community Action Agencies and Community Action Programs proved to be a near fatal flaw 
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as well. The lack of participation by the actual poor, who the War on Poverty was supposed to 
lift, was pointed out in editorials, but as with many legislative reforms, the flaws were built in as 
part of the price that was paid to get them passed in the first place. Like many of the New Deal 
programs, the new programs required politicization from the national level to the county and 
local level in order to garner enough legislative support to get the legislation passed.  The whole 
Great Society/War on Poverty that held such promise for Letcher County and Central 
Appalachia, began to take on the appearance of a cruel hoax not too long after it was introduced, 
as the cost of the war in Vietnam compromised funding for other programs. The War on Poverty 
eventually took on the look of a massive bait and switch political scheme, underfunded, 
politically manipulated, and eventually abandoned, as it went down along with the Johnson 
Administration. 
Gish expressed further doubt following Johnson's 1965 State of the Union Address, 
which outlined the Great Society programs that Johnson said would lift the poorest areas of the 
nation out of poverty. In reply Gish wrote that it might happen, "if the president's proposals to 
Congress live up to the promise of his "State of the Union" address this week, and if Congress 
approves the program he presents."48 The accompanying editorial was even more doubtful and 
laid out a number of stumbling blocks that eventually came to define the futility of Johnson's 
attempts and the massive challenge of addressing a century of neglect and exploitation along 
with ineffective local leadership.  
But the glamour, the hopes, the expectations under the "Great Society" program will 
 tarnish rapidly unless President Johnson is able to come up with the administrative talents 
 and abilities in several levels of federal government to match his own bright hopes for the 
 nation. The problems of leadership also exist equally at state and local levels.49 
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 Gish went on to point out that the promise of the War on Poverty had already started to 
fade and appeared to be "on the road of becoming just another agency run by men of small 
minds, who were determined to show how unimaginative and wasteful a federal program could 
prove to be."  The federal government could easily pour $1.5 billion nationally into education 
without moving the needle as much as a point, if funds were handed to "incompetents" who were 
more interested in protecting the status quo and their own interests than in the interests of 
students.  He called the program "challenging" for the nation and predicted that if it failed it 
would probably demonstrate a national and societal failure, pointing with alarm to a national 
tendency of talented and able people withdrawing from the national grind of citizen participation. 
One week later, Gish called the "Appalachian Bill" a farce and said it could not be regarded as a 
"serious attempt to help the area."50 He did praise Johnson's proposal to create Medicare and his 
educational proposal that at least recognized that the problems of eastern Kentucky schools were 
created by endemic poverty and would require massive federal assistance to alleviate. But he 
also pointed to the flaw in Johnson's formula that figured school funding in poverty stricken 
areas by basing it on the state as a whole and particularly on the state's better funded schools. 
Gish wrote that while Louisville schools received about twice what eastern Kentucky schools 
received, they still performed at the bottom of the nation and their teachers were leaving in 
droves for better jobs in nearby states.  
 As effective aid to the region proved to be hard to come by, Gish's frustration reached a 
boiling point. This was a battle he had fought since taking over The Mountain Eagle, and to see 
the possibility of action that might actually relieve the poverty he saw on a daily basis be dangled 
like bait and withdrawn as regularly as it appeared must have driven him well past his usual level 
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of contempt for the political process. As other flaws in Johnson's programs revealed how poorly 
Kentucky's congressional delegation had presented the case for eastern Kentucky, he turned his 
wrath on legislators he had recently praised, when he learned that new schemes for allocating 
funding for Appalachian development programs tied funding to possible return per dollar and 
placed eastern Kentucky counties in competition with highly developed urban areas like 
Pittsburg.  Gish had generally been favorable when writing about Kentucky's U.S. House and 
Senate delegations, but by then, he was so upset by changes concerning the allocation of funds 
that had been made to the bill he wrote,  "our" disgust with Carl D. Perkins, John Sherman 
Cooper and Thurston Morton was "total" for allowing the language to be incorporated in the bill 
to frontload funding to areas that didn't have the need of eastern Kentucky, but would provide a 
much more visible return for the money spent. "If a growth center is the best place to spend 
Appalachian funds, it would make sense to spend the entire one billion dollar appropriation in 
California." The editorial questioned leadership at the state level as well, especially that of John 
Whisman, who Gish wrote had no plan in place to expend funds even if they were allocated, 
while the state of Pennsylvania had a detailed plan ready. 51 
 Not long after Gish's editorial criticizing the Kentucky congressional delegation, a "Letter 
to the Editor," written by Harry Caudill appeared in The Louisville Courier Journal that referred 
to an article by Richard Harwood that had appeared in the paper's February 5, 1965 edition, 
quoting John Whisman as saying that except for highway development, Kentucky had no 
detailed plans for taking advantage of subsidies that were provided by the Appalachian Recovery 
Program. Like Gish, Caudill criticized Whisman's eight-year effort in planning what he called 
the Eastern Kentucky Meetings, where "planning -- endless planning--has been the theme and 
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topic."  Caudill wrote that in the two years since the Appalachian Regional Commission was 
created, planning and meeting were about all they had accomplished. "Now after all this 
planning, it appears there are no plans....the prospect is that we will plan to plan some."  Caudill 
called it ironic that while Kentucky had originated the Appalachian Redevelopment Program, 
Pennsylvania would get four-sevenths of the funds that were allocated for reclaiming strip-mined 
lands. He finished by stating that the one thing Kentucky had in abundance was "planless 
planners."52 
 Early in 1965, Lyndon Johnson made the most important decision of his presidency. 
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, Congress overwhelmingly approved the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that authorized the president to take "all necessary measures to repel 
any armed attacks against the forces of the United States, and to prevent further aggression." 
This resolution gave Johnson a good deal of leeway in broadening American objectives in 
Vietnam, and he was under considerable pressure to do so. By his show of force in Vietnam, 
Johnson was able to disarm attacks from his presidential challenger Barry Goldwater.53 After the 
election, Johnson found himself unable to control the expansion of the war and by the end of 
1965 he had committed 40,000 American troops to Vietnam and authorized American forces to 
undertake offensive operations, although he did not inform the public until June when it came 
out in a press release.54  Later, Johnson revealed that when he made the decision to expand the 
war, he had feared "that bitch of a war" would destroy "the woman I really loved, -- The Great 
Society."55 
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 The House of Representatives passed the Appalachian Regional Development Act on 
March 3, 1965 and President Johnson signed the bill into law on March 9. It was very similar to 
the recommendations made in the Presidents' Regional Appalachian Commission report, and 
created the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Appalachian Development Highway System, 
and allocated a billion dollars to bolster the economy in the eleven-state region. It called for 
Demonstration Heath Projects, low income housing assistance, and modifications to existing 
programs. The Highway Act was specific about the amounts of funding to be made available 
each year, although they would not be allocated until 1972. However, it was less specific about 
the overall distribution of funds, which set off a good deal of congressional debate and Gish's 
earlier prediction concerning the allocation of area funding came true.  After the House had 
refused to pass the act in 1964, one change was made when a clause was inserted at the 
insistence of PARC Director John Sweeney and Charles Shcultze of the Bureau of the Budget. 
The clause carried the statement that the "public investments made in the region under the act be 
concentrated in areas where there is a significant potential for economic growth." The insertion 
of this language set the stage for bitter disagreements between factions that favored depopulating 
the region and training the residents to seek employment elsewhere and those who wanted to 
develop Central Appalachia. Appalachia had become the first American region to receive a 
specific program for infrastructure development and the media examination of the region 
intensified.56 
 By October, a dispute centering around the economic growth potential clause had 
developed between Sweeney, who was by then co-chairman of the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, and John Whisman, States Co-Chairman of the ARC. Sweeney's contention was 
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that federal efforts at development be limited in rural mountain areas and that people should be 
encouraged to move out. Whisman favored developing eastern Kentucky and did not believe it 
would be necessary to move people out of the region. Summarizing an article that had appeared 
in the September 27 issue of U.S. News and World Report, Gish wrote that Sweeney had 
presented his views to the magazine that called for ignoring the pockets of poverty and 
unemployment in the inaccessible hollows of the region and concentrating all spending in places 
where growth potential was greatest. This included building a network of roads so the poor and 
unemployed "can get out of their hollows and commute to new jobs in or near the cities.57 
 Whisman disagreed with Sweeney and stated that because there was an existing belief 
that eastern Kentucky and other areas of its kind in America could not be developed, "Eastern 
Kentucky is in for a real fight."  Whisman referenced the clause calling for the bulk of funds to 
be spent where the return would be greatest, and called it a "gross misinterpretation of the act to 
say the sentence rules out Eastern Kentucky development." He pointed out that growth in 
America at the time was not taking place in cities but in suburbia, and he said Whitesburg, 
Hazard, and Pikeville could be easily included in the definition of suburbs.  He added that it 
would be easier to rework some of the Appalachian towns than it would be to solve problems in 
Chicago, where some of the Appalachian migrants had moved only to find that they faced more 
intense problems than they had at home.  He also warned that eastern Kentucky had been totally 
omitted from the Appalachian highway network as it was initially proposed in Washington. 
Whisman said that in an all-night telephone session, he had only managed to get 37 miles of 
quick start road projects included for eastern Kentucky, including the section between 
Whitesburg and Isom, and that the major proposals put forth by the state had been approved.  
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Eastern Kentucky was being "beaten over the head" with the same statistics that had been used to 
justify the ARDA by economists who now said statistics did not justify investing in the area.58 
 Whisman's optimism about reworking the county seats that he referred to as suburban 
areas in eastern Kentucky was lost on Gish, who also saw the possibility that the control of the 
development councils and Area Development Districts might move away from regional and local 
elites and into the hands of state and federal officials who, while they lived in eastern Kentucky, 
were not of eastern Kentucky. Gish understood that while the elites, who had by then gained 
control of the councils, often saw the programs as a mechanism to cement their power over their 
individual fiefdoms, it was still local control. In a front-page editorial, Gish asked how the 
money that was supposed to be coming to eastern Kentucky would be allocated and who would 
make the decision. He wrote that the evidence pointed to an attempt by John Whisman to "collect 
to himself the tight reins of control of all federal programs in Kentucky," for everything from 
"airports to zoological studies," including highway funding, health funds, dam construction, 
poverty programs, and economic development funds. Gish's experience in Kentucky politics in 
his days in Frankfort, as well as his much more intimate experience with the politics of eastern 
Kentucky, gave him reason to believe that if politics alone dictated the make-up of the councils, 
their leaders would appropriate every program that came into their respective counties for their 
own political purposes, and if the councils were set up in Frankfort, it would place so much 
power in the hands of politically appointed members that  "the following conclusion was valid." 
No federal funds would be appropriated to Whitesburg, Letcher County or any other city or 
county in the state without the approval of the councils, and the people would have no effective 
voice since "active membership consists of civil service employees, vested private interests, and 
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other individuals outside the framework of public accountability." Later, when articles of 
incorporation for the Upper Kentucky River Area Development District were drafted at a 
meeting in Hazard attended by Whisman and William Miller of Quicksand, Resources 
Development Specialist for the University of Kentucky Economic Resource Development 
Project, members of the drafting committed named directors for six counties, ignoring the fact 
that Letcher County had already named its members. Gish pointed out that three of the members 
chosen in Hazard were already members of Letcher County's Economic Opportunity Committee 
and asked if Letcher and other counties would have any voice in choosing their own 
representatives for the council.59 
 Gish's editorial drew an unusually heated response from Whisman in the form of a 
"Letter to the Editor," that appeared three weeks after the editorial was published. Whisman 
wrote that nothing he had done or written had been sufficient to allow Gish to draw the 
conclusions he had drawn, and stated that "The article presents a totally inaccurate picture. 
Nothing I have ever said or written presents what you refer to as "valid conclusions." Whisman 
wrote that his intention in writing the letter was to make sure Gish understood the truth and 
recognized their shared concern for the region. He added that he hoped that the "our work could 
join us as closely as our purposes do." Whisman asked for renewed understanding and pointed 
out that everyone would have to work together to "seize the opportunity -- for the first time -- to 
meet our problems in Eastern Kentucky." He called the Great Society programs eastern 
Kentucky's "last chance," and an opportunity to "accelerate the trends of progress in the region, if 
we use it well." But he warned that the same trends of progress on the national level could leave 
eastern Kentucky further behind if it the programs were not used wisely, and applied with 
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technical expertise and "plain common sense." Whisman added that he had fought for the Area 
Development Council approach because without it, no program could meet the common needs of 
the region, but cautioned that the ADDs would only be as good as the people would make them 
be.  Whisman referred to the councils as "not being finalized in nature" and indicated that while 
he would continue to advise them, their ultimate form would be determined by the individual 
councils, which he hoped would be as open and broad as possible in their design. No council 
could serve its purpose unless it was truly representative of all the groups in the region, and 
every group should be equally represented. Whisman was adamant that no single group on any 
council would possess veto power and that no individual or group could prevent an idea or 
project from being presented fairly to state or federal agencies."60 
 Gish responded to Whisman's letter in an editorial that appeared on the same page, and 
was surprisingly conciliatory, considering some of the rhetoric he had recently used to describe 
Whisman. He pointed out that his main criticism had been that business leaders, private citizens, 
and even the courthouse leaders could possibly be cut out of the leadership in the ADDs and 
councils. He wrote that if that happened, it would effectively take control away from eastern 
Kentuckians, even if the state and federal officials who ran the councils actually lived in the area. 
He agreed with Whisman's assertion that no council could serve its true function unless it was 
equally representative of all the interest groups and each community in the area. However, he 
added that there was reason to believe that the councils would become even less broadly 
representative than they already were, and that the development of the council affecting Letcher 
County, organized as a legal entity with a board of directors and an executive committee, would 
place control of the four counties it served, Letcher, Perry, Knott, and Leslie, in the hands of 
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three Hazard residents. The development district bylaws established the four district officers, 
president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer, as the council's executive committee, which 
would direct the council's activities. The nominating committee for the council officers had 
selected a slate with Hazard Mayor Willie Dawahare at the head of the council and two of the 
other three officers would also be from Hazard. Leslie County would have one representative, 
and Knott and Letcher Counties would not be represented. This would effectively deny two of 
the four counties a voice on the executive committee, giving Hazard residents the knife to slice 
the federal cake, the millions of dollars allocated to the region. "We want more than crumbs from 
Hazard's table," and used the already underway Carr Fork Dam in Knott County, as well as a 
planned dam at Ulvah in Letcher County as examples of a "watery death for a major portion of 
Letcher County." 
 Central to the entire issue of course, is the question of whether the people of Eastern 
 Kentucky at any level or in any capacity are to have any say-so over their destiny in the 
 new programs -- the really basic issue of whether democracy is to be allowed to work in 
 the mountains.  
 Gish added that the November 11 editorial had stated that while the councils would have 
broad powers, the ultimate veto would be in Whisman's hands, "who appears to be seeking and 
gaining an across the board sanction from state and federal official to run all the development 
programs in eastern Kentucky," and his opinion on that had not changed.  He referenced a press 
release from the State Appalachian Land Development Committee announcing that plans should 
be submitted by December 15 for $747,000 in development funding allocated through ARDA for 
land development. The press release was dated November 28, and according to Gish, it was the 
first form of notice concerning that particular "slice of the federal cake." He asked how, if at all, 
could any kind of planning be done in a two-week time period to determine projects of that 
magnitude and finished by asking if the money would just go to the out of state mineral owners 
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who had already "brought eastern Kentucky to its knees through deliberate exploitation?...  Who 
will cut the cake? Who gets the slices? Who gets the crumbs?"61  
 The Mountain Eagle ended 1965 with an ominous warning that the Johnson 
Administration was preparing to cut funding for some of the Great Society programs in order to 
pay for the war in Vietnam. Two areas that were specifically mentioned were the Appalachian 
Regional Development Act programs and the Economic Opportunity Act programs. The two 
were administered by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce, which 
were the first two federal departments to feel the effects of the budget shuffling conducted at the 
president's Texas ranch in late November. The article stated that Johnson's willingness to 
authorize releasing the information more than a month before Congress received the budget 
indicated his resolve to do whatever was necessary for the United States to win the war. The only 
budget increases that were mentioned were for the development of combat aircraft62. 
  Commerce Secretary John T. Connor reported that the budget for his department would 
fall short of the previous year's budget by over a billion dollars, and said it was clear that some 
projects would be cut, particularly these which had been passed by Congress in the preceding 
year. Some would be phased out and he mentioned both the Appalachian Development Program 
and Economic Development Program as possibly being subject to the cuts, but he did not name a 
specific program that would definitely be cut. Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman was also 
quoted as saying that his budget would be significantly reduced.63 
 A December editorial warned Letcher County residents that a new "get tough" policy was 
in effect in the War on Poverty for unemployed men, either to "move or starve."  Gish referred to 
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John Sweeney as the new "Tough Guy" and wrote that he had come up with the program in order 
to eliminate the embarrassingly high unemployment rate in Kentucky and the Appalachian hill 
country. The "drive-em-out approach" was described as the only idea Sweeney had come up with 
and was the "gem of thought" that would justify taking funds appropriated by Congress for 
eastern Kentucky and funneling them to the "Pittsburgh's, Birmingham's, and Knoxvilles." The 
chief targets of Sweeney's program were the men enrolled in the Workforce Experience and 
Training Program (WETS), "the happy pappies, the L-B-Jaybirds, or the jobless fathers," 
depending on the prejudices of the speaker. Gish wrote that the new approach was punishment 
because the coal industry had not been able to provide enough jobs for the region and was 
intended to force the displaced workers to relocate to the Midwest or northeast. "How dare they 
embarrass America by being jobless?  Make them move, or starve them out."  He also reported 
that a recruiter from a foundry in Indiana had come to Letcher County under the auspices of the 
U.S. Department of Labor and had interviewed a number of men. Many of the WETS men were 
selected for employment but when they got to Indiana the promised wage of $3.00 per hour had 
turned out to be $1.80 and the cost of living had made it impossible to provide for their families. 
When the men returned home they were dropped from the WETS program for "failure to accept 
suitable employment." They were also dropped from the Food Stamp Program operated by the 
Department of Agriculture, "Starvation has thus become the official weapon of the United States 
government as it seeks to impose its will upon the already kicked and downtrodden of eastern 
Kentucky." Gish pointed out similar initiatives to provide workers from eastern Kentucky for the 
citrus industry in Florida and for various Ford Motor plants.64 
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 Ironically, both Gish and Harry Caudill had previously called for training programs that 
would allow unemployed workers from eastern Kentucky to receive training at state or federal 
expense, in order to allow them to qualify for skilled labor jobs in industrial centers in other parts 
of the country.  In his 1959 testimony before hearings convened in Pikeville and Harlan by U.S. 
Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems, Gish had called for a vocational 
education system to train young people to find jobs in other parts of the country and for the 
creation of a formal relocation bureau that would help the residents of eastern Kentucky relocate, 
and provide relocation expenses and help in finding jobs. In the closing pages of Night Comes to 
the Cumberlands, Caudill called for "manual training schools" to provide young people who had 
little interest in formal education with vocational skills. While Caudill wrote that the schools 
would help to encourage industrial development in eastern Kentucky with a trained workforce, 
"at the same time, the advantages of such skills to departing mountaineers can hardly be 
overstated,"65 
 Gish's objection to Sweeney's use of federal funds to remove men enrolled in WETS 
from the mountains did not come over the removal of unemployed men from eastern Kentucky 
to good jobs in the Midwest or the northeast. It came from the exploitative nature in which the 
program was being used by the employers who used decent wages to lure the men to their 
workplaces and then decreased the wages until it became impossible for them to provide for their 
families. When, after finding that they had been lied to, the men returned to eastern Kentucky, 
they were dropped from assistance programs. Gish was outraged by what he saw as just another 
way of kicking the WETS participants when they were already down. 
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 Sweeney backed away from his plan to depopulate Appalachia later in 1966 in a speech 
at Ohio University when he said the problems that plagued Appalachia would not be solved by 
resettling the population. Instead, Sweeney proposed a program to build 2,300 miles of highway 
across Central Appalachia to bring the entire region within 25 miles of major highways. He cited 
the dispersed population, uncontrolled water, and inadequate public facilities resulting from a 
low tax base as the major problems the region faced, but said the location of the region between 
the two richest areas of the nation made it an ideal place for business if it could be improved and 
developed properly. At the same time, Sweeney warned that the Appalachian development 
programs faced sharp economic cutbacks in federal funds as a result of the costs of the war in 
Vietnam. Congress had allocated $307,000,000 for Appalachian programs in fiscal 1966 but 
President Johnson had reduced the amount to $200,000,000 and he expected cuts to continue for 
the duration of the war.66 
 As Gish had pointed out in 1964, problems with establishing sound and representative 
leadership and membership for the various Community Action projects funded through the 
Office of Economic Opportunity were ongoing throughout the War on Poverty. County elites 
continued to push for their place on the committees, or to include individuals whose allegiance 
they could count on, and continued to resist seating representatives of the poor people the 
commissions were established to serve on the boards and committees that were supposed to drive 
the projects that served them. The presence of county officials on boards of directors or at the 
head of agencies guaranteed that significant portions of the projects would be used to enhance 
patronage and reward loyal political operatives, and the coal operators, businesspeople, 
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educators, and other elites who populated the committees continued to resist including 
representatives of the poor in their groups.  
 In an essay that concerned problems with regionalism, Mountain Eagle reporter Phil 
Primack wrote that while most non-highway funds flowed through Local Development Districts 
(LDDs), the LDDs did not always represent the voice of the local people, but were instead 
dominated by the courthouse elites and elected officials who saw an increase in the amount or 
participation by the ordinary folks of the region as a threat to their level of control and to the 
degree of patronage they exercised.  So, while the ARC viewed the LDD as the "indicator of 
local will" because it included all the major elected officials in a county or development district, 
many of the local citizens viewed the LDD as an impediment to that will. "They contend it's hard 
enough to deal with their own courthouse gang," but when elected officials from several counties 
came together, it was almost impossible for the ordinary people to make their voices heard. 
Primack found himself asking the same question Gish posed in his November 11, 1965 editorial, 
"Who will cut the cake?" While Gish was concerned of the preponderance of Perry County 
officials on the ADD board, Primack's concerns centered on the fact that the regional power 
brokers, who had very little interest in radically changing the status quo, would control the 
LDDs. "If this is to become a national model, some basic problems need to be solved. Who 
represents who, and according to what guidelines?" He pointed to LDDs in western North 
Carolina as "little more than power structure collectives," that equate progress with profit.   
 The composition of board members tends to support the fear that LDDs in Appalachia 
 are at best, staffed from the top down. Even where representatives of the poor or of 
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 minority groups do sit on the board, they are generally so outnumbered that they fall 
 silent.67 
 The Mountain Eagle revealed a number of problems in the area of participation for the 
poor in the Community Action Agencies and the projects they spawned. Responding to 
numerous complaints from workers in the Unemployed Fathers program in the county, The 
Eagle conducted interviews as part of a "venting session" where they found complaints that 
ranged from poor overall treatment to the workers being "treated like slaves." Some of the 
workers said they had been forced to dangle from a rope while cutting weeds on steep cliffs and 
others said they were not allowed to smoke on the job and were not given ample time to eat their 
lunch. An unemployed coal miner from Millstone named Walden Cuddy emerged as one of the 
leaders of the group and first spoke out concerning a meeting held to discuss the program at 
Millstone School. Courthouse officials had dominated the meeting and very few of the 
unemployed fathers were aware it was taking place. Although a sign had been posted in the 
Millstone Post Office to announce the meeting, it's placement was described as "obscure" and 
The Mountain Eagle questioned whether the poor of the county would be allowed a voice in 
deciding their fate. Gish asked if the "bosses of poverty" in Letcher County were quietly 
attempting to organize local groups of proven "political trustworthiness" and if they were 
seeking "poverty finks" who would rubberstamp all the proposals coming from the courthouse. 
He went on to write that only the presence of Cuddy at the meeting had kept it from being a 
"pure farce" and Cuddy had attended only because he had been walking by the school and 
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wondered what was going on. Cuddy had also complained at an earlier date that he had been 
mistreated in the program because someone in the welfare office didn't like him.68  
 Following the initial article, jobless fathers convened a meeting where they voiced their 
own complaints to a reporter from The Mountain Eagle. This angered county officials and 
prompted a response from George Willie Webb, a foreman for the state highway department in 
Letcher County. Webb denied mistreating anyone, specifically Cuddy. He also disputed the right 
of the paper to publish the complaints from the Unemployed Fathers.  
 Webb was quoted saying, "We don't want no criticism of the way it's being run." and 
added "It's erroneously wrong" for The Mountain Eagle to publish any criticisms of the program. 
Webb said the workers were not forced to dangle over the edge of cliffs, but they had actually 
volunteered for the job. The rope was a safety precaution. "We expect safety and we are going to 
have it."  One of Cuddy's complaints was that he had been transferred to work at the head of the 
Cumberland River, across Pine Mountain and over 20 miles from his home in Millstone. He said 
he had to hitchhike to work and to the class required as part of the program, and both created a 
real hardship for him. Webb said that Cuddy was not transferred and it "just happened" that he 
was assigned to a crew with duties at the head of Cumberland River. The paper also reported that 
a number of criticisms had centered on crews being supervised by political appointees who were 
not necessarily qualified to train them in job skills. Webb said the men were getting experience 
and training in such things as cutting weeds, cleaning the highway right of way, and operating 
mowing machines, adding "We don't want no criticism."69 
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 In August, Harry Caudill wrote a letter to Gordon Ebersole, who was then serving as 
Consultant on National Resources in the OEO. In his letter, Caudill described the efforts of the 
Millstone Council and included a copy of their bylaws. He told Ebersole that similar groups had 
organized in Mayking and Eolia and added that the groups were willing to "do practically 
anything to do something for themselves, their children, and their communities," and that they 
would do "practically anything to get something going." Caudill described their efforts as a "real 
breakthrough in the O.E.O.'s Community Action Program, and added "I think it is of utmost 
importance that O.E.O encourage such groups and work with them."70 
 Later in the year, the Unemployed Fathers Program was one of the programs scheduled to 
be cut by Congress due to increased expenditures for the Vietnam War. Gish wrote an editorial 
in which he not only made an impassioned defense of the WETS Program but also gave his 
sharpest criticism of the Vietnam War up until that time. He wrote that the loss of revenue from 
the program and the money spent by the jobless fathers in Letcher County would have a 
detrimental effect on local businesses, and that it could pose a fatal blow for the Appalachian 
Regional Hospitals.  Gish tied the budget cuts for Appalachian programs directly to the war.   
 Take away the program and most of these men and their wives and children face 
 immediate disaster. Yet it appears that the program may be taken away in the next few 
 weeks or at least be cut in half because of a national decision that killing Vietnamese is 
 more important than saving the lives of Eastern Kentuckians.  We have to stop taking 
 care of the poor in Appalachia so we can keep killing the poor in Vietnam...Is killing a 
 Vietnamese child more important than saving an American child?71   
 
 One week after the article voicing George Willie Webb's complaints appeared in The 
Mountain Eagle, the Letcher County Economic Opportunity Committee admitted they were 
getting considerable pressure from "Washington poverty officials," and voted to include the 
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chairman of any anti-poverty group in the county as members of the LCEOC Central Committee. 
The first committee chairman to be added was Mountain Eagle Community Correspondent 
Mabel Kiser, of Millstone who was active in organizing the Millstone Sewing Circle and other 
community groups. Mrs. Kiser was selected to represent the Jobless Fathers of Millstone. The 
action took place although only 11 of the 25 LCEOC members were present and there was no 
quorum. Gish called it a meeting that was "marked by the absence of most of the county's official 
warriors on poverty."  County Poverty Director Isaac B. "Ike" Caudill told the committee that he 
had been warned by officials from Washington that no further funds would be allocated for the 
LCEOC unless the central committee structure was changed to represent the actual targets of the 
war on poverty.72  
 In August, the LCEOC officially approved three proposals and submitted them to the 
OEO office in Washington. The proposals included the expansion of the administrative staff 
from three to ten, the creation of a community center at Blackey, and the establishment of two-
day care centers to serve 60 preschool children. This would add a total of 39 employees to the 
staff with salaries ranging from $7,500 to $2,800 a year. County Poverty Director Ike Caudill 
and Assistant Director Ottis Amburgey, who also served in the elected capacity of Property 
Valuation Administrator, were to become permanent officers of the program with salaries of 
$7,450.00 and $6,000.00 a year. Both men had already been hired earlier that year under a nine-
month grant from OEO. They would be assisted by an eight person "professional staff" with 
salaries that ranged from $7,200.00 a year to $3,600.00 a year for two "sub-professionals." After 
years of reduced income from boycotts along with their frequent absences from the newspaper to 
attend hearings in Washington, economic circumstances drove Pat Gish to take a position with 
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the LCEOC as one of the professional staffers. During the meeting to discuss the proposals, 
Letcher County Judge Executive James M. Caudill expressed fears that the qualifications for the 
positions were set too high to be filled by Letcher County residents, saying he did not want 
"outsiders coming in with a lot of socialistic ideas." However, he added that he had several 
people in mind who could easily meet the qualifications and that a dozen young women had 
recently been in his office seeking jobs as secretaries. County Tax Commissioner Sam Clinton 
Webb agreed with Caudill, saying that he wanted the new employees to be people "who think 
and talk like Letcher Countians."73 
 The proposal was approved in November and the county committee signed a contract that 
included the provision that they would appoint a Professional Personnel Selection Committee to 
include the County Poverty Director, a member of the county committee, one Letcher County 
citizen to be named by the Council of the Southern Mountains, another citizen to be appointed by 
the governor, and a professional employment counselor who would act as chairman. OEO then 
ruled that as county director, Ike Caudill could not sit on the committee while his position was 
being considered. The other members of the committee, which included Tom Gish, met with the 
LCOEO Executive Committee, and recommended that Caudill not be re-employed. Gish had 
been appointed as the Governor's Representative to the Professional Personnel Selection 
Committee, which had been written into the contract authorizing the county committee to receive 
a grant of $202,000 to expand their staff and open a day care center at Blackey. The provision 
calling for the committee was included in the contract in order to assure the selection of a 
"capable and professional staff for the project."74 The following week, the board of directors of 
the LCOEO met in a closed meeting and voted 13 - 9 to reject the personnel committee's 
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recommendation and rehire Caudill anyway. The Personnel Committee, except for Caudill, 
immediately resigned, saying they felt that no useful purpose would be served by their "selection 
of other qualified people to be rejected by the executive committee." Reverend Charles Sydnor, a 
Presbyterian minister from Haymond, who had been chosen to sit on the committee by the 
Council of Southern Mountains, submitted a letter of resignation in which he stated, "our people 
do not seem ready to hire and fire on the basis of professional standards....Professional 
qualifications do not matter, nearly so much as our clan feelings." The events surrounding the 
rehiring of Caudill led the Washington OEO office to send Assistant Kentucky OEO Director Joe 
Smith to Letcher County to discuss the situation, and the article reporting the action referenced 
reports that Smith would attempt to persuade Letcher County to join with Knott County, Perry 
County, and Leslie County to form a regional poverty program with one central office. OEO had 
already made the request for the regional committee, but the Letcher County committee had held 
out against the idea and assured the Washington office they could employ a strong professional 
staff and operate a local program that would be of more benefit to the county.75  
 Less than a month later, Ike Caudill resigned, but at the same time, the LCEOC refused to 
accept the recommendation of the new professional screening committee to hire former Letcher 
County Extension Agent James K. Kendrick as director. Kendrick had originally been 
recommended by the first committee when they voted against hiring Caudill, but was rejected by 
the board at that time. Kendrick was already serving as poverty director in Scott County Virginia 
and according to Gish, he was running the most successful program in Virginia, and only wished 
to take the position in Letcher County because it was his home. The Kentucky office of the OEO 
had also ruled the original rejection of Kendrick to be illegal because it was done at a closed 
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meeting. Ottis Amburgey was reappointed as assistant director and Caudill accepted the position 
of supervisor of the Jobless Fathers Program in Letcher County. As soon as the motion to rehire 
Amburgey and three other employees passed, U.S. Marshall and LCOEO board member Archie 
Craft made a motion to adjourn the meeting and Amburgey was later appointed to serve as 
director of the County EOC Office.76 
Following the resignations and re-hiring, a new four county agency was formed to design 
and operate the War on Poverty in Letcher, Perry, Leslie, and Knott counties. The agency, called 
the Leslie-Knott-Perry-Letcher Community Action Council, replaced the Letcher County poverty 
agency. The Directors of the Letcher County group said they had no choice in the matter, 
because the OEO in Washington would no longer finance single county agencies. Ten Letcher 
County residents were named to a board to serve until a new director could be hired.77 But the 
Washington Office of Economic Opportunity formally intervened in the management of the 
Letcher County Office of Economic Opportunity in June and told them they must reorganize 
their program to involve the poor of the county. Justus Jenkins, Director of the OEO's 
Community Action Agencies presented them with a list of conditions that said if the demands for 
reform were not met, funding for the program would be withheld. Among the conditions was that 
each board member must be directly chosen by the organization or group he or she represented, 
and the formation of a County Citizens Advisory Committee to represent low income citizens 
that would select one-third of the Letcher County OEO Board. Jenkins also called for a new set 
of by-laws for the board.  As the national organization expressed their concerns with the Letcher 
County group, dissention in the ranks grew and in July, the OEO in Washington called for an 
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investigation of charges made in affidavits submitted by Pat Gish, Information and Guidance 
Counselor for the Letcher County Equal Opportunity Committee, Social Worker Wincel E. 
Rayborn Jr., and VISTA Volunteer John R, Labovitz, to the effect that Otis Amburgey, the Staff  
Director of the county EOC Office had been too drunk to perform his duties on several 
occasions. All three workers had previously filed verbal complaints with the Board of Directors 
of Letcher County EOC, which voted to continue his employment after Amburgey admitted to 
drinking but claimed he was never drunk on the job. The affidavits were made public in a July 1 
article that appeared in The Knoxville News Sentinel as part of a series on the anti-poverty 
program in Letcher County. When Mrs. Gish returned to work following the July 4 holiday, she 
was told that she had been terminated, along with Wincel E. Rayborn Jr., although both were 
informed by the EOC office in Washington they would be on paid leave until the matter was 
decided.78 
 Later, in the same week, Amburgey sent Pat Gish and Rayborn letters explaining their 
dismissal. Although the entire letter to Pat Gish was not published, several direct quotations from 
it appeared in the Mountain Eagle. 
I have had several complaints from the people in the Community of Blackey, from which 
you know, you must serve, that your attitude toward people in general is un-co-operative; 
and as you know, we must have an employee who will co-operate with the centers.... For 
more than six weeks, I have not been able to communicate with you and it is rather 
difficult to work in the same office with an employee who doesn't even speak to you. 
The paper also quoted directly from Amburgey's letter accusing Rayborn of revealing the 
information in the affidavits to the reporter that attacked his reputation and embarrassed himself 
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and his family, which he said was against the LCEOC code of ethics and was disloyal to the 
staff.79   
Within a week, the Letcher County EOC had expressed their confidence that Ottis 
Amburgey was fit to "conduct the county's programs in the War on Poverty" and retained him as 
director. At the same time, the council voted to reinstate Pat Gish and Wincel Raborn.  Both 
votes took place in a two-hour executive session attended by Justus Jenkins, during which the 
affidavits were read. Due to extensive press coverage of the problems in Letcher County EOC, 
and the subsequent uproar over the firing of Gish and Raborn, the meeting drew the largest 
audience that ever attended a community action meeting in Letcher County and had to be moved 
to the fiscal courtroom due to the size of the crowd. At the meeting, a letter from Sidney 
Woolner, acting director of the Mid Atlantic Division of OEO was introduced that directed the 
county committee to take immediate action against Amburgey if they found the affidavits to be 
valid, or to face having control of the poverty programs in the county transferred away from the 
committee. Jenkins told the committee they had shown very little understanding as to how 
membership should be selected or the overall purpose of the program, although they had been 
provided with the same information in several memorandums and in personal appearances by 
OEO personnel in the past. The meeting concluded at midnight with a statement by the 
chairman, Mrs. Zenneth Bentley, that Sidney Woolner had charged the board with "not doing the 
job that was supposed to be done," and later, OEO officials said the county committee's actions 
were not satisfactory. 80  
79 Ibid. 
80 "EOC retains entire staff," The Mountain Eagle, July 14, 1966, 1. 
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In August after months of turmoil in the county poverty relief programs, four members of 
the Leslie-Knott-Perry-Letcher Community Action Council resigned. Three of them, including 
Ottis Amburgey and Bill Banks, Director of the Blackey Center, gave the reason for their 
resignations as "the uncertainty of the job." The fourth staffer, a secretary, had resigned to take a 
job in Lexington, and Pat Gish was named by the Economic Opportunity Commission as Interim 
Program Developer for the four-county council.81 The Leslie-Knott-Perry-Letcher Community 
Action Council became the LKLP, the Letcher, Knott, Leslie, Perry Community Action 
Partnership, and helped to develop a number of programs, including the Boone Fork Kitchen, 
and The Eastern Kentucky Housing Development Corporation (EKHDC). 
The Boone Fork Kitchen was a nutrition program funded by the Emergency Food 
Division of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The purpose of this program was to 
prepare and deliver hot meals each day to the disabled elderly in the seven communities of the 
Boone Fork Area. These communities included Seco, Whitaker, Fleming-Neon, Hemphill, 
Haymond, and McRoberts in Letcher County. 
The Eastern Kentucky Housing Development Corporation was the first rural housing 
demonstration project ever funded by OEO. The purpose was to plan and develop low-cost 
housing in the LKLP area. Also, delegated under EKHDC was the "Older Persons Home Repair 
Program". The program was assisted by the Graduate School of Architecture of Yale University. 
The "Pole House" in Hindman and the Hillside Dormitory building are examples of the work of 
the Yale students. They were attempting to design housing that would blend with the hillside.
EKHDC developed into a factory that built modular, low-cost housing at Goose Creek, 
near Neon, Kentucky. Congressmen Carl D. Perkins was instrumental in obtaining the 
81 "Four EOC staff members quit Letcher office," The Mountain Eagle, August 11, 1966, 1. 
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cooperation necessary to make this program work. It was important for federal, state, and local 
agencies to cooperate for this program to function. Ed Stafford, former LKLP Executive 
Director, was the first director of EKHDC, but Pat Gish, the Assistant Director, took over after a 
few months and developed the program into an innovative approach to housing in Appalachia. 
Under Pat Gish, EKHDC eventually established a separate board and was able to spin off from 
the LKLP Action Council. Over three hundred (300) new homes were built and many repaired.82 
The EKHDC was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Department of Labor. The program was 
terminated when it was defunded during the Reagan Administration and Pat Gish returned full 
time to The Mountain Eagle. In 1970, Pat Gish received a Master of Science Degree in 
Community Development from the University of Louisville.83 In an interview with the 
Associated Press printed for her obituary in The Washington Times, Gish’s son Ben recalled this 
period, saying she would take a Greyhound bus from Hazard to Louisville every weekend during 
the 1960s to work on the master’s degree.84
After being urged to do so for nearly two years by the Office of Economic Opportunity 
the Letcher County EOC reorganized in 1966. As part of the reorganization, greater 
representation by the poor would be required at the Millstone Sewing Center if they were to 
receive financing from OEO, and new bylaws must be adopted setting the committee's 
membership at seventeen. Nine of the members would be poor people elected by the Letcher 
County Citizens Advisory Committee and the other eight would represent a variety of agencies 
and professions. The Citizens Advisory Committee, composed from various community groups, 
82 LKLP Website: http://www.lklp.org/Overview/Early-LKLP-Programs. 
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would be formed within a month, and would elect nine members to the board of directors. The 
Millstone Sewing Center, originally called the Millstone Sewing Circle, had been formed as a 
voluntary group of local seamstresses who were talented quilt makers, to make clothing for poor 
children from the tons of used clothing which had been donated to the county through various 
relief efforts. The Center became an OEO funded project and employed five seamstresses, with 
other volunteers donating their time. The controversy surrounding representation on the Center 
board as well as the LC Citizens' Advisory Committee is representative of other programs within 
the OEO umbrella. While the people who were seen as the county leaders felt they should be 
guaranteed a place on every board and commission, the people who were actually supposed to be 
served felt that they should have a place at the table. The age-old patrimony and patronage of 
county government had created an atmosphere that made it hard to trust the county officials to 
see that the needs of the poor were being met, when they had such lucrative morsels to pass out 
to their political allies and supporters. The Center became a focal point for the community and a 
center for activism, much of which involved the unequal distribution of aid and jobs in the 
programs overseen by OEO. A number of community events and meetings were held at the 
Center, including meetings to reform the WETS program and other programs designed to employ 
unemployed men in the county. Mountain Eagle Correspondent Mabel Kiser was one of the 
founders and she became a leader in the area reform movement. Toward the end of the article 
announcing the reorganization of the Letcher County EOC Office was a line with the information 
that that "volunteers known as VISTAS are living in various sections of the county.85 
The Appalachian Volunteers (AV) had been in Letcher County for several years and 
when workers from Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) joined them, both groups were 
85 "Poverty program reorganizes again," The Mountain Eagle, December 22, 1966, page 1. 
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initially welcomed, although some Letcher County residents saw them as strange and a few were 
put off by their long hair and clothing. But in the early days, the young volunteers in the War on 
Poverty were not terribly controversial. As one of the first demonstration projects of the Great 
Society, the Appalachian Volunteers had been in Eastern Kentucky for over two years, working 
with local self-help organizations and doing things like repairing schools, building roads and 
bridges, and establishing community centers. Then, Pearly Ayers, Executive Director of the 
Council of The Southern Mountains dismissed three key officials. The AVs operated under the 
umbrella of CSM, until Ayers fired AV Director Milton Ogle, Director of Field Operations Dan 
Fox, and Alan Zuckerman, Director of the Community Action Technician (CATS) Program. The 
CATS program operated separately from the AV program. With a staff of 16 "technicians" plus 
office staff, CATS was designed to help local groups develop community action programs. 
Following the dismissals, the entire 13 member AV staff submitted their resignations. An 
internal AV document stated that expanded AV activities following a summer program in 1965 
had enlarged their focus from "band aid" services to the identification of real issues linked with 
poverty, such as welfare administration, mining practices, and government corruption. When the 
AVs wanted to confront those issues more directly than CSM saw fit, the AVs broke from the 
Council and established themselves as a separate organization.86 
Plans for the summer of 1966 called for an OEO backed program of AVs and the CATS 
program, costing $700,000, that would involve bringing in 500 college students for the summer. 
The combined staffs of the two organizations had assisted in drafting proposals for more than 
100 community action programs. The reasons for the firings were vague and subject to a great 
deal of speculation. In the article/editorial concerning them, Gish asked what had caused the 
86 Program of the Appalachian Volunteers, April 1969, 1, Appalachian Volunteers #2, Berea College Library, 
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blow up and answered his question with several speculative answers from "a reporter." A number 
of Appalachian Volunteers working in Letcher County, including Tom Bethel, had found The 
Mountain Eagle offices to be a friendly place to stop in for a cup of coffee, directions, and 
advice. They had come to rely on the newspaper offices as a place where they could use the 
telephone, type letters and reports, and use other office machinery. As the newspaper became 
increasingly isolated from the community it served, the Gishes and other staffers found comfort 
in the company of the volunteers and soon discovered that the young people shared a good deal 
of their concerns for the region. The Gishes and Eagle staffers were happy to have the company 
of intelligent and well educated young people to compensate for the community imposed 
isolation. However, throughout the relationship, Gish was plain spoken in his advice to the 
volunteers, particularly his attempts to change the way they approached the locals, and the often 
severe criticism they had for the business community and the courthouse crowd.87  
 One possible reason for the problems between the AVs and the CSM was that the 
combined AV/CATS programs had grown larger and faster than the council's ability to handle 
them. The council's staff had not grown correspondingly and they were stretched, which created 
tensions between the staffs of the three organizations. The AVs desire to move their headquarters 
from Berea to the Bristol-Kingsport Tennessee area was also listed. Gish wrote that the wish to 
move was partly due to being closer to air travel facilities and being more centrally located, but 
added that it would also free the AVS from the "Small town, highly moralistic attitudes of the 
Berea community." The move to Bristol and the separation from CSM were indications that the 
relationship between CSM and the AVs was beginning to splinter, as more moderate council 
members began to question the increased activism espoused by the AVs, and the question had 
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been addressed at three separate sessions at the Council's board of directors in Huntington, West 
Virginia. After reversing itself several times, the board approved the move, although there were 
questions as to the presence of a quorum at the meetings.88 The split with CSM occurred around 
the same time the War on Poverty had begun to suffer from funding cuts, and Republican 
opposition to the program had grown. The increase in activism from the AVs reflected other 
disagreements in community action programs within the overall context of the War on Poverty 
and the increased radicalism became a political issue and a tool some opponents would use to 
dismantle many of the Great Society programs. 
 The summer following the split with CSM, Letcher County was selected as one of 19 
Appalachian counties to take part in the AV plan to bring 500 college students in for the summer 
to act as special Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) workers in four Appalachian states, 
bringing the total number of VISTA worker to nearly 800. OEO Director Sargent Shriver stated 
that based on the success of the summer program, it might be expanded in coming years to bring 
in thousands of volunteers, and could evolve into a major new dimension of the War on Poverty. 
Shriver said the volunteers had been invited into the communities where they would work to 
establish special school and cultural enrichment programs as a starting point for community 
development, and that community members had been consulted by the AV staff. 89  Internal 
reports from the AVs revealed that the 1966 summer program and another in 1967 had drawn 
charges from local officials of long hair, inappropriate dress, and misconduct, and AV workers 
were referred to as Communists, beatniks, and hippies. The AV reports stated that the attacks 
were a reaction to the increased AV orientation toward community action.  
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An incident that illustrated the tensions around land ownership and property rights took 
place in Pike County in the summer of 1967, and also greatly affected the fate of the volunteers, 
when a retired coal miner named Jink Ray told Puritan Coal Company it could not strip mine his 
property. Although he was initially rebuffed by the state courts, Ray succeeded in getting a ban 
on strip mine operations on his property through action by the Kentucky Division of Reclamation 
Director Elmo C. Grimm, who ordered Puritan Coal Company to cease all strip mining 
operations on Ray's property, because he said the original reclamation plan had no chance of 
succeeding. Ray and his neighbors had been ordered to stop interfering with Puritan’s operation 
the previous month by the Pike County Circuit Court and the decision had been upheld by the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals.90 Ray was supported by the anti-strip mining organization, the 
Appalachian Group To Save the Land and People, and by workers from the Appalachian 
Volunteers and the Southern Conference Educational Fund, as well as his neighbors, two of 
whom stood in front of the bulldozer when its operator attempted to cross Ray’s property line. 
Ten days after Ray’s victory, Pike County Commonwealth Attorney Tom Ratliff, a coal operator, 
and past president of the National Independent Coal Operators Association, prosecuted three of 
the volunteer workers under Kentucky’s antiquated sedition law, which would later be struck 
down by the Supreme Court.91 
During the litigation over Ray’s refusal, Pike County Sheriff Perry Justice and Robert 
Holcomb, president of the Pike County Chamber of Congress and the National Independent Coal 
Operators Association, paid a visit to volunteers Alan McSurely and his wife Margaret. The 
McSurelys were workers with the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF) and the sheriff 
and Holcomb suggested it would be best if they left the county. Not long after the McSurelys 
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refused to leave, Tom Ratliff led a band of fifteen deputies to arrest them along with 
Appalachian Volunteer Joe Mulloy. All three were charged with sedition.92  Ratliff told reporters 
the charges could carry sentences of twenty-one years in prison and fines of $10,000 each. Civil 
rights workers Carl Braden, Director of SCEF, and his wife Anne, were also arrested in Pike 
County on bench warrants issued for their late arrival to their arraignment in Pikeville. The 
Bradens declined to post bond and elected to stay in jail, and in the proceedings, Anne Braden 
told the court that she and her husband had been charged with sedition before and it had been 
thrown out.93 
The McSurely’s attorney, Dan Jack Combs of Pikeville, asked for a three judge 
constitutional court to consider a habeas corpus motion that attacked the validity of Kentucky’s 
Sedition Law.94  In a letter to the Pike County News, Thomas Ratliff said he believed the 
McSurelys had taken advantage of Jink Ray and his neighbors' concerns about having their 
property strip-mined and that the McSurelys and the Bradens were attempting to harm his 
candidacy for Lieutenant Governor. “As far as I am concerned, it is far more important that we 
rid Kentucky of communists or their sympathizers than it is that I be elected lieutenant governor. 
From what I have seen of the evidence in this case, it is possible that communist sympathizers 
have infiltrated the anti-poverty program, not only in Kentucky, but in other sections of the 
country as well.”95  
Gish's reporting and editorializing on the sedition incident and the later Kentucky Un-
American Activities Commission hearings in Pike County took on a humorous aspect. Gish 
obviously saw Ratliff as a political opportunist who was willing to use the incident to advance 
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his political ambition to be Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky. However, Ratliff's opportunism 
was to be taken seriously at a time when actors such as Richard Nixon and George Wallace had 
taken the same act to the national stage. The Letcher County counterparts of the people Ratliff 
represented in Pike County were ramping up their attacks on The Eagle through boycotts, 
attempts to persuade local grocers to stop selling the paper in their stores, and attempts to get 
advertising withdrawn. Coal company thugs had already seized film from Eagle staff and 
attempted to intimidate reporters and photographers. Ratliff may have looked foolish to readers 
of national newspapers, but Gish and other newspapermen knew his type well, and Ratliff played 
well in eastern Kentucky, even though he was unsuccessful in his pursuit of the state's second 
highest office.   
 The Mountain Eagle had a friendly relationship with the Appalachian Volunteers and 
VISTA workers, and many of the volunteers made the paper's offices one of their first stops 
when they came to Whitesburg. Thomas Bethell, who operated the Appalachian Volunteers' 
information office in Whitesburg, was a frequent contributor to the paper and close friend of the 
Gish family. Bill and Josephine Richardson, came to Letcher County in 1969 to develop the 
Appalachian Film Institute, which developed into The Appalshop, one of the most enduring and 
best known of the War on Poverty projects. The Richardsons lived in the Gish home for six 
months before finding their own place and developed a lifelong friendship with the Gish family.  
 On the other hand, the courthouse crowd and coal operators had little love for the 
volunteers, and in the summer of 1967, a Letcher County Grand Jury delivered a report that 
questioned whether their continued presence was "in the best interests of Letcher County." 
Although the final report listed no specific charges or incidences of misconduct, the jury reported 
that it had heard evidence "that an undesirable and lawless element has been introduced into the 
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county through the sponsorship of the Fiscal Court and the Office of Economic Opportunity."  It 
went on to say that the grand jury was "proud of the state of law and order now existing in 
Letcher County," and asked the fiscal court to reconsider their sponsorship of the anti-poverty 
volunteers. Edwin J. Safford, Director of the Leslie, Knott, Letcher, Perry  Community Action 
Council expressed surprise at the grand jury report. but since it gave no actual evidence of any 
specific incidences, it was "difficult to give it much weight." However, Safford did make a 
request to OEO to fully investigate the VISTA and AV programs in Letcher County.96  
 The grand jury reported that several volunteers had been arrested on minor traffic charges 
and two pled guilty and paid fines. Another worker was acquitted in a jury trial and one was 
charged with vandalism in the Jackhorn community, but charges were later dropped.  The next 
week, Tom Bethell wrote a letter to the editor calling the jury's description of the volunteers as 
an undesirable and lawless element "a surprise." "We have been called various names at various 
times, but never lawless." Bethell suggested that the description of the volunteers as lawless 
came not from the traffic violations that several workers had received but from reports from The 
Louisville Courier Journal and The Mountain Eagle that VISTAs and AVs had taken over the 
fight against strip mining in Letcher County, which he denied. Bethell credited The Mountain 
Eagle as one of the "earliest and hardest fighters" against strip mining, stating that The Mountain 
Eagle was fighting strip mining long before the VISTA or AV workers came to the county. 
According to Bethell's letter,  leadership in the fight against strip mining rested with the 
Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People, which had been in existence for over two years 
at the time of the jury's report.  
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 The Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People had organized in Knott County to 
oppose strip mining and spread to other eastern Kentucky Counties as organized opposition to 
the coal companies grew in the region. Bethell identified the Pike County Chapter as the prime 
motivators behind opposition to strip mining in Pike County and identified the "Appalachian 
Group," rather than the volunteers, as being responsible for the Pike County incident that had 
eventually led to a raid by the Pike County Sherriff.  Bethell credited them, along with the 
"stubbornness of Jink Ray in the face of bulldozers" as helping Ray get a ban on strip mine 
operations on his property, through action by Kentucky Division of Reclamation. He did point 
out that by advocating for the rights of the people, the volunteers occasionally stepped on a few 
toes, and wrote that in the case of strip mining, sometimes, "sparks do fly." He added that the 
volunteers were deeply interested in the future of eastern Kentucky and were in the area to work 
toward goals identified by the residents, not by the volunteers, and finished by expressing his 
hopes that having strong opinions would not be misconstrued as lawlessness.97 
 On the same page as Bethell's letter, Tom Gish wrote an editorial concerning the grand 
jury's report and laid out some of the factors that divided the "young visitors" and the county 
officials. Gish wrote that if a reader assumed from reading the report that the members of the 
grand jury had personal knowledge of the volunteers and their work, or had spoken to them at all 
prior to issuing the report, they would have been wrong, and that "it appears that the jury issued 
its sweeping statements of condemnation on the basis of something less that complete 
information." In fact, the middle class and the power brokers of Letcher County had very little 
contact with any of the youth workers and generally saw them in the same light as southerners 
had seen "carpetbaggers" and "Scalawags" in the Reconstruction South, either as "do-gooders" or 
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a subversive element out to overthrow them and turn the county over to welfare recipients. Gish 
also referred to the volunteers' contempt for elected officials and their general belief that all the 
court officers and coal people were crooks, growing wealthy at the expense of the poor. The 
position of some business and community leaders had begun to harden with the "discovery" of 
poverty in the county and had grown more extreme with the introduction of the volunteers. Gish 
also attributed a good deal of their resentment of the volunteers to the way they dressed and wore 
their hair, even though he pointed out that it wasn't really all that different from the appearance 
of many of the local young people. He could have pointed out that the same hardening of 
attitudes had been directed at his family and The Mountain Eagle, from the time the paper had 
begun to address the issues of poverty and strip mining .   
 Gish identified two competing opinions as being largely responsible for the friction, one 
that was held by the volunteers and the other by the county leaders. A number of the young 
visitors came into the area with starry eyes and fixed opinions "to the general effect that all 
public officials are lazy, stupid, or crooked, and that all poor residents are good and deserving 
and being held back by the politicians." To the young, things were more often seen as black and 
white rather than shades of gray, and Gish made a case that county judges, mayors and other 
officials were more often constricted by lack of adequate budgets and economic resource than by 
personal corruption. "The poverty which is so widespread in the mountains has spun a web that 
ensnares all the residents of the area in one way or another." The other factor in the tensions, 
coming from the other side, was a widespread belief among county leaders and many eastern 
Kentuckians that all the volunteers were "Communists and part of some deep and darkly 
designed plan to bring on a revolution."  However, most of the volunteers came from middle 
class homes in middle class cities and generally embraced middle class values. Their 
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distinguishing characteristic was their belief that democracy in the United States was not 
working to benefit the overall welfare of the people, because there were "so many poor people in 
such a rich country." Gish had seen enough since his return to Letcher County be painfully aware 
that this was the case in much of Central Appalachia, and while his purpose at the time may have 
been to mediate the dispute between the officials and the volunteers, The Mountain Eagle had 
addressed issues of democracy and inequality many times and would continue to do so. He 
finished by stating that on balance, the presence of the volunteers was generally beneficial for the 
county and by asking questions, raising issues and "trying to persuade us to think for ourselves," 
the volunteers were performing a service that could be inspiring and rewarding "as they go about 
the business of making democracy work." Although he didn't address it in the editorial, this 
process of making democracy work was the driving purpose behind The Mountain Eagle's battle 
to educate the public by reporting the process of government and continuing to demand access to 
open meetings by elected officials.  If  the volunteers had misconceptions, the best way to erase 
them would be for the people of Letcher County to embrace them and let them see that all was 
not as they believed, to get to know them and invite them into their homes, and "generally 
extending the warm hospitality of which we boast."98 
In late August, as a result of congressional pressure resulting from the arrests, Sargent 
Shriver and Kentucky Governor Edward Breathitt jointly announced that OEO would cease to 
support Appalachian Volunteer operations in Kentucky as of September 1. Breathitt was quoted 
as saying he had requested the cutoff because of numerous complaints from community action 
agencies to the effect that the AVs had refused to cooperate with them in prosecuting the War on 
Poverty. Milton Ogle told The Mountain Eagle that he had not received formal notification of the 
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cutoff and AV members announced that they would continue their work in Kentucky. On August 
24, 1967, more than half of the community action directors in Kentucky signed a telegram to 
Shriver protesting the manner in which OEO support had been withdrawn and the Appalachian 
Volunteers asked for a full public hearing on the withdrawal of funding. No previous warnings 
that funding might be cut off had been issued and OEO had already announced the renewal of 
the AV's funding for the next year. OEO also initiated an investigation of AV activities in West 
Virginia after West Virginia Governor Hulett Smith complained about charges of personal 
misconduct by AV volunteers.99 
The break with Governor Smith of West Virginia is symptomatic of the tremendous push 
against the Appalachian Volunteers and VISTAs by the coal companies and highly placed 
officials in the coal producing states and their representatives in the Unites States government. 
Smith had initially lauded the AV's efforts to rein in strip mining in West Virginia and they had 
joined with Smith in 1966 to press the issue of regulating strip mining in his battle with the West 
Virginia Assembly, which was dominated by coal supporters.100 As the anti-AV movement grew 
and the state politicians and coal interests expanded their attacks, Smith must have seen the 
writing on the wall, because in October 1967, West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd read a letter 
from Smith in a senate hearing, in which Smith claimed that certain unidentified groups in West 
Virginia considered the AVs and VISTAS to be "trouble makers who only offered negative 
solutions to community problems." The letter also contained accusations from the same groups 
that the volunteers taught Communistic ideas to the poor people they worked with. Byrd also 
attacked the Office of Economic Opportunity by claiming that a report issued by the agency 
earlier that year vindicating the AVs was merely a defensive action that indicated that OEO had 
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little local control over the volunteers. In Byrd's statement, the damage was done because the 
volunteers were "identified in the public eye" with OEO and were also dependent on public 
funds. He finished by saying that the anti-poverty volunteers in Kentucky were "revolutionaries 
bent on destroying the present order of society."101.    
 The Mountain Eagle called Governor Breathitt's request to withdraw OEO support the 
result of a power play by Kentucky State Poverty Director Al Whitehouse, a Breathitt appointee 
who had waged an all-out war for direct personal control of the AV apparatus in Kentucky. The 
article stated that Whitehouse had used his relationship with Breathitt to operate a panic and 
rumor mill in eastern Kentucky that had worked to a paint the AVs in the mountains of Kentucky 
as Communists, and to spread rumors of riots and threats of riots by the black population of the 
region, even in places where the number of African-Americas was so small there could be no 
possibility of a riot. Gish wrote that he felt some sympathy for Breathitt, who had been inundated 
by panicky phone calls from east Kentucky residents which were similar to rumors and calls he 
had received himself. Whitehouse's war with the AVs had started almost as soon as he took 
office and had resulted in a full scale investigation into AV activities by OEO earlier in 1967 that 
led to a complete exoneration of the organization and a recommendation that other community 
action agencies work more closely with the AVs and follow their model for engaging the poor. 
The only CAA director that supported Whitehouse in his allegations had been Harry Eastburg of 
the Big Sandy Valley poverty program, which Gish referred to as one of the weakest in the state, 
and the target of a good deal of criticism from the AVs. However, he also wrote that if the anti 
AV sentiment in eastern Kentucky had been "mostly smoke and little fire," the AVs had done 
little to clear the smoke. They had not addressed criticisms of their dress and off duty conduct 
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and Gish believed the organization should have held the workers to a more strict standard of 
behavior, with those who refused "being shipped back to where they came from." But he made it 
clear that his criticism applied to only a few of the volunteers and that most had behaved quite 
well. He also questioned the governance of the AVs, stating that no one knew how they governed 
themselves, whether or not they had a board of directors, or if the people of the region actually 
had a meaningful voice in their decisions. The AVs had been less than frank with the people 
concerning their aims and purposes, as well as their relationship with the McSurelys and SCEF, 
who took a much stronger and more militant position on social and economic issues than the 
AVs, although, he added it was their right to do so. The editorial closed by stating that if 
Whitehouse was allowed to succeed in closing the AVs out, it stood to reason that "one by one, 
he will knock off any and every community action agency in Kentucky which refuses to 'co-
operate' with his office."102 
 The shock waves from the sedition arrests reached into the United States Senate, where 
Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky offered an amendment stating that “persons serving 
as volunteers under this section or under Section 821 shall provide such information concerning 
their qualifications as the Director shall prescribe.”  Cooper explained his amendment as a 
response to the fact that the AVs had no way to screen their volunteers and the Director of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity had no control over their selections. He said the entire thing 
was the result of the sedition charges in which “The charge was made that they (the McSurelys) 
had been disseminating literature throughout eastern Kentucky in which they called for, in 
substance, the overthrow of the Government, the state government, and the local government.” 
Cooper told the Senate he felt his amendment “would assure that qualified people are appointed 
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and would insure that the situation which has taken place, bringing widespread criticism on 
OEO, VISTA, and the volunteers would not rise again.”103   
 Not to be outdone by the United States Senate in addressing the situation with the AVs in 
eastern Kentucky, the Kentucky General Assembly passed H.R. 84 on March 27, 1968, “A 
Concurrent Resolution creating a Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities.”  A 
committee of ten members was appointed with five from the House and five from the Senate, all 
appointed by the governor.  The committee was charged with investigating and analyzing “the 
activities of groups and organizations which have as their objectives, or as part of their 
objectives, the overthrow of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or of the United States by force, 
violence, or other unlawful means.” Hearings were scheduled in Pikeville Kentucky for October 
15 and 16 with the Honorable Scott Miller to serve as chairman. A second set of hearings was 
convened December 3 and 4. 
 The hearings were split into two separate sessions although many of the witnesses who 
testified in the first session also testified at the second session on December 3 and 4.  Neither 
Thomas Ratliff, crusading Commonwealth Attorney and failed candidate for Lieutenant 
Governor, nor the outside (non-Pike County) staff of the Appalachian Volunteers chose to testify 
at either hearing. However, several of the Pike County power elite did testify, including Herman 
G. Dotson, Assistant Commonwealth Attorney at the time of the raids. Several locals who were 
employed by the AVs also testified, the most prominent being Edith Easterling who had worked 
with Joe Mulloy before his arrest.  The Mountain Eagle pointed out that when Easterling was 
questioned about any wrongdoing she may have committed, her reply was, "I will confess that 
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I've done wrong. I voted for that dirty bunch in the courthouse."  Easterling accused Pike County 
officials of using the sedition issue and charges of Communism as a smokescreen to allow them 
to get at the poverty program because they weren't able to skim from the poverty funds. "If they 
can't get it themselves, they don't want anybody else to have it." 104 
 The Pike County incident, the KUAC Hearings, and the general backlash against the 
volunteers marked the end of the AVs. Shriver terminated their funding shortly after Mulloy was 
arrested for draft evasion, and drastically reduced the number of VISTA workers in the region. A 
number of AVs left the region but others stayed and settled into positions in nonprofit 
organizations and other agencies. Milton Ogle resigned as director in 1968 and assistant director 
David Walls became acting director, and then director for the final year of the organization's life.  
Ogle joined the staff of the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, and Tom Bethell set up 
Appalachian Information after his resignation. After publishing Coal Patrol, which was a semi-
regular feature in The Mountain Eagle from 1970 – 1972, Bethell became Research Director for 
the United Mine Workers of America, following Arnold Miller's election as president.105 
 As the AV/VISTA situation unfolded, the War on Poverty continued to struggle with 
reduced funding and growing criticism from Congress as well as the states. In the 1967 State of 
the Union Address, President Johnson proposed a 20 percent average increase in Social Security 
payments, which he tied to funding for the War on Poverty. He also urged the extension of 
Medicare Benefits and expanded Head Start to include three year-olds. Johnson made no further 
expansions in anti-poverty programs and after saying he did not believe the American people 
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were ready to quit in the battle against poverty, he announced that he would seek a six percent 
surtax on income taxes to fund both the War on Poverty and the Vietnam War.106  
 U.S. Representative Carl D. Perkins never believed that federal efforts were sufficient to 
properly address the poverty in Central Appalachia. In 1967, he introduced legislation to double 
the amount of aid to the Appalachian region and called for expanded thinking that would go 
beyond the efforts that were underway. Perkins called for developing untapped resources and 
said it would take considerable work and spending to effectively confront poverty. He called the 
Appalachian programs that were currently in effect, "two lane remedies for a four lane disease," 
and said that in his congressional district it would take at least $250,000,000 in spending on 
public facilities to provide a base upon which economic prosperity could be built.107 
 In August, a Mountain Eagle editorial sarcastically congratulated the USDA for realizing 
that "there are people in America who are literally starving to death," and responding to the 
revelation by lowering the cost of food stamps for families with no income at all.  Gish 
questioned how the department figured the participants would pay for the food stamps with no 
income but added that at least they had a better chance at getting food stamps than before 
because, "it is easier to beg $3.00 than it is $12.00." Letcher County residents had received the 
money to buy food stamps from a number of sources, including the Salvation Army, church 
groups, employee contributions from community action agencies, and private contributions, but 
it wasn't enough. Gish wrote that he understood the theory that families would retain more 
dignity if they contributed something, even a token payment to the food stamps, but added that 
their dignity went away when they ran out of stamps before the end of the month and were 
                                                 
106 "Johnson Proposals would affect Letcher County," The Mountain Eagle, January 12, 1967, 1. 
107 "Perkins to seek added aid to area," The Mountain Eagle, February 2, 1967, 1. 
231 
 
 
 
forced to beg or borrow the money to buy more. "The fact of starvation in Letcher County and 
eastern Kentucky was reported nationally nearly four years ago"108  
 Late in the summer of 1967, the Appalachian Regional Commission announced that 
while the employment rate in Appalachia as a whole had risen by four percent, with 
unemployment dropping from 9.2 percent in 1962 to 5.2 percent in 1965, eastern Kentucky 
continued to lag behind, and unemployment had only dropped from 13.1 percent in 1962 to 10 
percent in 1965. The number of jobs had only grown from 191,100 in 1962 to 200,700 in 1965. 
The report called eastern Kentucky the "hard core" of Appalachia in unemployment and other 
problems.109 
 The lack of employment was one of the main topics Robert Kennedy heard about when 
he made a two day tour of the mountains of eastern Kentucky. Although he visited other sites in 
the region, the highlight of the tour for Letcher County was an official hearing of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty that was conducted at Fleming Neon 
High School, at Neon in Letcher County. Many people expressed dissatisfaction and 
disillusionment with the efforts made at alleviating poverty in eastern Kentucky and E.J. Safford, 
Director of the Leslie, Knott, Lecher, Perry Community Action Council told Kennedy that anti-
poverty programs had only "made the state of poverty more livable," and called for the 
replacement of welfare checks with paychecks, even if the federal government had to create jobs 
by building roads, schools, public parks, and other public buildings. Stafford also told Kennedy 
his agency had run up against a wall because of competing state and federal agendas and said the 
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government had played a cat and mouse game with the residents of eastern Kentucky by cutting 
programs and then promising to restore them.110 
 Harry Caudill read a prepared statement before the subcommittee in which he detailed the 
history of the exploitation of Appalachia that had produced some of America's richest 
corporations as well as some of its poorest people. He described communities impoverished by 
low taxes and the inadequate public services, and poor schools that went with them. Caudill 
pointed to extreme unemployment, highly destructive mining practices, and absentee mine 
owners who paid low property taxes but "cleared more than 61 percent of gross receipts" after 
paying operating expenses. He called on the subcommittee to initiate federal legislation to outlaw 
strip mining on steep slopes and establish a federal severance tax on minerals to be used in 
programs to develop the manpower and create jobs.111  
 After Caudill finished his remarks, David A. Zegeer, General Manager of Beth-Elkhorn, 
which was owned by Bethlehem Steel, asked to speak as a rebuttal to Caudill's testimony. Zegeer 
told the subcommittee that while he agreed with Caudill that the primary problem that beset the 
region was the lack of good roads to attract industry, much of Caudill's testimony indicated that 
industry was bad. Zegeer told Kennedy and the other participants that Bethlehem Steel had 
bought its Lecher County property twelve years previously, in 1956, and said that "Bethlehem 
coming here was one of the finest things that could have happened in this area." He said that in 
the last year the company had paid $200,000 in property taxes and $500,000 in all taxes. It put 
$950,000 in the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund and donated $50,000 to the 
Appalachian Regional Hospitals. Its 850 employees had earnings of $6,687,693 with average 
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annual incomes of $8,000. He added that while Beth-Elkhorn owned just seven percent of the 
surface land in the county, it paid 20 percent of the property taxes. "This is a side of the coin you 
rarely see." He said he did not know the exact assessment rate on Beth-Elkhorn's property or how 
much the corporation had paid for its Lecher County holdings but promised he would provide 
that information to the subcommittee. Zegeer also said that while Beth -Elkhorn was not 
currently strip mining coal, it had in the past and would in the future if there was an economic 
need for it. He said that Bethlehem Steel had about 800 stockholders in Kentucky, but after 
persistent questioning by Kennedy, he admitted that the total number of shareholders was 
between 50,000 and 70,000.  
 "I would hardly say that is a Kentucky owned company," said Kennedy.112 
 Zegeer replied that he thought the area should be happy that corporations like Bethlehem 
Steel had located their operations there and said they were good and honorable companies. Then 
he said if "we are wrong in what is going on in Appalachia, then I think this whole country is 
based on the wrong philosophy. To do it any other way, you are just talking about socialism. So 
if what we are doing is wrong, then this whole country is wrong."113 
 The Kennedy tour, the AV/Vista situation, and the Kentucky Un-American Activities 
Committee hearings in Pike County in October and December marked a major change in the War 
on Poverty, and the election of Richard Nixon changed the direction of the government's efforts 
in Appalachia. When Nixon appointed Donald Rumsfeld to head the OEO, the agency changed 
its focus to managing the tax burden resulting from the Vietnam War and the anti-poverty 
programs. Many of the programs that survived Nixon's election were shifted to other agencies 
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and efforts to reform the social and economic conditions in Appalachian were effectively at an 
end.114  
 Like most truly ambitious programs, the War on Poverty had its successes and its 
failures. Attracting industry to Central Appalachia did not happen for a number of reasons. The 
highways Gish and Harry Caudill campaigned so vigorously for were too little and too late. The 
highway construction program that started in the early 1970s was not finally completed until the 
21st Century had been rung in and the funding for the highways went through innumerable 
congressional sessions and administrations. By the time the "good roads" were finished, the two 
lane ones were obsolete and the four lane roads were not enough. America had already entered 
the post-industrial period, and those industries that might have been attracted to Appalachia were 
already leaving the country. Much of Appalachia remains tied to the failing coal industry today 
just as it was in 1968 and with the near total exodus of coal jobs from eastern Kentucky, 
conditions for coal miners and their families look bleak. 
 On the other hand, many of the War on Poverty programs not only endured, but added 
greatly to the overall health and well-being of eastern Kentucky and Central Appalachia. 
Programs like Head Start, school lunch programs, food stamps, Medicaid, and Medicare have 
survived and flourished. Some have been expanded. Medical clinics that were initiated during 
the War on Poverty have grown and serve tens of thousands of Appalachians with high quality 
medical care, and housing programs have allowed thousands to live in relative comfort and 
safety.  Lots of money has gone into school construction and while eastern Kentucky schools still 
lag behind, the physical plants are vastly improved.  
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 The War on Poverty was a lifesaver for eastern Kentucky in many ways. It fed people, 
 clothed people, and provided housing for people who were living in paper shacks with 
 dirt floors. It got health care in. It was a success to feed, clothe, and take care of people. 
 It did not provide a cure for the economic problems but it was ended before it had a 
 chance to. You can’t cure 100 years of bad practices with a band-aid that lasted 10 
 years.115 
 
 1968 was a monumental year for the nation and while The Mountain Eagle continued to 
report on the community action agencies and the remaining efforts to work within the region, 
there were many other issues that demanded the newspaper's attention as well. Reporting on the 
various agencies created by the War on Poverty that continued to operate would occupy a good 
deal of the newspaper's time for years to come, but changes wrought by the Great Society were 
sweeping Appalachia just as they swept the rest of the nation. Political struggles and reform 
efforts in Letcher County demanded attention, and new methods and schemes for extracting the 
mineral wealth of the county appeared on the horizon. The coal industry had always occupied a 
good deal of the papers' news space, but changes in mine safety laws on the state and federal 
level, as well as efforts in Kentucky to control strip mining were in the developmental stages and 
The Mountain Eagle soon found itself addressing these and many more issues.  
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Chapter Five 
Although The Mountain Eagle regularly addressed a very broad range of issues, it is best 
known for its long association with coal mining, and more specifically, with strip or surface 
mining. While The Mountain Eagle was also deeply involved in mine health and safety issues as 
well as issues concerning the United Mine Workers of America, strip mining was the main 
thread in the tapestry of The Mountain Eagle's relationship with the coal industry, as well as the 
main point of contention. 
Tom Gish grew up in a coal camp and his friends were the sons and daughters of coal 
miners. His father was a pioneer in the use of roof bolts, used to support the mine roof after the 
coal was removed, and Tom was adamant about doing everything he could to protect miners. At 
the time the Gishes took ownership of the paper, strip mining was in its early stages, John L. 
Lewis, who served as president of the United Mine Workers for 40 years, was in the final years 
of his presidency, and mine safety was an ongoing problem in an industry where many operators 
saw men as more expendable than equipment. The old saying that if a coal operator was faced 
with a choice between saving a man or a mule, he would choose to save the mule, was not as 
farcical as it may sound. After all, he would have to buy another mule, while it was no problem 
to hire another man. Reporting on mine accidents and efforts toward mine safety was not terribly 
popular with coal operators, and union men were often displeased to see the excesses of UMWA 
bosses revealed in the paper, but these were issues that were reported by most newspapers, 
especially those in coal producing states. 
The Mountain Eagle was consistent in promoting underground coal mining as the driving 
force of the economy of Central Appalachia. It was the work Ben Gish had spent his life doing, 
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and it was the kind of mining most closely associated with the UMW. The changes that came to 
the industry after World War II, when the nation began to move away from coal as the prime 
source of locomotive fuel, were exacerbated when the Tennessee Valley Authority began to 
drive underground coal operators out of business with their ever-increasing demand for the 
lowest prices for coal. Most of the smaller underground mine operators could not compete, and 
either went out of business or moved into strip mining, which Gish saw as suicidal and ruinous to 
his dream of promoting tourism as an important part of the economic puzzle for eastern 
Kentucky.  Strip mining played out in the courts, the media, and in citizen and coal company 
instigated protest actions throughout the last half of the 20th Century, and it was The Mountain 
Eagle's signature issue for almost 20 years. It was initially disputed as a property rights issue, 
pitting the holders of broad form deeds and mineral rights contracts that had been obtained in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, but The Mountain Eagle was among the first to see strip 
mining as a civil rights issue. Mountain families rightly opposed coal companies stripping their 
land on the basis of a deed that was often the product of flim-flam and larceny, with slick land 
agents taking advantage of the illiteracy of their forebears. At the time the deeds were obtained, 
most people who signed their mineral rights away did not object to having a mine under their 
land, but they had no concept of bulldozers, front-end loaders, and augers stripping the surface.  
Unfortunately for the land owners, the mineral rights deeds were interpreted by Kentucky courts 
as giving the deed holder the right to go after the mineral in whatever way they chose.1  
 Before 1960, The Mountain Eagle had been an enthusiastic proponent of a coal based 
economy in eastern Kentucky and the paper continue to advocate underground mining. But when 
                                                 
1 Ronald D. Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 
Kentucky, 2008), 38. 
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Tom Gish became acquainted with the strip mining that was being done in parts of Letcher 
County, he was horrified. Not only did this mark a shift in The Mountain Eagle's policies toward 
what would become a major part of the eastern Kentucky coal industry, the industry's response to 
Gish and Harry Caudill, and the anti-strip-mine groups introduced a darker and more dangerous 
element than anything the newspaper had so far experienced. Shunning, defamation, and 
withdrawing advertising were no longer sufficient, although all were part of the response. But for 
the first time, the Gish family, Mountain Eagle reporters, and the offices of the newspaper came 
under the threat of violence. The coal industry had never liked being challenged, and many of the 
smaller more loosely organized strip miners were largely opportunists who felt they had nothing 
to lose and everything to gain by stripping, and they were less constrained by the law then the 
larger companies. Early on, strip mining was very different from more modern methods, and 
even though it was destructive, it was a somewhat less invasive to land, water resources, and 
communities. However, it was also virtually unregulated, and, as sometimes happens, when laws 
were made to regulate coal mining, the laws of unintended results came into play. The laws that 
had been designed to regulate stripping were themselves stripped and modified by legislators 
who were friendly to coal companies, and the final product opened the door to vastly more 
destructive methods of mining.  
 The auger and bench mining that was common in the 1960s and 1970s did a significant 
amount of damage in their own right, as operators used explosives, bulldozers, and other earth 
moving machines to develop "benches" around the steep hillsides in the region. The actual 
mining was done by augers, which as the name implies, drilled into the side of the coal seam, 
and brought the coal out through the augers, which varied in size from 16 inches to six feet. The 
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benches the augers sat on were often strip mined as well, not only to reach coal under the 
existing bench, but to expose deeper seams to auger, so large portions of the mountain's side 
were taken off. These methods were destructive and operators often ignored early laws against 
dumping rock and dirt, which they called overburden, over the slopes. Still, augur mining was 
less invasive and easier to reclaim than the mountaintop removal method. MTR was first used in 
Millstone in Letcher County, on a permit owned by Beth-Elkhorn in 1969 when Kentucky State 
Reclamation Director Elmore Grim issued an expansion order for an existing permit, giving 
Beth-Elkhorn permission to expand the operation by stripping an additional 40 acres on 
Millstone Creek. The permit covered the two top seams and was "expected to include the 
removal of the mountaintops."2 After that, the practice was allowed in Kentucky on a case by 
case basis and it became widespread in other Appalachian states after an amendment was 
inserted in legislation introduced in the United States House of Representatives in 1973, which  
became part of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, and was construed to 
allow for the total or near total removal of an entire mountaintop. The amendment was presented 
as a way to prohibit the dumping of overburden down the side of the mountains and to require 
mountains to be returned to their natural contour without a high wall. However, it contained a 
rider that allowed for the removal of the mountaintop if the operator could demonstrate that the 
land would be left in a "socially more acceptable condition" with the mountaintop leveled.  The 
Mountain Eagle, Harry Caudill, and other advocates for property and environmental rights were 
outraged by the expansion of the Beth-Elkhorn permit in 1969, and were stunned when they 
learned it would be codified into federal law in the 1977 act. Strip mining and mountaintop 
                                                 
2 "Stripping resumes at Millstone after state removes earlier ban," The Mountain Eagle, November 20, 1969, 1. 
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removal mining became an environmental and civil rights issue as well as a property rights issue, 
as citizens asked law enforcement and the government to recognize that the right to be safe in 
their homes is a basic civil right. Blasting and overburden removal that crushed homes definitely 
impeded that right, just as it destroyed the fragile aquifers that contained pure water that could be 
tapped with relatively shallow hand dug wells. As the backlash against strip mining became 
more visible, and definitely more vocal, the coal industry added the idea that strip mining created 
jobs to their standard argument that they had a valid contract that allowed them to do what they 
wanted to do with the land in order to get the coal.3  
 Although The Mountain Eagle was editorially opposed to strip mining, which Gish saw 
as "suicide" for tourism, and a brutal assault on property rights and the environment, the paper 
continued to advocate for underground coal mining as the basis for an expanded Appalachian 
economy. A 1964 article with the headline, "Coal=Money" contained information from the 
National Coal Association showing that Kentucky received wages of over $168 million a year 
from coal mining. In a companion piece, the paper welcomed the news that American Electrical 
Company had announced that it would be building several large coal-fired power plants in 
Kentucky and surrounding states, even though the industry had begun to attack the newspaper as 
anti-coal. The Mountain Eagle always promoted the underground coal economy and the Gishes 
shared the understanding with Harry Caudill and Congressman Carl D. Perkins that while 
economic diversity was crucial to the long-term survival of the region, it would have to be based 
on a strong coal mining economy and expand from that base.4   
                                                 
3 "New strip mine bill 'disaster'," The Mountain Eagle, October 18, 1973, 1. 
4 "Coal = Money," The Mountain Eagle, March 26, 1964, 1. 
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 The Gishes were unaware of strip mining when they took over The Mountain Eagle, 
although it was already in its early stages in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia. The decline 
of the use of coal in trains and industry after World War II had brought the coal industry to the 
brink of ruin, but instead of passing into the dustbin of history, it was “saved” by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority’s shift from powering turbines from water power to steam, produced by 
burning coal in order to generate electricity to power southern homes and industry. As TVA’s 
hunger for cheap coal to satisfy the south's increasing demand for electricity became greater, the 
agency became a major force in the Appalachian Coal Industry. TVA's willingness to give long 
term contracts to those producers who could come in with the lowest bids brought about 
important changes in the coal business, and their insistence on the lowest possible prices for 
"steam" coal drove many small non-affiliated companies out of business.  
 The big steel companies, Bethlehem Steel, United States Steel, Republic Steel, and 
several others, maintained large mining operations in the Central Appalachian states that were 
known as captive mines, that is mines that specifically produced metallurgical coal that was 
targeted for the furnaces of the company that owned them. The captive mines did not compete in 
the open market, and they tended to be quite large in size and in numbers of employees. They 
were also frequently affiliated with the UMW. Although captive mines never made up as great a 
percentage of total production as they had in Pennsylvania, they did provide a significant portion 
of union membership.5 Metallurgical coal, or met coal, is lower in sulfur and phosphorous than 
other bituminous coals that are burned to create steam to turn turbines in power plants, and it is 
less readily available. Met coal is used to make coke, which is an essential ingredient in making 
                                                 
5 Curtis E. Harvey, The Economics of Kentucky Coal, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 
1977), 53. 
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steel, because coke can be heated to nearly 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit to produce high quality 
steel in blast furnaces. There were a number of excellent met coal seams in the eastern Kentucky 
counties and the Elkhorn Number 3 in Letcher County was among the best met coal in Kentucky. 
Metallurgical coal has more narrow operational parameters than steam coal, and it must be low 
in ash (< 10%) and sulfur (< 1%) content. Met coal existed alongside numerous deposits of high 
sulfur coal that was not useful in the steel making process, but was useful as "thermal" coal, for 
producing steam for electricity. Coal from eastern Kentucky has long been valued by the 
electrical utility industry as a high BTU, low sulfur fuel source.  All of the coal mined in eastern 
Kentucky can be used as steam coal.6  Since 1970, met coal has accounted for between 10 and 
fifteen percent of the coal production in Central Appalachia.7   
  The captive mines that did business in eastern Kentucky in the 1960s and 1970s were few 
in number, compared to the overall number of mines in operation, but they accounted for a 
substantial amount of coal production.  They also accounted for the majority of remaining 
“model towns” in the region which still enjoyed the benefits of the welfare capitalism that had 
led to their development, but was largely abandoned following World War II. Communities such 
as Jenkins in Letcher County, affiliated with Bethlehem Steel, Behnam and Lynch in Harlan 
County, affiliated with International Harvester and United States Steel, and others in Virginia 
and West Virginia, still prospered with the welfare capitalism and paternalism of the steel 
companies, and the generous contracts that kept United Mine Workers members among the 
                                                 
6 Cortland Eble, Jerry Weisenfluh,  "Metallurgical Coal Resources in Eastern Kentucky," Kentucky Geological 
Survey, (University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2012), 14. 
7 Rory Mcllmoil, and Evan Hansen, “The Decline of Central Appalachian Coal Production and the Need for 
Economic Diversification,” (Downstream Strategies, Morgantown, West Virginia, January 19, 2010), 
www.downstreamstrategies.com. 
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highest paid industrial workers in the nation.8 On the other hand, the non-union miners who were  
employed in the “scab mines” and “dog holes” still trying to compete on the spot market saw 
their pay shrink as the number of days they worked fell from days per week to days per month 
and some found themselves working one or two days a month.9 
      In 1970, captive mines accounted for 12 percent of total coal sales in eastern Kentucky in 
average production for the previous ten years.10   To give these figures more relevance, on a 
national scale, two captive mining companies in Eastern Kentucky were among the top ten 
commercial bituminous coal producers in the United States in 1973.  United States Steel ranked 
sixth nationally with 16.2 percent of total production. Bethlehem Mines produced 14.1 percent.  
This meant two captive mining companies operating in Eastern Kentucky produced 30.3 percent 
of all coal commercially mined in the United States in 1973.11   
 The mines producing steam coal however, were not owned by major steel companies, nor 
did they enjoy the long-term contracts the met mines had secured during World War II when coal 
production was a vital component of the Unites States war effort. Instead, they were forced to 
compete on the open or “spot” market, and they found they could no longer operate 
competitively at the rates TVA was willing to pay for a ton of steam or thermal coal. This led to 
the advent of strip mining on a much larger scale in eastern Kentucky and in Letcher County as 
well. In the 1960s, Bethlehem Steel began to operate its own strip mines, but more often, the 
company allowed contractors to strip mine those coal reserves that were more conducive to strip 
                                                 
8 Dave Zegeer, interview by author, tape recording, at his home in Lexington, Kentucky, June 27, 1995. 
9 Tom and Pat Gish, 1995 interview by Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kinney at the Gish Home, Tape 2, located at 
Appalshop, Whitesburg, Kentucky. 
10 Curtis E. Harvey, The Economics of Kentucky Coal, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky,  
1977), 53. 
11 Cortland Eble, Jerry Weisenfluh, "Metallurgical Coal Resources in Eastern Kentucky," Kentucky Geological 
Survey, 2012, (University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY), 8. 
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mining and less accessible to the large highly mechanized underground mining operations 
Bethlehem favored. While the contractors were more flexible and therefore more able to shift 
around to get the coal on outcrops, they were also less accountable and some were less likely to 
be interested in being good corporate neighbors to the communities that were impacted by their 
mining operations. 
 The two main types of strip mining that were introduced to Letcher County in the late 
1950s and early 1960s were auger mining and open pit strip mining. Of the two, auger mining 
was less expensive to get into, requiring only one or two bulldozers and front-end loaders and a 
coal auger. The bulldozers would move in first and create a “bench,” by taking the outcropping 
rock and dirt and usually pushing it over the hill. The earth and rock that composed the waste 
product that was pushed over the hill was called "overburden," and was the first product of strip 
mining to impact the narrow hollows that lay beneath the mining operations. Among the effects 
of pushing the overburden into the hollows included terrorizing the families who lived there by 
rolling rocks as large as small cars onto people's homes and yards and introducing large amounts 
of dirt into streams. While many of the streams were hardly pristine due to the lack of sanitary 
sewer systems outside the model towns and county seats, they were not yet heavily silted. 
Siltation is the process that results from the dumping of topsoil and lower lying soils into streams 
and had the effect of cutting down on water flow and oxygen, as well as introducing whatever 
materials that existed in the soil into the streams and the rivers. The dynamite used in old style 
underground mines was replaced by ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and (diesel) fuel oil 
that was first introduced in the United States in the 1950s, and could be used in plastic sacks 
shaped to fit a circular hole made by a rotary drill, or loaded in bulk. This kind of blasting was an 
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inexact science and in the early days of strip mining, shooters (shot-firers) were often poorly 
trained, so blasts varied widely in the degree of destructive force unleashed. For that reason, 
rocks ranging in size comparable to soccer balls to boulders as big as a Volkswagen Beatle were 
sometimes thrown in the air and some either rained down on the houses below the mine sites or 
rolled down the steep hillsides. Over blasting also destroyed water supplies for individual homes 
and entire neighborhoods by breaking the fragile rock aquifer, which meant wells would have to 
be sunk deeper, where poorer quality water was much more common, usually due to excess 
minerals. The combination of overburden and over blasting created a markedly hostile 
environment for those living in close proximity to strip mines and damage claims were handled 
individually with company attorneys negotiating with individual landowners to reach settlements 
that were often driven by intimidation and the power of the companies on one side and the 
ignorance and fear of the land owner on the other. To exacerbate the inequity of the mining, the 
land owners had little recourse if the mining was done under broad form deeds dating back to the 
turn of the century, which Kentucky courts had validated over the right of the surface 
landowner.12 So whether a homeowner saw his house damaged by blasting or by the  inevitable 
mudslides that came with flattening the mountainside and the not infrequent incidences of 
drilling into aquifers or old mine works full of water, or if his land was stripped against his will, 
he had few legal options, leaving him at the mercy of the coal companies and their attorneys. 
 This was the scene Tom Gish was introduced to by his mine superintendent father not 
long after he returned to Letcher County, when Benjamin Gish drove him to Beefhide, a long 
hollow that connects Letcher and Pike Counties that had been heavily farmed along the rich 
bottomland of Beefhide Creek. It was stripped by Consolidation Coal before it sold out to 
                                                 
12 Ron Eller, Uneven Ground, 148. 
246 
 
Bethlehem Mines and was one of first sites Bethlehem stripped.  Gish said his introduction to 
strip mining came as a shock and that his father, who had worked in underground mining all his 
life, rising from miner to superintendent, was deeply troubled by the devastation of the land and 
the oppression of the people who were impacted by the mining.  
 My father took me to Beefhide and showed me a strip mine. I couldn’t believe it. The 
 valley held several mines. It had been heavily populated but the coal company had 
 pushed overburden on the houses.  It was total devastation and I thought it should be 
 stopped. We showed pictures of the Beefhide mine in the paper. I went to Beefhide          
 and took pictures, and then published a story. The Eagle was the first paper other than 
 the (Louisville) Courier Journal to call attention to strip mining. I thought it was suicide. 
 I still think it (opposing strip mining) was the right thing to do. But politics went the other 
 way. It generated jobs and lots of money for the absentee landowners. They made huge 
 profits from strip mining, oil, gas, but mostly from the broad form deed.13 
The Gish family had already become isolated in their home community of Whitesburg 
and damaged economically by the backlash to Mountain Eagle's coverage of county government 
and school board politics, as well as the paper's stance on the War on Poverty, and by taking on 
the coal industry, The Mountain Eagle pitted itself against the largest employer in the county, 
and the most powerful economic interest in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia. The regular 
stream of articles and editorials condemning strip mining put the newspaper in direct conflict 
with an industry that was legendary for ruthless retaliation to anyone standing in the way of 
extracting the mineral wealth of Central Appalachia.  
The series of articles and photographic essays that started with Beefhide was the 
beginning of a long struggle with the coal industry that eventually led to the fire-bombing of The 
Mountain Eagle offices in 1974, and in boycotts, intimidation, isolation, and near poverty for the 
Gish clan. It finally caused Tom and Pat Gish to move their family out of Whitesburg into a 
                                                 
13  Tom and Pat Gish, 1995 interview by Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kinney at the Gish Home, Tape 2, located at 
Appalshop. 
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much more isolated and secure location in the Thornton community. The struggle against strip 
mining and the power and indifference of the coal industry became the great task of The 
Mountain Eagle and as the gloves came off, the cost of opposing the coal industry and speaking 
truth to power became clear. Along with the work of the newspaper during the War on Poverty, 
coverage of the coal mining industry was the issue that most clearly defined the paper on the 
national stage, as the wealth created by strip mining reinforced the political and economic power 
of the coal industry, in the county and in the state. 
The first call to control strip mining in Kentucky came from The Louisville Courier 
Journal in 1948, but at that time, they were only able to generate enough interest to get a 
resolution passed in the General Assembly asking the Legislative Research Commission to make 
a study and report to the 1950 session. Harry Caudill led eastern Kentucky in opposing strip 
mining while serving in the Kentucky House of Representatives, and as one of the primary 
sponsors of the 1954 Strip Mine Control Act, Caudill played a major role in its passage. 
Although the legislation was among the weakest to attempt to regulate strip mining in the coal 
producing states, it did establish the Strip Mining Reclamation Commission. However, when 
Happy Chandler returned to office in 1955, he abolished the agency and by 1960, only nine of 
160 strip mine operators in Kentucky even had permits.14  
The battle over strip mining was waged in The Mountain Eagle for decades but it began 
in 1960, as the coal industry was in the early stages of reinventing itself into a leaner and 
predominantly non-union one made up of smaller companies. However, the industry was still 
largely controlled by absentee owners as the regionally owned operations were absorbed by 
                                                 
14 Chad Montrie, To Save the Land and People: A History of Opposition to Surface Coal Mining in Appalachia, 
(The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2003), page 64.  
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larger energy conglomerates, and international political considerations put American energy 
policy on the front burner.  The newspaper joined Harry Caudill in a concerted effort to bring an 
end to strip mining as Caudill expanded his legislative efforts by introducing a bill in 1960 to 
abolish surface mining entirely, although he received little support from his fellow legislators.15   
The Mountain Eagle worked to inform the residents of Kentucky about the destruction 
caused by strip mining in the hope that enough pressure could be brought to bear on state 
legislators so that it could be abolished in the General Assembly. A February 1960 editorial 
praised Caudill for his efforts to bring the issue to the public's attention and called for the 
residents of eastern Kentucky to get behind him in the legislature. The editorial spoke of the 
devastation visited on the mountains by strip mining and shocked local and state officials enough 
to prompt outcries in Frankfort and a number of courthouses in eastern Kentucky. Gish called 
strip mining the single greatest threat to eastern Kentucky’s potential for becoming a tourism 
center, one that threatened “almost overnight to turn our mountains into denuded hunks of rock 
looking as if they were created by Hollywood for a special horror movie.” He invited Letcher 
County residents to travel to Muhlenberg County in western Kentucky, later described in the 
John Prine song “Paradise” as being where “Mr. Peabody’s coal train has hauled it away,” to see 
the “once prosperous farming land, left gutted by strip coal operations.” The editorial allowed 
that the ruination of the level western Kentucky farm lands could at least be reshaped to 
something approaching their original contour, but cautioned that it would be multiplied 
exponentially in the mountains of the Central Appalachian Highlands. 
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Strip mining will fill our valleys with silt and filth, raising the levels of our creek beds 
 and rivers so that scarcely a building will be above flood level. This is already beginning 
 to happen. We have been told that the Army Corps of Engineers calculates that the 
 recently finished million-dollar flood wall in Pineville will be useless in five or six years 
 because strip mining is filling in the Cumberland River so rapidly.16 
In March, the paper reported that Bethlehem Mines Corporation was in the process of 
opening a new operation on the Letcher/Pike County border at Marshall’s Branch that was 
expected to get underway in the spring of 1960 and would include deep mining along with strip 
and auger mining.17 In July, Gish wrote that he hoped “The governor of Kentucky can identify 
the mud which is going to reach his front porch at Frankfort one day as coming from Letcher 
County,” and criticized Governor Bert Combs for stalling the introduction of a bill that would 
have outlawed strip mining. It referenced the new Bethlehem operation at Marshalls Branch and 
added that another was coming on old Elkhorn Coal property at Hemphill, predicting that as the 
coal was stripped, the land would be laid bare, and since there would no longer be any vegetation 
to hold it back, rainwater would become flood water and ravage the county. The floods would 
enter the Kentucky River and eventually make their way to Frankfort where they would leave a 
share of Letcher County mud. 
Gish asked who Letcher County's friends were in Frankfort, and stated that initial efforts 
to prohibit strip mining entirely had gained steady momentum until "it reached the governor's 
desk....We don’t know whose friends are who in Frankfort today but we do know that those 
interested in controlling strip mining operations started out with an idea of simply prohibiting it 
entirely." That movement had gained considerable support until it reached the governor’s office. 
                                                 
16 “Strip mining endangers us all,” The Mountain Eagle, February 18, 1960, 2. 
17 E.H. Johnson, “Coal to be stripped on Marshall’s Branch, The Mountain Eagle, March 4, 1960, 1. 
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From there it became a bill which merely increased the amount of bond a mining company had 
to put up and directed the firm to merely plant a few more trees when it was finished.  
In the past mining, companies have found it more profitable to forfeit the bond than to do 
 the reclamation work and we presume they will do so in the future. 
Of course, the governor is not the only one to blame. Letcher County citizens who urged 
 strong strip mining legislation were few and far between….Rep. Harry Caudill, who 
 sponsored the strip mine bill and was successful in getting it considerable publicity over 
 the state through The Courier Journal, had to sit by while his bill was gutted and the very 
 people he was trying to help failed to give him the support he needed. 
 
The state legislature passed the watered-down bill and strip mining increased 
dramatically. Gish predicted that by the time another (biennial) session examined strip mining, it 
would be too late, and said all it took a was a look at existing operations to see how much 
damage could be done in two years. "If you have a message to send to Frankfort, just stick it in a 
bottle and put it in the mud – it will get there all too soon.”18 
That fall, a petition initiated by retired miner Raymond Rash of Cromona was circulated 
in Letcher County asking the governor to call the legislature into special session to prohibit strip 
mining in the mountains of eastern Kentucky. The language in the petition stated that eastern 
Kentucky would be ruined by strip mining and the only possibility of stopping it was through the 
legislature, since the Kentucky Court of Appeals had ruled that there was no judicial remedy. 
“Observers in Letcher County have been unable to detect any signs that the (1960) bill has done 
anything to curb strip mining, nor is it evident that the state is making any effort to enforce the 
new law.”19  
 In a move that must come as a surprise to coal operators, the Whitesburg Chamber of 
Commerce took up the torch against strip mining and carried the battle to the desk of Governor 
                                                 
18 “Mud for Frankfort,” The Mountain Eagle, July 28, 1960, 8. 
19 “Governor requested to halt strip mining,” The Mountain Eagle, September 1, 1960, 1. 
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Bert Combs in 1960. In a three-page letter, the Chamber went on record supporting the Rash 
Petition asking that Combs "call the state legislature into special session to enact legislation 
prohibiting strip mining on mountain slopes of Eastern Kentucky." Although Combs called the 
legislature into special session, strip mining was not on the agenda, and in a special session, only 
agenda items can be discussed. In the letter, the chamber told the governor they were concerned 
that strip mining as it was then being practiced would have calamitous effects on the economy of 
the region and said it would negate efforts to reforest the mountain slopes to prevent further 
flooding. 20 
The article announcing the action taken by the Chamber of Commerce pointed out that 
while the legislature been called into special session, strip mining was not included and added 
that while the Chamber expressed its desire for increased employment, they felt the long-range 
harm done by large scale strip mining would far outweigh the good. The letter mentioned an 
increase in flooding from the increase in siltation of rivers and streams, and pointed to state 
efforts to reforest the hillsides in eastern Kentucky as a method of containing the ravages from 
the heavy rains. It also stated that the community of Haymond was threatened with “virtual 
destruction” from strip mining, and that the several hundred people living there were confronted 
with the situation of seeing their property destroyed, and it pointed to thousands of dollars spent 
by the State Highway Department to clean up strip mine mud from public roads in Haymond and 
in cleaning out ditches and culverts.21  
Although the coal industry was also lobbying the state legislature, opinions in Frankfort 
on strip mining were mixed and at an October 1960 meeting of the Kentucky Strip Mine and 
                                                 
20 "Chamber asks strip mine controls," The Mountain Eagle, September 22, 1960, 1. 
21 Ibid, 1. 
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Reclamation Commission, Commissioner J.O. Matlick said he had already received numerous 
complaints that operators were flagrantly disregarding even the mild laws that governed strip and 
auger mining. Matlock said the commission was charged with enforcing the law and it was his 
intention that it would "bring about full compliance as quickly as possible.” He also said a 
number of operators were “wildcatting,” or operating without permits and that the commission 
would make certain they were brought into compliance.22  In the next issue, Gish, wrote his 
strongest condemnation of strip mining thus far when he said a nightmare of gigantic proportions 
had haunted him recently, causing him to lose more sleep than he liked to admit, and asked if 
eastern Kentucky and Letcher County were not even then in their final death throes, and if they 
were not “headed on a final course of action that will make every branch, creek, every hillside 
unfit for habitation?”  He also referenced the damage to economic development through tourism, 
writing “we are making ourselves so scarred, so ugly, that no tourist in his right mind would ever 
come this way." He added that strip mining had already crippled Letcher County’s chances of 
getting a state park and it was spreading “like wildfire” in the county, and returned to Beefhide 
for a stark reminder of the ravages of strip mining.  
If you would listen to the argument that time heals all wounds-- then go to 
 Beefhide…Beefhide was once something of an apple orchard center, and there are many 
 persons in and around Jenkins who relied upon Beefhide farmers for their summer 
 vegetables and their winter supply of apples.  
 
But now that was gone.  Beefhide had been "brutally striped by Consolidation Coal 
Corporation," and since then, many families had left Beefhide, forced to abandon their homes.  
Where there were pleasant orchards and lush meadows, now there are dead apple trees – 
 only a few survivors – striving for life against the weight of giant boulders that have 
 rolled down the mountainsides, many of the rocks bigger than a car. Not rocks in the 
 ordinary sense of the word. Giant boulders. Bigger than a washtub, big as a car. And not 
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 just a few, but hundreds and hundreds covering mile after mile of what once was good 
 farming land.23 
 
At that time, reclamation of strip mined land was an afterthought, if it was thought of at 
all. Grass planted in the ruined land had to be looked at closely to make sure it was even 
growing.  What had happened to Beefhide had happened to other communities in the county as 
well, in Millstone, Camp Branch, Line Fork, Pert Creek, Rockhouse and others and one by one 
the creeks that watered these communities and fed into the Kentucky River had been ruined. 
Gish was explicit in his condemnation. “To my mind, there is no possible justification for strip 
mining in these mountains.”  He also challenged the industry's claim that strip mining provided 
employment, writing that it actually took jobs away because strip mines produced more coal per 
man than underground mines. Truck mine operators couldn’t compete, and the result was that 
they were either going out of business or going into strip mining. For Gish, the final straw was 
when all the lands that were controlled by Bethlehem Mines, Elkhorn Coal Corporation and 
United States Steel were designated for strip mining, if they were not deemed suitable for large-
scale underground mining. The Mountain Eagle estimated that up to 90 percent of the hillsides in 
Letcher County would be stripped and once stripped, the land would be worthless, with no tax 
value. The only solution was to outlaw strip mining, but Governor Combs had been indifferent to 
the petitions and letters of Letcher Countians asking for his help. 
The governor did not even show the signers of the petition the courtesy of a reply. 
 The only acknowledgement was in the form of a routine letter from a clerk in the 
 governor’s office, who said the matter was being referred to the State Strip Mining and 
 Reclamation Commission for consideration and possible action by the legislature in 1962. 
The governor’s position reminds me of a doctor who refused an appointment to a man 
 dying of cancer but told him to come back in two years.24 
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Late in 1960, Attorney General John Breckinridge finally obtained a restraining order 
against a strip mine in Harlan County, halting the operations of C.M. Wallen and Cranks-Mason, 
Inc. until they obtained a permit and posted the bond required by the state.  The Attorney 
General brought the action under the Strip Mine Act, and sought civil penalties of $22,500 and a 
fine of $250 a day, retroactive through June 16, 1960, when the Act went into effect. The 
Division of Strip Mining asked that Cranks-Mason Inc. be restrained from further operations 
until they complied with the provisions of the law. 25   
In a November 1960 Letter to the Editor, Harry Caudill called strip mining “a new horror 
(that) has recently entered the great Appalachian coalfields, bringing problems so great as to 
dwarf all previous ones...”  He said the new “industrial development” threatened the very 
existence of the mountains, and as he sometimes did in courtrooms and on the floor of the 
General Assembly, referenced scripture, saying “The Bible tells us the earth endureth forever and 
forever.” Caudill said any traveler could reasonably wonder what would be left in ten years after 
strip and auger cuts, some as high as 90 feet, had assaulted the mountains. “The ruin is 
sometimes made absolute by simply decapitating the hillside. Thus, the coal is literally gouged 
out of the earth and the hill is ruined.” Caudill called strip mining a threat to the very foundation 
of mountain life, one that destroyed the land so there was no future benefit to landowners, with 
timber ruined and streams filled with silt. He predicted that the TVA lakes would be harmed by 
the silt and acid from coal that was carried into them from east Kentucky streams, and the natural 
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beauty of the land would be lost. Caudill finished the letter with a reference to Beefhide Creek, 
stating that the area had lost 80 percent of its population since it had been strip mined.26 
While Bert Combs ignored pleas to regulate strip mining, the State Conservation 
Commission took a different view of strip mine operators ignoring the law, tame as it was. In 
November State Conservation Commissioner Matlick announced that he would turn the names of 
strip mine operators who had refused to comply with the law over to Attorney General 
Breckinridge, who could levy thousands of dollars in fines and close down mines that were not 
in compliance. Matlick said that only nine of 169 strip mine operators in the state had the permits 
that were required by law, but about 20 more were “making efforts to comply with regulation.” 
The Conservation Commission recognized the importance of coal mining to the state’s economy, 
but Matlick added that it was his job to enforce the laws and the efforts would be backed by the 
governor.27  
While the coal industry continued to trumpet the economic benefits of coal mining, it was 
never grounded in statistics, and in fact, the counties that led the nation in coal production often 
led in poverty as well. The Mountain Eagle cited two articles from other papers to show that 
Kentucky’s economic future was not dependent on the coal industry but on diversifying the 
state’s economy. One was from the western Kentucky coalfields in Hopkins County and another 
concerned depressed areas, The Hopkins County article referred to record breaking production in 
Western Kentucky and the miniscule effect it had on the economy. “Hopkins County was on the 
list of depressed areas -- even though its major industry, coal mining – obviously was and is 
booming as never before.” The Eagle called the idea that eastern Kentucky's economy would be 
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fixed with new coal orders untrue, since mechanization had changed the industry to the point that 
the only thing an increased demand for coal would do was to “put more machines to work and 
provide longer hours for the machines now working.” 
It is about time that everyone concerned bury once and for all the idea that new coal 
 markets will cure Eastern Kentucky’s economic situation. That false hope only serves to 
 blind those who should be using their eyes to find some other possible cure.28 
Late in 1961, Attorney General John Breckenridge filed lawsuits in Bell, Letcher, Harlan, 
and Perry County Circuit Courts to require eleven strip mine operators in these counties who 
were operating without permits to comply with the law. In the suit, the Attorney General asked 
that the operators be ordered to refrain from further mining activity and be fined $250.00 for 
every day they had been in violation of the law.29 
 In the early days of strip mining, there was substantial legislative support for regulation 
on both the state and federal level.  Even without Bert Combs, questions were being asked in the 
Kentucky General Assembly about the effects of strip mining, including whether the economic 
benefits of the method were worth the costs in ravaged land and displaced people. In 1962, U.S. 
Senator John Sherman Cooper proposed a research effort to look at ways to prevent the 
increasingly frequent floods that were exacerbated from the deforestation caused by strip mining. 
Cooper called for a $200,000 grant to go to the United States Forest Service's Berea Kentucky 
Field Office, where the Central States Forest Experimental Station had already begun to 
experiment with methods of reforesting strip-mined areas in an effort to reduce damage from 
flooding. While he did not call for an end to strip mining, Cooper did recognize the damage that 
was being done and called for efforts to develop methods to stabilize soil and prevent tree 
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seedlings from being washed away. It was also an early step toward federal oversight of strip 
mining, as Cooper pointed out that laws in Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania could not 
be truly effective if they lacked the necessary data to develop methods to prevent large scale 
erosion.30 
 The issue of strip mining was beginning to receive national media coverage as well, and 
Harry Caudill's "Rape of the Appalachians" was the lead article in the March edition of The 
Atlantic Monthly in 1962, where Caudill discussed the history of strip mining and its effects on 
the land and people of the region. The Mountain Eagle referred to the Atlantic as one of the 
country's most influential magazines, adding, perhaps tongue in cheek, "although it is not widely 
circulated in Letcher County."31 
 Just weeks before Cooper's announcement, The Mountain Eagle had printed a front-page 
article complete with pictures showing the devastation from a "giant slide" from a U.S. Steel 
mine on the Cumberland River side of Letcher County, when tons of mud and debris cascaded 
down and drove Fred Jones and his family from their home. The main slide, which was described 
as a "gigantic accumulation of overburden," still threatened the valley and the Jones family took 
the coal company up on its minimalist offer to "find a place for them to store their belongings in 
Lynch" while they tried to find them another house. Mrs. Jones told The Eagle that since an 
earlier slide in January, she had received daily reports from a representative of U.S. Steel who 
told her each day if it was safe for her to spend the day in her home and each evening if it would 
be safe for the family to spend the night.32 
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 Late in 1962, Harry Caudill filed a lawsuit challenging the broad form deed in United 
States District Court, that questioned the validity of an old Northern Coal and Coke Company 
deed. The lawsuit argued that the strip mining of land under the deed was a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution because it would deprive the property owner of his land without due compensation. 
Caudill filed his motion under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which states that "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges of any citizen of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life 
liberty, or property without due process of law." He claimed that while the deed gave the holder 
broad powers, it was also designed to reserve something of value to the surface owner, and that 
because strip mining would destroy the land forever, what would be reserved for the landowner 
would be nullified, and his property would therefore be taken without due compensation. U.S. 
District Judge Mac Swinford overruled a motion by Twin Fork Coal Company that it be allowed 
to continue to strip mine the property of Elwood Roberts of Marrowbone Creek in Pike County, 
and refused to dismiss the suit brought by Caudill on Roberts' behalf to stop the mining.33  
 The motion was later dismissed in favor of Twin Forks Coal. In his 1963 ruling, Judge 
Swinford ruled that the case was "not properly in federal court" and that he could not subscribe 
to Roberts' position since Twin Forks Coal was a private company with no state connection. 
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because it did not permit relief from the 
actions of private persons but was intended to limit state actions.34 
 The Mountain Eagle drew a sharp response in a letter from Bill Preston of Seco, who 
accused Gish of filing an inaccurate report in the March 1 article, "Family flees strip mine slide." 
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when Preston alleged that U.S. Steel had found "suitable lodging for the (Jones) until a 
permanent home could be found." He also claimed that U.S. Steel had made an adequate 
financial settlement to them for the damage to their property caused by the mud slide, and that 
Gish's allegations that the family had been in danger of being flooded since a previous slide was 
"absolutely without foundation." Preston wrote that U.S. Steel had gone well beyond the 
demands of the law in reclaiming strip mines and that strip mining was a help to the local 
economy, and stated that he had a business that was associated with underground mining. (U.S. 
Steel operated several of the largest underground mines in Harlan County at that time) He closed 
by asking Gish to be more considerate when he pointed an accusing finger at anything that 
helped the regional economy. In a heading posted before the letter, Gish wrote that the company 
had not offered the Jones family a financial settlement at the time the article was published, but 
had made arrangements since,35 
 In an editorial that appeared in The Mountain Eagle just before the 1963 gubernatorial 
election, Gish wrote that although Democratic candidate Ned Breathitt would probably defeat 
Republican Louie Nunn, neither man had shown any inclination to limit strip mining in the state 
and "it is apparent to the most casual afternoon driver that Eastern Kentucky will become a 
barren wasteland in a few short years if strip mining continues at its present destructive pace." 
He added that while he estimated that between 75 and 90 percent of eastern Kentucky residents 
would look with favor on any candidate bold enough to address strip mining, "both candidates 
seem to fear strip coal mine operators more than they do just plain citizens."36 
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 The candidates' lack of conviction, or courage in addressing strip mining in the 1963 
campaign notwithstanding, a solid base of elected and appointed officials still existed who either 
opposed strip mining all together or at least wanted to see it regulated. However, if the citizens of 
Letcher County were expecting to see any courage shown by their fiscal court over the mining 
that was ravaging Millstone, Beefhide, and other parts of the county, they were doomed to 
disappointment and it became evident that citizen action, augmented by The Mountain Eagle and 
the courts would be required.  
  The War on Poverty took up much of The Eagle's time and space, but strip-mining was 
definitely part of the public conversation, and civic groups, county governments, and citizens' 
action committees, empowered by the Community Action Programs, began to advocate for 
regulation or an outright ban on strip mining. Early in 1964, a group of Letcher County citizens 
joined the Board of Directors of the Letcher County Soil and Water Conservation District to 
submit a formal request to the Kentucky state legislature to ban strip mining in eastern Kentucky. 
In the request, the board wrote that continued strip and auger mining in Letcher County would 
wreck the economy of the county by destroying the area's natural beauty and filling the rivers 
and streams with run-off.  The letter pointed out that it was the board's legal obligation to protect 
the soil and water in the county, and if strip mining was not checked, it would run rampant 
throughout the region.37 
 In 1964, Harry Caudill figured prominently in another strip mine related lawsuit when he 
defended the property rights of a Bell County man whose land had been damaged by strip 
mining. The suit was upheld in federal court in Bell County and gave relief to a property owner 
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whose land had been damaged by water runoff from a strip mine on property owned by Asher 
Coal Company. The ruling held that Asher Coal had been aware of the purpose their land was 
being used for and was therefore liable for damage caused by the activity, and Caudill stated that 
he believed the suit opened the door for other land owners to recover losses from strip mining 
that impacted their land.38 
 As coal producers in eastern Kentucky moved increasingly toward strip mining, the 
ability of the surface mining companies to mine large amounts of coal at low costs caused 
smaller underground mine operators to recognize the threat strip mining posed to "truck" mines. 
When competition from cheap strip-mined coal became a serious problem in the mid-sixties, the 
smaller operators began to band together to protect their own interests. At a meeting of the 
National Independent Truck Coal Operators held in Pikeville early in 1965, a number of small 
operators heard warnings from their Board of Directors informing them that they could soon be 
wiped out by consolidation, along with hauling coal directly to power plants in "unit trains," 
which also favored larger producers. A unit train is an entire train load of coal with 100 cars or 
more, often hauling as much as 10,000 tons. Because the unit trains only hauled coal, they could 
be loaded at a much quicker pace and with new technology, they could be unloaded quickly, as 
the train moved through the power plant coal yard.  The association's president, Robert Holcomb 
of Pikeville warned that the unit trains were a threat to small operators because they represented 
a substantial freight savings to the power plants.     
 Holcomb also voiced concerns about the probable extension of federal oversight in mine 
safety and told the operators that it was probably inevitable. The Truck Coal Operators 
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Association had proposed that federal regulation only be instituted if the federal government 
could demonstrate that mining in a particular state was unsafe. However, the operators were not 
hesitant to accept federal aid from the Small Business Administration and the Office of 
Economic Opportunity for loans and job training, and Holcomb reported that the association had 
approached both agencies for help. Pike County Attorney Thomas Ratliff told the gathering that 
eastern Kentucky operators could accumulate enough capital to enable them to pursue their 
economic endeavors through small independent coal operations, but that he believed it would 
soon be impossible for the small mines to exist if they had to sign contracts with the United Mine 
Workers. Ratliff called on truck mine operators to improve working conditions to the point that 
their workers would not want to leave for jobs in larger mines.39  
 By the early to mid-1960s, the Tennessee Valley Authority was recognized as the prime 
mover in the decline of small deep mines and the growth of strip mining in eastern Kentucky. At 
a meeting of the Upper Kentucky River Area Development Council in London, Lewis Howard, a 
long time Laurel County Coal operator, told the group gathered at the council meeting that he 
had been in the coal business since 1934 and that TVA's desire for low priced coal had put a lot 
of coal miners out of work by driving the creation of the strip mining industry. He said operators 
had to bribe engineers to falsify BTU reports on the coal they mined and that any operator who 
complained about TVA's coal buying practices was blacklisted. He also said that while TVA was 
supposed to purchase its coal through a competitive bid process, the agency actually told 
operators what it wanted to see on the bid sheet and the operators could "take it or leave it."40  
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 In 1961, Richard Kelley and Bill Sturgill, who operated as Caperton Coal and Kentucky 
Oak Mining Companies, signed a 15-year contract with TVA to provide two million tons of 
cheap coal from mines in Knott and Perry Counties, on land they leased from the Kentucky 
River Coal Corporation. In December 1961, Kenneth Seigworth, Director of the TVA Division 
of Forestry Relations, called a meeting that was attended by Central States Forest Experimental 
Station Director R.D. Lane, Kentucky Conservation Commissioner J.O. Matlick and his 
assistant, Robert Montgomery, along with Division of Strip Mine Reclamation Director Henry 
Callis, and Representatives from the U.S. Forest Service. Following the meeting, Montgomery 
wrote a letter to Seigworth in which he informed him that since TVA was a federal agency and 
the largest user of strip mined coal in Kentucky, it was Matlick's feeling that the agency should 
assume some responsibility for strip mine reclamation in river basins in the state. TVA 
established its own task force to conduct a study on the matter, and in a 1962 report, admitted 
that its large coal purchases, along with those by other consumers, "contributed significantly to 
land and water management problems outside the (Tennessee River) Valley" and that as an 
agency representing the citizens of the United States, TVA should be "concerned with these 
problems." The report suggested that TVA could begin by supporting the passage of state 
reclamation legislation in states that had not yet enacted strip mine control bills and by inserting 
contract clauses "Setting minimum standards for reclamation."41 
 In Knott County, Kelley and Sturgill began stripping on a larger scale than anything yet 
seen in eastern Kentucky, with an auger that measured seven feet in diameter and could penetrate 
216 feet into a seam. They quickly became well known for operating at the very limits of the 
law, driving beneath property boundaries, and taking coal from under people's land without their 
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permission, frequently with almost no reclamation. By 1965, their operations had covered houses 
with "spoil," knocked them off their foundations, covered roads, ruined valuable farmland 
without compensation, and uprooted timber. Excessive blasting ruined wells and broke windows 
and they made no compensation to owners.42 
 Sturgill and Kelly began to meet some individual resistance to their mining tactics in 
Knott County, and in May they reached property belonging to "Uncle" Dan Gibson and his 
family on Clear Creek. The land they wanted to mine belonged to Gibson's stepson, who was 
serving in Vietnam, and when the bulldozers started ripping the topsoil off and pushing trees 
over, Gibson and his neighbors complained and warned the mine workers about trespassing on 
their land. When the bulldozers came back and crossed his property line the next morning, 
Gibson and his neighbor Paul Ashley went back and Gibson was armed with a .22 rifle. He 
confronted an armed company guard, warned him not to draw either of his pistols, and told the 
guard and the bulldozer operator to get the equipment off his land. After they left, Gibson stood 
watch, gun in hand, at the property line and told the operators they could not come though. By 
afternoon, police officers had arrived to arrest Gibson. Local educator Eldon Davidson, who was 
also a strip mining opponent, told them that Gibson would hand over his gun and leave if Sturgill 
and Kelly would promise not to strip his stepson's land. Sturgill promised and Gibson 
surrendered and was jailed in Hindman, the county seat of Knott County. That evening, the jail 
was surrounded by a group of armed men who demanded Gibson's release and he was freed after 
charges against him were dropped.  
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 Sturgill's promise proved to be worthless and the next morning, when the bulldozers 
returned, they were met by a group of men and women, mostly armed and elderly, who refused 
to let them pass.  The company attorneys described the citizens as a "gang of outlaws," but the 
equipment never crossed the property line.  On the first day of June, eighty people met in 
Hindman to try to stop the stripping and declared their willingness to adopt the peaceful non- 
violent tactics of the civil rights movement, using sit-ins, lie-ins, and peaceful marches to stop 
the mining. Some of the attendees also said they would advocate violence as a last resort, if their 
goals could not be achieved without it.43 
 By the summer of 1965, eastern Kentucky had become the center of the anti-strip mining 
movement and while the state and federal governments had not taken up the challenge, a number 
of citizens groups had formed around the issue, and efforts to rein in strip mining in most 
counties were driven by individuals or groups of citizen, who had seen enough. In Knott and 
Perry Counties almost 800 individuals signed a petition protesting both strip mining and the use 
of the old land deeds that gave the surface rights to the mining companies. When the signers met 
in Hindman, a Mountain Eagle article reported that those who spoke at the meeting revealed that 
slides had closed roads in Knott County and covered an entire house, leaving only the corner of a 
refrigerator standing above the mud to show that a house had once been there. Harry Caudill 
spoke briefly and challenged the county courts to get involved, saying that if the court officers 
cared about the people at the meeting as much as they had promised before the elections, they 
would have attended the meeting. The attendees decided to organize a "cavalcade of 
automobiles" to go to Frankfort to address the governor and state legislators, and sent copies of 
the petition and a letter to Carl D. Perkins and President Johnson asking for their help. One 
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woman at the meeting told about family members holding coal operators off with a hand gun, 
and when her husband was away on jury duty, his wife "manned" the gun in his absence. From 
these beginnings, one of the best known of all the anti-strip mining organizations, the 
Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People, was formed"44 
 In the same edition that covered the Knott County protest, a Mountain Eagle editorial 
drew a comparison between the property rights movement in eastern Kentucky and the Civil 
Rights Movement. Making reference to the talk about arming both sides in the Knott County 
strip mine conflict, Gish also pointed to less violent methods of resistance. "There is also talk of 
picketing, of sit-in demonstrations, of lie-in protests, and other use of civil disobedience of the 
type that has sparked the southern Civil Rights movement." The paper also criticized the 
University of Kentucky for its cooperation with strip mine operators in futile attempts at 
reclamation, with the editorial running alongside a press release from The Kentucky Department 
of Commerce concerning growing elderberries on "spoil banks" as a means of reclamation. The 
editorial called the program by UK and other state agencies in cooperation with the strip miners 
to grow elderberries on reclaimed mine sites an attempt "to hide the wreckage of strip mining 
under a coating of elderberry jam."  Gish wrote that the university had distinguished itself by 100 
years of misguided and ill-conceived interest in eastern Kentucky and its problems, and would 
now have the region believe it could become another Eden if they would just turn the strip 
miners loose. "UK should be ashamed."45 
 In the summer of 1965, the Letcher County unit of the Appalachian Group to Save the 
Land and People, was formed at a meeting in Isom, in western Letcher County. Dr. Lundy 
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Adams, a Blackey physician, was elected to head the group and he warned the members that 
Letcher County faced the same destruction from strip mining that was taking place in Knott and 
Perry Counties. "The awfullest destruction and devastation that ever took place is going on now. 
The strip miners want the last drop of blood in the carcass of Eastern Kentucky."46 
 The edition containing the announcement of the formation of the Letcher County unit of 
AGSLP also carried two editorials and a statement from Governor Edward Breathitt concerning 
strip mining and the use of the old deeds to force landowners to allow their land to be mined. The 
TVA was criticized for requiring operators to grade spoil banks on strip mined land, which was 
called a trick to make it look like TVA was taking an active part in reclamation since it was 
already required by Kentucky law. It would cause more erosion than was already taking place 
and just gave operators an excuse to plunder the land. The Eagle also reprinted an editorial from 
The Floyd County Times, "IT IS "EITHER - OR," saying that either strip mining would be done 
under laws that did not cause undue damage or it would be eliminated, thanks to new rules 
promoted by Governor Breathitt. 
 In the Breathitt statement, the governor said he had pledged to defend the rights of 
landowners in his campaign and that he would fight the court decisions upholding the old land 
deeds that gave the surface rights to the mining companies. "I have instigated action to try and 
relieve the sorry situation in which the owners of surface land in Eastern Kentucky find 
themselves because of the so-called broad form or long form deeds to mineral rights." He stated 
that he had asked the Attorney General to intervene in Knott County to test the legality of the 
deeds in Knott County and had assigned another attorney from his office to help with the suit. He 
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also mentioned the 19 landowners who had been enjoined from interfering with mining 
operations and said he was prepared to take the case to the United States Supreme Court to 
protect their property rights. Breathitt said he was determined to work for federal and state 
legislation restricting strip mining and eliminating the broad form deed.47 
 Breathitt's willingness to oppose the strip miners must have been a breath of fresh air to 
Gish and those who joined him in opposing strip mining. The indifference of Bert Combs to the 
matter had further cemented his dislike of "the little lawyer from Powell County” so the prospect 
of a Kentucky governor who was willing to take on the coal industry was a new thing.  Breathitt 
was as good as his word, but the coal industry moved quickly to and fought back in the courts 
and in the press. 
 As Breathitt began to work to rein in the strip miners, Harry Caudill used his national 
platform to address a broader audience in Washington. Speaking at a panel on reclamation of the 
landscape at the White House Conference on National Beauty, Caudill told his fellow 
participants that while the hills of Appalachia were so beautiful that they masked the poverty of 
the residents, that beauty had never been respected by the "corporations which own the vast 
mineral wealth." Caudill used Black Mountain and the Poor Fork of the Cumberland River that 
runs parallel to US 119 in Letcher County, as the easel for his verbal picture, telling of the once 
crystal clear and fish-filled river that had been heavily silted by strip mining and then destroyed 
when the U.S. Coal and Coke Corporation "sent its bulldozers to dredge the river." He described 
the ruination as the bulldozers and other earth movers pushed the silt out of the main channel and 
left it lying on the side of the river. "Thus the river, once the cool pleasant habitat of some of the 
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gamest fish in the world, became nothing more than a smooth bottomed trough."  The natural 
ecology of the river had been ruined, and Caudill said that if a man "loves America the Beautiful, 
and sees this wrecked and ravaged land, the gouged-out creek bed, this fishless stream, he must 
feel a revulsion for the industry that would recklessly destroy the valley for a bit of cheap fuel."48 
  Later, in response to a request from Governor Breathitt, the Kentucky Attorney General's 
Office prepared a plea to the Knott County Circuit Court to ban surface mining in the county. 
The plea was an attempt by the governor to assist landowners in Knott County, and Uncle Dan 
Gibson and 19 other Knott County citizens were named as co-defendants with The 
Commonwealth of Kentucky in a court action against Bill Sturgill's Kentucky Oaks Coal 
Company. The action was brought in response to a suit to prevent the Knott County landowners 
from interfering with Kentucky Oaks' attempts to mine their land under the broad form deed.49  
 At the same time the state attempted to ban strip mining in Knott County, a Mountain 
Eagle headline in all capitals screamed, "13 STATE TROOPERS ARREST UNCLE DAN," 
after Dan Gibson had once again taken his .22 rifle to the ridge above his home to protect his 
land from mining. Gibson was approached by "six heavily armed state troopers," who asked the 
81-year-old man to accompany them off the mountain. Gibson, who was eating his lunch, 
refused and the officers radioed for reinforcements. Shortly, thirteen more troopers arrived, 
accompanied by a Knott County sheriff's deputy. Gibson's neighbors had seen the police go up 
on the ridge and followed them, to keep things from getting out of hand, and Gibson surrendered 
to the police and accompanied them to Hindman, where he was charged with flourishing a 
deadly weapon and held on a $5,000 bond. Gibson's neighbors told The Mountain Eagle that 
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well after Gibson had left the mountain, several state troopers who remained on the ridge started 
shooting in what they called an attempt to intimidate them.50     
 Governor Breathitt stood by his promise to work to regulate strip mining and proposed 
new rules in the summer of 1965 to cut down on the hazards of "overburden" being pushed onto 
homes and occupied property, and into streams. Then, later in the year, he proposed a national 
compact to regulate strip mining. The move came at a meeting in St. Louis with representatives 
from all 50 states attending and Breathitt asked them to approve a draft of an interstate compact 
on surface laws that had been prepared by the Council of State Governors. The compact 
addressed strip mining as well as gravel, stone pits, coal washers, and other mining operations 
and defined mining as breaking the surface for "the extraction and removal of minerals, ores, and 
other solid matter." It also included washing and preparation plants and other treatment plants for 
extracted ores. At the time of the proposals, Breathitt was Chairman of the National Resources 
Committee of the National Governors' Conference and he proposed the compact after touring 
surface mine reclamation sites in Pennsylvania with Governor William Scranton.51  
 Breathitt proposed to submit the compact as legislation in the beginning of the 1966 
Kentucky General Assembly session. He linked water to strip mining, saying that while 
Kentucky had an adequate amount of rainfall, it was important to make sure the water stayed in 
the right places, and said he would invite the governors of Indiana and Ohio to discuss regulating 
strip mining in the best interests of the Ohio River. Breathitt patterned his proposal after 
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legislation that was working well in Pennsylvania. Governor Breathitt called the Pennsylvania 
laws the most rigid in the nation, but said they had not destroyed the coal industry there.52 
 Following the proposal, Breathitt asked the strip miners involved in the Knott County 
mining cases to "desist from further insistence on their pound of flesh," until the courts could 
decide on the scope and meaning of broad form deeds, and added that if the courts decided in 
behalf of the strip miners, he would ask the legislature to intervene to protect land and 
homeowner’s rights. His actions came after Mrs. Ollie Combs, generally referred to as the 
Widow Combs, and two of her sons, had lain down in front of bulldozers getting ready to strip 
their land. Mrs. Combs and her sons had spent Thanksgiving in the Knott County Jail after their 
arrest by state troopers, and they were convicted of contempt of court by Special Circuit Judge 
Don Ward. In his statement, Breathitt said, "I want the Widow Combs and all other Kentuckians 
whose homes and farms are threatened with destruction by strip and auger mining to know I am 
on their side." He also directed Frankfort attorney Edward F. Prichard to serve as special counsel 
to intervene in the broad form deeds case. 
 Late in the year, a Knott County Circuit Court Judge agreed to address the issue of 
landowner's rights vs. the rights of the coal companies that owned the mineral rights. The 
decision, which came late in 1965, opened the possibility of a court decision regarding the broad 
form deed. Most Kentucky judges had dismissed the issue out of hand but Judge John Chris 
Cooper ruled that he would hear the entire issue, on "the merits, the facts, and the law presented 
by the respective sides." The decision was the result of a lawsuit filed by Helen and Leroy 
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Martin. co-chairs of AGSLP, against Kentucky River Coal Company. In his verbal ruling on the 
motion to dismiss the suit, Cornett said that those who believed they had been wronged were 
entitled to their day in court, and that was the place to "settle confusions." Governor Breathitt 
was expected to intervene in the case, after having directed Edward F. Prichard to become 
involved in the case on behalf of the Martins. 
 The strip mine bill was initially tabled in the Kentucky House, so Governor Breathitt 
issued an executive order to make the strip mine regulations he had proposed go into immediate 
effect. The Eagle praised his decision and said he had acted with great courage and conviction, 
and Gish once again tied the events on Clear Creek in Knott County to the Civil Rights 
movement, as well as the War on Poverty.  Ollie Combs was heralded as a "heroine of the 
mountains" for her act of resistance and the "sad fact that it was necessary for Mrs. Combs to 
face the deadly guns of the coal company's guards and the terror of the bulldozer's blade" before 
public attention could be called to her plight. It also pointed out that AGSLG had originally been 
organized as a War on Poverty Community Action Program, the Clear Creek Community Action 
Group, to plan the community's participation in the War on Poverty. It had moved to confront 
strip mining when the need had become apparent, but the actions of a few families on an isolated 
creek in a forgotten county had galvanized the governor to take action against the most powerful 
industry in the state. 
 The similarities between the Knott County Struggle and the civil rights struggle in the 
 south are marked. Have we in the nation become so calloused, so indifferent to the right 
 of a citizen to live in peace that we can act only by reacting to the drama of a widow 
 ready to lay down her life for her birthright? Surely not.53 
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 Breathitt and many other Kentucky officials had been deeply embarrassed by the media 
coverage of the state troopers carrying the Widow Combs off the mountain in Knott County, as 
well as the arrest of Uncle Dan Gibson. The Mountain Eagle had reported on the situation, but 
the events in Knott County at the close of 1965 were often overshadowed by the events in 
Washington DC concerning the War on Poverty.  Early the 1966 legislative session, Breathitt 
sent a bill carrying strong regulation of strip mining to the legislature, in which he stated that 
current strip mine law was inadequate. Breathitt said he wanted a bill that would protect a man's 
rights on his own land and require the restoration of the land to a useful surface.54  Later in the 
session, even after hearing several weeks of charges levied by the coal industry that it would 
destroy strip mining in Kentucky, the bill passed overwhelmingly. The Mountain Eagle called 
the legislation important and strict, but the Breathitt strip mine law had barely gone into effect 
when anti-strip mine groups began to say it was not sufficient, and in April of 1967, AGSLG 
took a group to Frankfort to complain that the law was ineffective and would not help even if it 
was followed to the letter. At the same time, William Sturgill spoke at the Kentucky Industrial 
Coal Conference at the University of Kentucky, and said that strip miners in Perry County were 
doing their best to follow the letter of the law, and added that Kentucky needed the regulations. 
He finished by saying he hoped that intelligent and effective enforcement would be carried out 
for the good of the state. Governor Breathitt asked AGSLG for their patience and said it would 
take time to prove the effectiveness of the law.55 
 Not long after his plea for patience to the anti-strip mine activists, Breathitt again asked 
strip miners in Kentucky operating under the broad form deed to stop working, this time, until 
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the State Court of Appeals could rule on several cases involving land owners' rights, and issued a 
statement saying he believed that those who claimed the right to "destroy under the broad form 
deed" could afford to wait until the question was decided in court. "Then or course, all citizens in 
a free commonwealth will, I am sure, obey the law."56 
 The Mountain Eagle's coverage of the anti-strip mining activity in neighboring Knott 
County made the paper no friends in Letcher County, and went a long way toward continuing the 
alienation that already existed between the Gishes and the coal industry. Along with Harry 
Caudill and a few others, Tom and Pat Gish were portrayed by proponents of coal mining as 
being opposed to all coal mining, even though The Mountain Eagle continued to issue positive 
reports about new underground mine openings and to boast about increased production in deep 
mines. Unfortunately, the move toward strip mining was not only growing, the coal industry was 
becoming increasingly sensitive concerning any opposition to its methods.  The Mountain Eagle 
was already struggling from boycotts, withdrawal of advertising, and other efforts to silence its 
voice, and as it became a strong voice for property rights and strip mine regulation, the gulf 
deepened and attempts to silence the newspaper grew. 
 For much of Edward Breathitt's administration, Tom and Pat Gish spent a good deal of 
time in Washington where they worked with congressmen crafting anti-poverty legislation and 
served as expert witnesses in House and Senate hearings on the subject of eastern Kentucky 
poverty. The anti-strip mine movement in eastern Kentucky was centered in Knott County where 
AGSLG, along with Knott County elected officials and judges carried on the fight.  Governor 
Breathitt and a number of legislators also worked to regulate strip mining with varying degrees 
                                                 
56 “Breathitt asks strip miners to stop work," The Mountain Eagle, July 13, 1967, 1. 
275 
 
of success. For The Mountain Eagle, the frequent absences of the Gishes created more than a few 
problems. The paper often came out late and some of the advertisers who had stuck with the 
paper through the boycotts initiated by the fiscal court and board of education became disgusted 
and stopped advertising with the paper. The loss of income hurt, leading Pat Gish to take a job 
with a War on Poverty Program in Letcher County. But the focus on the War on Poverty also 
created openings for a number of young journalists, many of whom worked without pay or for 
very low wages, to step in and take on the issues. Among the most prominent of these were 
James Branscome, Phil Primack, and Thomas Bethell. Not only did these young writers help to 
fill the gap, along with contributing some excellent coverage of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
and other mining related issues, they also filled the void that was created in the social lives of the 
Gish family when many of their middle-class neighbors turned away from them, whether for 
their coverage of local government or the coal industry, or the revelations of the depth of poverty 
in eastern Kentucky. The lively and intelligent young people who came in to work at the paper or 
with War on Poverty agencies, and later, the young artists at the Appalachian Media Institute 
were a more than adequate replacement for the middle-class residents of Whitesburg, and a 
number of them became lifelong friends of the Gish family. The newspaper became a proving 
ground for a number of young journalists who worked for statewide newspapers as well as those 
who contributed to The Mountain Eagle. The Gishes were stern mentors to a generation of young 
journalists who came through the offices of the newspaper and David Hawpe, later managing 
editor of the Courier Journal, told Ben Gish that Pat was the only person in the business he really 
feared when she proofread his work.57  
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 Bethell and Branscome took on issues within the coal industry that included but were not 
exclusive to mining in eastern Kentucky.  Bethell took on two eastern Kentucky icons when he 
addressed the collusion between Consolidation Coal and the United Mine Workers against 
Southeast Coal Company in his essay "A Conspiracy in Coal."58 He detailed the scheme between 
the UMW and Consol to shut Southeast out that led to a Supreme Court decision in favor of 
Southeast. Branscome became a frequent critic of TVA and wrote a number of scathing studies 
of the agency's role in introducing strip mining and other coal related issues he saw as 
detrimental to the region. Branscome published three Appalachia themed books in the 1970s, 
Whatever Happened to Appalachia (1971), Annihilating the Hillbilly (1976), and The Federal 
Government in Appalachia (1977).  His articles on TVA appeared in regional and national press, 
particularly the Washington Post, where he was special correspondent for 10 years, covering the 
South, coal issues, and the United Mine Workers.  
 Breathitt's term ended in 1967 and Louie B. Nunn succeeded him as the first Republican 
to be elected to the governor's office in 20 years. Nunn was much less inclined to use the power 
of his office to limit or regulate strip mining, since the passage of the relatively mild bill 
regulating strip mining in 1966. As funding for the War on Poverty was siphoned off to pay for 
the increasingly expensive war in Vietnam, many of the anti-poverty programs became 
institutionalized or closed out. At the same time, there was a dramatic expansion of strip mining 
in Letcher County. It came in massive proportions and was promoted by the largest coal 
company on the county. In the late 1960s, Dave Zegeer, manager of Bethlehem Steel's operations 
in the county, announced that Bethlehem Steel would allow its property to be strip mined once 
again, although initially, it was uncertain whether Beth Elkhorn Division would carry the mining 
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out or would contract the work out to smaller strip mining companies. Small communities like 
Millstone, Beefhide, and Jackhorn all had sizable deposits of coal that were too close to the 
surface to mine with conventional deep mining methods, and Beth-Elkhorn and several other 
large coal companies turned their attention to obtaining that coal through auger and strip mining 
methods.  
 While Bill Sturgill and some of the other Knott County strippers had hired security 
guards and enlisted the Kentucky State Police to keep strip mining protesters away from their 
mine sites, Dave Zegeer took a different route. Zegeer was well educated and very personable, 
with a degree in mining engineering from West Virginia University, and he had a sophisticated 
grasp of the relationship between coal mining and the communities of eastern Kentucky. While 
he was willing to mine in small isolated areas like Millstone, he kept the conversation focused on 
the topic of job creation and the economic benefits to the communities that surrounded the strip 
mine sites. Regardless of which side Zegeer was on, he was a formidable opponent and the 
Gishes found that he could make his argument in a very persuasive manner. Zegeer was also an 
old-time company man, having been brought up in the company town ethos of CONSOL and 
then Bethlehem Steel. He came to Jenkins after World War II and made his home there, so he 
understood the power the companies had over the people, both those who worked directly for the 
mines and those who made their livings in support capacities. Zegeer always led with the 
economic argument, but he was also adamant that as long as the mining was legal, the coal 
companies weren't doing anything wrong, and he believed it and he stood by it. His 1968 
statement to Robert Kennedy, at hearings the senator held at Fleming Neon High School, that if 
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what Beth Elkhorn was doing was wrong, then American was wrong, was not something he just 
threw out for Kennedy's benefit. It was what he believed and what he lived.59 
 Beth Elkhorn totally controlled Jenkins in the old-time coal town/welfare industrial 
model and Zegeer, as General Superintendent, was the leading citizen. Although he never sought 
public office, it was well understood that he was first among equals and he was highly skilled at 
relating to the miners who worked at the Beth Elkhorn Mines. Zegeer had a gift for 
understanding "his people," and could remember names and family details effortlessly. The City 
of Jenkins still reveres him and the Dave A. Zegeer Mining and Rail Museum stands in 
testimony to the quality of his memory. Even today, as the city’s fortunes have almost hit rock 
bottom, there are very few who are willing to criticize Zegeer publicly and the belief in the coal 
industry is almost cultish. Signs welcoming visitors to Jenkins call it “A city built on Coal.) 
Jenkins was also the largest city in the county and an important outlet for The Mountain Eagle. 
The paper experimented with a Jenkins edition that served as a second section to the paper for a 
while and always kept at least one community correspondent in the city. As a coal man himself, 
Tom Gish also had a real appreciation for the modern mining methods practiced by Beth-Elkhorn 
and the safety record the company maintained. Even as Beth-Elkhorn decided to go back to strip 
mining, the paper carried a number of articles on the new underground mine "the company" was 
opening in Ashcamp, a nearby Pike County community just across the county line. Mine 26 as it 
came to be called, was the most modern coal mine in the world at the time it opened and had the 
most technologically innovate preparation plant. Mine 26 was the first underground coal mine in 
America to use long wall mining and The Mountain Eagle was highly complementary of the 
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innovation. However, at the same time, contractors working for Beth-Elkhorn were damaging the 
Millstone Community and relations between the newspaper and Beth-Elkhorn quickly soured.  
 About the same time, Beth-Elkhorn announced it would enter into strip mining through a 
contractor, Harry Caudill ramped up his opposition to strip mining and used the notoriety his 
books and other publications gave him to take the discussion to a broader audience. In April of 
1968, Caudill addressed the United States Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and told 
the committee he had waited for over a dozen years to see the Senate address the destruction 
caused by strip mining and the "industrial devastation spread like a gargantuan cancer across 
hundreds of thousands of acres." Caudill described streams turned yellow by siltation and once 
productive fields reduced to desolate wastes. The text of his speech to the committee appeared in 
The Mountain Eagle and was accompanied by pictures of inadequate efforts at reclaiming the 
strip-mined land. Comparing the strip-mined areas with bombed out areas he had seen in Italy 
during World War II, Caudill called for stiffer regulation of strip mining and said "the nation 
cannot leave reclamation to the industry's discretion. If reclamation cannot be assured, stripping 
should not be permitted."  He told the committee that problems with land management had led to 
a state of exploitation and could possibly threaten the nation as much as the racial crisis that had 
erupted in cites all over the country.  
 Caudill told the Committee that he "marveled that a democratic society could care so 
little about its future as to calmly destroy the land its descendants will inherit and inhabit," and 
he referred to the people of the strip-mined regions as a "once sturdy people -- a people who 
even today sink with a dying land."  He called poverty, and the bitterness and frustration that 
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sprang from poverty one of the two great crises to afflict America. The other was he affliction of 
the land, with tumble down structures, "sewn with junk and trash and drained by filthy streams."  
 Let us frankly recognize that the earth is just as important as the people who inhabit it 
 and that the right to be free is matched by a responsibility to preserve freedom's land. 
 Liberty in a wasteland is meaningless. 
 He referred to 3,187,00 acres of land that had been strip mined in some form or another, 
"turned upside down by miners," and called the need for remedial action urgent and added that 
the nation could not afford to leave reclamation to industry in its greed, and interminable lust for 
mineral wealth. He called for strict government supervised reclamation and stated that 
governments in England, Germany, and Czechoslovakia had all managed total reclamation. 
Caudill called the surface mining of coal the most dangerous of all, partly because it was mined 
in areas with heavy rainfall near population centers, and claimed that due to strip mining of coal, 
"large parts of Southern Appalachia are threatened with extinction." He went on to express his 
gratitude to every senator who had sponsored strip mining legislation, and then proposed his own 
goals to remedy the situation.60  He laid out three goals that would help to manage the disaster. 
The goals Caudill suggested to the Senate would have ended strip mining in the mountains of 
Central Appalachia.  
 First, Caudill called for legislation to outlaw strip mining in areas such as the southern 
Appalachian Region, where the "slopes are so steep and the rainfall so great that reclamation and 
restoration of the land to its former utility is impractical." Then, he said strip mining should only 
be allowed where "total reclamation of the land can be carried out promptly and effectively." 
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Finally, he called for the creation of a massive program to purchase, reclaim, and re-vegetate 
lands that had already been stripped.61   
 In July, 1968 Judge Edward Hill of the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that strip mining 
under the broad form deed was oppressive and unjustly severe, in the case of Martin V. 
Kentucky Oaks Mining Company. Hill's ruling cited the ruling in Parrish V. Newberry, KY 
279S.W. 2D229, 223 and stated that "as a fundamental and supreme rule of construction of 
contracts, the intention of the parties governs," and went on to write that strip mining had been 
unknown when the first broad form deeds were crafted, although some early operators had used 
picks, shovels, and slip scrapers drawn by mules to mine channel coal near Cumberland Lake 
around 1914. "I contend that inasmuch as the parties to the "broad form" deeds never 
contemplated the use of the then unknown method of strip mining and never dreamed of the 
cataclysmic destruction of the surface, the grantee and his successor in title have no right to 
remove the coal by striping methods." He also said that if the rules were modified to allow for 
stripping, the grantee should be "answerable in damages to the surface owners for just 
compensation." Hill's ruling was overturned later that year in a cross appeal of Martin V 
Kentucky Oak. In his dissenting opinion on the decision overturning his original ruling, Hill 
wrote that no other state had so greatly expanded the rights of the grantee under the broad form 
deed as Kentucky.62   
 Bethlehem Steel was undeterred by either Caudill or Judge Hill and announced in June 
1969 that it intended to launch a major strip mining operation in Letcher County within the next 
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few weeks. In an interview with The Mountain Eagle, Dave Zegeer said that the mining would 
involve auger mining but not stripping and that he considered reclamation to be fully controllable 
despite the steep grade of the slope that was intended for mining. He said the mining was 
necessary to maintain employment for Beth-Elkhorn employees because the reserves at Beth-
Elkhorn's Number 27 deep mine were about exhausted. At that time, Mine 27 employed 180 men 
and produced about 580,000 tons of Hazard #4 coal per year, although Mine 27 had been a 
leader in producing Elkhorn Number 3 metallurgical coal before it was mined out. The Hazard 
#4 was fine for steam coal and sold well, according to Zegeer. The coal from Mine 27 was 
processed at the Jenkins preparation plant and Zegeer said the decision to auger the three seams 
in question was based on keeping the 35 men who worked at the plant employed. The 
underground miners would either be absorbed by other company operations already in operation, 
or move to newly opened Mine 26 in Pike County, which was already mining coal even though 
the mine's ultra-modern preparation plant was still being developed at the time. The company 
would also timber more than 1,000 acres of land to prepare the site, which Zegeer said should 
yield some 7,000,000 tons of coal. He said the choice had been to either let the Jenkins plant 
close or to continue by using the surface mined coal, and since Beth-Elkhorn was "by far the 
largest employer in Jenkins," the decision had been to mine.63 
 Zegeer also told The Mountain Eagle that a contractor would mine the coal. However, at 
the time of the interview, no contractor had been chosen, but he acknowledged that over 25 had 
already approached Beth-Elkhorn about doing the work, and that Beth-Elkhorn was accepting 
bids on the timbering. Some of the wood would be used by Beth-Elkhorn for roof support and 
the rest would be finished and shipped to buyers outside the county, but it would be used.  In 
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those days, timber was very often stacked and burned or covered over during reclamation, which 
later created sink holes as the wood decomposed. Zegeer declined to tell the paper how bidding 
would be handled, but the article stated that other coal operators had suggested that Beth-Elkhorn 
would pay about $4.00 per ton and sell it as processed coal for $6.00 a ton in the metallurgical 
market. At that time, Beth-Elkhorn mostly mined metallurgical coal including the Elkhorn seams 
which were among the best in the world for coking.64 
 In the same edition, Tom Bethell wrote an article suggesting that Zegeer already expected 
to have problems with anti-strip mine groups. Bethell wrote that the possible closing of the 
Jenkins preparation plant was but one of several problems Zegeer had faced that were solved by 
the decision to initiate contract auger mining operations, but he had other problems as well. If 
Beth-Elkhorn allowed the Jenkins operations to close, then Mine 22 at Hendrix would be the sole 
remaining operation in Letcher County. Beth-Elkhorn was the county's largest and most 
prominent corporate citizen, employing 833 men and paying 26 percent of all the taxes received 
in the county. It was also the last unionized deep mining operation in Letcher County and paid 
over $1 million annually to the United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement Fund.  Zegeer had 
come to Letcher County in 1945 to work as a rodman on a survey crew for Consolidation Coal 
Company and had raised his family in Jenkins. It had been his decision to go after the company's 
coal with augers once it became apparent it could not be reached by deep mining.65 
 "And that decision will put horns on Zegeer's head as far as conservationists are 
concerned," Zegeer told Bethell. But he suggested that the decision had been made more with an 
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eye to Beth-Elkhorn's future in Letcher County than for profit, since the greatest amount of the 
company's coal was already being mined in Pike County and the auger mining would keep the 
plant operating for at least 10 more years.66 
 Neither article suggested that The Mountain Eagle had a particularly adversarial 
relationship with either Zegeer or Beth-Elkhorn, but that changed very quickly once auger 
mining operations in the Millstone area of Letcher County began. While Beth-Elkhorn was 
scrupulous in following safety and other mining laws at its own operations, the same could not 
be said about their contractors, and Millstone very soon became what Gish referred to as an 
environmental disaster area. An editorial in The Mountain Eagle the week after the Zegeer 
interview, Gish predicted that only Beth-Elkhorn would actually benefit from the auger 
operations, saying that the 34 new jobs on the auger mine were short term and would in no way 
compensate for the 180 plus men who would be put out of work when Mine 27 closed.  The 
landowners would receive a token royalty for land that would be ravaged, the county would see 
its tax base erode as the coal was removed, and although the UMW welfare and Retirement Fund 
would see its coffers expand, the fund already had a surplus of $180 million and the union faced 
declining membership, which meant there would be fewer retirees to serve in the future.67 
 In August Bethlehem Steel's corporate offices announced that they would proceed with 
strip mining in the Millstone area as well as opening two new underground mining operations, 
one in Letcher County and another in Pike County. E.P. Leach, Bethlehem's Vice President in 
charge of mining, made the announcement and said the new operations would increase Beth-
Elkhorn's coal production by approximately 50 percent and add several hundred new jobs to the 
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payroll. The coal would be used for producing coke for new steel making facilities at Burns 
Harbor Indiana and to replace coal production from mines in Kentucky and West Virginia that 
were close to being worked out, including Mine 27 in Jenkins. Leach also announced that Beth-
Elkhorn would soon announce the contractor who would strip the three seams in Millstone and   
said that reclamation would be done in conformity with Kentucky law, which he said was 
considered to be a model reclamation law. He added that even before the law was passed, "the 
Elkhorn Division consistently practiced good reclamation on its mining properties and was 
commended by the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources on two occasions in 1965."68 
 Later in the year, the National Audubon Society called on Bethlehem Steel to "reconsider 
its plans to strip mine large portions of Eastern Kentucky," in a letter written by Audubon 
Society President Elvis Stahr to S.S. Cort, President of Bethlehem Steel. Stahr wrote that because 
the terrain was so steep, "the results can be nothing but catastrophic for the land and every plant 
and creature on it." The Audubon Society also opposed Bethlehem's plan to clear cut the 
proposed strip mine area as well, saying "This land lies in the heart of the earth's oldest 
hardwood forest regions, the eastern mixed mesophytic forest, which botanists say has persisted 
in its present state for millions of years."69 
 By this time, the relatively convivial relationship between the newspaper and Bethlehem 
Steel had begun to deteriorate and a week after the Audubon article appeared, three unidentified 
men confronted Mountain Eagle photographer Jean Martin, who was on assignment to 
photograph the Millstone strip mine, and seized her film and threatened her with death if she 
took any more pictures of the mine. After Tom Gish sent a telegram of protest to S.S. Cort, Cort 
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called the newspaper office and said he "could not believe that any Bethlehem employees were 
involved in the incident," and that Mountain Eagle photographers were welcome at any of their 
operations, anywhere at any time, adding that Bethlehem had nothing to hide. Gish had labeled 
the incident "terrorism" in his telegram and called on Cort to halt all Bethlehem's strip mining 
operations throughout eastern Kentucky. 70 
 In November, an order directing Beth-Elkhorn to halt mining until four violations were 
taken care of shut the Millstone operation down temporarily. The violations included failure to 
construct silt basins, allowing debris out of the permit area, stripping within 100 feet of a stream, 
and creating a wider "strip bench" than was allowed due to the grade of the slope. The order was 
delivered by Kentucky State Reclamation Director Elmore Grimm, who said that two or three 
days of concentrated effort by the contractor, Tackett and Manning Coal, should get the problem 
cleaned up to the state's satisfaction. At the same time, Kentucky River Mining, which was 
mining on Beth-Elkhorn land near Jenkins, received a notice of non-compliance because the 
overburden from their mine was going further down the slope than the permit allowed, and no 
ditch or silt basins had been installed. The article reporting the shutdown stated that pressure was 
building for a "state law which would outlaw strip mining in Eastern Kentucky totally, as well as 
for new state legislation bringing tougher controls."71   
 Stripping resumed quickly at Millstone after less than a week and State Reclamation 
Director Grim disclosed that he had given Bethlehem permission to expand the operation by 
stripping an additional 40 acres on Millstone Creek. The permit covered the two top seams and 
"is expected to include the removal of the mountaintops." At the same time Bethlehem purchased 
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full page ads in The Courier Journal, The Mountain Eagle, and "possibly other papers, to boast 
that the firm does do reclamation." The ad invited selected newsmen and editors to tour the 
operation on November 20 as part of a campaign to convince the public that Bethlehem "does no 
harm." Grim not only backed away from his crackdown on strip mining operations in eastern 
Kentucky, he also reversed the planned closure of Pittsburg and Midway Coal Company's strip 
mining operation in western Kentucky, later made famous in the John Prine song, "Paradise."72 
 A November 1969 editorial in The Mountain Eagle had reported on the closure of the 
Millstone operation and called the Bethlehem mines the "new battlefield, describing the 
Millstone operation as a "threat to the basic way of life in Letcher County." It also tied in strip 
mining with propaganda efforts made by Bethlehem to convince eastern Kentuckians that the 
company was helping to alleviate poverty by "providing work for some starving strip miners," 
which Gish called "a concern that comes more than a little late in the war on poverty, and a 
concern that was put into effect, apparently only after Bethlehem decided that there was money 
to be made fighting poverty by strip mining back in the hills."73 
 It soon became clear to Bethlehem Steel that The Mountain Eagle could not be ignored. 
Whether it was the close relationship between the Gishes and editors and reporters at The 
Courier Journal, The New York Times and other newspapers with a state wide and national 
readership, The Mountain Eagle had an editorial presence that reached well beyond Letcher 
County. It had been the newspaper of record on poverty issues in eastern Kentucky for many 
national legislators during the War on Poverty, but many reporters working with much larger 
papers had used The Mountain Eagle office as a base of operations whenever they visited 
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Letcher County. The Gishes both were also widely admired and respected in the newspaper 
industry for their integrity and the quality of the reporting and editorial writing. Bethlehem began 
to encourage its supporters to write letters to the editor in The Mountain Eagle and other papers.  
 In one of several letters that followed the November article, Sarah Casey, a former Texan 
who lived at Millstone, criticized Harry Caudill and The Mountain Eagle for their criticism of 
strip mining and for tying in stripping and water pollution, writing that in Texas, it was not 
unusual for streams to dry up in the summer. She also criticized anti-poverty efforts because they 
were not working with middle class organizations in the county. Her chief complaint was that the 
newspaper's criticism was directed toward Beth-Elkhorn, one of the largest employers in the 
county. She questioned the earlier article concerning the seizure of a roll of film of Millstone 
Strip Mining taken by Mountain Eagle photographer Jean Martin and the threats made to Martin. 
The film had been returned later and three of the pictures were published in The Mountain Eagle 
as well as The Courier Journal. "How can film that has been seized be printed in a paper? How 
much of the publicity is really true?"74  
 There was a good deal of support for the coal industry throughout eastern Kentucky and 
many of the supporters wrongly assumed that because the newspaper opposed strip mining, it 
represented an anti-coal outlook. However, since the Gishes took over, The Mountain Eagle had 
always supported underground mining and along with Harry Caudill, Tom Gish consistently 
called for building the eastern Kentucky economy around the coal industry. Gish was also 
realistic enough to understand that strict regulation of strip mining was a much more attainable 
goal than demanding that it be abolished altogether. None of this meant much to industry 
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supporters, and letters came in regularly that supported strip mining and called for the paper to 
get on board. Residents of Jenkins were frequent critics of the newspaper's editorial policy on 
strip mining, which is understandable, given that Jenkins was Bethlehem Steel's model town and 
Dunham, where the plant Zegeer had said the Millstone operation would save, was part of 
Jenkins. But the coal industry was strong everywhere in the region and letters came in from all 
parts of Letcher County and from out of state as well.  
 Another letter supporting Beth-Elkhorn and strip mining came from Phillip "Pee Wee" 
Back, a Letcher County transplant living in Seymour Indiana. Back also pointed to the 
employment issue and discounted water pollution on the account that streams and rivers in 
Letcher County and most of eastern Kentucky were already full of "Clorox bottles, beer cans, 
dead dogs, car bodies, and household trash." He also criticized the opposition to the Kingdom 
Come Dam (which was never built) and suggested that strip mining should be allowed to 
continue until the coal was mined out, and then the state should wait a year until the mud settled 
and just go ahead and "build the Kingdom Dam, call me and Jean Martin so she can take my 
picture as I pick the Clorox bottles off the lake."75 
 Family members of Beth-Elkhorn employees also responded to The Mountain Eagle with 
letters. Mrs. C.B. (Mary Jo) Wolfe (for whom the new Jenkins branch of Letcher County Public 
Libraries is named), delivered a sarcastic response to an Eagle article concerning surface miming 
by questioning the accuracy of the paper's news and headlines.  (Mrs. Wolfe's husband was a 
salaried employee of Beth-Elkhorn) "You are using the paper to beat the drums for another 
'cause.' Stop surface mining. As in the past, your headlines and slanted information does not give 
                                                 
75 Phillip "Pee Wee" Back, Letters to the Editor, The Mountain Eagle, December 25, 1969, 2. 
290 
 
an accurate account. The motto of The Mountain Eagle is, "It Screams. Let me add, so does a 
child having a temper tantrum."76 
 Late in 1969, Luther Johnson of Blackey filed a lawsuit asking federal courts to put a halt 
to strip mining throughout Letcher County. Johnson's suit asked the court for $2.1 million and a 
halt to all strip mining in Letcher County through a permanent injunction "enjoining the 
defendants from continuing strip and auger operations within the watershed wherein Millstone 
Creek and the North Fork of the Kentucky River is located."  The Frankfort law firm of Hughes, 
Clark, Burk, and Zeigler acted on Johnson's behalf and the approach taken by Johnson and his 
attorneys was innovative, described in the article as raising basic questions that "have not been 
tested in the courts." Rather than focusing on landowner’s rights against a broad form deed, the 
Johnson suit made claims of overall environmental degradation and permanent damage to the 
watershed. It also alleged that Bethlehem Steel was in violation of state law because spoil was 
going directly into streams.77 
 Johnson's lawsuit was dismissed the following year on technical grounds by the United 
States District Court for Eastern Kentucky. Ruling on behalf of Bethlehem Steel, Judge Bernard 
T. Moynahan stated that the class action suit, filed on behalf of the residents along Millstone 
Creek, was invalid because Beth-Elkhorn's principal place of business was Kentucky and there 
was "insufficient diversity of citizenship among the parties to support federal jurisdiction." One 
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of Johnson's attorneys, David Schneider, was quoted as saying that even though the suit was 
dismissed, it was a victory of sorts because strip mining near Johnson's land had been stopped.78 
 As the battle intensified, other news organizations became involved. In an article in The 
New Yorker, by Calvin Trillin, The Mountain Eagle was described as "one of the few county 
weeklies in the United States that might print anything that might cause discomfort to anyone 
with any economic power," and said that Bethlehem Steel might have been better served to 
locate its operation as far away from Whitesburg as possible. It also mentioned an article in The 
Courier Journal concerning the short period of closure for the Millstone site by the Kentucky 
Division of Reclamation in 1969, alleging that the state's behavior led to "raised suspicions of 
political interference."79  
 Trillin referenced earlier opposition to strip mining, including the Jink Ray incident and 
the subsequent KUAC hearings in Pikeville, and quoted Dave Zegeer as saying that even if the 
mining damage proved to be irreparable, "You can't walk away from 10 million tons." He also 
described Bethlehem's efforts at reclamation in Marshall's Branch, the company's  first strip mine 
site and quoted Harry Caudill saying, "Dave (Zegeer) told me the bench would be good for cattle 
grazing and I told him when Bethlehem finished stripping all that land, they will have created the 
longest, narrowest cow pasture in the history of agriculture -- fifty feet wide and five thousand 
miles long.” Trillin also mentioned Zegeer's enthusiasm for growing blackberries on the land, 
which would then be "put up" by women living near Marshall's branch in jelly jars dispensed by 
the Jenkins Kiwanis Club. The jam would then be purchased for a fair market price and 
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distributed for sale in state parks, with labels saying where it had come from. He quoted Zegeer 
as saying that the blackberry project was, "Not to fight back exactly, but just to show what 
people can do."  Zegeer had said the 10 million tons could not be reached by deep mining and 
that Bethlehem Steel had paid good money for the mineral rights to the land and should be 
allowed to recover it. In an aside, Trillin wrote, "It is common in the coal industry to talk about 
'recovering' coal, as if the mountain snatched the coal away from Bethlehem somewhere in the 
past." He wrote that the strip mining battle had become more about the environmental damage 
posed by strip mining and less about people, as mining companies had begun to avoid contested 
plots of land such as Jink Ray's, and finished the article by quoting Harry Caudill, "People, we've 
already fought this on the people issue, and nobody cared. They said, 'They're just a bunch of 
paupers -- let it go.' Nobody cares about people in this country. We're better off talking about the 
environment."80 
 Early in 1970, The Congress for Appalachian Development entered the strip mining 
discussions when Executive Director Gordon Ebersole, asked the Federal Power Commission for 
hearings in the New River Basin to study the area before water rights were to be deeded to the 
Appalachian Power Company in Virginia, West, Virginia, and North Carolina. Ebersole wrote 
that rights to the area had been obtained by crafty buyers and the "infamous broad form deed," 
which had robbed the people of the region of their oil, gas, and coal deposits, often as the land 
owners used an "X" as their mark because they couldn't read and write, and were also without 
council. Ebersole told the FPC that the purpose of the Congress of Appalachian Development 
was to "restore self-government in the Appalachian Mountains in order to wisely conserve and 
develop the human and natural resources of the region for the benefit of the people residing 
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therein." He added that it would be difficult to change the attitudes of the Appalachian Power 
Company, which saw the acquisition of rights as a "real Bonanza," and that their stockholders 
will be pleased when "they bring home the scalp of the New River neatly packaged." While 
Ebersole expressed his desire to make the New River Basin a habitation of which mankind 
would be proud, he also asked the FPC to "make their mark" on the broad form deed.81    
 Not every "Letter to the Editor" The Eagle received supported strip mining. One poignant 
example came in a letter from Petty Officer First Class James W. Haynes, stationed aboard the 
U.S.S. Coral Sea (deployed off the coast of Vietnam between 1964 and 1973), who questioned 
why he should even come home when all he saw of the "super road" he had been told about in 
eastern Kentucky was ruination? "What is so super abut a road that is covered with mud and coal 
and rock that has been pushed off the mountaintop." Haynes wrote that while eastern Kentucky 
was supposed to be one of the richest places in the world in terms of natural resources, the riches 
weren't going to the landowner. "Who gets all the riches? Not the poor land owner, who has no 
say over what happens to his land when Mr. Money Bags decides to strip. The landowner is the 
one who loses everything and receives nothing."  Haynes referred to a radio announcer he had 
heard on his recent visit who had told his listeners that if they had never seen a strip mine, they 
would probably be surprised by the high quality of the reclamation done by the mining 
companies, where ponds, homes, and house sites sat on the reclaimed land that had been sewn 
into grass. Haynes wrote that the reality was far from the announcer's description and that either 
this announcer was from a different area, had never been to eastern Kentucky, "or he was blind." 
He also referred to the lake being built on Carr Creek in Knott county (the present site of Carr 
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Fork Lake), where "Mr. Money Bags just recently augured the coal seam most of the way around 
the dam. site. This should help to add mud to the mud hole." He added that as a member of the 
armed services, he couldn't fully express himself, but compared the terrain in eastern Kentucky 
to the terrain he had seen in Vietnam, after two decades of fighting there.82  
 Another letter, from R.T. Maney of Erie Pennsylvania, wrote to praise the courage of 
Mrs. Paul Ashley and Mrs. Bessie Smith who had joined to stop coal trucks on their road in 
1971. "I would like to commend the two ladies who stopped the trucks for a day. That took a lot 
of courage." He went on to write that he failed to understand why the "ones who protest, such as 
these two ladies" were subject to be arrested while the truckers who hauled overweight and the 
strip mine operators were untouched by the law.83 In 1972, Smith and Ashley joined with 19 
other Knott County women to block bulldozers from stripping Clear Creek, in Knott County. 
County officials later terminated the food stamps Smith received for her and her children because 
of her activism and membership in the Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People.84 
 Young reporters continued to join The Eagle in exposing the damage that was being done 
in Millstone, and in a photo essay that documented the destruction of Millstone by Bethlehem 
Steel and its contractors, Mike Clark called Kentucky's laws regulating strip mining "failed," and 
wrote that a new reaction against strip mining was coming from "the man on the street, who 
knew a bad thing when it stared him in the face." Strip mining was expanding in its scope and 
scale and the present law had done little to halt the its advance, despite loud howls of pain from 
the coal industry. Clark wrote that Millstone's fate might easily become the fate of other 
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communities and that "Millstone Creek has been destroyed by one company, which apparently 
feels no social responsibility for the area and its people."85  
 Some industry sources complained that the younger writers showed the increasing 
radicalization of the newspaper, but a close look at Eagle editorials (which were mostly written 
by Tom Gish, unless otherwise noted) and articles from the period concerning Bethlehem's 
embrace of strip mining would reveal that few of the young writers were substantially more 
radical in their opposition to strip mining than Tom Gish. Gish was outraged at the destruction 
being wreaked on his county and the damage being done to people's homes, so the idea that these 
young idealists were somehow taking the paper to the left was unlikely. As Tom Bethell told 
Gish when the Appalachian Volunteers were named as leading the opposition to strip mining, it 
was well known that The Mountain Eagle had taken that position for several years before the 
AVs came to the county. However, the young writers were welcomed to the paper, and it led 
many who opposed The Mountain Eagle's stance on strip mining to complain that the paper had 
brought in radicals and Communists to oppose the coal industry. It also further deepened the 
isolation the Gishes experienced from the community at large and drove them further to 
companionship with people who shared their ideals.  
 Stripping by Bethlehem Steel was a terrible blow for local anti-strip mine forces. 
Bethlehem Steel was the second largest steel manufacturer in the world and Beth-Elkhorn was 
the county's largest and most powerful coal company and employed nearly 1,000 people, so 
anything that was associated with "The Company" was received with a certain degree of 
legitimacy. Tom Gish was well aware of this fact and he also knew that even though Bethlehem 
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was stripping through third parties, the company's power and reputation placed the contractors 
under the Bethlehem umbrella, helping them to achieve better credit arrangements and better 
relations with state regulating agencies. And then there was Dave Zegeer, who was well liked 
and respected in industry circles throughout the state. He was an articulate and passionate 
spokesman for coal and had excellent relations with elected officials on both sides of the aisle, in 
the state and in Washington. He had a long reach and many connections, and not long after he 
retired from Beth-Elkhorn, Zegeer was appointed to serve as Undersecretary of Labor and 
Director of the Miner's Safety and Health Administration under President Ronald Reagan.  
 Accepting the legislative process as  the best way to address strip mining exacted a toll on 
efforts to end it, and  "very soon after  proponents of a ban started to focus on passing a federal 
law, however, the movement began to weaken and dissipate in the face of numerous challenges 
to its efficacy."86 As the abolition of strip mining became less central and regulation took center 
stage, the regulatory bills that were introduced in congress became weaker, and those 
congressmen who had initially opposed regulation became more aggressive in their opposition. 
The War on Poverty in Appalachia had ceased in large measure by this time, and the AVs and 
VISTAs were no longer active. Coal operators also began to flex their muscles in the federal 
government, just as they had in state governments earlier. The UMW was weakened by the 
ongoing division in their ranks over short term gains in job creation associated with strip mining 
against long term environmental damage, and national environmental leaders began to accept 
industry rhetoric as "realistic."87 The Environmental Policy Center and the Sierra Club began to 
work to convince Appalachian strip mining opponents to add their influence to passing 
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regulation rather than abolishing strip mining. As industry leaders began to accept the 
inevitability of legislation that would regulate strip mining, they also threw their weight against 
any proposals to eliminate it. But in 1972, following his election as UMW President Arnold 
Miller took a stronger approach when he presented a statement to a Senate committee that 
favored strong regulation and "selective abolition."88 Miller's proposal reflected division within 
the union over strip mining, and he asked that surface mining only be allowed as a last resort, 
when it was the only way to get the coal out of the ground. However, he also argued that limiting 
surface mining would protect displaced workers and asked only that strip-mined land be 
restored.89 
 Discussions about strip mining became common in the state legislature, but proposals to 
ban the practice were quickly modified or dropped all together in favor of legislation to apply 
new regulations to existing laws. National legislators took up the debate as well and in 1971, the 
United States Senate began debating on a federal law to regulate strip mining. Late in 1971, The 
Eagle carried a report on hearings held in Washington when former Eagle reporter, James 
Branscome, who by then headed a statewide conservation group called Save Our Kentucky, 
testified before both House and Senate committees in an effort to promote federal legislation to 
ban or regulate stripping. The hearings were in response to a bill proposed by West Virginia 
Congressman Ken Hechler to abolish strip mining all together and Branscome was called on to 
discuss charges he had leveled in a letter in which he charged that House Subcommittee on 
Mines and Mining Chairman Ed Edmondson (D) of Oklahoma had sought to "nullify the strip 
mining opposition's voice by heavy handed bureaucratic procedures and unfair questioning of 
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strip mining opponents." In the letter, Branscome also questioned why witnesses like strip mine 
opponent Joe Begley of Blackey (in Letcher County) had not been given a firm date to appear 
before the committee.90 
  One week after Branscome and Gibson addressed the subcommittee, the Interim 
Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources approved legislative revisions to the 1966 
Kentucky law regulating strip mining, including a request that a separate department be 
established to protect the environment from pollution. The legislation was placed in two separate 
bills, each to be re-filed for the 1972 General Assembly Session. The proposed surface mining 
bill would redefine strip mining to conform with the interstate mining compact and extend 
regulation to mining clay, fluorspar, and limestone, as well as coal. It would also extend the 
state's authority over preparation and cleaning plants using strip mined coal, and regulate the 
timber and logging industry. The bill also proposed increases in permit fees and bonds. However, 
the chairman of the subcommittee, Billy Paxton, a Democrat from Central City in the Western 
Kentucky Coalfields, said the panel felt that Kentucky's strip mine law was sound and the 
committee specifically stated that "Strip mining is most important to the state's economy." Tom 
Harris, a Worthville, Kentucky Democrat who chaired the Committee on Agriculture and Natural 
Resource, reinforced the move toward regulation rather than banning strip mining by saying that 
"if the present law is enforced, it should solve most of the problems."91 
 In December, Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper joined with Tennessee Senator 
Howard Baker in calling for interim federal control of strip mining until uniform state 
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regulations and procedures could be established. Cooper called for a joint federal/state 
commission to control strip mining, but said that quick federal action would be necessary before 
it got "completely out of control." Cooper also expressed his belief that it was in the best interest 
of coal mining companies to have strip mining regulated a soon as possible because, "unless 
immediate action is taken to effectively regulate strip mining, those who desire to operate surface 
mines will certainly face the prospect of being prohibited from operation." Baker called strip 
mining a "national disaster" and said the need was immediate for relief from the practice, and 
that the enforcement of reclamation laws was very important. A group including Letcher County 
residents Joe Begley, Harry Caudill, and Warren Wright, along with Bessie Smith of the 
Appalachian Group to Save the Land and People, Jim Branscome, and naturalist Ray Harm, sent 
a letter to the Kentucky congressional delegation warning them that the effort may "the last 
opportunity to plea for the survival of our mountains and our people." Begley and Caudill also 
complained that they had not been notified about recent hearings on strip mine regulation and 
said they had missed their chance to testify.92 
 As legislation to regulate strip mining was crafted on both the state and federal level, it 
became apparent that the practice was not going to be legislated out of existence. Instead of 
being abolished, strip mining became institutionalized by the state and federal laws that had been 
passed to "control" it. When the U.S. House of Representatives began their debate, stricter 
regulations were proposed than those passed by the Kentucky legislature, but the efforts to 
restrain strip mining turned into a nightmare for eastern Kentucky. When Congress called for the 
elimination of high walls and "islands" under the new law, it meant the land would have to be 
leveled. This opened the door to large scale mountain top removal mining and Tom Gish wrote 
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that what had seemed to be a good piece of legislation to prohibit the dumping of overburden 
down the side of the mountains and to require mountains to be returned to their natural contour 
without a high wall, had been subject to a last-minute amendment that also allowed for the 
removal of the mountaintop, if the operator could demonstrate that the land would be left in a 
"socially more acceptable condition."  He quoted Harry Caudill's statement on the matter. 
 Everybody knows that level land is socially more acceptable than mountain land. They'll 
 take the top off every mountain around here.  They will go on and on until everything has 
 been leveled into a mass of boulders and mud and gravel that won't support a single thing 
 for the next thousand  years. You won't be able to tell Eastern Kentucky and West 
 Virginia from those pictures of the moon we've been seeing in recent years.93 
 Caudill was also prescient in his prediction that the coal companies would use the 
material removed from the mountain top to fill in the next hollow so they could get at the coal 
seam by seam, using each successive layer to fill another hollow. In modern strip mining terms 
this is referred to as hollow fill and has been responsible not only for the removal of more than 
500 mountaintops, but for the destruction of thousands of miles of streams as well. Politicians, 
land developers, and coal company executives took up the cry for flat land and any idea of 
developing land to the contour of the hillsides was dropped in favor of the long-held desire for 
level ground. 
  The Mountain Eagle pointed to mountaintop removal that had been done under TVA 
contracts in Breathitt County by Falcon Coal for the past several years, and stated that Breathitt 
County was well on its way to becoming a total wasteland. The newfound ability to totally 
remove the mountaintop to get at all the coal would "beyond doubt convince any and all strippers 
that this was the best of all possible worlds." The amendment had been attached by West 
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Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph "for the special benefit of Cannelton Coal Company," and 
Gish mentioned Randolph's "perfect record of putting the interests of coal operators ahead of the 
interests of the people of West Virginia." He expressed his hope that the bill produced by the 
House of Representatives would feature a better alternative and that perhaps Senator Randolph 
could be "hogtied" during the debate over the conference version of the legislation. Barring that, 
he wrote, maybe President Nixon would veto the bill in order to save the land from being 
destroyed by legislation that had been originally drafted to save it.94 
 The Mountain Eagle's coverage of the senate bill reflected Gish's realization that there 
would be no salvation for the mountains of Central Appalachia, and that the possibility strip 
mining would be banned or even regulated in a way that would prevent the worst practices of the 
coal operators was now unlikely. When the bills from both houses of Congress went into 
committee, staffers from both bodies predicted a tough bill that would make it difficult to mine 
on steep slopes, but both bills also allowed for mountaintop removal. The Senate Bill exempted 
mountaintop removal mining from the requirement to re-grade strip mined land to the original 
contour and the House bill introduced Jennings' language to allow for expanded mountaintop 
mining, by providing an exemption from returning the land to its original contour by stating that 
"variances can be given for industrial, commercial, residential, agricultural, or recreational post 
mining uses."95 
 As the struggle to reconcile the differing versions of strip mine regulation bills played out 
between the House and Senate for most of 1974, the debate was heavily influenced by the OPEC 
Oil embargo. When the Middle Eastern oil producing countries began to use oil as a weapon 
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against the western nations to retaliate for U.S. support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 
1973, gas lines and shortages of heating oil created panic in the United States. The coal industry 
presented its product as the logical solution to the energy crisis, with calls for turning coal into 
liquid fuel and for coal gasification. Legislators were hesitant to be seen as doing anything that 
might prolong or deepen the energy crisis, and President Gerald Ford refused to take any action 
that would limit coal production. By the end of 1974, the United States was moving toward a 
more heavily coal based energy policy, and when the House and Senate finally presented a strip 
mine regulation bill late in the congressional session, Ford allowed it to die through a pocket 
veto.  At the same time, the flaws in the bill had become apparent, and nothing was so glaring as 
the introduction of federally approved mountaintop removal mining. Although MTR was already 
taking place in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia, it was limited and was being practiced as 
a way that was designed to "improve” the economic picture by creating flat land for industrial 
sites. The congressional version greatly broadened the scope of mountaintop removal and The 
Mountain Eagle, along with Harry Caudill and others, called attention to its flaws and railed 
against the inclusion of MTR, but the legislation was unchanged.  
 When a second strip mine bill came out of committee and was presented to Ford, he 
vetoed it and the veto was sustained by a divided congress. It became apparent that as long as 
Ford held the veto pen, he would strike down any bill that placed any real regulation on strip 
mining. This became further evident when Ford presented his own bill, which was so mild it was 
considered dead on arrival. Adding to Ford's opposition, a coalition of coal state congressmen 
continued to introduce language that would not only permit mountaintop removal, but weaken 
other important provisions in the legislation including the removal of highwalls. Although both 
303 
 
of Kentucky's senators, Wendell Ford and Walter "Dee" Huddleston initially voted for the 
legislation that was re-introduced by the Senate in March, several of Kentucky's Representatives 
were pro strip mining and deeply allied with the state's coal industry. Both Tim Lee Carter (R-
5th) and Carroll Hubbard (D-1st) switched votes and opposed the final version of the combined 
House/Senate Bill. In April, Hubbard promised strip mine operators, workers and truckers who 
protested the bill that he would support their cause by switching his vote and Carter switched as 
well. Representative Marion Gene Snyder (R-4th) opposed both the House bill and the final bill 
when it came out of committee, and although it was passed by the joint committee, Ford again 
vetoed the legislation.96  
 Between 1970 and 1978, strip mines outproduced underground mines in Kentucky by a 
total of 788,518,275 million tons in strip mine production to 710,328,566.97 It had become 
obvious that while federal regulation of strip mining would probably become law, it would not 
be enough to stop the practice and would probably usher in an era of mountaintop mining that 
would dwarf the damage caused by auger mining and pit striping. Putting the protection of the 
people and mountains of eastern Kentucky in the hands of federal legislators had been a vain 
hope, but one other avenue was still open, although it was already losing ground in court 
decisions and had been struck down in several previous attempts. In early 1975, an editorial 
appeared in The Mountain Eagle calling for people to write their legislators in an effort to kill the 
broad form deed. In grudging acceptance that legislation had not been effective, it called for "an 
outright ban on Appalachian strip mining without written consent from the surface owner." The 
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editorial did not offer much hope for a result, but it called other legislative efforts to control strip 
mining ineffectual and an attempt by congress to defraud the American people by pretending to 
control strip mining.98 
 Following the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, proponents of federal strip mine 
regulation felt certain that new legislation would be signed into law early in the Carter 
Administration. However, their hopes were derailed when a bill introduced by Morris Udall, (D 
Utah) that was very similar to the one that had been killed by Gerald Ford's veto the previous 
year, was held up by further controversy. An unnamed member of the House Interior Committee 
told reporters that while industry representatives continued to maintain that state regulation was 
adequate, the holdup came from environmental lobbyists, "Swarming all over the Hill in an 
intensive lobbying campaign," who sought "an orderly phase out of strip mining." The 
environmentalists referred to Udall's bill as a watered-down version of two previous bills that 
had been vetoed by Ford and sought stronger legislation. One of Udall's aides told reporters, 
""Congressmen have to face realities. Attempts to prohibit strip mining have never gotten far in 
the House."99  
 Just two weeks later, Udall and Interior Secretary Cecil Andros accompanied Kentucky 
Governor Julian Carroll and Kentucky "environmental chief" Robert Bell on a helicopter tour of 
Kentucky mines in which Bell "successfully lobbied for mountaintop removal, but failed to 
convince Andros and Udall that naked highwalls should be allowed on reclaimed strip mines." 
Andros told reporters the President favored the more moderate approach to regulating strip 
mining that was being discussed by the House Interior Committee, which was designed to reduce 
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the administrative burden on small operators. Carroll said he favored mountaintop removal 
because the mountains needed all the flat land they could get and the process would create land 
that could be used in the future. Udall said he thought the bill would allow the practice. "We just 
ask that they have a good usable piece of land when they're done." Both Udall and Andros 
remained adamant in opposing large highwalls on reclaimed strip mines. The tour group later 
met with coal operator L.D. Gorman in Hazard.100 
 Severe flooding hit the mountains of eastern Kentucky in April 1977, that left much of 
Pike County under water and isolated, with buildings in downtown Pikeville flooded well into 
the second story and house trailers over 60 feet long floating down the Big Sandy River, with 
some making it as far as Prestonsburg. The City of Pikeville was closed by the National Guard 
for over a week and millions of dollars in damages were reported, including a Pikeville boat 
dealer left with several of his speedboats stranded on the second level of the road cut for the 
newly revamped US 23 that was also part of a long-term flood control project for the city. As 
state and federal agencies began to examine the causes of the massive flooding, the National 
Weather Service found that while heavy rainfall was a major factor, they also found a much 
higher level of siltation in the Tug fork of the Big Sandy, which they attributed to "some source 
upstream." The Kentucky Department of Natural Resource and Environmental Protection 
attempted to look at "flood causes other than rainfall" and expressed a willingness to consider 
changes in land use patterns in the region to examine if they had contributed to "increased runoff 
or increased river levels."101 
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 The coal industry struck back against newspapers that made too much of a case linking 
the industry and the flooding and a demonstration of what The Mountain Eagle referred to as 
"Hitler tactics" came after James Lee Crawford, editor of The Corbin Times-Tribune wrote a 
column in which he said strip mining had opened up the Cumberland River to flooding. 
Following the article's release, Crawford was forced to resign as a member of the Corbin City 
Recreation Commission, after David O. Smith went before the Corbin City Commission and read 
a statement attacking the editorial and a subsequent report on area strip mines, and demanded his 
resignation from the board. Smith was Vice President of the Kentucky/Tennessee Coal Operators 
Association, and the action against Crawford came less than three years after the offices of The 
Mountain Eagle were torched. 
 It all has a frightening sound to us here at The Mountain Eagle, for we recall all too 
 clearly that public threats to burn down The Mountain Eagle were voiced at a Letcher 
 County Courthouse meeting a short time before The Eagle did, in fact, fall victim to 
 arson.   
  The Coalfield Progress of Norton, Virginia had also been the victim of an economic 
boycott orchestrated by Wise County Virginia coal operators. The Mountain Eagle editorial 
concluded that it was a tragic situation at a time when the coal mining areas of West Virginia, 
Virginia, and Kentucky had suffered the greatest flood damage in history as a result of strip 
mining, but "no public discussion of strip mining and the damages it causes is permitted."  The 
three newspapers that were attacked by the industry were among the oldest and largest in the 
mountains. "When they can be burned out and pushed around with total impunity, why indeed 
dare to exercise freedom of speech?"102 
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 The House of Representatives and U.S. Senate finally passed the joint committee version 
of the Strip Mine Bill in July 1977. The compromise bill "allowed Appalachian strip mine 
operators to change the shape of the mountains" through the authorization of mountaintop 
removal mining. It also exempted mines producing less than 100,000 tons of coal per year from 
federal reclamation laws for 18 months. Kentucky Senator Wendell Ford had inserted language 
in the Senate version that would allow operators to leave highwalls on reclaimed land, but 
Representative Morris Udall had refused to back down on the highwall language and Ford 
countered by saying that Appalachia had two things, "coal and people, and they need flat land." 
The subsequent compromise was modeled on language inserted by Senator Jennings Randolph 
that would allow operators to leave a bench if they returned as much "spoil" as possible, covered 
the highwall completely, and presented plans for useful development of the bench. At Ford's 
suggestion language was inserted that the land should be used for public works and private, 
industrial, or commercial uses.103 
 President Carter signed the final version of the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control 
Act on August 2, 1977 at a Rose Garden Ceremony attended by a number of anti-strip mine 
activists, including Joe Begley and Harry Caudill, although representatives of the Appalachian 
Coalition and West Virginia's Save Our Mountains refused the invitation, saying the bill simply 
created an illusion of unified support from the environmental movement. The bill had taken over 
five years to make its way through Congress and survived two vetoes by President Gerald Ford 
and many Appalachian legislators expressed the belief that it was the best they could hope for. 
The final bill did not satisfy strip mine opponents and many said it actually weakened regulation 
of the industry. "In some states it will weaken standards," said Don Askins of the Appalachian 
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Coalition.  It takes priority over state laws." That was true because in some states existing state 
law placed stronger restrictions on strip mining than the federal bill. The legislation had been 
pared down through the long legislative process in order to satisfy "industry supporters in and 
out of Congress, and unfavorable rulings in state supreme courts." Aside from allowing 
mountaintop removal, many of the activists said the most objectionable aspect of the bill was that 
it required compliance from operators producing over 100,000 tons per month within nine 
months of its passage, but allowed those producing less than 100,000 tons until 1979 to meet the 
standards, which meant that less than 15 percent of strip miners nationally would be affected by 
the federal bill for its first two years.104   
 The bill ushered in large scale mountaintop removal, which topped most strip mining 
opponents' lists of complaints. Congressional supporters of the coal industry like Senator 
Wendell Ford of Kentucky and Jennings Randolph of West Virginia had done a workman's job 
of selling other legislators on the idea that the mountaineers needed usable flat land if they were 
to join the 20th Century and participate in the prosperity that was even then starting to fade in 
Post-World War II America. A number of protesters from Tennessee, Kentucky, and West 
Virginia came to Washington to ask Carter to veto the bill, even though they knew he would 
refuse. James Hanna of West Virginia told reporters that most mountain people "like our 
mountains the way they are." Hanna referred to mountain life as very special and said if he 
wanted flat land he would "move to Kansas." The bill also pitted a number of environmental 
organizations, including Save Our Cumberland Mountains, against the highly respected 
Environmental Policy Center, which had lobbied for the very organizations that now found 
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themselves at odds with the federal EPC. John Doyle of the Appalachian Coalition said the EPC 
had lost its way during the long struggle to pass the legislation, and had drifted away from the 
realities faced by the people who were directly affected by strip mining." A big strip job down 
along the Potomac would open a few eyes around here." EPC lobbyist John McCormack was one 
of the most influential lobbyists during the bill's movement through Congress, and he 
acknowledged that there were areas that disappointed environmentalists, but he also pointed to 
the realities that existed in Washington, saying they had gotten about as good a deal as could be 
expected.105 
 Mountaintop removal has had wide-ranging and generally negative effects on the 
mountainous areas of Central Appalachia since the 1977 act was signed into law. A 2011 article 
that appeared in "The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences" stated that "based on 
complete utilization of fill permits issued between 1992 and 2002, the EPA estimated that 1,944 
km of headwater streams were buried during this period and predicted that the extent of buried 
stream length will double to almost 4,000 km by 2012. This fundamental change in the 
topography and morphology of the watershed has important consequences for the water quality 
of downstream ecosystems," and that MTR exposed previously buried toxins and introduced 
them to watersheds.106  
 The Natural Resources Defense Council reported that forests in southern Appalachia are 
among the most biologically diverse temperate deciduous forests in the world, and that 
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mountaintop removal is destroying them at an alarming rate. The EPA estimates that using 2011 
rates of MTR, the total forest loss by 2012 would be 1,408,372 acres (2,200 square miles). This 
loss would prevent the sequestration of 3.14 million tons of carbon dioxide annually107 
 In a valedictory 1977 interview with The Mountain Eagle, Harry Caudill predicted the 
demise of the eastern Kentucky coal industry, even if mountaintop removal became the norm and 
predicted that even eastern Kentucky power plants would eventually be burning coal mined in 
Montana. He told the newspaper that the coal industry had been "pole-axed" in the early days of 
the Cold war by the "rapid opening up of the Arabian oilfields," and predicted "Don't be 
surprised if they carry coal to Newcastle," in the form of coal mined in the American west.  
Caudill said that regardless of the need for coal, the only thing that would prevent the 
westernization of the coal industry was the cost of transporting coal. He referred to a deposition 
he had from a mining engineer stating that in much of the land he had surveyed, 81 percent of the 
coal was" locked up" in the mountains and the only way it could be retrieved was "to take the 
whole top of the mountain off." 
 If the problem of transportation can be solved, that (western) coal can go to market 
 everywhere cheaper than it can be produced in Appalachian mines, because we have 
 foolishly, greedily, and short sightedly gouged out and wasted a tremendous lot of our 
 coal and what is left is hard to get to.108  
 Caudill blamed most of eastern Kentucky's problems on politics, when he told The Eagle 
that the problems of the Appalachian Mountains were political in nature and related to the land 
and resources. "We have never developed a sound political system or effective political 
institutions and that's the reason that just a few years ago, 20 percent of our adult population 
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couldn't even read their names."  He also blamed the social welfare solutions of the War on 
Poverty, which he called "the most striking example of governmental and societal failure that I 
ever heard of."109 
 With the passage of the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act, The Mountain 
Eagle stood at the end of almost 20 years of editorializing, reporting, and taking a stand against 
the most powerful industry in Kentucky and saw a final product that satisfied few people on 
either side of the issue. Tom Gish got the regulation on strip mining he had sought for so long, 
but the provisions that allowed for mountaintop removal mining must have soured the moment 
for him and many others who had hoped that federal regulation of strip mining would limit it to 
the point that it would eventually cease to exist on the steep slopes on eastern Kentucky. Now, 
those slopes would simply cease to exist. For the remainder of 1977, there were no more 
editorials and only a few articles concerning strip mining. Some who were close to Gish have 
indicated that once he saw that the mountains were sufficiently damaged to disallow the 
possibility of developing a Smokey Mountain type of tourism industry, he moved on to other 
issues, but his son Ben Gish said it was just as likely that after realizing the goal he had sought 
for regulation, he felt he had done all he could toward limiting the damage strip mining had done 
in Letcher County. 
 Even though Gish and Caudill were willing to admit that the coal industry had won the 
battle over strip mine regulation, there were other issues to address at the local and state level. 
Overweight coal trucks and related issues did extensive damage to state and county roads in 
eastern Kentucky, and the dust from coal trucks running on the "haul roads" caused health 
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problems for residents living nearby. Speeding coal trucks also endangered the lives of residents 
who were forced to share the narrow, poorly maintained, and winding roads with tractor trailers 
hauling as much as 70 tons of coal.  The Mountain Eagle had already addressed the issue, and 
some regulation had been passed in the state legislature. But as coal operators and truckers 
vowed to flaunt the law and Letcher County officials swore that they would not enforce state 
weight regulations, things heated up considerably in the summer of 1974.  Threats to Gish and 
the newspaper came from operators, truckers, and county officials, and in August, the offices of 
The Mountain Eagle were fire-bombed. Although a former Whitesburg City Police officer was 
charged with arson, Tom Gish later said the fire was directly related to the coal operators and 
truckers.110 
110 Tom and Pat Gish, 1995 interview by Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kinney at the Gish Home, Tape 2, located at 
Appalshop in Whitesburg, Kentucky. 
Copyright © William Farley 2017
Chapter Six 
The 1970s were climactic in many ways for The Mountain Eagle. The courthouse elites 
and the coal industry, along with their supporters, had come to see the newspaper and the Gishes 
as the enemy, standing in opposition to their control of Letcher County, and they marshaled their 
forces against them. Not only did the newspaper suffer continued boycotts of advertising and 
sales, there also new attempts to decertify it as the county's newspaper of record, even though 
The Mountain Eagle's circulation dwarfed that of its nearest rival. In 1974, the newspaper office 
was the subject of a fire bomb attack, and Mountain Eagle reporters were harassed by coal 
operators, truckers, and the Kentucky State Police. At the same time, the family was shunned, 
and many of the citizens of Whitesburg turned their backs on them in their time of greatest need. 
Yet, both the family and the newspaper survived, and by surviving and making their stand, they 
prospered. 
In the summer of 1970, after years of stress, overwork, and a four pack a day cigarette 
habit, Tom Gish suffered a serious heart attack. He was hospitalized for several weeks and his 
recovery was slow and unsatisfactory, so in January of 1972, very near the fifteenth anniversary 
of purchasing the newspaper, Gish underwent open heart surgery at the University of Kentucky's 
Chandler Medical Center. Open heart surgery was relatively new at the time and Gish was one of 
the first patients to undergo the procedure at the UK hospital. The entire illness and surgery was 
characteristically underplayed by the family and the paper, with a short mention in January 
saying it was a “pretty dismal” way to celebrate the anniversary, but adding that Gish was 
recovering.  Pat Gish reported that he was feeling restless.1 
1 Editor's Report, "THE EAGLE EYE,” The Mountain Eagle, January 6, 1972, 2. 
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 The 1960s had proven to be one of the most tumultuous decades in American history and 
the events that had rocked the nation had been felt in Letcher County as well. The War on 
Poverty had raised the standard of living for thousands of poor people in Central Appalachia and 
its effects rippled through Letcher County. Children were being fed at school, subsidized repairs 
by federal housing programs had made houses more inhabitable and built houses for thousands 
of families. The influx of federal programs also brought scrutiny and oversight to the halls of 
power. The county elites had managed to co-opt many of the federal programs to at least partly 
serve their own needs, but the heavy-handed control that had existed before the coming of the 
federal programs had become more subtle.  Due largely to the dramatic increase of strip mining, 
Kentucky had become the world’s fourth or fifth largest coal producer by 1980, depending on 
mine strikes in Poland.2  State legislators who had abased themselves before tobacco and other 
agriculture interests were by then almost totally owned by the coal industry. The 1977 Federal 
Strip Mining Act that was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter contained a clause that 
called for states to pass their own reclamation acts and with television cameras recording the 
session, one after another Kentucky legislators debated the act, "posturing  and ranting in what 
was supposed to be a debate," to show their masters in the  industry how much they hated it, 
while at the same time bowing before the necessity of passing their own regulations, "because 
otherwise the hated 'feds' would have patrolled the hilltops to see what was being 
accomplished."3 
 Around the same time, in the wake of the painful oil boycotts and gasoline price hikes, 
national energy policy once again turned to coal.  When West Virginia Governor Jay Rockefeller 
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was named to chair both the President's Commission on Coal and the White House Conference 
on Balanced National Growth and Economic Development, it became evident that while there 
were still serious environmental problems that resulted from the mining of coal and especially 
with strip mining, these factors would be offset by the goal of energy independence. 
Acknowledging that there would be "environmental trade-offs, Rockefeller offered the 
possibility that Appalachian coal mines could add another 100 million tons per year in coal 
production, which could now be mined and burned in an environmentally responsible manner, 
thanks to state and federal regulations.4  
 The national angst over the War in Vietnam had been felt in Letcher County too, and 
hundreds of returning servicemen brought back all the experiences they had endured while 
serving in the conflict. The deference shown to the county elites was starting to slip and 
problems that had once seemed to be almost foreign were beginning to show up throughout the 
region. College students who had experienced the shock wave of the 1960s brought their 
attitudes home to Letcher County. The Civil Rights Movement had touched the county too, and 
the previously segregated schools in Jenkins and the county were integrated, while government 
sanctioned integration became the law in public life as well. Although the overall population of 
African-Americans in Letcher County was well under the state average of about three percent, 
Jenkins and Fleming Neon had significantly larger African American populations than the rest of 
the county. 
   As Central Appalachia was drawn inexorably into the modernity that the rest of the 
country had enjoyed since the end of World War II, a number of the changes ushered in by the 
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regulatory laws passed in the late 1960s caused a good deal of frustration and anger in the halls 
of power. The coal industry in particular had already begun to chafe under the 1969 Coal Mine 
Health and Safety act, which they had vociferously opposed, and it had become inevitable that 
state regulation of strip mining would give way to federal regulation at some point in the coming 
decade. These were both issues The Mountain Eagle had advocated for and the industry had 
never appreciated interference of any kind in its affairs.  
 The Mountain Eagle had also been a consistent voice of opposition to the war in 
Vietnam, as President Johnson's expansion of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam led to the 
deployment of thousands of young Americans, and escalation and the exorbitant cost of the war 
sucked the life out of the War on Poverty and programs established to alleviate poverty in eastern 
Kentucky. The paper criticized Johnson's handling of the war and after 1969, it continued to 
carry articles and guest editorials criticizing Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger as well. By the 
time Nixon resigned in disgrace, Tom Gish had become one of his most vocal critics. 
 Patriotism has always been strong in Central Appalachia. During World War II, most 
draft boards in the region were kept busy with regulating the flow of volunteers to the nation's 
military forces rather than having to beat the bushes to provide men for the draft. The patriotic 
feelings of the region run deep and can be traced back to the American Revolution. The 
American Legion inspired "my country right or wrong" jingoism that arose during the Red Scare 
following World War I had taken root in eastern Kentucky too, and Gish's criticism of the 
Vietnam War created a significant backlash among right wingers and the service clubs. The 
already heated opposition from the coal operators and the county elites was joined by those who 
felt Gish went too far in his criticism of the war, and new voices were added to those accusing 
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the paper of harboring communists and radicals in the guise of the young reporters who had 
begun to flock to The Eagle to experience the tutelage of a master reporter in Pat Gish. 
 Strip mining had never been the only coal related issue upon which the paper focused, 
and coal mine safety and health issues were very important to Tom Gish. He said on many 
occasions that as the son of a coal miner, it was the least he could do to use his editorial skill and 
the power of the paper to try to improve working conditions for coal miners, and The Mountain 
Eagle was one of the leading coalfield advocates for safety and health regulation in the industry. 
The paper also became the "local source" of reporting during several of the worst coal mine 
disasters in American history and many members of the U.S. Congress used Mountain Eagle 
articles as templates for drafting the legislation that created mine safety laws.5   
 When a coal dust explosion on December 30, 1970 at the interconnected Number 15 and 
16 mines of the Finley Mining Company in nearby Hyden, Kentucky, killed 38 miners, The 
Mountain Eagle led the way with its coverage of the disaster. Reporter Phil Primack continually 
monitored the rescue attempt and reported that the death of 38 men under a mountain five miles 
from Hyden had marked the first anniversary of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act. Hopes for survivors were dampened as the first real blizzard of winter swept down on the 
mountains east of Hyden.6 
 In an accompanying article, Tom Bethel reported that the new mine safety law had not 
been obeyed by officials at the Finley Mining Company and the Federal Bureau of Mines had 
been lax in enforcing it. At a hearing held one week after the explosion, Kentucky Senator John 
Sherman Cooper laid the blame on a dearth of trained inspectors and said the explosion showed 
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the "necessity of employing and training sufficient inspectors." Bureau of Mines Director Elbert 
Osborne countered by saying there could be no real enforcement until working miners received 
more safety training. Bethel wrote that both points of view were valid and had been expressed 
two years before when 76 men had died at an explosion at the Farmington Mine in West 
Virginia. Bethel added that the record of the Finley Mine had been written well before the 
disaster struck. The explosion had little to do with enforcement or education and everything to do 
with the knowing operation of an unsafe mine by Finley Coal, which had been cited several 
times in the six-month period prior to the explosion and had done nothing to change the 
conditions. In fact, two near fatal accidents occurred at the mines before the big explosion. 
Bureau of Mines Inspector C.E, Hyde had visited Mine 15 and 16 in June and found that Charles 
and Stanley Finley were operating the mines with ungrounded electrical equipment and 
inadequate dust control. Hyde's report also indicated that there was evidence that the miners had 
been smoking underground, and the operators had not furnished "Self Rescuers," breathing 
devices to allow miners to escape from a smoke filled mine. 
 Dangerous accumulations of loose coal dust were evident in Hyde's inspection and rock 
dust, to hold the coal dust down and make it less volatile, was insufficiently applied. Subsequent 
inspections, including one that followed an explosion that blinded one man and deafened 
another, found that little effort had been made to alleviate the conditions mentioned in Hyde's 
report. Respirable dust in the mines was not being monitored either. By December 22, the 
Bureau inspectors had logged more than 35 violations at Mine 15 and 16. Yet other than a 
weekend closure, no further action was taken. The inspectors had then gone on Christmas 
vacation, even though mid-winter is a notoriously dangerous time for mine explosions due to 
higher levels of methane from increased moisture in mines.  
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 But to blame the inspectors for the disaster is less than totally fair; it may be like blaming 
 Lieutenant Calley for the My Lai massacre, when in effect the argument could be made 
 that he was only carrying out orders to "Search and Destroy." No one had told the Bureau 
 of Mines Inspectors to get tough on unsafe mines....Whatever else it proved, after the 
 Hyden explosion, the evidence was convincing that the mine disaster in West Virginia in 
 1968 had not been enough to shake the complacency of men in high positions of national 
 power. The question mark that hung over Hyden this week was whether two disasters 
 would be enough.7 
 An editorial in the same issue called small truck mining a "poverty industry," and said 
that the smaller mines were inherently unsafe and were more often avenues to poverty for 
owner/operators than a means of attaining wealth. But it also stated that the mines were 
necessary to the region's lifeline. "It is hard for eastern Kentucky to live with these mines, but it 
is probably true that the area couldn't live without them." The recent fuel shortage had created an 
increased demand for coal and resulted in a boom for small truck mines and local merchants had 
called 1970 "the best business year they had ever had.  So we hope the small mines won't be put 
out of business. Eastern Kentucky simply couldn't live without them." It went on to call for "an 
atmosphere of maximum safety" but also stated that the truck mine operators were not without 
blame, since they had mined coal profitably in 1969 for $3.50 a ton and were selling the same 
coal for as much as $14.00 per ton when the Finley Explosion occurred, and yet they hadn't 
invested in new safety measures. Miners' wages hadn't increased noticeably, although some of 
the more conscientious operators had done those things. Most had "simply raked in fantastic 
profits."   
 Gish described the mining industry as "an 18th Century operation, little touched by the 
scientific advances of the 19th, to say nothing of the 20th Century." Almost nothing had been 
spent, he added, on basic research for safety or newer mining techniques. Most coal miners were 
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still housed in company owned shacks and poorly paid, with little improvement to their 
hardscrabble lives. And yet, he also wrote that eastern Kentucky had few other jobs to offer, and 
the size of an operation had little to do with the safety record, and the small operators had to live 
with their victims while the corporate giants enjoyed the benefits of absentee ownership. But the 
small mines were vital to the Appalachian region and Gish called for bold thinking on the part of 
federal officials. If the small operators could not afford to operate under higher standards, the 
implementation of measures such as grants, small business loans and other measures were 
necessary to bring them up to date and allow for the best safety technology available. "if the 
federal treasury can bail out the Penn Central Railroad," Gish chided, "...why not help the coal 
industry."8 
 The fears Gish expressed for the small operators were not totally unfounded. A number 
of small mines had gone out of business following the passage of first Federal Coal Mine Safety 
Act in 1952, a fairly innocuous piece of legislation which provided for annual safety inspections 
of mines employing more than 14 workers and gave inspectors the ability to close mines if an 
inspection revealed the imminent danger of a fire, inundations, or explosion. The act instituted a 
number of safety regulations and imposed penalties on mines that violated them.9 It was true that 
during this time, a number of smaller mines were put out of business, primarily by drastically 
reduced prices for coal, particularly those paid by TVA. UMWA President John L. Lewis' 
insistence that they agree to contract terms that were deemed unaffordable, as in the case of 
Southeast Coal, was also very damaging to the smaller mines, but mechanization was the major 
reason for the loss of many coal mining jobs, along with the smaller operators' financial inability 
                                                 
8 "Safety help needed," The Mountain Eagle, January 7, 1971, 2. 
9 "History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation,” United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, website: http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM.   
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to compete on the scale of mining introduced by the continuous miner and shuttle cars. Lewis 
had, for many years, insisted that there were too many mines, and that coal should be mined by 
machines and he believed the miners who lost their jobs through mechanization would be easily 
absorbed into other industries. Bitter strikes had combined with the use of oil to lessen the 
national reliance on coal to a degree, and the larger operators had come to realize that if they 
were to keep any remnant of the traditional market, they would have to avoid future work 
stoppages. However, miners insisted on enforcing their motto, "no contract, no work," and the 
union continued to win strikes and humble the operators until they organized themselves into an 
efficient mechanized industry that relied less on human labor and more on mechanical power. 
Picks and shovels, hand drills, and other labor-intensive methods were supplanted by cutting 
machines, shuttle cars and coal loaders, and by 1947, hand tools were obsolete. As the big 
mining companies were forced to mechanize their operations in order to compete, the smaller 
ones failed and closed.10  
 For several weeks following the disaster, much of newspaper's space was dedicated to the 
Finley Mine explosions and the repercussions of the disaster. When a report was issued in 
February 1971 by the Bureau of Mines, the paper criticized it as too weak and timid in its scope, 
citing a report by Fred Sinclair of The Courier Journal stating that Undersecretary Fred J. 
Russell of the United States Department of the Interior had taken the Bureau's original statement 
and "eliminated every section of strength." The Mountain Eagle went on to say that Russell had 
been the target of several investigations because he was seen as being too lenient toward the 
industry and printed the sections he had redacted from the report. Among those that were 
removed were statements saying that the Bureau would collect at least $77,000 in fines and that 
                                                 
10 Harry Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands A Biography of a Depressed Area, (Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1963), 260. 
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many lives would have not been lost if Finley Mining had followed the law in its rock dusting 
activity. The original statement also indicated that a stricter rock dusting plan would be 
implemented.  However, a "vague suggestion" that criminal charges might be pursued against the 
Finley brothers for their negligence was all that remained in the report. The document also 
revealed that five of the dead men had survived the initial explosion but had died from lack of 
oxygen. None of the men had been furnished with self-rescuers, which were required by federal 
law and could have saved their lives by scrubbing the smoke and allowing them to walk out. 
 A separate report issued by the Coal Miners Defense Fund, lawyers who offered free 
legal aid to the miners' families, contained an article by Eagle reporter Tom Bethell titled, "The 
Hurricane Creek Massacre." The report was included as an appendage to the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines Report and charged that the 38 miners were victims of institutional manslaughter. It 
blamed Finley as well as a "complacent federal bureaucracy," extending the blame to the highest 
levels of the federal government and charging that government officials had refused to serve the 
best interests of the people. The CMDF report accused Finley Mining of using illegal explosives 
and refusing to keep them under lock and key, another violation of federal law. It also called a 
report by the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals absolving the company of blame and 
placing blame on the employees, "wholly inadequate, inaccurate, and deceptive," and accused 
Charles Finley of contributing to the deaths of the five men who had died from lack of oxygen 
because he had refused to supply self-rescuers. The report noted the state had refused to 
investigate a fatal accident several weeks prior to the explosion at Finley and suggested that state 
mine inspectors had been of no practical value to the miners or operators. Bethel's report also 
called a public hearing on the explosion held in Hyden in January an astonishing display of 
incompetence on the part of the bureau and said that due to the ineffectiveness of MESA and the 
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Bureau, as well as a lack of oversight by the White House, President Nixon "...bears a large 
responsibility for the disaster....There is blood on his hands."11 
 In March 1971, the Labor Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives 
held a week-long hearing in March on the disaster, beginning in Washington and culminating in 
Hazard with testimony from widows and the sole survivor of the explosion.  The Mountain Eagle 
covered it in detail, allowing the testimony to make their case for mine safety regulation. Phil 
Primack referred to the overall purpose of the hearings as being ""to gather an overview of the 
practices, or lack thereof, of the Bureau of Mines (BOM) in enforcing the much heralded 1969 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act." The tone of the hearings made it clear that many members 
felt that BOM and the Department of Interior shared a good deal of the responsibility for the 
conditions that led to the explosion. The first days of the hearings focused on "bureaucratic 
bumbling and alleged inspector ineptness," and MESA Inspector Gordon Couch, who had lost 
three relatives in the explosion, made it clear he felt he was being used as a scapegoat. "This is a 
low blow to us. We done everything we could with that mine, short of kill the operator. We don't 
get credit for what we do, we get blamed for what isn't our fault." Couch and other inspectors 
had been accused of being lax on the mine but Couch claimed he was merely following MESA 
guidelines. Another inspector who was not named said he and others would be blamed no matter 
what the finding. BOM Director Henry Wheeler added that the tone of the hearings would have a 
damaging effect on morality within the Bureau, a suggestion which angered Kentucky 7th 
District Congressman Carl D. Perkins, who said he was disappointed with the BOM reaction. 
                                                 
11 "No blame assessed by bureau," The Mountain Eagle, February 4, 1971, 1. (there was a misprint on the masthead 
of The Mountain Eagle on February 4 ,1971, giving the date as February 4, 1979. It did not carry over into the body 
of the newspaper) 
324 
 
 Perkins went on to say he felt there were people within the Bureau who did not want the 
act to work at all, adding that the members of congress on the committee did not wish to harm 
the industry but would do all they could to make certain the act worked. He also said that he 
would much prefer underground mining to continue rather than being replaced with strip mining 
and that he felt the Bureau to be well managed overall, "But from Mr. Wheeler, certain practices 
in your department and other high ranking (departments) have not met the expectations of 
Congress when it passed the act." The first witness called was former Finley employee Robert 
Combs who said he had a conversation with the man in charge of explosives, or "shot-firer," who 
indicated the use of (illegal) primer cord had been common at the Finley Mine, although co-
owner Charles Finley had said it had not been in use. Combs also indicated that when he was 
employed at Finley, rock dusting was not conducted within 200 feet of the "boom hole," where 
the shot was to be fired.   
 A.T. Collins, the sole survivor, told the committee he had been standing about 20 feet 
inside the portal when the explosion took place and he was pushed at least 50 feet through the air 
by the pressure of the explosion, causing numerous injuries. Collins said he had found primer 
cord in the mine several weeks earlier and had asked Charles Finley if that wasn't dangerous, but 
Finley had ignored him.  Another miner, Ernest Bolling, who worked a different shift than the 
one in which the explosion occurred, testified that it was his view that the mines needed qualified 
inspectors, "who can't be fired by the owner." According to Primack, the most revealing 
testimony came from the widows of the slain miners, many of whom stated that their husbands 
had complained about the lax safety procedures at the mine. Mrs. Lawrence Gray said her 
husband had told her they were shooting with illegal primer cord and 40 percent dynamite, which 
was also illegal. She said her husband worried so much about working in the unsafe conditions 
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he couldn't sleep at night. Another widow, Mrs. Daisy Young, said her husband had told her that 
Charles Finley stayed drunk all the time and Mrs. Pearl Phillips said her husband regularly took 
an extra pack of cigarettes to work so he could leave one on the outside for inspectors to see.  
Most of the widows said their husbands hadn't reported the unsafe conditions to authorities 
because they feared losing their jobs. The reports on the hearings that appeared in The Mountain 
Eagle not only made the poor safety record and unsafe practices of the Finley Mine available to 
the public, it also revealed the disregard the owners held for the men who worked for them. In 
his testimony, Charles Finley said he knew nothing about the presence of primer cord at the mine 
and said he had so much to do with 100 men working around the clock that it had been difficult 
for him to keep up with everything, but he always told the men to "be careful." Finley said his 
shift foremen had been responsible for the day to day operations but admitted he had made very 
little effort to see that the foremen or workers were familiar with the safety procedures mandated 
by the Mine Safety Act. He added that he had instructed the foremen to use only legal explosives 
and when asked why the illegal explosives were present, answered "That's what I would like to 
know. I'd like to know that myself."12 
 In June 1971, a Federal Grand Jury convened at the U.S. District court in Pikeville 
returned a formal accusation against Finely Coal, listing 24 charges. A 118-page report issued by 
the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor placed the responsibility for 
the explosion on the mine owners, but did not charge them with criminal neglect because of the 
ongoing Grand Jury and Justice Department actions. However, the report also acknowledged that 
the Bureau of Mines "must bear a heavy responsibility for the Hyden tragedy" by stating that it 
was general knowledge that Finely Mining was operating in an unsafe manner and if the bureau 
                                                 
12 Phil Primack, "Widows, mine owners, testify at hearing," The Mountain Eagle, March 8, 1971, 1. 
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officials could not properly analyze reports from inspectors from the mines "then the whole 
structure of federal coal mine health and safety enforcement becomes a farce."13 
 Finley Mining negotiated a plea agreement on the charges and accepted a fine with no jail 
time for either of the Finley brothers. While many people saw this as a miscarriage of justice in 
its own right, a number of coal operators were satisfied with the outcome of the case and more 
than a few truck mine operators thought the Finleys had suffered unduly from federal 
interference. The coal industry had never liked regulation and even though most mines in 1971 
were making profits well beyond their wildest dreams of just three years before, most felt that 
those profits were their just desert and bitterly resented being forced to spend more money on 
safety and training. Just as Charles Finely had shown his indifference to safety and callously 
steered clear of the truth in his testimony at the congressional hearings in Hazard, many other 
small operators were still operating in the same 19th Century frame of mind of, "save the mule, 
we can always hire another man." And while some of the operators complained about the extra 
expenditures, others genuinely feared that they would not be able to survive if the boom tapered 
off and prices returned to their pre-boom levels. Few if any read the editorial in The Mountain 
Eagle calling for federal intervention and most felt that the newspaper was part of an enormous 
force aligned against them.  
 At the same time the coal industry was struggling to accommodate to the new mine safety 
act, the United Mine Workers was in the process of beginning a long collapse inward, spurred by 
corruption, a civil war in the ranks, and the near total loss of control of the rank and file. Jenkins 
was the last large union town in Letcher County and represented a stronghold of UMWA support 
                                                 
13 "Finley firm named in 24 count bill: House committee criticizes Bureau of Mines in Hyden coal disaster," The 
Mountain Eagle, June 24, 1971, 1. 
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in eastern Kentucky, although Lynch, Benham, and other parts of Harlan and Pike Counties were 
also strong union areas. The Mountain Eagle extended the same level of coverage to union 
affairs as it did to mine safety.  When John L. Lewis resigned as UMWA president in 1960, he   
made a mistake common to many powerful men by choosing his own successor, and rather than 
scouring his ranks for a more capable leader for the union he had made into a national power, 
Lewis instead chose to bestow his blessing on his closest henchman, "Tough" Tony Boyle. Boyle 
was elected vice president of the UMWA in 1960 when Lewis Retired. Thomas Kennedy, the 
well-liked vice president at the time, assumed the presidency upon Lewis' retirement, but his 
health was already failing and Boyle assumed many of his duties as he continued to falter. Boyle 
was as tough and dictatorial in his use of power as John L. Lewis had been, but the UMWA was 
no longer the same union Lewis had been able to dominate, and Boyle was not the Great John L. 
In 1962, Kennedy became too ill to continue and Boyle was named acting president, and when 
Kennedy died in 1963 Boyle was elected president.14 
 Boyle came to Jenkins in 1962 to address a large UMWA Labor Day Rally and in his 
keynote speech, he attacked President Kennedy for his failure to address poverty in the 
coalfields, in spite of his campaign pledges. The rally was a large regional UMWA gathering, 
attended by over 20,000 union members. Boyle, who still held the office of Vice President at the 
time, took advantage of the occasion to cement his position as John L. Lewis' chosen successor 
and to highlight his political independence. He accused Kennedy of wasting billions of dollars in 
overseas projects while neglecting the needs of poor people in the coalfields and urged UMWA 
members to undertake a post card and letter writing campaign demanding that congress do 
something to relieve the plight of coal miners. He also charged the government with subsidizing 
                                                 
14 Thomas Kennedy, "UMW Head Dies, Boyle Takes Post," The Evening Standard, Uniontown, PA, January 21, 
1963, 1. 
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American oil companies in the importation of foreign oil.  "If President Kennedy wants to do 
something to help the coal industry, he will control imports of both residual oil and natural gas." 
He also railed against nuclear energy and called on the president and congress to provide 
unemployment insurance to any unemployed worker who was ready to work and unemployed 
through no fault of his own. The rally was the first major one in ten years and Jenkins, with its 
strong union roots and many Boyle supporters, was the ideal place to hold it. District and local 
officials hailed Boyle as the "Next successor to John L. Lewis." 
 Boyle presented Jenkins as one of the last strongholds of the UMW in a region where 
many union mines had been displaced by smaller non-union ones and he told the miners they 
must be willing to sacrifice and struggle if the union was to survive. He added that the union had 
"spearheaded much of the social legislation" of the New Deal and before, including workmen's 
compensation, unemployment insurance and child labor laws. A number of Kentucky notables 
spoke at the meeting, including several Democratic candidates such as Lt. Governor Wilson 
Wyatt, who was running for U.S. Senate, U.S. Congressman Carl D. Perkins, running for re-
election, and Edward T. Breathitt, who was running for governor. Sitting Governor Bert Combs 
had planned to attend but was unable to be there and sent a telegram "expressing his best wishes 
to the union."15 
 Boyle's support ran strong in eastern Kentucky and one letter from Fred L. Arthur Sr. of 
Mayking seemed to tie The Mountain Eagle's support for Jock Yablonski to Communism and 
organized crime.  "As you are for Yablonski and not for Tony Boyle for president of the United 
Mine Workers' Union, please be advised that Mr. Boyle does not want members of the Costa 
                                                 
15 "UMWA official accuses Kennedy: President has failed to keep campaign pledges to miners, Boyle charges," The 
Mountain Eagle, September 6, 1962, 1. 
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Nostra in the union and Mr. Richard Nixon doesn't want damn Communists." The Eagle replied 
that the newspaper had not taken a position on who should be president of the UMW.16 
 Just over a month after Boyle's visit, a front-page article in The Mountain Eagle 
announced that Josephine Roche, Director of the UMWA Health and Welfare Fund, had 
announced that the Whitesburg UMWA Hospital, along with nine other union hospitals would be 
sold because the union's objective of "making first rate medical care available from a large group 
of medical specialists to all people in Eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, and Virginia," had been 
accomplished. Following the announcement, roving bands of pickets composed of retired and 
unemployed miners moved though the Appalachian coalfields in an attempt to close down the 
small mines that refused to continue paying union royalties. Their actions resulted in roads being 
closed and numerous incidences of spontaneous violence, and Governor Combs was eventually 
forced to intervene. Closing the hospitals proved to be the tip of the iceberg, and as the UMWA 
began to remove some widows, dependents, and retired miners from the "medical card," benefits, 
the roving pickets continued to travel through the coalfields to picket, but this time they were 
protesting actions by the UMWA and picketing union mines as well as the non-union mines they 
believed had damaged the Health and Welfare fund by refusing to pay royalties.  
 When Boyle's attempt to gain the presidency of the UMWA came under challenge, many 
coalfield papers stayed out of the fray, but as it had done in other issues, The Mountain Eagle 
took sides. This was initially done through reporting on ongoing instances of incompetence and 
the corruption that permeated the union, but as evidence of Boyle's complicity in the December 
1969 murder of his rival Joseph "Jock" Yablosnki began to emerge, Mountain Eagle editorials 
demanded justice and denounced Boyle well. Boyle was just the kind of villain Tom Gish could 
                                                 
16 Fred L. Arthur Sr., Letters to the Editor "Against Yablonski,", The Mountain Eagle, October 9, 1969, 2. 
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get his teeth into, a labor leader who cared more about his own interests than those of the coal 
miners Gish loved, and a corrupt bully who ruled through intimidation. Boyle was neither well 
liked nor trusted by many of the union rank and file either. Already many of the younger miners, 
particularly those in District 17, which included southern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky, 
were proving more difficult to control, and calling for more democracy and greater autonomy in 
their locals. Other rank and file miners felt that it took too long to settle grievances and Boyle 
was frequently accused of having too cozy a relationship with coal operators and not protecting 
the interests of union members. By this time, the Bituminous Coal Operators Association was the 
chief negotiating organ for most UMWA mining operations, and Boyle had a cozy relationship 
with the BCOA. Many rank and file workers increasingly saw him as a tool for the industry.  
Joseph A. "Jock" Yablonski, International Board Member and president of District 5 in 
Pennsylvania, had clashed frequently with Boyle over the direction of the union and in 1965, 
Boyle enacted "reforms" that called for district leaders to be appointed rather than appointed, and 
removed Yablonski as president of District 5.  In May 1969, Yablonski announced that he would 
seek the presidency of the UMWA.17 
Yablonski and others accused Boyle of mismanaging the all-important UMWA Miners 
Health and Welfare Fund, which provided excellent insurance and retirement benefits for miners' 
families and served as a recruiting tool to entice non-union miners to join the UMWA. The 
"Union Card" at one time was the best health insurance that a member of any union could hope 
to have, paying for every medical expense for union members and their families, and providing 
regular benefits for disabled miners and survivor benefits for the widows and dependent children 
17 Victoria Brittain, "The Murder of Joseph Yablonski," The New Statesman, January 30, 1969, 136. 
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of miners after they died. The union had also provided low interest student loans and other 
benefits for the children of union members, but the loss of union membership following the 
mechanization of the mines, as well as the further loss of union signatories due to the inability of 
many smaller mines to meet the payments in the 1950s and 1960s, had already severely depleted 
the fund's coffers before Boyle ever took office. Along with the loss of members, Boyle did a 
poor job of managing the fund, and benefit cuts became unavoidable. Boyle's administration was 
increasingly marked by various scandals and episodes of corruption and while working miners 
labored in dangerous conditions and faced the near certainty of contracting pneumoconiosis, or 
black lung, Boyle and his close henchmen lived in splendor and luxury and rarely bothered to 
visit the bleak coal towns of Central Appalachia.  Perhaps this distinction more than any other 
made Boyle unpopular with the miners. His style of leadership was reminiscent of John L. 
Lewis’ in that he brooked little dissent, but unlike Lewis, he didn't do the outreach necessary to 
bind the rank and file to his presidency. Yablonski ran as a reformer, calling Tony Boyle a 
dictator. He also accused him of collaborating with the coal operators, just as news stories 
revealed that the three top officials of the UMWA had an unpublicized $1.5 million fund which 
would guarantee their retirement at full pay.18   
 Beth-Elkhorn and its contractors were the only UMWA operations left in Letcher 
County by the time of the Yablonski murder. A significant number of UMW pensioners and 
widows lived there and there was a long history of union activity associated with Letcher County 
coal companies. This included the dissolution of ties between South East Coal Company and the 
United Mine Workers in 1962 and the subsequent UMWA pickets and violence. The Mountain 
Eagle had covered the break-up and the strikes that plagued South East for years, including an 
18 Ibid. 
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incident in which Harry LaViers Jr., son of the company's president, was charged with assault 
after striking two strikers with his pick-up truck during a picket at the company's Goose Creek 
Mine. In the trial, LaViers said he and another Southeast employee, Raymond Smith, were 
assaulted in his truck by several strikers and he hit the two men while trying to escape.19 
 Boyle's problems with the reformers were well documented by Tom Bethell in "Coal 
Patrol," which appeared as a regular feature in The Mountain Eagle, and through reporting by 
Eagle reporter Phil Primack. Both Bethell and Primack had come to The Mountain Eagle as 
something other than reporters and both developed deep friendships with the Gish family as they 
pursued projects that interested them through their reporting.  Bethell had originally come to 
Letcher County as a staffer for the Appalachian Volunteers. After his resignation during the 
events that led to the discharge of AV staffer Joe Malloy in 1968, events that foreshadowed the 
eventual dissolution of the AVs, Bethell began to pursue his interest in the relationship of the 
coal industry with the region. He wrote a number of articles under the heading, "The Coal 
Patrol," in The Eagle, and was instrumental in covering the Finley mine explosion. He later 
worked for the UMWA as research director until he was fired by Arnold Miller in 1977, along 
with most of the senior staff.20  Phil Primack came to The Mountain Eagle as a photographer, 
and like Bethell, he became close to the Gishes. Expanding his work to reporting, Primack 
worked for four years as a general assignment reporter. It was rare for local weeklies to have 
reporters as able as Primack and Bethell, but by this time, The Mountain Eagle was recognized 
as an extraordinary paper, and a number of young reporters who might have sought jobs with 
                                                 
19 "South-East Picketing Continues," The Mountain Eagle, July 26, 1962, 1. 
20 "No Peace in the Pits,” Time, June 27, 1977. 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,915101,00.html. 
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larger newspapers were eager to have a chance to work in Whitesburg under the tutelage of Tom 
and Pat Gish.    
 By the 1970s, Tom and Pat (Gish) had amassed a long list of concerns. Aided by the 
 young writers and photographers who made their way to Whitesburg after hearing about 
 The Eagle -- and who stayed to help publish it, mostly without pay -- they reported and 
 wrote editorials about unregulated strip mining, underperforming schools, the 
 shortcomings of the poverty war and other federal programs, corruption in the local 
 government, unsafe mines, and black lung."21 
 In the summer before the 1969 UMWA election, Districts 28 and 30 ran a large 
advertisement in The Mountain Eagle lumping Ralph Nader with the Communist Party and the 
national press, all as part of a vile conspiracy to rob Tony Boyle of "his hard-earned sleep--and 
perhaps his hard-earned salary as well." The ad was paid for by Carson Hibbitts, who served as 
president of both Districts. The week after the ad appeared, Bethell wrote that top UMW officials 
were starting to show signs of panic and referenced Hibbitts' implication that the Communists 
had joined forces with the nuclear power industry and insurance companies to ruin the coal 
industry, along with the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund as an example. Ralph Nader, then 
a young attorney who had come to national prominence for his revelations about the dangers of 
the Chevrolet Corvair, was working with the Yablonski while he decided whether or not to enter 
the campaign. The Mountain Eagle quoted Hibbitts as saying Nader knew "nothing about coal 
miners or their organization," and that Nader had demonstrated for several years that he didn't 
know what he was talking about in general, although he contradicted himself by saying that 
Nader never "opened fire" without doing a good deal of research on the topic.22   
                                                 
21 Marc Murphy, "Tom Gish, newspaperman,” reprinted from The Louisville Courier Journal, November 24, 2008, 
The Mountain Eagle, November 26, 2008 1. 
22 Tom Bethell, Eagle Coal Patrol, “UMW leaders fight fire with smears," The Mountain Eagle, May 15, 1969, 2. 
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 When Yablonski officially threw his hat into the ring, Bethell reported that it would be 
difficult to unseat Boyle, whose salary of $50,000 per year and additional expense allowance of 
$11,631, made him better paid than U.S. Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas. Boyle would have 
access to union funds for his campaign and many of the district presidents would also have a 
financial stake in Boyle's re-election. But Yablonski was a long time International Board 
member himself, having served since 1942, and knew his way around union politics. "(He) 
knows where the bones are buried." Yablonski was not coy about admitting his own role in the 
union's problems either. "I participated and tolerated the deteriorating performance of the 
leadership, but with increasingly troubled conscience." He stated that it was his duty to the 
members of the miners' union to seek the leadership in order to reinvigorate the union and to 
"make it truly a union of the miner rather than a union of inaccessible bureaucrats."23 
 When John L. Lewis died on June 11, 1969, at the age of 89, his eulogy in The Mountain 
Eagle credited him as having had more influence on lives in eastern Kentucky than any other 
man in the century. Lewis was "the voice most listened to, and the leader most mountain men 
followed." He was praised for "lifting "the coal miner from a state of absolute serfdom" and 
described as "no ordinary man, possessed of no ordinary talent." No man had been his superior in 
the use of language "to persuade, to electrify the atmosphere, and to inspire....He feared no one 
and nothing and perhaps his finest moments came when he spoke to coal operators and to 
presidents as no man before or since has dared."  But Gish also used the eulogy to describe how 
far the UMWA had fallen since Lewis' retirement, noting that the union's membership had fallen 
from over 100,000 to no more than 5,000. He laid part of the blame for that fall at the feet of 
Beth-Elkhorn and other large operators for their decision to start strip and augur mining with 
                                                 
23 Tom Bethell, Coal Patrol: “NEW CHALLENGER FOR UNION LEADER," The Mountain Eagle, May 5, 1969, 
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contractors, although at least initially, Beth-Elkhorn required its contractors to sign union 
contracts. Gish also wrote that while it would not be fair to lay the decline of the union at Lewis' 
feet, the decision he made to allow for the mechanization of coal mining had cost hundreds of 
thousands of miners their jobs. 
 The great national sin is that this happened without real regard to what would be the fate 
 of the coal miner and his family. Literally tens of thousands of miners and their families 
 were left to decay and rot in the filth and litter of abandoned coal towns.... They are the 
 sacrificial offerings of industrial progress, receiving a few scraps from the federal 
 treasury and every now and then an occasional shipment of outdated used clothing from 
 the nation at large. But they remain the living ghosts of automation, unwanted and 
 uncared for by the union, the nation, the coal operators, the federal government, nor 
 anyone else." 24  
 Yablonski had little support in eastern Kentucky, but when he spoke to a large rally in 
Madisonville in the Western Kentucky coalfields less than two weeks before the December 
election, he promised to initiate reforms in the union pension system and said he would work to 
do away with technicalities that had denied some long-time members their just rewards. He also 
promised to hold a special convention to rewrite the union's constitution to require that all district 
officers be elected by the miners in their district, because most district presidents were appointed 
by Boyle. He also called for other reforms, such as benefits for miners who became disabled 
before retirement and a credit union that would be financed by money that was currently held 
without interest in The National Bank of Washington, which was controlled by the UMWA, and 
loaned money to congressmen at a special low interest rate.25  
 In the December 6, 1969 UMWA election, Boyle dominated the UMWA convention with 
squads of delegates from District Nineteen, who wore distinctive white hard hats and controlled 
the microphones to prevent dissidents from speaking out.  Through intimidation and block votes, 
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Boyle and his "thugs" managed to insure his re-election by a margin of nearly two-to-one 
(80,577 to 46,073). Yablonski conceded the election, but on December 18, 1969, he asked the 
U.S. Department of Labor to investigate for fraud and initiated five lawsuits against the UMWA 
in federal court. The Eagle reported on Boyle's initial election victory, saying that Yablonski had 
been the first serious challenger for the office of president in more than 20 years, although John 
L. Lewis had gone nearly his entire tenure as president without seeing a serious threat to his 
power as UMW chief. Yablonski had lost the election at a rate of about two to one and claimed it 
had been rigged, and the "court action presumably meant further airing of campaign charges" of 
misuse of union funds.26   
 Then, on December 31, 1969, three killers shot Yablonski, his wife, Margaret, and his 25-
year-old daughter Charlotte dead, as they slept in the family home in Clarksville, Pennsylvania. 
The bodies were discovered on January 5, 1970, by Yablonski's son, Kenneth. Boyle had 
demanded Yablonski's death on June 23, 1969, after a meeting with Yablonski at UMWA 
headquarters had degenerate into a shouting match between the two men and in September 1969, 
UMWA executive council member Albert Pass, a former resident of Jenkins Kentucky, received 
$20,000 from Boyle (who had embezzled the money from union funds) to hire assassins to kill 
Yablonski. Paul Gilly, an out-of-work house painter and the son-in-law of a minor UMWA 
official, and two drifters, Aubran Martin and Claude Vealey, agreed to do the job. The murder 
was postponed until after the election in order to avoid suspicion. The election was widely seen 
as corrupt and was overturned by a federal court, and a new election between Boyle and 
Yablonski was ordered. But before it could be held, Yablonski and his wife and daughter were 
murdered.  In the wake of the investigation, the District Two office was occupied by federal 
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agents and the District's business transactions, including the bank accounts, were searched for 
improprieties, although none were found. Under the leadership of Arnold Miller, a movement for 
rank and file control of the International got underway soon after the Yablonski murders, and 
reform members initiated the "Miners for Democracy" movement. The union old guard 
surrounding Boyle formed a strong opposition to reform and opposed further investigations.27 
 The Mountain Eagle became more deeply involved in UMWA affairs after the death of 
the Yablonskis, and called for a broad investigation of the deaths and of union management. The 
article announcing Yablonski's death carried a reference from authorities investigating the crime 
that called it an "execution," and carried a statement from Yablonski family members who said 
Yablonski had feared for his life ever since he became involved in the election. Yablonski's sons, 
who were not in the family home at the time of the murders, claimed that the deaths were linked 
to the election, and although Tony Boyle and other union officials denied that the deaths had 
anything to do with the election, 7,000 miners walked off the job and several mines were closed 
as a memorial to Yablonski. District 31 leaders in Northern West Virginia announced that they 
would close all West Virginia mines unless the killers were found. Reports from the 
Pennsylvania State police revealed that the killers were driving cars with license plates from 
Ohio and Tennessee, but the police admitted they had no real clues as to the identity of the 
killers, who Yablonski's sons called "professional assassins."28 
 Although Letcher County was located squarely in the heart of Boyle's stronghold in 
eastern Kentucky, The Mountain Eagle continued to side with the union reform movement and 
printed articles that exposed the corruption of Boyle and his henchmen during his time at the 
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head of the union. An editorial that accompanied the announcement of the murders called them a 
"brutal execution" and stated that the "UMWA must act to remove the tremendous burden placed 
on its good name and reputation." The paper added that nine out of ten people who had spoken to 
representatives of the newspaper had said they believed the deaths were tied directly to 
Yablonski's challenge to Tony Boyle for the union presidency. If he had "never questioned what 
happened to millions of UMWA dollars he would have never been murdered." It also asked how 
safe were Ralph Nader, Ken Hechler, Harry Caudill, or others who had led in the reform 
movement that had resulted in increased scrutiny of the mining industry and the UMWA.29  
 As the investigation into the Yablonski murders got underway, it was revealed that 
Yablonski's attorney Joseph L. Rauh Jr. had asked Labor Secretary George Schultz to intervene 
in the election on three separate occasions in response to incidences of violence and intimidation 
aimed at Yablonski and his supporters. Despite an investigation conducted by the Labor 
Department prior to the election showing "gross misuse" of union funds by Boyle and other 
union officials, Shultz refused to intervene, although he finally ordered a full-scale investigation 
three days after the murders took place. Attorney General John Mitchell had also been asked by 
Rauh to intervene and he refused until January 6, the day after the bodies were found.  Then, 
Mitchell ordered the FBI to conduct a thorough investigation, in which more agents were 
assigned to the case "than any murder since the killing of Martin Luther King." A spokesman for 
the Justice Department later revealed that a "sizable sum of money" had been offered for the 
murders by "a person or group" in the Kentucky and Tennessee coal fields, the same area in 
which Yablonski had declined to campaign due to threats from Boyle supporters. Late in 
January, Tom Bethell reported that in Harlan County and in most of Tennessee, the UMWA had 
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frequently been accused of making deals with operators to allow them to pay wages below union 
scale as long as they continued to make their forty cents per ton royalty payment to the Welfare 
and Retirement Fund. Bethell added that the union had allowed small union companies to go out 
of business and re-open with the same management soon afterward under the same conditions.30 
 The United States Senate conducted hearings on UMWA affairs starting in the summer of 
1971 and heard an appeal from Miller's group, Miners for Democracy, asking that the U.S. 
Department of Labor change its methods of overseeing union elections. Joseph Yablonski's son 
Kenneth charged that the Labor Department's lax enforcement of laws governing union elections 
had played a role in the death of his father and other family members and said, "Indifference or 
outright contempt for my father and his supporters characterized the Labor Department's 1969 
performance."  He also warned the hearing board that coal miners were becoming weary of the 
Labor Department's indifference and said the until there were sweeping changes, "we do not 
think there will be peace in the coalfields." Senator Robert P, Griffith, a Michigan Republican 
said the American people "simply will not allow" the Senate or the Nixon Administration to 
continue to ignore questions relating to the UMWA and the election.31  
 In September 1971, over 18 months after the death of Yablonski and the initial challenge 
to the 1969 elections filed by the Labor Department, the trial to decide the U.S. government's suit 
to overturn the election finally got underway. Although he had been dead for over a year and a 
half, Jock Yablonski was a silent witness in the trial to decide the government's charge that Tony 
Bole and his cronies orchestrated widespread voting irregularities and outright fraud to steal the 
election. 
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 Yablonski's name, however, has cropped up frequently in the trial, as the government had 
 anticipated.  "Unfortunately, Mr. Yablonski is dead and the government has to rely on 
 representatives of the defendant, who presumably will be hostile witnesses," said Justice 
 Department Attorney David Orlikoff in opening the government's case.32 
 The government charged that the UMWA had violated "virtually every one " of the 
federal laws regulating labor elections and that Boyle and his fellow union officers had made it 
impossible for Yablonski's forces to station election observers in union polling places, by 
refusing to reveal the site or the time the elections would take place. There were also violations 
regarding the use of UMWA funds for campaigning and the use of the UMWA Journal, which 
every union member received, in promoting Boyle in his bid to retain the presidency of the 
union.33 
 Boyle's problems grew as the conspiracy in the Yablonski murders began to unravel, and 
as this happened, the iron control he had attempted to impose on the increasingly fractious union 
began to slip badly. Miners for Democracy made a direct attack on Boyle's position and began 
the long struggle to wrest control of the union from him. As The Mountain Eagle continued to 
report and editorialize on Boyle's impending downfall, a backlash started to grow in Letcher 
County against what many union members, especially retirees and widows, perceived as an 
overall attack on the union. Eastern Kentucky was Boyle territory and the Letcher County union 
men had voted overwhelmingly to support their man. In addition to that, it became apparent from 
the tone of some letters to the editor that some of Boyle's supporters did not separate Boyle from 
the United Mine Workers and that any criticism, of Boyle was criticism of the union. It was 
during this period that Tom Bethell did some of the most incisive reporting on UMWA issues in 
the entire country, in articles for The Mountain Eagle. 
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 In an article set against the failure of the union's strategy in the national contract strike 
that got under way in 1971, Bethell highlighted the growing lack of respect the rank and file 
were beginning to show for Boyle and wrote about "frustration and bitterness" the UMWA men 
felt for his handling of the negotiations, which Boyle and the coal operators had agreed in 
August to conduct in private and to withhold comment until the contract was signed. "It kept 
nearly 100,000 working miners totally uninformed...They would have nothing to say about the 
contract." At the time, the UMWA had no provision for rank and file voting to ratify the 
contract, and few of the miners had expected the strike to drag on so long, 35 days at the time of 
Bethell's writing. Bethell also wrote that the giant oil companies, the new owners of many of the 
large coal companies, were not happy with the length of the strike, the instability of the union, or 
Boyle's leadership. The union really only had two main bargaining chips in negotiating with the 
big companies, it gave the companies one entity with whom to negotiate, and of infinitely greater 
importance, the signed contract would guarantee a mostly uninterrupted supply of labor for the 
four-year period of the contract. Bethell pointed out that the oil companies had purchased the 
mines with the purpose of making a windfall by controlling energy production, but due to the 
instability of the union, and Boyle's inability to control the roving pickets and wildcat strikes, 
they had lost their faith in his leadership to at least as great a degree as had the rank and file. The 
new owners had hoped to use automation to increase productivity, but that required continual 
operation of the mines. Very few UMWA members would cross a picket line, whether it was 
authorized or not, and the roving pickets wreaked havoc with productivity, as the long contract 
strike heaped coals on the smoldering fire of distrust from the operators. Joe Moody, president of 
the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, was quoted as saying that under Boyle "the UMW 
suffers from a leadership vacuum," and that he had no idea whether the rank and file would abide 
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by a Boyle contract. Boyle's lack of control prompted Moody to say, "Under John L. Lewis, the 
UMW was a disciplined organization. It's not anymore." He continued to speak publicly about 
his doubts over Boyle's ability to control the union before the strike actually took place, and 
according to U.S. Steel President R. Heath Larry, Boyle "threw a tantrum" and said there would 
be no negotiations at all if Moody didn't stop criticizing him. "Soon after, silence descended over 
the whole subject of contract negotiations.34  
 In an interview with Dave Zegeer  that was conducted after he retired from his post as 
Director of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and Assistant Secretary of 
Labor, Zegeer affirmed Bethell's statement that the union's inability to control the rank and file 
had led at least in part to its eventual demise, saying that once it became apparent that the union 
could no longer guarantee a relatively unbroken supply of labor during the contract period, the 
BCOA operators became much less interested in doing business with the UMWA. That inability, 
along with the demise of the big steel companies that had operated the captive mines, proved to 
be deciding factors in the eventual decline of the UMWA presence in the eastern Kentucky 
coalfields.35 
 Boyle henchman William J. Prater, of District 19 was indicted by a federal grand jury for 
complicity in the Yablosnki murders in April and by the summer of 1972, Tony Boyle's hold on 
the UMWA was slipping away from him. The U.S. Department of Labor's lawsuit to have the 
UMW election overturned was successful and in May, Judge William Bryant threw the results of 
the 1969 election out. Following Bryant's decision, the DOL asked federal courts to impose strict 
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guidelines on the union in order to allow the upcoming elections to be closely monitored. Miners 
for Democracy announced a slate with Arnold Miller as their candidate for president, and a 
convention to be held in Wheeling, West Virginia later in May. Bryant ordered the union to be 
placed under careful scrutiny by the DOL and gave the agency the power to veto any and all 
union financial transactions and to station observers in UMWA headquarters. He called for a 
new election to be held before January 1, 1973 and ordered that those officers who held office 
before the December 1969 election "shall continue to conduct the affairs of the defendant 
union."36 
 While Yablonski had stayed out of eastern Kentucky during the 1969 campaign, Miners 
for Democracy decided early on to take the fight to the heart of District 30, the Letcher County 
Boyle stronghold, and they must have been pleasantly surprised by the results. When Miller, 
along with Harry Patrick, candidate for Secretary-Treasurer, and Vice-presidential candidate 
Mike Trbovich made an unannounced trip to Neon, Kentucky to record a two-minute radio spot 
detailing MFD's plan to eliminate corruption in the union, all three men were surprised to be 
recognized and welcomed on the city streets by union miners. They were also warmly received at 
a rally in Evarts, in the heart of District 19, and in Wheelwright in District 30, Phil Primack 
reported that there were no incidents. "not even a catcall marred the MFD opener." Miller told 
Primack he was very concerned about the deterioration of living conditions for miners in eastern 
Kentucky and pledged to use his power, if elected, to "get the men who mined union coal back 
on union rolls, regardless of how long they had worked at non-union mines." After being 
introduced at Evarts by Harlan County UMWA legend Granny Hager, who had been through the 
struggles of the 1930s as well as the roving pickets, Patrick told the Evarts miners there were 
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some dangerous men in District 19, and said two, William J. Prater and former Jenkins resident 
Albert Pass, were already in jail and said he was proud to walk "in the footsteps of Jock 
Yablonski. Granny Hager added that Boyle had done nothing but "steal us dry."37 
 In October, Miller charged Boyle with altering the 1971 Bituminous Coal Contract by 
removing a key strike protection clause and hiding the fact from the unions by printing two 
versions. In the contract presented to the miners, the right to strike was still protected, but in the 
one signed by Boyle and the BCOA, the clause was disallowed by being bracketed with the 
phrase, "Not included in the 1971 National Agreement." Miller said the operators had sought to 
remove the clause for years and that in 1971, Boyle had given them what they wanted. Boyle had 
called the contract the "best ever," at the time it was signed. "He just forgot to add, for the 
operators," said Miller. The "right to strike" clause had been inserted in 1947 by John L. Lewis to 
protect the union from lawsuits and injunctions under the Taft Hartley Act.38  
 Miners for Democracy garnered support and endorsements from a number of areas, 
including an endorsement from Josephine Roche and the Farmington Mine Widows. When it 
became official that Miller and the MFD slate had won the elections, Boyle’s supporters moved 
to hinder the reformers in a series of meetings held in New York. The International Committee 
of the UMWA was heavily weighted with Boyle supporters and, when it accepted Boyle’s court 
mandated resignation, they had set his retirement pay at $50,000 per year, which was the same 
amount he had earned in his role as president. The committee also transferred Boyle's Executive 
Assistant, Suzanne Richards to the union's legal department at a salary of $40,000 per year and 
sent Miller a telegram accusing him of planning to retaliate against Boyle supporters on the 
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board and promising him the board would exercise all the power granted by the union 
constitution to prevent Boyle personnel from being removed from office, even though Miller had 
repeatedly promised not to retaliate against Boyle supporters. The International Committee then 
set up a reprisals committee to protect it from Miller, a financial committee to freeze funds so 
Miller could not use them, and a watchdog committee to make sure the UMWA Journal could 
not be edited by the Miller Administration. UMWA General Counsel Edward L. Carey led the 
International group and warned them that Miller would destroy the union and take away their 
pensions.  Miller said that he planned to convene the International Board and if they refused to 
conduct business, he would disband the board and replace the members with temporary 
appointees until the Labor Department could set up new elections for International Board 
Members. District 28 President Carson Hibbitts, who had called Boyle the finest man he had 
ever known in a Letter to the Editor that appeared in The Mountain Eagle in July, threatened to 
resign, but Carrey persuade him to remain in office in order to hinder MFD in taking the union 
over. Miller did accept the resignation of True Davis, president of the UMWA controlled 
National Bank of Washington. 39   
 Boyle was indicted for the murder of Jock Yablonski's family in September 1973, after 
which he attempted suicide and failed. He was convicted of misusing union funds in December 
of the same year and was convicted of conspiracy in the murders in April 1974, for which he 
received three life sentences. In 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned his sentence 
because a government witness had not been called to testify. He was re-tried and found guilty 
again in 1978, and he died in prison in 1985. Unfortunately, for the UMWA, Arnold Miller 
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proved to be a weak and indecisive president who had even less success than Boyle in reining on 
the roving pickets and controlling the wildcat strikes. 40 
 In June 1973, miners at the Brookside Mine at Ages in Harlan County struck against 
Eastover Mining, which was owned by Duke Power, and sought to join the UMW. The miners 
had been represented by the Southern Labor Union, the same "company union" that represented 
miners at Blue Diamond in Letcher County. The SLU mines all had mine specific contracts with 
no national agreement. In June 1973, the Eastover miners voted to affiliate with the UMWA, but 
contract negotiations stalled over the company's insistence that a no-strike clause be included and 
the miners called a strike. The UMW's initial response to the Brookside Strike was indecisive, 
and although the union agreed to provide strike pay and benefits to the striking miners, Miller 
refused to consider a national walkout to support the strike. Some locals, including Local 1428 in 
Letcher County came over occasionally to picket for a day or two on "sympathy pickets," but 
without the national union's backing, the support was sporadic. The Mountain Eagle sent 
reporters on the nearly two-hour drive that covered just over 60 miles to Ages on a regular basis, 
and the reporters that made the trip did some of the newspaper's best and most incisive reporting. 
Tom Gish later said he was told by a number of national newspapermen that if The Eagle had 
bothered to submit its coverage of the Brookside Strike, or the later disaster at Scotia, either or 
both would almost certainly have won a Pulitzer Prize. Several of the most iconic pictures to 
come out of the strike were taken by Mountain Eagle photographers, including several of 
Kentucky State Troopers acting as "company thugs" and herding miners and their wives into 
police cruisers to be taken to the Harlan County Jail. One photo of a State Trooper looking 
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directly into the camera with the cold gaze of a gunfighter still decorates the offices of The 
Mountain Eagle today.  
 It isn't a stretch to say that the Brookside Strike gave the newspaper the opportunity to 
alienate all the parties concerned, and in many ways, it did just that. And there were plenty of 
reasons for the criticism leveled at each group. Under Miller's weak leadership, the UMWA 
hesitated to take an active role in the strike. While the payments made to the strikers and their 
families by the union were welcome, the full force of the UMWA was not applied, in legal aid or 
support by other UMW members on the line, other than the nearby locals that occasionally set 
pickets, and there was no serious threat of a national walkout. There were a few day-long 
sympathy strikes late in the year, but the union leadership was busy negotiating the upcoming 
contract. The UMWA carried out a national contract strike in December that kept miners off the 
job for over four weeks, and during that period, a number of neighboring locals organized 
pickets at Brookside. The Mountain Eagle printed several articles that criticized the lack of 
overall support from the national union office, and the paper was seen regionally as supporting 
the Brookside miners.  
 In October 1973, Letcher County Circuit Judge F. Byrd Hogg, whose circuit included 
Harlan County, ordered the arrest of striking miners and their wives after they defied a 
restraining order he had issued that restricted the number of pickets at Brookside to two at each 
mine. He later modified it to allow three pickets, but on several occasions in September and 
October, between 40 and 100 pickets had been in the area of the mines, and many of them 
included the wives of the striking miners. The women turned out to picket because Eastover 
Mining had managed to get 60 "scabs" (strike breakers) into the mine, but once the women began 
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to turn out, the number of strike breakers dropped. Eventually, they no longer tried to enter the 
mine, although a few of them would show up at the company store and check in for the shift. 
Hogg issued a restraining order and when the women continued to picket, he ordered their arrest, 
along with their husbands, who accompanied them on the picket line. Since some of the women 
had small children with them and refused to leave them at home alone, some entire families 
spent the night in jail. Hogg empaneled a grand jury to hear charges that the union was complicit 
in violating the picket order, but said he would decide charges against the individuals himself. 
Then he dismissed the jury and fined the union $20,000, although Kentucky law specified that a 
fine of more than $500 could not be levied without the unanimous consent of a jury. He found 16 
individuals guilty, including six women, and fined them $500 each and sentenced them all to six 
months in jail. He later suspended the jail sentences but ordered them to appear at the courthouse 
the next day to pay their fines. One of the men who was sentenced was Hobart Grills, President 
of the Harlan County Black Lung Association, and when the defendants came to court, they not 
only declined to pay their fines, but also refused to be declared paupers, which probably would 
have spared them from having to pay the fines. All 16 were jailed, and when the women refused 
to allow their children to be separated from them, the children were jailed as well. The women 
also refused to allow representatives of the Harlan County Welfare Office to take the children, 
but the children were later released to relatives. UMWA District 19 President Hugh Jones 
entered jail voluntarily as an act of solidarity, although the national union office said he had 
acted without their knowledge or authority. Strikers from Brookside also picketed Duke Power 
Company corporate offices in Raleigh, North Carolina and placed full page ads in North 
Carolina newspapers explaining the plight of the Eastover miners, as well as their opposition to a 
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17 percent rate increase Duke Power was asking the North Carolina Public Service Commission 
to approve.41.   
 The arrests continued and more women were arrested for various acts, including blocking 
the roads and throwing rocks at cars carrying strike breakers. As the strike entered its twelfth 
week, the number of Kentucky State Troopers assigned to the strike reached 50, prompting 
UMWA officials to ask Kentucky Governor Wendell Ford for an explanation of why so many 
troopers had been sent to Harlan County. The governor replied that the state police had a report 
that Eastover Mining had three gun thugs who were going to try to provoke an incident at the 
already tense scene. Union locals in the region began to shut down mines in their area in 
sympathy strikes and sunrise revival services were held at Brookside.42 
 F. Byrd Hogg had a reputation for running his courtrooms in a flamboyant style and the 
coverage he received in The Mountain Eagle, and later in the documentary film, "Harlan County 
USA," was generally not favorable. He also later achieved national prominence during a murder 
trial involving the daughter of a local physician who was killed in 1985 during the robbery of her 
father's office, and in several cases concerning the fire-bombing of The Mountain Eagles offices 
in 1974, Hogg consistently ruled against the newspaper.43  
 The Kentucky State Police may have been dragged into the Brookside Strike unwillingly 
and they may have been uncomfortable with the tactics of the striking miners' wives that forced 
them to haul women and children off to Byrd Hogg's court to be sentenced to jail, but they also 
showed a chilling tendency to adopt para-military tactics in their attempts to control the strikers, 
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as well as a willingness to stretch the law to gather intelligence. In the climactic final year of the 
strike, state troopers posing as reporters began to photograph strikers and gather information 
about the men on the picket line by trying to pass themselves off as "free-lance reporters." The 
ruse was uncovered by strikers as well as Mountain Eagle reporters and was revealed in an 
article that appeared less than a month before the Mountain Eagle was firebombed, an incident 
that was investigated by state police arson inspectors. The plainclothes troopers told reporters 
that they were working in a free-lance capacity for a Hazard (KY) newspaper, and the ones 
posing as photographers were often stationed on high ridges surrounding the mine alongside 
state police snipers with scoped high-powered rifles. They justified their tactics by saying they 
were a response to increased UMWA picket activity during the summer that took place just 
before the union's upcoming contract strike. The operation was uncovered when the faux 
reporters were spotted leaving the site in undercover state police cruisers, many carrying their 
shotguns and radios as well. 
The presence of the photographers was first noticed before the shift changed when a 
picket yelled, "hey, there's a trooper up there with a rifle" and pointed to the high rock 
ledge which protrudes over the road, where the bridge intersects with Kentucky Highway 
38. With the state trooper was a man dressed in an army field jacket and carrying a small
movie camera.44 
When a Mountain Eagle reporter approached the trooper with the movie camera, 
described in the article as having shoulder length hair "in a mod fashion," the trooper readily 
identified himself as a detective sergeant from the Frankfort post and said, "I guess I'm a member 
of the shag detail." Beside him was a trooper with a scoped 30 caliber rifle.  The reporter then 
called to two men standing nearby and asked if they were freelance reporters. One of the men 
replied that they both worked for Oscar Combs at The Hazard Voice, but when the strike 
44"State troopers pose as newsman at strike," The Mountain Eagle, July 18, 1974, 2. 
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breakers left after their shift, both men left in state police cruisers. As they moved to leave, both 
were carrying police radios and one had a shotgun while a pistol protruded from under the other's 
shirt. They walked a short distance though the woods and were picked up by a state police 
vehicle. As they got into the cruiser, one actual reporter said, "that's strange equipment for 
reporter to carry." The cameraman with the handgun identified himself as Rod Mitchell and 
replied, "If you don't believe me call Oscar Combs." When Combs was contacted about the 
incident he said the man was Rod Maggard, a state trooper who was related to Combs through 
marriage. He said Maggard had asked if he could occasionally write for The Voice and Combs 
had given him a press pass, but had not seen him at all for over six months and Combs said 
Maggard was not on assignment for his paper. The article described the troopers' attempts to 
pose as reporters as endangering reporters because strikers had begun to identify every person 
with a camera as a state trooper. The morning following the initial incident, as pickets converged 
on the Highway 31 Bridge to stop coal trucks, one miner yelled "Get your guns and go up there 
boys, every other reporter up there has a gun."45 
As the Brookside Strike gathered heat and momentum, problems involving coal trucks 
began to show up in Letcher and Knott Counties. Until the mid to late 1960s, almost all the coal 
trucks hauling coal from the truck mines on the narrow winding roads in the steep hollows of 
both counties had been relatively small, and carried less coal. Most were "straight axle" trucks 
with ten wheels that carried 30 tons or less. However, the advent of large scale strip mining gave 
many truckers the same access to credit the strippers enjoyed and they began to buy tractor 
trailers that were capable of carrying in excess of 150,000 pounds (75 tons). And like the truck 
mines, the strip mines were usually located in remote hollows with narrow twisting roads that 
45 Ibid. 
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were often just wide enough for two cars to pass, if they were going slow and used good manners 
when they met. The truckers were independent contractors who negotiated their own contracts 
with coal operators, and the operators often exploited their willingness to undercut their fellow 
haulers. They were paid by the ton on delivery and the trucking industry promoted a semi-outlaw 
image, often selling mud flaps and decals that referred to truckers as "the last American 
cowboys," and promoted other western images. Training for most truckers was minimal and they 
worked from well before dawn often till past midnight, maintaining their trucks. It was a hard 
life, but it was also an avenue for men with little education and few transferable skills to acquire 
more wealth than they had ever imagined, growing up in eastern Kentucky. Amphetamines were 
easy to obtain from area doctors and the truckers worked long shifts, frequently using the 
plentiful speed to stay awake.  
 To add to the danger from the truckers themselves, many of the mines they hauled from 
were either located on graveled roads or county and state roads that were not built to handle as 
much weight as they carried. Highway contractors in eastern Kentucky already understood that it 
was easier to bribe a few state inspectors than to build roads to standard, so the roads didn't last 
long. The ones that were paved often had pot holes as big as small cars and deep enough to do 
extensive damage to automobiles, and all day long overweight coal trucks ran up and down what 
were essentially dirt roads. In dry weather, the dust was horrendous and when it was wet, mud 
covered everything. People living along the haul roads suffered considerably, not only from the 
mud and dust, but were also endangered by the drivers, who ran on a short profit margin and 
depended heavily on getting in that one extra load. It became impossible for children to play on 
the roads and the dust caused real hardship, making it impossible to keep houses clean and by 
causing or exacerbating problems for people with respiratory ailments.  
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 At the same time truckers went to larger rigs, a new breed of strip miner emerged. Rather 
than the well-financed TVA operators, this new breed were "seat of the pants fliers," mining with 
older equipment in poor condition. They took advantage of a loophole in the law that allowed the 
excavation of "house seats" or "house coal" mines no larger than two acres, without a permit or 
reclamation. The loophole was later maintained in the 1977 Surface Mine Control and 
Reclamation Act and the two acre mines were prominent in Kentucky and Southwestern Virginia 
under laws that allowed excavation of private land for the purpose of mining coal for a single 
household or for building a home. It was widely abused in both states and by the time the 
practice was finally outlawed, in 1987, more that 6,000 of the house seat mines had been 
abandoned with no penalty or reclamation.46  The sites were often further marred by the decaying 
corpses of bulldozers and front-end loaders that had barely survived the mine and were left to 
rust away and leak oil and hydraulic fluids into the water table. Representative Morris Udall of 
Utah, who sponsored the legislation to end the practice, said the U.S. Department of Interior's 
Department of Surface mining listed 2,457 of the abandoned sites in Kentucky and 2,358 in 
Virginia. Udall told reporters that although the industry had backed the legislation, it "gave the 
coal industry a bad name."  Some commercial operators, including subsidiaries of major energy 
corporations, also used the exemption to cut costs. 47 
 The truckers and wildcat operators were more militant and more volatile than the larger 
more established mining companies, who preferred to litigate rather than take direct action. Both 
groups found themselves the subject of newspaper editorials as well as community actions. The 
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first real protests against the encroachment of the truckers came in Knott County and were 
reported in The Mountain Eagle. While citizens’ groups and individuals in Knott County and 
later in Letcher County were mostly concerned about the danger posed by the large trucks 
passing on narrow roads and the dust and mud they created, the real battle was fought in the state 
legislature and regulatory agencies over the amount of coal the trucks could haul per axle when 
crossing state and county bridges. While state legislators heard a number of complaints from 
their constituents about the trucks themselves, the damage done to state roads and bridges was 
the issue that would initially be addressed by legislation. Many of the haul roads were county 
roads and some were supposed to be maintained by coal companies. The thin layer of gravel, and 
infrequently laid blacktop county road departments would put on the haul roads when conditions 
became unbearable didn't last long or provide much relief. But it did serve to remind the 
constituents of the magisterial districts that their "squires" still held the whip hand and could dole 
out county road services like gravel, blacktop, and culverts at their whim. Like most in eastern 
Kentucky, the Letcher County Fiscal Court used county services as a means of confirming 
rewards to loyal party functionaries and punishing those who voted the wrong way. 
 In a bizarre incident in which one of Letcher County's most famous citizens was accused 
of bootlegging, the ongoing pushback by the coal industry in the county found its way into the 
pages of The Mountain Eagle.  The incident, which occurred in 1971, reflects the animosity 
displayed by the coal people against anyone who dared to oppose their interests. In an article that 
was at least partly written tongue in cheek, Tom Gish described his astonishment when he 
learned that Harry Caudill had been accused of bootlegging. Gish wrote that he had been busy 
one morning when David Hawpe of The Louisville Courier Journal and Oscar Combs of The 
Hazard Voice stopped by his office and told him there was some kind of activity involving Harry 
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Caudill, bootlegging, and strip mining taking place at the Letcher County Courthouse that 
morning and Gish sent Phil Primack to see what was going on. All three reporters were barred 
from the courtroom but Judge Executive Robert Collins later filled Gish in on the details of the 
case. At this time, county judge executives still held court and magistrates also tried 
misdemeanors in their districts, so Judge Collins held court that morning in a bootlegging case 
against Harry Caudill. The case was insignificant, in that it involved Caudill's 10-year old son 
sharing some of his father's whiskey, without Caudill's knowledge, with the son of Caudill's 
neighbor Raymond Duncil. However, the spiteful nature of the case provided a good example of 
the enmity strip miners felt for Caudill and the Gishes. Duncil was a well to do coal operator 
who was heavily involved in strip mining. When he learned that his boy (age 13) had gotten 
liquor from the Caudill home, he swore a warrant out and insisted that state troopers and sheriff's 
deputies search the Caudill home.48 
 To add to the intrigue, Duncil was the brother of Letcher County Sheriff Macie Warf 
(who had filled the unexpired term of her late husband Tip after he died in office) and Mrs. 
Warf's daughter Nancy was married to Donnie Manning, of Tackett and Manning, one of the 
largest strip mine operators in the county. Tackett and Manning had already been the subject of 
many Mountain Eagle articles and editorials from the mining they had done in the Millstone 
community, and Caudill was one of the most severe critics of strip mining in Kentucky. Gish 
downplayed the possibility of a conspiracy by local strip miners against Caudill, but he made the 
connection with Warf and Manning. He added that while The Mountain Eagle was frequently 
bombarded with complaints that it was almost impossible for Letcher County residents to get an 
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emergency response from either the sheriff's office or the state police, it had only taken 30 
minutes to issue a warrant and assemble the officers who had searched Caudill's home. 
 As we understand it, the search warrant was obtained and the house was entered and 
 searched, all within a half hour. And you would think a raid was being staged upon some 
 highly dangerous criminal hide-out perhaps, for two Sherriff's deputies and one state 
 trooper took part. How Come?49 
 Two other incidents that took place within six months of each other, both in the waning 
years of Collins' term as judge executive, illustrate both a further lack of desire to cooperate with 
The Mountain Eagle and the increasing dysfunction of county police agencies. In 1972, Letcher 
County Jailer Ernest Adams refused to allow Aaron Adams, a prisoner in his jail to meet 
privately with a Mountain Eagle reporter to discuss allegations that he was being held longer 
than his offense mandated for speaking out against jail policies and county elected officials. 
Aaron Adams was in jail for public drunkenness, and had a long history of similar offenses, but 
when he asked to speak privately with the reporter during regular visiting hours, his request was 
denied. The jailer said he could speak to the reporter but would have to do so in front of the jailer 
and his officers. An opinion issued by the Kentucky Attorney General's office agreed that it was 
the jailer's right to restrict private visits, but only if three factors were present. The jailer would 
have to base his decision on the humanity of the situation, taking into account personal reasons 
for the prisoner; the personal safety of the prisoner or others present; or, the general security of 
the jail. The jailer maintained that none of these conditions were in effect, and the AG's opinion 
also mentioned that Adams had been held for a long period without a hearing or trial and that 
cases involving drunkenness should be resolved without unnecessary delay.50 
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 The search of the Caudill home, along with the two-acre mining and truck weight 
controversies, took place during a time when conditions in Letcher County were described as 
"pretty damn feudal up there" at the first presentation of the Gish Award in 2007, sponsored by 
the Institute for Rural Journalism and Community Issues at the University of Kentucky. The 
remarks were made by the late Rudy Abramson, Institute board member and former Los Angeles 
Times reporter, who made the statement while describing Tom Gish's reaction to the August 
1974 arson of the newspaper offices when decades of ineffectual and self-serving county 
government that went from corrupt to incompetent had left the county with one of its worst ever 
fiscal courts. Early in 1973, the fiscal court voted to establish a new county police force "to cope 
with widespread increases in crime throughout the county," which would be controlled by the 
court, rather than the sheriff's office. The new force was to be paid for by federal revenue sharing 
funds and was ostensibly created to augment the sheriff and his deputies. But Sheriff Lewis Hall 
did not see eye to eye with the court on the new officers and changed the locks on his office door 
and refused to have anything to do with the county's law enforcement agency. Hall refused to 
allow anyone in his office to take calls and told one of the county policemen that he was not 
going to cooperate at all. Collins and the court said the new agency was not meant to replace the 
sheriff's department or take any of his authority away but was intended to "supplement the 
sheriff's department to enforce the laws of the county." One of the county officers, Lawrence 
Sumter, told the newspaper that Hall had spoken to him in a very harsh manner and had refused 
any further cooperation in the venture.51 
 Estill Blair defeated Collins in the 1973 county judge's race and came into office with a 
politically mixed group of magistrates, several of whom were long-time allies of former Judge 
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Collins. A Republican and a successful funeral director, Blair stood outside the usual courthouse 
crowd, and he was not part of the local Democratic machine, which had traditionally controlled 
the county, and as a political outsider, he had no experience in directing the county's affairs. The 
relationship between Blair and The Mountain Eagle began to deteriorate almost as soon as it 
began, and Blair and his chief ally on the court, Magistrate Monroe Hogg, moved early in the 
term to control access to meetings. Blair made no secret of his contempt for federal strip mining 
laws or his willingness to circumvent state laws to allow coal trucks to haul illegally. Against 
this background, The Mountain Eagle did some of its best reporting, but at the same time, Tom 
and Pat Gish, along with their family and staff, learned that the price for exercising freedom of 
the press in Letcher County had gotten a good deal higher. Magistrate James F. "Chum" Tackett 
of Jenkins had been a loyal ally of the former Judge, Robert Collins, and started out in the Blair 
Court by trying to help Collins gain employment as a $650.00 per month consultant to help the 
court spend its newly acquired revenue sharing funds, although the judge executive's salary was 
only $500 per month at that time. This action came to light through a report in the newspaper but 
it was more colorfully detailed in a letter from local gadfly Willard M. Gilliam, a frequent 
contributor to the letters column and Chairman of the Save Letcher County Committee. Gilliam 
was a man who greatly feared government tyranny and was an active opponent of Area 
Development Districts and what he perceived as an over-reaching federal government that would 
institute zoning and tell people what color they could paint their homes if area planning was 
instituted. However, he was extremely scrupulous and he correctly identified the odor of 
deceased rodent when "a member" (Tackett) made the motion to add Collins as a well-paid 
consultant to the court, even though Blair had soundly defeated him in the recent election. The 
motion was defeated and Tackett, along with Magistrate Monroe Hogg, became the most 
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troublesome members of the Blair Court, and although they were often at odds, both men worked 
with the judge when circumstances demanded. Hogg was first cousin to F. Byrd Hogg as well. In 
his letter, Gilliam wrote that a strange presence had pervaded the courtroom in an attempt to 
subvert the new court and asked if maybe "the ghost of the former fiscal court" still lingered.52 
 It didn't take long for things to go sour for Judge Blair and his court, and early in the 
second month of his term, he was accused of firing County Road Foreman Lloyd Collier and 
several other road workers for working against him in the previous election. Blair denied the 
charge, saying that Collier and the others had been laid off, although other men had already been 
hired to take their place. Blair said the others had certain skills that Collier and the fired men 
lacked, but Tackett, who represented Jenkins on the court, made a motion to pay the men right up 
to the day of the court meeting, citing a ruling from the Kentucky Attorney General's Office 
stating that the judge could not fire a county employee without the consent of the full court.53  
 Not long afterward, both James F. Tackett and Monroe Hogg were served with writs of 
prohibition for exceeding their authority. Both men had issued writs of garnishment against 
people in their districts who had failed to pay a debt. Neither of the magistrates had followed the 
proper legal procedure, and in one of the cases Tackett was involved with, the amount of the debt 
had also been incorrectly stated in the writ. In his opinion on the writs of prohibition, Circuit 
Court Judge F. Byrd Hogg held that Tackett had exceeded his authority. However, in the other 
case he decided that there was no reason to believe that his cousin Monroe Hogg had exceeded 
his authority. Judge Hogg had held a session the previous December for court officers to educate 
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them on the legal ramifications of the kind of cases that would routinely come their way, but 
neither Tackett nor Monroe Hogg had attended.54  
 The City of Whitesburg had a particularly aggressive police department that included 
Patrolman Johnny Caudill, who was later convicted of torching the offices of The Mountain 
Eagle. The combined police agencies of Letcher County were poorly prepared for the social 
changes the late 1960s had brought to the region, and they were stunned and overwhelmed by a 
growing problem with drugs, and particularly with the increase in prescription drug abuse that 
Harry Caudill had so accurately predicted in Night Comes to the Cumberlands. While many of 
their fears were unfounded, their responses were extreme and it soon became very dangerous for 
young people, particularly young men, to congregate after dark in Whitesburg or to travel the 
twisting back roads of Letcher County. One particular site in Whitesburg was located at a bridge 
across the Kentucky River that sat at the foot of "School Hill," where Whitesburg High School 
sat atop a steep incline. The Gish family lived further up the hill, and the bridge was a popular 
gathering place for young men from Whitesburg High School, including Gish's son Ben. As 
such, it quickly became a focal point for the Whitesburg Police Department. The bridge was 
situated near the bottom of the stairs to the school, and it was on the way to the downtown 
"Yellowjacket Cafe," a popular student hangout. The bridge had been a gathering place for high 
school boys for a generation but in the early 1970s it was viewed as a center of drug activity by 
the Whitesburg Police Department, although no actual arrests for drugs ever took place there. 
The high school boys at the bridge mainly gathered to talk about girls and music, and to flirt with 
the high school girls that would pass by on their way to the Yellowjacket or to stores in town, but 
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city police officers spent a good deal of their time harassing the high school students who hung 
out there and frequently threatened them with arrest along with various physical punishments.  
 When a group of concerned parents began to attend city council meetings to protest the 
officers' threats and occasional brutality, Pat Gish was among the attendees, not as a reporter, but 
as the mother of high school student Ben Gish, a frequent visitor to the bridge. The city council 
meetings became very rowdy and Mayor Ferdinand Moore deeply resented the interference and 
the accusations made by the parents, even though numerous documented incidents of police 
brutality in and out of the city had occurred by then.  The Mountain Eagle often carried articles 
detailing accusations of brutality made against various county police agencies, and there were 
editorials that accused police of being out of control and asking if it was a crime to be a young 
man in Letcher County. Young men and boys of high school age were being singled out by the 
police in exaggerated response to problems both real and imagined. An ongoing debate over the 
issue was held in the paper's "letters" section and letters and editorials and both said there was no 
actual threat that would justify such an extreme response from police. The police response was to 
increase the brutality and arrests, while the Whitesburg City Council, the Letcher County Fiscal 
Court, and the Sherriff's Department either denied or justified the police actions. 
 The fiscal court's attempts at conducting the people's business in secret and the brutality 
of the county and state police had moved easily through the administration of (Judge Executive) 
Robert Collins and Sherriff Lewis Hall to that of Estill Blair (JE) and Sherriff Reuben Watts. The 
Mountain Eagle continued to report on the incidents and particularly on those involving the 
police terrorizing local and county youth. As the same time, Estill Blair, who had run as a 
reformer, found himself on the wrong end of a scathing editorial that came out when he 
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conducted his first "special called" meeting without notifying the press. In the first issue of the 
new year in 1974, the paper took Blair and his court to task for holding a meeting in secret and 
printed one of Blair's campaign promises to highlight his broken pledge.  "The fiscal court 
meetings will be open to the public and the public will be notified in advance the time and date 
of every meeting. There will be no closed sessions."  The editorial called that pledge and others 
stating that he would be worthy of the public trust as the most likely reason Blair had unseated 
Collins, but added that seven days after he took the oath of office, the court met without public 
notice and Blair's pledge went the way of so many others from previous elected officials. 
Although it affected a conciliatory stance, it was followed by a warning. "We like to think this 
was an oversight on Mr. Blair's part." But it went on to say that if the court continued to meet 
without notifying the public, after just a "couple of weeks in office," it would surely cause an 
erosion in the public trust, as well a setting a record for early promise breaking, even in a county 
where political promises were frequently broken.55 
 The paper also carried an article on the meeting, including Blair's explanation that the 
only official business conducted had been to appoint Whitesburg Mayor Ferdinand Moore as 
Civil Defense Director. Blair said no other official business was conducted although he and other 
court members had discussed county business in general terms. At the court's regular meeting 
later in the month, Blair was unable to resist taking a swipe at the paper, saying that since the 
Mountain Eagle had been so critical of the closed meeting, he had ordered the minutes to be read 
for their benefit and they had been reported in the papers previous edition. But it must have made 
an impression on the court, because when he asked for a vote to approve the meeting, Magistrate 
James F. Tackett said he did not feel the meeting had been legally conducted and he and 
                                                 
55 "Promises, promises," The Mountain Eagle, January 17, 1974, 2. 
363 
 
Magistrate Harry Smith voted against approving them. Another indication of friction between 
Blair and the two magistrates came when Tackett made a motion to hire Garnett Ruth Webb, 
who had served as Judge Pro Tem under Judge Collins, to continue her post under Blair. Blair 
urged Tackett to withdraw his motion, but Tackett refused and the result was a tie vote, which 
Blair said he could break as judge after 15 days had passed. But the incident set the stage for 
further disputes between Blair, Tackett, and Smith, as well as other disagreements with the 
newspaper.56  
 Judge Blair soon appointed a Judge Pro-Tem who shared his antipathy for regulation, and 
his chosen man announced early in his term of office that he had no more interest than Blair in 
enforcing weight limits for coal trucks. There had been rumors that Blair, Judge Pro-Tem Lexie 
Potter and other county officials had made an arrangement with local truckers not to enforce 
weight limits county courts. This occurred before legislation was passed to take the ability to 
adjudicate traffic cases and misdemeanors away from county judges and magistrates. Later, the 
Kentucky General Assembly passed a law that only members of the Kentucky Bar could try 
court cases ranging from misdemeanors to felonies. Another editorial criticized the "double 
standard" of throwing the book at teen-age boys, who came before the magistrate's and Judge 
Pro-Tem's court for traffic violations, but weight limit citations issued to coal trucks were 
dismissed. "You have it from Judge Pro-Tem Lexie Potter, you will be set free if you appear 
before him and are charged with violating state weight limits on trucks." The paper called for 
Judge Blair to refute Potter's statement if there was to be any public trust that the Blair court 
would administer justice fairly, and to issue his own statement saying the court would enforce 
the law, although Blair did not issue a comment. When The Mountain Eagle attempted to contact 
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Blair about Potter's statement, the reporter was told he was out of town and had left no word as 
to where he was going or when he would be back. " The paper also called on Blair to "repudiate 
those who made the public threat to burn down The Mountain Eagle if Editor Tom Gish 
published anything about an agreement between county officials and coal truckers to permit the 
truckers to violate weight laws." Gish wrote that it was "downright disgusting" that such a threat 
could be made at a public meeting attended by the judge, without anyone challenging it. "Arson, 
after all is illegal." It closed by saying that maybe the newspaper shouldn't take the threat 
seriously because the county itself was a subject of derision throughout the state. "Our county 
officials are a joke, ha, ha."57 
 Not long after the newspaper revealed the agreement between county officials and coal 
truckers to skirt the law, it criticized the behavior of the Vicco Police Department for conducting 
a high-speed chase in which four young men were killed. The chase had started in the Perry 
County town of Vicco but had continued outside city limits at speeds in excess of 100 MPH. The 
cause of the chase was the suspicion that the four had purchased beer illegally. The editorial also 
carried the accusation that a Letcher County sheriff's deputy and a Kentucky state trooper had 
terrorized a Whitesburg family when their car was pulled over after being closely trailed by the 
state trooper, who finally pulled it over directly in front of the Letcher County Courthouse.  
When the officer found that a teenager was driving, he demanded to search the car and along 
with the deputy sheriff, terrified the family with threats of arresting them all for drunk driving, 
before finally releasing them. A letter to the editor from Mrs. Ida Lee Hansel accused the trooper 
and Deputy Ray Frazier of being the two who had terrorized her family, and asked how it could 
be possible for people to respect officers who continued to behave is such a manner.  Mrs. 
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Hansel said that when she told the officers the driver was her son and she owned the car, both 
she and her son were threatened with being taken "upstairs" (to the jail) for talking too much.58 
 There is widespread fear among members of the local bar association that basic civil 
 rights are being violated almost daily and that an increasingly serious situation is 
 developing that may lead to some kid being shot....There is also concern among local 
 lawyers that eastern Kentucky magistrates and police judges have only a limited 
 knowledge of the law and are not paying proper heed to basic rights spelled out in the 
 U.S. Constitution.59 
 A curfew went into effect in Whitesburg on April 1,1974, that called for the parents of 
anyone under the age of 18 to be subject to arrest and charged with a criminal offense if their 
children were on city streets past midnight. Police were directed to take the young person home 
and to then use their discretion in deciding to arrest the parents or cite them. The charges carried 
a fine of from $5.00 to $25.00 and from $10.00 to $30.00 for subsequent offenses. The 
Whitesburg city attorney was quoted as saying he assumed the ordinance would be interpreted 
sensibly and not used by police as "blanket authority to pick up everyone under 18" who was on 
city streets past midnight. However, during the deliberations, the council had agreed that there 
was no legitimate reason for a seventeen-year old to be on the street after midnight. Not long 
after the article concerning the curfew appeared, Sherriff Ruben Watts issued a statement 
denying that his deputies were harassing young people or threatening them and said that anytime 
the law was enforced there were complaints. He also affirmed that it was standard practice to 
administer breathalyzer tests to anyone suspected of being intoxicated. He admitted that he was 
investigating charges that some deputies had beaten teenagers but said none of the charges were 
true.  Jailer Vernon Hall also denied that youths were beaten while in jail and said they were 
always allowed to call their parents if they were arrested. One of Hall's deputy jailers told The 
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Mountain Eagle that Hall "treated them just like they were his own children." Hall was later 
elected sheriff.  
 The situation with the police began to snowball in the early summer of 1974 and The 
Mountain Eagle ran editorials and articles throughout the summer calling city, county, and state 
police forces out for their heavy-handed treatment of young people in Letcher County. In May, 
an editorial questioned the degree of control Sherriff Watts had over his deputies after one young 
man was jailed by city officers because he had left his driver's license at home and in a separate 
incident, three police cruisers, one city, one county, and one state, were involved in a high-speed 
chase with speeds topping 130 miles per hour. They were in hot pursuit of a young man driving a 
carload of his friends who "scratched off" in front of a Whitesburg theater. The newspaper 
questioned city officials as well as the sheriff and state police and concluded that ""It is not safe 
to allow your child to be in Whitesburg after dark. ...We seriously doubt whether anyone can 
raise a family free from daily fear of our police in the present Whitesburg environment.”60   
 Later, a group of Whitesburg parents attended another meeting of the Whitesburg City 
Council to protest the treatment of their teenage sons by Whitesburg police officers after five 
boys were arrested around 11:00 PM (before the curfew) for sitting on the infamous bridge. Pat 
Gish again attended the meeting in the capacity of a concerned parent rather than a reporter. The 
boys had been jailed and locked in cells before they were given their opportunity to make a 
phone call, although the arresting officer, City Patrolman Johnny Halcomb had simply charged 
them with being "disorderly." He had arrested another youth before he arrested the five and told 
them if they were still at the bridge when he returned he would arrest them too, unless they 
turned their music down. Mayor Ferdinand Moore attested that Halcomb arrested the boys 
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because they turned up the volume on their automobile tape player after he had told them to turn 
it down but the boys said they had turned the volume down when the officer asked and he 
arrested them anyway because since they turned it off when he came back, he assumed it had 
been louder. When asked why he hadn't waited until the curfew went into effect, Halcomb 
replied, "It's time to get off the bridge when I say it is." Charges were eventually dismissed 
against all the boys, but the parents told the city council they believed the police were 
deliberately harassing the young men who "hung out" on the bridge. Halcomb was a relief officer 
who also worked as an usher at the theater near the bridge where the boys said he wore his gun 
while on duty. The boys also complained that Officer Johnny Caudill, who later admitted to 
orchestrating the fire that destroyed the offices of The Mountain Eagle, often mistreated them. 
Parents also questioned the council about city police officers being involved in high speed chases 
outside city limits but the mayor said police were directed not to take their police vehicles 
outside city limits. Council members also said police were instructed not to jail young people 
unless a judge ordered it, but several young men under 18 told them they had been jailed 
overnight and had been refused when they asked to call their parents. After more discussion, a 
councilman was asked if he would expect to be arrested and taken to jail if he was cited for 
reckless driving, and the council got up without adjourning and began to leave. When asked if 
they would meet again, Councilman Lee Moore said, "We've already met."61 
 In the same issue, another article reported that officer Johnny Caudill had beaten and 
kicked a nineteen-year old man while he was in custody at the Letcher County Jail. When Tom 
Gish asked Police Chief Nathan Baker, who was married to Lois Baker, founder of Mountain 
Comprehensive Health Care, for information on the issue, Baker refused comment and did not 
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return Gish's calls or the messages he left. Jailer Vernon Hall also refused comment and would 
not return calls. Jail officials denied that the beating had taken place and Sherriff Watts said he 
had investigated the matter and found no evidence of a beating. Mrs. Riley Cook, the young 
man's mother, said the boy had been beaten several times after being arrested for throwing a beer 
can off the bridge. Caudill said when he shined his light on the river bank he had seen the beer 
can, but Mrs. Cook said that although he hadn't been drinking beer, "there must be a thousand 
beer cans down there, " and added that her son was recovering from recent abdominal surgery at 
the time of the beating.62 
 The Whitesburg City Council refused to take any further direct complaints and said 
anyone wishing to make a complaint would have to lodge it with the city's police commission. 
The council spokesman, Lee Moore, said complaints would no longer "be out in the open." The 
families who attended the previous month's meeting to complain said the council had "given the 
police a pat on the back, to which Moore, a Whitesburg physician who was described in an 
editorial as dominating city government, replied, "Malarkey." The council also voted 
unanimously to reject Chief Baker's resignation and increased the police uniform allowance.  
 Obviously, Dr. Moore believes that citizens of Whitesburg have no right to complain 
 about police no matter how brutal the treatment, no matter how justified the complaint. 
 But we ask Dr. Moore: If conduct of city police is not a citizens' affair, then what is? In a 
 democracy, if you can't talk about police with city officials, then democracy ceases to 
 exist. If you cannot talk about police, then you are in a police state. 
 The editorial also mentioned that at the recent meeting, Mr. John Palumbo, who said both 
of his sons had been mistreated by city police, had asked, "Are the police acting according to 
your desires? Are the following your instructions?" Moore replied, "They are following our 
orders."  The editorial cited Kentucky law prohibiting the incarceration of juveniles except under 
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very strictly defined conditions, and stated it had not been followed in any of the recent arrests 
and finished by asking if the council still supported the police when they were very clearly 
violating the law themselves.63 
 One week after Moore's remarks, a grand jury was empaneled to investigate the shooting 
of a boy described as a "young teenager," at his home in Democrat, near the Knott County line, 
when the boy challenged the right of Deputy Arnold Hall, a former school board member, to 
arrest his brother. The boy said he was going to call Sherriff Ruben Watts, who had been a 
principal at a county school during Hall's tenure on the board, and Hall knocked him down and 
shot him in the leg. Just a week before the Hall shooting, another deputy had been charged for 
shooting two teenagers in McRoberts. In the same issue, The Mountain Eagle reported that the 
sheriff's office employed 32 deputies, but only seven were bonded, although Kentucky law 
required all deputies to be bonded.64 
 By this time, The Mountain Eagle stood in opposition to the power structures in both the 
county and in Whitesburg, and in many ways, it was the lone voice for justice in a county that 
was rapidly moving backwards to embrace "the good old days" of eastern Kentucky. Judge Blair 
and his cronies in the coal trucking business had adamantly refused to obey the law, or to enforce 
it. At the same time, the Whitesburg City Police and Letcher County Sherriff's Department, 
along with Kentucky State Police troopers, had unleashed a reign of terror on young men in the 
county, and the Whitesburg City Council and Mayor Moore had given the city police department 
carte blanche. Coal operators and truck owners felt comfortable threatening Gish and mistreating 
reporters, and the constant stress, along with the financial problems and threats had taken a toll 
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on Tom Gish's heath and the paper's ability to operate. And yet, they did operate and they 
continued to take on the interests that dominated the county, but it came at a high price. 
  
Chapter Seven 
The animosity toward The Mountain Eagle finally reached a tipping point in mid-1974. 
Less than three weeks after the paper published an article detailing how few of Letcher County's 
deputy sheriffs were bonded, and another concerning the grand jury investigation of the shooting 
of a teenaged boy by a deputy, the offices of The Mountain Eagle were fire bombed. At first, it 
was believed to be an electrical fire, but while cleaning up after the fire, Tom Gish discovered 
kerosene soaked papers and rags in the rear entrance.  The next day, an article in The Courier 
Journal reported that although the cause of the fire had not been determined, it damaged the 
office badly and destroyed many of the records and articles in the paper's archives, including the 
paper's extensive Appalachian photo collection. The fire was discovered around 1:30 AM and 
extinguished in around 30 minutes, but not before the three back rooms were totally destroyed. 
The Eagle had occupied the space for 15 years, and Gish said that the greatest loss would be the 
photographic archive and a collection of books and articles on eastern Kentucky and Appalachia, 
which he described as one of the best collections he was aware of.  Typically, Gish promised the 
paper would come out the following week, "even if we have to use just one typewriter." The 
Courier Journal article called attention to the many controversial articles, including numerous 
critiques of strip mining and "strong statements on poverty in the area, that had "incurred the 
wrath of some local officials and citizens.”1  
The Mountain Eagle made its first post-fire press run one week after the blaze destroyed 
most of the equipment needed to get the paper out. The front page featured a photograph taken 
through the office window that showed the extent of the devastation and carried a separate report 
on the resignation of Whitesburg Police Officer Johnny Caudill, who said he was quitting 
1 Stephen Ford, "Mountain Eagle damaged by fire," The Louisville Courier Journal, August 2, 1974, Section B, 1. 
372 
 
because of the "harassment given to me by the editor of The Mountain Eagle and others." The 
fire had "followed threats to burn voiced at a public meeting by a coal trucker and threats against 
the life of Editor Tom Gish by a local law enforcement officer." At the request of Gish and 
Whitesburg Fire Chief Philmore Bowen, Kentucky State Police arson investigators began an 
inspection of the newspaper offices, and Gish was quoted in the article as saying it appeared that 
someone had thrown a flaming object through the window. Gish also discounted the possibility 
that the fire may have been accidentally caused by someone associated with the paper, saying 
they were all very "security conscious" due to many threats and break-ins, along with petty 
thefts. Although Gish later said he had been certain all along that the fire was caused by arson, he 
was still quoted in the article as saying he liked to think it was accidental. "I don't want to believe 
that someone hates us enough to burn us out. Nor do I want to believe Whitesburg's response to 
criticism takes such an extreme form." Most of the equipment used to produce the paper was 
heavily damaged, but Gish said they were fortunate that the subscription records were not 
damaged and the bound copies of the paper covering most of its history also survived.2 
 However, if Gish was willing to discount the animus of the city and its inhabitants, an 
accompanying article showed that the city government was no friend to the newspaper.  
"EAGLE OFFICE CONDEMNED" described how Police Chief Nathan Baker, who said he was 
acting on the order of Fire Chief Philmore Bowen, posted a condemnation order at the newspaper 
office that required The Eagle staff to vacate the building without further notice. Under the order 
no one could enter the building except for the purpose of demolition or making repairs. Gish said 
the order was a heavy blow and no further explanation for the action was offered. The order also   
required the building to be in compliance with national building and electric codes was when it 
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was remodeled. The city council had adopted the new codes the previous Monday. When asked 
for an extension so the staff could remain in the building until the paper was finished for the 
week, Bowen said he would get an opinion from the city attorney, but called back later in the day 
and said the building would have to be vacated immediately. Bowen said he had not been aware 
the staff planned to publish from the office that week and Baker came back shortly to say they 
must vacate at once. Gish wrote that he was dismayed but not surprised and attributed the city's 
antagonism toward the paper to the recent criticism of the city police department and the 
practices of city and county law enforcement officers. He added that following the publication of 
several issues with articles about incidences of police brutality toward young people, threats on 
his life were voiced before several witnesses by a city policeman. Gish reported that he had 
personally gone to the mayor and council members and asked the city to take disciplinary action 
against the officer, but nothing had been done, except for the council telling parents they would 
no longer listen to complaints against the police at their meetings. Gish also stated that he had 
made an arrangement with the building's owner so the staff could clean the damage up and 
continue to operate out of the relatively undamaged front portion of the building while the rear 
part of the building, which had been heavily damaged, was repaired but the city proceeded to 
enforce its order to condemn.3 
 The following week, the paper came out directly from the Gish home, and was set in 
typewriter script rather than newsprint. Jim Branscome, a former Mountain Eagle reporter and 
longtime friend described visiting Tom Gish a few days after the fire, saying he had climbed the 
steps to Gish's home and had seen him on the front porch typing away to get the next week's 
edition out.  
                                                 
3 Wayne King, "An Eagle that Just Won't Stop Screaming," The New York Times, August 25, 1974, 47. 
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 Here he was not far away from his heart attack, having quit a five pack a day habit, and 
 he was determined to get out a few pages, just to let all the bastards know The Eagle was 
 still screaming. Was it an incredible act of courage, commitment, or just plain mountain 
 stubbornness? I still haven’t figured out the proportions of these three things, but I am 
 leaning toward the last one as explaining a lot.4  
 The August 15 issue managed to carry one article that had been set in regular newsprint, 
the reprint of an article by Wayne King that had run in The New York Times earlier in the week. 
King wrote that since the Gishes had bought the "tough little mountain newspaper," the masthead 
had carried the two-word slogan, "It Screams." But in the August 8 edition, just under the picture 
of the American Eagle, the masthead carried a new slogan, "It Still Screams."  The paper had 
taken on almost all the power brokers in the county and state and it had almost "quit screaming" 
after the fire. But rather than close the doors and give in to the interests arrayed against them, 
Tom and Pat Gish put the issue following the condemnation of the newspaper's offices together 
in their living room. King reported Gish's disappointment, as well as his lack of surprise that not 
one member of the city council expressed any sympathy or regret. "Ordinarily, you'd think that 
when a leading institution in town is hit by disaster, you would hear some offer to help.  All we 
got was a condemnation order." Privately, Gish told King that some people in the city wanted the 
newspaper's voice to be silenced and that some of his remaining friends had expressed the 
opinion that one of the "big companies" he had taken on over the years had been behind the fire. 
However, Gish said he thought that was not logical, since he and his environmentalist allies were 
clearly fighting a losing battle and nothing had happened during the much hotter battles over 
strip mining with larger coal companies. King also mentioned a meeting, held in the courtroom 
at the Letcher County Courthouse, where a coal truck driver had said that if Gish disclosed any 
of the details of the supposedly private meeting, including an agreement with county officials to 
overlook weight violations for coal trucks, "we'll burn his building down." He also noted the 
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animosity between Gish and the Whitesburg police, including the threat by one officer to shoot 
the editor, along with the subsequent resignation of Patrolman Johnny Caudill. "The most 
untouchable of the all untouchables are your local police -- a lesson we should have learned--" 
said Gish. But when King asked him if that meant he would not do it over, Gish replied, "No, no, 
you just never quit." 
 King went on to describe Gish's appearance as being particularly un-Eagle like, "unless 
one considers a certain sharp quality of mind that suggests quick talons somewhere up high." He 
could have included a stubborn courage that had carried the newspaper through economic 
boycotts which had almost forced them into bankruptcy and had forced the family to be 
dependent on Tom Gish's parents for help a number of times. King described the paper as a 
"surprisingly graceful balance between intensive and skillfully written analysis of complex issues 
and long bucolic ramblings from county correspondents."  He included Gish's statement that it 
wasn't just he and Pat who had paid the price for the paper's insistence upon publishing the news 
at it took place. The Gishes had five children, including Ben, who was 17 at the time and who 
had been arrested by City Patrolman Johnny Halcomb for playing an automobile tape player too 
loud. Ben Gish had just recently been acquitted following two court appearances that included 
being forced to endure a long lecture “about respecting anyone who wears a uniform and issuing 
apologies to the police. "Our kids have already paid a price -- for being our kids -- not being 
welcome in the 'better homes,' not being invited to other kids' birthday parties." King finished his 
piece with Gish saying the paper would continue to publish, and that two issues had already gone 
out from the family's living room since the fire. 
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 The paper is a little skinnier, the typeface a little different on the new equipment, but it is 
 still a joy to read...and the slogan on the masthead has changed too. It now reads THE 
 MOUNTAIN EAGLE: "IT STILL SCREAMS."5 
 The same issue that carried King's NYT article also reported that evidence of arson had 
been conclusively found in the newspaper offices by work crews clearing away debris from the 
fire. The following week the paper contained a blistering editorial in which Gish said that while 
was very tempting to say yes to the many interests who had wanted to buy the newspaper out, 
"We are too mean and ornery to quit. We’re going to stay right in there with it. Don't ask us why. 
We have no good reason. Call it stubbornness. Or stupidity." He called the discovery of arson the 
most demoralizing thing about the fire, but added that he and several others had immediately 
suspected that it was not an accident. Gish wrote that some of his friends had told him and Pat 
they should have looked for some sort of attack on the paper, or on themselves or their children, 
due to the many strong positions they had taken. What really angered him was that he had gone 
to two council members asking for help but had gotten nothing, and because county officials had 
openly condoned threats to burn down the paper by their silence, when the threats were voiced in 
public meetings. The city and county officials had ignored their responsibility to upheld the law 
by allowing coal truckers to openly haul overweight and created a "climate where lawlessness is 
the norm and where no one should be surprised by arson.”  
 When you live in a community that upholds the kind of casual disregard for the rights of 
 free speech, the rights of a free press, the rights of children to go about the streets without 
 being harassed by police...then who is safe from arson, who is safe from murder, who is 
 safe from fear?6 
 In a 2005 interview with Appalshop filmmaker Mimi Pickering and radio producer 
Maxine Kinney, Tom and Pat Gish spoke at length about the fire and the period surrounding it.  
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More than 30 years after the fire, Tom was obviously still hurt and angry about the whole thing 
and Pat was certainly still angry. Tom said that he had been told by state police arson 
investigators that most of the Whitesburg business community had known about the details of the 
fire as soon as it had taken place but no one had come forth to tell him anything about who had 
torched his newspaper, or why, and no offers of help had come forth from the business 
community either. The most revelatory experience for Gish had come from his old colleague 
Harry Caudill, who had been hired to represent one of the young men who had been hired by 
Johnny Caudill to do the physical act of burning the building. Caudill said the boy, who was by 
then a student at Eastern Kentucky University, told him he had been given a stack of large 
denomination bills to do the job and had been told not to worry about anything because "we 
won't let anybody touch you." Harry Caudill told him there was never any doubt that "coal 
money" had paid for the arson. Gish said he felt kind of sick about Caudill's revelation and Pat 
Gish said while she had been sick about the paper too, but she was more worried that someone 
might do something to the children. The fire and its aftermath permanently soured them on living 
in Whitesburg ever again, once it became obvious that so many people in the town had known 
what had gone on but had not come forward, nor had they cooperated with the state police arson 
investigation. Gish said the arson investigators told him they were very tempted to "prosecute 
every business person in the county for lying to them." They had all known what had happened, 
but had lied to the officers anyway. He said he believed the silence and lies came from fear of the 
coal interests, but it was that silence from his neighbors that had finally driven him from city life. 
"I guess the reason we live at the head of this hollow (aptly named Phoenix Drive) so many 
miles from Whitesburg is that we had had all of Whitesburg that we wanted. We did not want to 
continue living among them." The newspaper office stayed in Whitesburg because it was the 
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county seat, but Gish said The Eagle had always been a county-wide institution and he had never 
really considered it just to be a Whitesburg paper anyway. And it had always had more support 
in the hollows and far reaches of the county than in Whitesburg anyway. "We always had 
support in unusual places. It's better not to try to name them." Some of their supporters had gone 
as far as to tell the coal operators that if anything else happened to the newspaper or to the Gish 
family, they would come for the coal men and their families and they would be dealt with in the 
"good old mountain style."7  
 While many in the coal industry circles were happy enough about the fire, newspapermen 
from all over the nation sent condolences, offers of help, and threats of retribution to the coal 
operators and county officials who had persecuted the Gishes and The Mountain Eagle. One 
reporter for the New York Time had stayed in Whitesburg for quite a while working on the story 
of the fire, and before he left town, he went to county officials, the judges, and the coal operators 
and told them that the eyes of the national press, including the largest newspapers and wire 
services in the nation, were fixed on Letcher County, and that they could consider the Gishes and 
all the staff under the protection of the national press. According to Gish, the reporter had told 
everyone he spoke to that if anything more happened to Tom Gish, or the family or the staff, the 
county elites and coal operators had never imagined anything like the national scrutiny that 
would descend on Letcher County.8 
 Although the arson investigation, along with the arrests and court cases went on for 
several years, it soon became obvious to the enemies of The Mountain Eagle that although the 
paper may have been wounded, the "old bird" would continue to scream across the mountains of 
                                                 
7 Tom and Pat Gish, 1995 interviewed by Mimi Pickering and Maxine Kinney at the Gish home in Thornton, KY 
Tape 2, located at Appalshop in Whitesburg. 
8 Ibid. 
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eastern Kentucky. As that revelation went from being an epiphany to a settled fact, the 
newspaper's opponents intensified their campaign to close  The Mountain Eagle for good, but 
Tom and Pat Gish, along with a diverse cast of Letcher County natives and out of town reporters, 
dug in their heels, in what was no doubt a combination of  the "mountain stubbornness" Jim 
Branscome had attributed to Tom Gish, and a realization that if their voice was silenced, it may 
well be the last local effort to throw off the reigns of the power structure that would occur for a 
while. Both sides doubled down. 
 As things moved on past the fire, the Letcher County Board of Education found itself in 
turmoil once again, this time with a teacher's revolt over low pay and poor working conditions, 
and the Fiscal Court was ready to implode in a hail of corruption and dissent. The Board of 
Education once again took exception to the paper's reporting about the growing impetus for a 
teachers' strike and did their best to keep the information from the public, by keeping Mountain 
Eagle reporters in the dark as much as possible without violating open meeting laws. Several 
members of the fiscal court no longer saw themselves as being constrained by law or morality, 
and took every opportunity to quash the newspaper, from another futile attempt to decertify The 
Mountain Eagle as the county's newspaper of record to withholding obituary information from 
the judge executive's mortuary. Before being elected judge executive, Estill Blair had operated a 
successful funeral home, and in a fit of pique, he refused to provide obituaries to the newspaper. 
He also summoned a Mountain Eagle reporter to his court and told him he would "no longer 
provide the newspaper with county records and public information, 'until you learn to print the 
truth'." Blair was angry over a letter in which he had been criticized for not temporarily releasing 
an inmate in the Letcher County Jail to visit his dying mother, along with coverage of a meeting 
in April in which two magistrates and a crowd of Letcher County school teachers had walked out 
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of court in protest of Blair's conduct. "'Until that woolly bugger bunch up there can learn to print 
the truth, don't come in here and ask for information,' the judge fumed."9 
 Blair's anger at the paper came from the paper's coverage of a near melt down in the 
fiscal court that eventually led to numerous indictments, public protest, and trials. In his editorial 
concerning the obituaries, Gish told the readers that obituaries were published without any 
charge to the family of the deceased. He added that while the newspaper did not "intend to allow 
any Eagle-Judge Blair feud" to prevent them from publishing what they called one of any 
newspaper's primary obligations, it further stated that Blair's refusal to provide public 
information was illegal, since public documents from the court were required to be published in 
The Mountain Eagle because it was the newspaper with the largest circulation10 
 This came just after a report on a fiscal court meeting that had ended with magistrates 
James F. "Chum" Tackett and David Wright, along with a group of 30 teachers, walking out of 
the meeting after Tackett made a motion to earmark half of the revenue from a franchise tax on 
coal for education. The tax had had been passed at the February fiscal court meeting. Blair had 
moved to table Tackett's motion, and when no second was offered, he seconded it himself and 
called for a vote, in which only Blair and one magistrate voted. Blair then declared that the 
motion had passed by a margin of two - zero, although he had not called for abstentions. Tackett 
called for a re-vote and Blair refused, saying the issue was settled and Tackett, Wright, and the 
teachers walked out of the meeting.11  
 In late April, a Letcher County Grand Jury indicted Blair and the entire court for willful 
neglect of duty, although the specifics were sketchy and no actual reason for the charge was 
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listed in the bill of indictment. The Grand Jury also found the courthouse in generally poor 
condition and ordered that it be cleaned up and necessary repairs be made. The Grand Jury 
foreman was given the responsibility of seeing that the repairs were made, including several 
specific items, such as replacing plumbing fixtures in the courthouse and jail. Circuit Judge F. 
Byrd Hogg directed the Circuit Court Clerk to issue the warrants against the court as well as 
Sherriff Ruben Watts and Jailer Vernon Hall, although Judge Hogg was expected to step aside in 
the actual trial process of Magistrate Monroe Hogg, who was his cousin. In the same report, the 
Grand Jury recommended that the County Patrol be combined with the sheriff's department and 
pointed to the existence of a serious and growing drug problem in the county. One week after the 
indictments, the fiscal court cited the indictments as the reason for refusing to pledge federal 
revenue sharing funds for several county projects, including a countywide ambulance service.  
Judge Blair said he felt that the indictments had placed the funding in jeopardy and he did not 
recommend pledging the funds to anything before the indictments could be resolved. When 
asked after the meeting how he had learned that the funding might be threatened, Blair replied, 
"locally." In the same issue, the paper reported that two men, former Patrolman Johnny Caudill, 
and Bradley Jones had been charged with setting fire to The Mountain Eagle's offices, although 
the county attorney recommended that the original charge of arson be reduced because both men 
were in their 20s. Tom and Pat Gish agreed, saying that prosecuting the two young men on an 
arson charge would serve no public purpose. 12  
 Not long after the funding issue, Blair also swore out a warrant, which he signed himself 
in his capacity as Judge Executive, against a man who had called him a liar in a telephone 
conversation and ordered county patrolmen to arrest Billy Adams for "harassing 
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communication." Blair told Adams he would release him if he apologized, and justified his 
actions by saying the county attorney had shown him statute law that authorized him to issue the 
warrant. Adams' wife went to the jail to get her husband released, where she was told that only 
Blair could hear the case, and he was in Jenkins at that time. When he returned, Blair had Adams 
brought into his office, but barred a Mountain Eagle reporter and Adams' family members from 
attending the meeting. Blair later said that Adams' mother had accused him of selling out over a 
road issue, to which Blair responded, "nobody has bought me off since I've been county judge, 
and nobody is going to," After Adams apologized, Blair withdrew the charge.13 
 As investigators from the office of the Kentucky Attorney General and the State Auditor 
descended on the court and its members, Blair and several of the magistrates seemed to adopt the 
mentality that the only way out was total defiance of every organization that was trying to drag 
Letcher County into the 20th Century. Of those, none was more despised than The Mountain 
Eagle. Bair continued to refuse to share information on obituaries with the newspaper and to 
withhold information and documents that the county was legally bound to deliver to The 
Mountain Eagle as the county's newspaper of record. Then, in collusion with The Community 
Press, Blair and the fiscal court made another attempt to de-certify The Mountain Eagle by 
making fraudulent claims supported by The Community Press that the small weekly located in 
Cromona, actually had the largest circulation, although the matter had been settled as recently as 
1970, when the fiscal court had attempted to claim that The Mountain Eagle was not the paper 
with the largest circulation. While the claim was eventually proven false, it caused more 
problems for the paper at a time when they were already inundated with them. This played into 
the plans of Estill Blair, who had hoped to financially cripple The Mountain Eagle by denying 
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them the highly lucrative publication of county budgets and tax records, as well as legal 
publications from both school boards and all the incorporated cities in the county. Another very 
important source of income was the legal notice of mining permits and bond releases, which 
were also required by law to be published in the paper with the largest circulation.  
 In May of 1975, the Letcher County Fiscal Court voted to set up a panel that was tasked 
with examining circulation records to determine which newspaper had the largest circulation. At 
the same time, Blair published the county's list of delinquent taxes in The Community Press 
without the court's permission, although The Mountain Eagle was legally recognized as the paper 
with the largest circulation. Magistrates James Tackett and Harry Smith criticized Blair for the 
action and referred to the 1970 dispute that certified The Mountain Eagle as the paper with the 
largest circulation.  County property taxes were the prime source of funds for many county 
agencies, including the sheriff and county court clerk's office and the delinquent list was avidly 
read by county residents.  
 Charles Whitaker told the court panel the circulation of The Community Press was 2,528, 
and Gish reported that The Mountain Eagle's paid circulation was 3,412, including 1,438 mail 
subscriptions and 1,974 in newsstand sales. When the court asked for subscription records, Gish 
declined to furnish them, saying that he had furnished an affidavit to provide proof of circulation 
and that in past circulation disputes in Kentucky, that had been ruled to be acceptable. He added 
that due to the many threats the paper had received, including one made by an unidentified court 
member, "I don't know what efforts may be made to direct recrimination toward subscribers of 
The Mountain Eagle." When Jon Cornett, the attorney for The Community Press, questioned the 
number of newsstand sales, which had always been a prime source of sales for The Eagle, Gish 
replied that he could easily provide evidence from the stores that sold the papers, by using the 
384 
 
sales records they kept for them, adding that The Mountain Eagle's newsstand sales of nearly 
2,000 alone almost surpassed the total circulation of The Community Press, which was 2,528.  
Gish told Blair he had broken Kentucky law by publishing the delinquent tax records in The 
Community Press when he knew it did not have the largest circulation and both Tackett and 
Smith asked Blair what had prompted him to take that action. Blair replied that Sherriff Ruben 
Watts had requested that the delinquent tax rolls, which had been delayed by Blair's refusal to 
publish in The Mountain Eagle, be published as soon as possible so he had them published in 
The Community Press. When Tackett asked if Watts had specifically requested that the tax rolls 
be published in The Community Press, Blair said that he had asked if there was any way it could 
be in The Community Press, but under the advice of his attorney, Watts declined to comment on 
the action.14   
 James Tackett also told Blair he did not believe that it was the court's responsibility to 
determine which paper had the largest circulation, and suggested that the court accept the signed 
affidavits stating circulation. He said if Whitaker wanted to pursue the matter any further, he 
could challenge Gish's affidavit in court. During the meeting, Gish told Blair he believed he was 
trying to use the issue of circulation to intimidate The Mountain Eagle, but his threats would not 
silence the newspaper's voice. Blair claimed he had made no threats but only wanted the paper to 
print the truth. As the meeting wound down, Tackett asked that the legal advertising revert back 
to The Mountain Eagle while the court waited for the results from the investigative panels and 
County Attorney Fields said that by law, The Mountain Eagle should be carrying the ads 
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anyway. "As of today, it is restored to The Mountain Eagle?"  Tackett asked.  "Well, that's no 
problem," said Blair.15  
 The circulation issue was eventually resolved in Gish's favor, but it was a costly 
distraction that required paying legal fees, and directed attention away from other issues taking 
place at a time when the activities of the fiscal and legal courts in Letcher County were almost a 
caricature of what actual county government and legal systems should be. This was not an 
isolated incident, but one that mirrored other actions that were taking place as African Americans 
in the south had begun to assert their legal rights and the Chicano Movement was working for 
equal rights and equal justice for Hispanics. Each movement developed its own newspapers to 
provide information that the mainstream media failed to cover.   
 In Letcher County, F. Byrd Hogg affirmed his allegiance to the power structure by 
dismissing the charges of dereliction of duty against the fiscal court and later by reversing the 
convictions of the men who set fire to The Mountain Eagle. In the case of the court's dereliction 
of duty, Hogg brought the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney who had initiated the charges to 
heel, and granted the dismissal, saying that a "spirit of cooperation and unity" had made the 
indictment unnecessary. He also said the grand jury's charges were "more in the form of a 
mandate rather than an indictment, in a technical sense." Hogg was well known by this time for 
his own interpretations of Kentucky law, particularly when it favored local officials and coal 
operators. Reporter Phil Primack wrote that although only two days had passed since Leatherman 
had filed a bill of particulars on the indictment, both Hogg and Leatherman had noticed 
"Changes which have taken place in the courthouse."16 
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 Less than a month after Hogg dismissed the grand jury charges, the fiscal court voted to 
appropriate up to $1,750, or $250 each, to offset the legal fees incurred by the eight county 
officials named in the indictment. When Magistrates James Tackett and Lawrence Sumter both 
said their fees had been exactly $250, County Attorney Leroy Fields questioned the move, 
saying, "Gentlemen, I don't know any law for it (to allow the use of public money to pay the 
officials legal fees)." However, Tackett cited a previous action that took place in the previous 
court in which $1,000 in county funds had gone to pay his legal fees as well as those of 
Magistrates I.D. Back and Eddie Howard in their defense against charges of illegally using 
county funds. The charges in that case had been brought by incoming Judge Estill Blair. When 
Tackett mentioned the suit, it brought a round of laughter from other court officials and the 
audience at the fiscal court meeting. County Attorney Fields asked that the court record show 
that he had questioned the legality of the action and the court then passed the motion 
unanimously.17   
 Former Whitesburg Patrolman Johnny Caudill was convicted of "aiding, counseling, or 
procuring the willful and malicious burning of the offices of The Mountain Eagle” in Byrd 
Hogg's court but the sentence of up to one year was to be determined by Hogg in a separate 
hearing. Caudill's attorney said he would probably appeal the verdict. The conviction rested on 
the testimony of the three young men Caudill had hired to set the fire. The prosecutor tied the 
crime to the articles in The Mountain Eagle concerning police brutality in Whitesburg, and to the 
protests made at city council meetings by Pat Gish and other parents. During the trial, one young 
woman who said she was a friend of Caudill's testified that he had told her she should "whip Pat 
Gish,” and one of the men tied to the arson was said to have gone to the Mountain Eagle offices 
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before the fire to "Punch Tom Gish in the nose," although he had not entered the office or 
assaulted Gish. Other testimony made it clear that at least some personnel in the Letcher County 
Sherriff's Office were party to the arson, since part of the planning was done at the sheriff's 
office.  
 True to his attorney's prediction, Caudill filed a motion for a new trial. Whitesburg 
Attorney James Wiley Craft, who had represented Caudill at the first trial, filed the motion 
claiming that Judge Hogg had failed to rule that one of the witnesses was also charged as an 
accomplice in the crime and that since the prosecution's case had rested on the testimony of the 
accomplices, the testimony should have been ruled out. Hogg freed Caudill and placed him on 
probation for five years, with no special conditions on the probation, saying that the Chief 
Probation Officer, S.T. Wright, and Probation Officer A.B. Halliday had both recommended that 
Caudill should not be sent to prison, calling him a "victim of circumstances." Hogg said he had 
"no other course," but to set aside the sentence and grant probation. S.T. Wright was the brother 
of County Court Clerk Charlie Wright, the nephew of school board chairman "Doc" Wright, and 
a coal operator in Letcher County. The only conditions placed on Caudill's probation was that he 
refrain from violating the law and report once a month to his probation officer.18   
 In the issue reporting that Caudill had been freed, Tom Gish delivered a scathing 
editorial, starting and ending with "he got away with it." The editorial was titled "Open Season 
on The Eagle," and Gish wrote that Hogg's ruling in effect declared Open Season on the paper. 
The hope that a fair and open trial would help to clear the air concerning the years of harassment, 
threats and intimidation aimed at the newspaper and staff had been dashed, and Gish asked, 
"Why have we been so threatened? Why was the paper burned?"  He also asked why the 
                                                 
18 David Dyar Massey, "Judge frees Caudill," The Mountain Eagle November 6, 1975, 1. 
388 
 
Whitesburg and Letcher County Officials who had known about the crime had withheld 
information from Kentucky State Police arson investigators, who had testified that they knew it 
was arson as soon as they entered the newspaper offices. The newspaper had tried to stand with 
the working people, the "little guy," and to report the news just like countless other newspapers 
across the country, and yet they had been subject to an ongoing campaign of harassment and 
intimidation that carried on even after Caudill was convicted, when a truck bringing copies of the 
week's paper back from the printer had been stopped and searched as soon as it entered the city 
limits of Whitesburg. The editorial also mentioned the fiscal court's latest attempt to deny legal 
advertising to The Mountain Eagle although the paper had twice the number of subscribers as its 
closest rival.19 The November 6 edition of The Mountain Eagle also ran a half page 
advertisement asking readers to subscribe, in an effort to help the paper use the record of 
subscriptions to "overcome adversity and the Letcher Fiscal Court." 
  The attempt to de-certify The Eagle as the county's newspaper of record was one of four 
that ended only when a Floyd County Circuit Judge told the representatives of the fiscal court he 
did not want to see this come before his court again or he would seriously consider holding them 
in contempt. A front-page article in The Kentucky Kernel, where both Gishes had earned their 
journalistic spurs while attending the University of Kentucky, proclaimed that after 69 years, 
"The Eagle still screams." The Kernel article also carried Gish's claim that The Eagle had a 
greater circulation in Washington, DC than any other Kentucky newspaper and said that because 
of the paper's strong views and widespread readership, it was recognized as the "voice of eastern 
Kentucky." Gish told The Kernel that the reporting in the Eagle was "as good as The New York 
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Times, The Washington Post, or The Courier Journal. "On a one to one ratio, we're as good as 
anybody."20 
 An article published in the Berea Appalachian Center's Autumn 1974 newsletter, co-
edited by Loyal Jones and Thomas Parrish, referred to Gish as a crusading editor who lived and 
published according to his own convictions, and referenced TVA General Manager TVA Lynn 
Seeber’s, "apparently" joking remark that he had checked all the TVA employees to make sure 
none of them had been in Whitesburg at the time of the fire. The Kernel article also mentioned an 
event that was being held at the University of Louisville's Red Barn center with music from 
Appalachian musicians as a fund raiser to help defray repair costs.21   
 As the 200th anniversary of American independence got underway, Letcher County 
moved deeper into anarchy, and Circuit Judge F. Byrd Hogg's increasingly malignant presence 
permeated everything that came into contact with his court. But even Hogg's protective umbrella 
could not keep the fiscal court from that most dreaded of state agencies, the auditor, Early the 
following year, Kentucky State Auditor Mary Louise Foust released a scathing report that 
alleged wrongdoing and mismanagement in the expenditure of state and federal funds. This 
included federal revenue sharing funds, and Foust recommended further revenue sharing funds to 
be withheld until the situation was corrected. "The numerous violations of state statutes and 
excessive spending from budgets are indicative that the County has not been operated in a 
businesslike manner." The period covered by the audit included the last six months of the Collins 
administration and ran through June 30, 1975. It showed mismanagement, irregularities, and 
possible violations of the law in records of income and expenses and the general budget. It also 
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pointed to excessive spending from "publicly financed expense accounts," and failure to return 
excess fees to the county treasury.  In the report, Foust wrote, "In our auditing, we find violations 
all over, but Letcher County is a law all to itself." A copy of the audit was forwarded to federal 
revenue sharing officials in Washington, and Foust added that in her opinion, "revenue sharing 
funds should be cut off until they get their records in order."22 
 The audit revealed that the county had spent $152,764 in revenue sharing funds without 
advertising for competitive bids, as required by law, and had made $11,000 in allocations to local 
fire departments without any record of how the money was used. The county judge's office had 
failed to keep expense records or an up to date budget, which resulted in serious overspending, 
and records for revenue sharing payments made in 1973 were lost all together. Blair refused to 
comment on the report, other than to claim he could prove the audit was wrong on the subject of 
advertising for competitive bids. In his campaign against former Judge Robert Collins, Blair had 
ridiculed Collins for failing to publish a detailed list of the expenditure of public funds in his 
term, and he claimed Collins had not turned the proper records over to him when he took office. 
Collins said the papers had been taken to Blair's office and delivered to him personally. 
"Everything was in good shape when I left office," said Collins. "I was audited by the state and a 
federal man right after I left office and they found nothing wrong."23  
 In what had become a regular response to accusations of corruption and wrongdoing by 
fiscal courts in Letcher County, the former judge and the current court closed ranks to deny that 
anything illegal had taken place and accused the state auditor's office of presenting an inaccurate 
report. Collins and James F. Tackett denied that they had padded their expense accounts and said 
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that all their expenses during Collins' term in office had been valid. Monroe Hogg's expense 
account was brought into question over claims he made for travel, labor, and delivering voting 
machines, and the audit clearly stated that not only were the expenses improperly documented, 
the records showed improper payments as well. The auditor also asked why Hogg was delivering 
voting machines anyway. State Auditor Foust said the report was done by professional 
accountants and she would "stand by the audit in any court in the state, except Letcher County." 
The audit also questioned several incidents in which the county paid for legal expenses for non-
county related cases. Two of the incidents had occurred during the Collins Administration and a 
third during Blair's. It also revealed that the court had overspent the budget in both 
administrations, and when asked about what was referred to as "excessive meal charges" billed to 
Blair's hotel room on one trip, Blair explained that he had Tackett had eaten in his room and said 
they were both "big eaters." The audit also revealed that several elected officials in county 
offices had kept $47,000 in excess fees from their office activities, rather than returning them to 
the court as required by law.24 
 At the same time the audit report was released, the Kentucky Department of Water listed 
the City of Whitesburg as being near the top of a list of cities having problems with sewage 
treatment and meeting water quality regulations. Rather than making any effort to help the 
county seat avoid legal action under the Water Pollution Control Act of 1971, the fiscal court 
held a "called meeting," without notifying The Mountain Eagle or the public (the lack of 
notification violated the Kentucky Open Records Act), and voted to deny the court's support for 
the city's attempt to obtain a $30,000 federal grant to study the waste water disposal system in 
the city and surrounding area. Although Whitesburg had a relatively new waste water treatment 
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plant, it was frequently inundated with excessive flow during heavy rains, mostly because of 
badly broken and antiquated sewer pipes in the city. The DOW report stated that within a few 
years, the city could face fines and injunctions that would prevent new sewer hook-ups, which 
would severely limit any future growth, and the federal government could force the city to build 
a new sewer plant. However, EPA plans for treating sewer problems in rural areas made it 
possible to reduce the cost to the city so that they would only be responsible for 25 percent of the 
total cost to build a new waste water treatment facility. The EPA would subsidize the other 75 
percent, providing the city participated in the planning grant. State and federal officials admitted 
that they were puzzled by the court's behavior and said they had never heard of a county fiscal 
court refusing to accept federal money to alleviate a problem within their borders. The failure to 
enter into the first step of the EPA program eliminated the possibility that Whitesburg could 
receive any of the $92 million allotted to Kentucky for designing updates and remedies for 
inadequate sewer systems throughout the state.25 
 Less than a month after the secret meeting, the court called a public meeting to discuss 
the sewer problem, but only one magistrate attended the meeting. A representative of a 
Lexington engineering firm told a Mountain Eagle reporter the meeting had been called by the 
magistrates so they could get more information on the matter, but only one had shown up, even 
though the county as well as the city could be fined if the sewage treatment facilities within the 
county did not meet federal guidelines. Willard Gilliam, the only citizen who showed up for the 
meeting, was listed as the principal spokesman against the program. He warned that entering into 
the EPA program was a disguise for restrictions on land and said it was a "pig in a poke," and 
would be subject to abuse, even though the engineer denied it. In a meeting held for the same 
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purpose the following week, the court again voted down Whitesburg's participation in the federal 
program, although the Department of Housing and Urban Development had notified the court 
that HUD would pay the remaining 25 percent of the cost of the planning.  Only one magistrate 
spoke in favor of participating, and several others expressed confusion over which federal 
agency was to fund the planning. The court voted against taking part in the program, even though 
the fines for not doing so could cost the city and county between $2,500 and $25,000 a day if 
they were enforced.  State and federal officials again expressed surprise and said that 110 of 
Kentucky's counties had voted to join the EPA program, as well as the City of Neon in Letcher 
County. 26  
 By the end of the 1976 fiscal year, the county's finances were in shambles and the fiscal 
court was not paying its bills. Judge Blair dismissed the matter along with the financial problems 
that beset the fiscal court, saying that running deficits at the end of the fiscal year was just 
business as usual, and that it was common for the county to have to borrow substantial amounts 
from the next year's budget, although Kentucky law does not allow counties to end the fiscal year 
with a budget deficit. An official from the Department of Local Government told the newspaper 
that it was unusual for Kentucky counties to finish the fiscal year with a deficit, and that about 90 
percent of them finished with balanced budgets.  The Mountain Eagle reported that Letcher 
County was already over $100,000 in debt at the beginning of the 1976 - 1977 fiscal year and 
that that a number of local businesses would no longer extend credit to the county government. 
The court's inability to pay accounts also caused financial hardships for a number of businesses 
and three threatened to sue if the court did not pay its debts. Reporting on the county's financial 
problems further eroded the relationship between Judge Bair and The Mountain Eagle and in 
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mid-July, two weeks after the new fiscal year began, Blair delivered an expletive laced threat to a 
Mountain Eagle reporter. "Get off my back. I'm getting tired, damn tired. You're going to stay on 
me till I bust your god damn nose."27 
 Blair told the reporter that everyone was laughing at Letcher County over the news 
stories detailing the county's financial woes and other blunders, and when asked about the 
estimated expenditures for the coming year, Blair said it was none of his business. Other county 
officials began to turn against the court, with long time County Court Clerk Charlie Wright and 
Budget Commissioner David Seltzer both revealing that Blair had not allowed them to see 
county financial records for several years. County Attorney Leroy Fields told the paper that he 
would file suit if necessary to prevent the county from continuing to run a deficit in violation of 
Kentucky law. The court compounded its bad relationship with the county attorney by holding a 
special called meeting secretly after its August 31 regular meeting, when neither Fields, his 
assistant county attorney, nor The Mountain Eagle were notified. The court had met in the 
judge's office immediately following the regular meeting in order to vote to obtain a $20,000 
loan from a local bank in order to meet its financial obligations, and although The Mountain 
Eagle had not been notified, Charles Whitaker of The Community Press was at the meeting. 
Fields filed suit and asked that an injunction be issued to prevent the court from conducting 
further closed meetings and the court retaliated against Fields by voting to withhold the salary 
for Assistant County Attorney Peyton Reynolds a week after the special meeting took place. In 
mid-September, Circuit Judge F. Byrd Hogg again placed his own stamp on Kentucky statutes by 
ruling that the secret meeting may have violated the letter of the law, but had not violated the law 
"in spirit," and dismissed the charges and denied the injunction. 
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 Hogg's ruling stated that the meeting was held so quickly, it had been impossible to 
locate someone from The Mountain Eagle or from the attorney's office. However, both Bill 
Bishop of The Mountain Eagle and Assistant County Attorney Peyton Reynolds were outside the 
courthouse with Magistrate Estill Banks, when a county employee came out to bring Banks to 
the judge's office. A defense attorney representing the court told Hogg that Whitaker was already 
in the judge's office when he decided to convene the meeting, and the lack of notification to The 
Mountain Eagle and Reynolds had been the result of the confusion. He said the regular meeting 
had ended with heated exchanges between the court and members of the audience and the judge 
had forgotten the county needed to vote to obtain the loan until the meeting adjourned, so he 
called them back into session long enough to vote. County Attorney Leroy Fields said the subject 
of the loan and the secret meeting were important business, and the issue shouldn't have been 
decided in private. But in his characteristic fashion, Hogg interpreted the law to suit his own bias 
rather than the way it was written. He accepted the defense's contention that the hasty nature of 
the meeting had caused the failure of notification and added that a substantial number of the 
public had attended, saying that in his reckoning, an effort had been made to notify the others. 
Hogg did say that the court had recently conducted its business in "an informal manner" and 
should realize its business was important and should be done according to the law.  
 I think that to issue an injunction here would be to cast some aspersions that what did 
 take place was a violation of the law here...There may be a literal violation, but what took 
 place is not within the spirit of KRS Chapter 61....I don't think there was a violation of 
 the law here. There may be literally, but all laws are subject to reasonable application.28   
 The Mountain Eagle, was stretched thin during the period the court's financial problems 
came to light, and most of their resources were devoted to the results of two tragic methane 
explosions that killed 26 men in early March at the Scotia Mine, located at Oven Fork in Letcher 
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County. The coverage of the Scotia disaster and the investigation and hearings that followed was 
one of the newspaper's finest hours, and Tom Gish said he had been told by several legislators 
that it had figured prominently in the development of the 1977 Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act, which revamped the 1969 act and replaced the relatively powerless Mine Enforcement and 
Safety Administration (MESA) with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) in 
1978. The new law gave MSHA much more authority to enforce mine safety laws. Gish's claim 
to The Kentucky Kernel that The Eagle's reporting was as good as anybody's was proven again 
and again as Mountain Eagle reporters were the first to arrive at the disaster site and among the 
leaders in uncovering the many violations of mining law that had led to the disaster. 
 The first explosion took place on March 9 at 11:30 AM and resulted in the deaths of 15 
men, whose average age was 27 years old. A second explosion killed 11 more, including three 
MESA inspectors, in what was later revealed to be a poorly planned attempt to inspect the site of 
the first explosion. The Scotia Mine was owned by Blue Diamond Coal of Knoxville Tennessee, 
which had been made famous in folk singer Jeanne Richie's song "The L&N Don't Stop Here 
Anymore." The company was known locally as a rogue operator that ignored safety laws and 
shrugged off closure orders issued by the relatively powerless MESA inspectors. Early in its 
coverage, The Mountain Eagle revealed that "Two Left," the section where the first explosion 
took place, was operating in violation of a closure order that had been issued the previous week, 
and the entire mine was operating under a fraudulent ventilation plan. The plan that had been 
filed with the Pikeville MESA office did not show the removal of a "brattice" or stopping that 
controlled the flow of air to the "face," the site where the actual mining took place. A brattice is a 
brick structure built between entryways, grid-like openings created as part of the mining pattern, 
that is designed to send air to the work face. The Scotia Mine was known to be a "gassy mine," 
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meaning that unusually high quantities of methane were often released in the mining process, 
and the removal of the stoppage was subsequently shown to have diverted the vital airflow 
needed to remove the ongoing methane discharges at the working face. However, the first 
explosion had not actually occurred at the working face, but further down the rail track where 
two repairmen had been welding. The six men who had had been working at the face on a 
continuous mining machine had survived, but fearing that the mine was on fire, they had 
barricaded themselves with mine curtains at the face, only to suffocate from the gasses released 
by the explosion when their self rescuers expired. A self rescuer if a breathing device that uses 
carbon particles to scrub carbon dioxide and other gasses from the air but at the time of the 
explosion, even the best ones only had a one hour life span. There was no fire and the men could 
have easily walked to safety within the lifespan of their self-rescuers.  
In that hour, the men made a critical decision. Rather than proceed to the intersection and 
then outby (going out of the mine or in the direction of the shaft) to the mine portal three 
and a half miles away, they chose to barricade themselves at the face and wait for rescue.                                                                                                                 
It is easy to say they did the wrong thing, and press reports since the disaster have 
sometimes suggested as much. But reporters do not know very much about mine 
explosions. Very few people do.29  
 Tom Bethell, who was working as Research Director for the United Mine Workers at the 
time of the explosion, told the newspaper that the Scotia mine was definitely considered gassy, 
even for eastern Kentucky, and one miner Mountain Eagle reporters interviewed said there had 
been chronic problems with ventilation at the "bottom mine" (the lower of two seams that were 
being mined) where the explosions occurred.  He also said that Scotia officials had made cynical 
attempts to circumvent the inspectors, that included strengthening ventilation only in sections 
they knew would be inspected, at the expense of air flow to other sections, which they knew 
would not be inspected on the same trip. The unnamed miner (who probably feared retaliation if 
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he spoke out publicly) told Eagle reporters that the mine had received three notices for 
insufficient ventilation just before the first explosion. "They got the ventilation up yesterday 
evening by shunting air from three sections up to the southeast. They do that every time an 
inspector comes in."30  
 Kentucky State Police confiscated photographs of the disaster site taken by Mountain 
Eagle reporter Bill Bishop and film coverage that was being made by Appalshop filmmakers 
under contract to ABC News. Bishop asked the troopers why they had taken the film and he was 
told it was because he was taking the pictures on private property, although further questioning 
revealed that the confiscation was the result of a request made by Scotia Mining officials.  
Appalshop and The Mountain Eagle complained to Kentucky Governor Julian Carroll, and the 
pictures and the film were returned several hours after they were taken. On March 11, a second 
explosion killed 11 additional men who had been sent in to start roof bolting in the sections that 
had been damaged by the first explosion, which had been extremely powerful. The second 
explosion took place two and a half miles deep in Black Mountain and the investigations 
revealed that it was caused by a spark from a battery-operated compressor that was used on a 
"motor" (mine locomotive) that kept air pressure up in order to operate the brakes. In the 
investigations that followed, MESA officials told congressional panels that Blue Diamond 
officials had withheld any information concerning the compressor from them. Following the 
second explosion, MESA sealed the mine indefinitely, although mine rescue teams from several 
nearby mines, including the National Champion Mine Rescue Team from Beth-Elkhorn's Mine 
29, did enter the mine to begin efforts to recover the bodies of the dead. The United States 
Department of Interior announced that it would convene hearings in Letcher County in April and 
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MESA announced that it would conduct a formal investigation to see whether to file criminal 
charges in the explosions.  
 Against national coverage of the explosion, reporters Bill Bishop and Helen Winternitz 
provided a good deal of the coverage for The Mountain Eagle, along with Jim Branscome and 
several other former staffers and friends of the paper who Gish later said had descended on the 
paper to aid in any way they could. The Mountain Eagle was by far the best known local paper 
on the scene and as the son of a former Southeast Coal Mine Superintendent who had originally 
attended the University of Kentucky to study mine engineering, Tom Gish a had a greater 
knowledge of coal mining than most of the newsmen on the scene. He also had an infinitely 
greater understanding of the work the men did and of the community's sense of loss. The families 
of the dead men were willing to speak to Mountain Eagle reporters because they knew they 
would be treated with respect, and the reports following the explosion were done with a great 
deal of regard for the feelings of the family members of the deceased miners. The paper carried 
pictures and eulogies of each man that died in the explosions and had comments from family 
members as well. Each man's personal history was given in detail including his work history and 
family connections in the coal industry. 
 The reports and editorials concerning Blue Diamond and Scotia's cavalier and cynical 
disregard of mine law had a special sting to them too, as only one who has experienced the lives 
of those affected by coal mining on a daily basis could understand. The Mountain Eagle was 
harshly critical of the ineffectiveness of MESA, and reported that the agency had overlooked 
numerous infractions, including a closure order Scotia had ignored that required safety cabs on 
shuttle cars the previous October, with no consequences from the agency. Another article 
revealed that Scotia had been released from a safety inspection program the previous September, 
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which had been initiated because the mine had been found to liberate excessive quantities of 
methane. The reason Scotia was excused was because it would have required the presence of 
three inspectors almost continuously at the mine and The Mountain Eagle printed a copy of the 
order releasing Scotia from the inspection program by B.A. Taylor, Inspector Supervisor at the 
Whitesburg MESA Field Office. Helen Winternitz reported that the Scotia miners had received 
sub-standard safety training and the company did not require the miners to attend ongoing safety 
training because Blue Diamond would have to pay the miners if they made the training 
mandatory. State and federal regulations did not require operators to offer more extensive 
training than an annual course on first aid, a safety course, and a class in roof and rib control. 
Supervisors and miners with specialized skills such as electricians and mechanics were subject to 
more intensive training, but the only additional training the regular miners received was for the 
use of the self-rescuer and fire-fighting equipment.31  
 Scotia and Blue Diamond began to withhold documents as soon as the explosion 
happened, and information was kept private as company representatives rarely met with the 
press. Not only was this allowed, the initial reaction of both the Kentucky Department of Mines 
and Minerals and MESA had been to refuse the press access to "files that are legally public 
information." The Monday following the second explosion, two MESA attorneys denied access 
to United Mine Workers investigators for public files, and when asked for MESA reports on 
Scotia's safety record, one of the attorneys, Bob Cohen said, "I don't want anybody looking at 
our files. Right now, we're not providing any information," although the MESA files were 
opened the following day. Kentucky State Police joined company guards to keep a tight line of 
control at the mine site and refused to admit reporters. MESA's Public Relations man Richard 
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Nellius gave occasional reports, but "Nellius, however, was unfamiliar with both mining 
practices and the Scotia situation," and little information was provided during his visits. 
Reporters had begun to phone the Inn at Wise Virginia, where many of the MESA officials were 
staying, in an attempt to speak to MESA Director Robert Barrett, but one reporter overheard 
Nellius say that he had all Barrett's calls rerouted to his room.32 
 Director Barrett found himself in the spotlight in more ways than one, as his fitness for 
his position was questioned on several fronts and he denied having any knowledge of the danger 
the repair team had faced upon entering the mine after the first explosion, although the repair 
team had been accompanied by three "federal men." United States Attorney for Eastern 
Kentucky Eldon Webb told Jim Branscome that if MESA failed to adequately account for its role 
in the deaths in the two explosions, he would consider empaneling a separate federal grand jury 
to conduct an investigation to look into the tragedy, separate from the one conducted by MESA. 
Webb, who had served as an assistant U.S. Attorney in the prosecution of Findlay Coal Corp, 
told Branscome he had already started attending the MESA hearings and indicated that he 
intended to weigh the evidence to determine if he would pursue a separate investigation. He said 
that major conflicts in testimony had emerged in the hearings and that the government could 
probably prosecute several individuals for perjury. In a special Mountain Eagle section dedicated 
to the disaster, MESA Director Barrett was quoted as saying, "....prior to the second explosion, it 
was never brought to my attention that there might be any other possible ignition source in those 
areas."33 
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 Kentucky Attorney General Robert Stephens also told Branscome he had not ruled out a 
state investigation. He added that empaneling a separate grand jury would be up to Circuit Judge 
F. Byrd Hogg and if the facts warranted, the governor might ask Hogg to proceed. However, 
Hogg told a Letcher County grand jury that was already in session at the time of the MESA 
hearings that it would be better to wait until the MESA hearings concluded and held out the 
possibility of empaneling a grand jury to study the explosions in July. The Mountain Eagle 
questioned MESA Director Barrett's status and his ability to negotiate the tricky divide between 
congress, the operators, and his duty to protect miners’ lives. In an editorial, Gish pointed to 
questions from Senate Labor Committee testimony to the effect that MESA may have not 
checked the Scotia mine for the presence of methane after the first explosion. Then they sent 
their team to accompany the Scotia crew, and the second explosion killed 11 more men. Barrett 
had been a good deal more bold the previous week when he told reporters that criminal charges 
against some members of Blue Diamond were being considered. His opening statement 
concerned MESA and its handling of the explosion, and several newspapers, including The 
Mountain Eagle stated that it was inappropriate that he be allowed to preside. Senator Harrison 
Williams of New Jersey and UMW President Arnold Miller both argued that Barrett's presence 
on the panel, along with that of Kentucky Mines and Minerals Commissioner Harold 
Kirkpatrick, created a conflict of interest. An Eagle editorial harshly criticized a statement by 
Kirkpatrick who, when he was seen to be drowsing in the glare of the television lights had said, 
"we're not lawyers," and added that representatives from his office may not have known how to 
ask the proper questions. "That's hogwash...The right questions don't get asked if the dedication 
to finding the answers is not there"34 
                                                 
34 "Barrett's Crisis," The Mountain Eagle, April 8, 1976, 4. 
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 During the first two weeks after the disaster, Scotia Mine #6, which was mining the seam 
above the explosion site, went back to work and federal mine inspectors promptly issued 67 
citations for violations of safety regulations. The company's failure to correct six of the citations 
resulted in closure orders, either on specific pieces of machinery or entire sections. On two 
previous occasions Scotia had continued to work while under closure orders, and in one instance, 
the inspector who issued the citation asked for a special investigation for what he termed "willful 
violations and defiance of the order." The 67 violations ranged from improper ventilation, which 
had been found to be the root cause of the fatal methane ignition, to faulty equipment and 
electrical problems, which had supplied the ignition source for the second explosion.35  
 As the investigations and hearings continued, it became obvious that there was blame to 
spare on all fronts and that a good deal of the testimony from MESA and Blue Diamond was 
directed toward denial and cover-up from both parties. The company had been willfully 
negligent and defied closure orders, and the inspectors had been incompetent at best. The 
procedures that would have resulted in a safer work place for the dead miners had not been 
followed and when problems had been pointed out in inspections, they were either not addressed, 
or were not followed up. MESA had been in charge of the mine when the March 11 (second) 
explosion had taken place and testimony showed a good deal of miscommunication that had 
exacerbated the danger to the crew going inside. Safety regulations and guidelines that were not 
followed resulted in the 11 additional deaths. Scotia officials claimed that MESA had been 
warned that a compressor on a locomotive would automatically activate before the second crew 
went inside. The ignition from the compressor led to the second blast that killed all but two of 
the work crew, and Scotia accused MESA of negligence and of ignoring a warning that resulted 
                                                 
35 Bill Bishop, "Inspectors cite Scotia for 67 violations," The Mountain Eagle, April 1, 1976, 3. 
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in the second disaster. In the same testimony, former Governor Bert Combs, serving as an 
attorney for Blue Diamond, strenuously objected to a statement made by Robert Barrett alleging 
that Scotia employees in the past had been fired and blacklisted for reporting safety violations at 
the mines.36 
 At a joint House/Senate panel that was convened in the Letcher County Courtroom on 
May 7, Senator Harrison Williams, (D-NJ) and U.S. Representative Carl D. Perkins, the long 
serving Democrat who represented Letcher County in the Seventh Congressional District, joined 
the Senate Public Welfare Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee to "dwell 
primarily" on MESA's handling of rescue efforts after the first and second explosions. One staff 
member told reporters, "The hearings will deal primarily with MESA, and what MESA was 
doing between the two explosions." House staffer Jack Reed said the hearings would also look 
into the overall effectiveness of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, and its administration.  
The panel took testimony from federal inspectors and members of the rescue teams that had 
helped in the recovery and repair operations. The hearings stood in contrast to an earlier round of 
Interior Department hearings that had taken testimony from Gordon Bonnyman, president of 
Blue Diamond, who was pictured with one of his attorneys, Bert Combs, on the front page of The 
Mountain Eagle in the same edition.37 
 As the hearings moved on, it became obvious that MESA's lack of enforcement power 
had made it very difficult for the agency to have much of an impact on the mine safety situation. 
A federal inspector working out of the Whitesburg office said that at least five Letcher County 
mine operators had refused to allow inspectors into their mines, and the situation dated back to 
                                                 
36 "Scotia says MESA warned," The Mountain Eagle, April 29, 1976, 1. 
37 "Hearings to check on MESA," The Mountain Eagle, May 6, 1976, 1. 
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1974. MESA officials said they had little ability to do anything but take court action, because 
they had no immediate power to do anything concrete about violations. Whitesburg inspector 
Harold Lucas did offer the good news that none of the Whitesburg inspectors had been 
threatened with guns for attempting to do their jobs, but he said resistance to the law was a good 
deal worse in Letcher County than in Pike County or anyplace where he had worked as a MESA 
inspector. Six underground mines had violated closure orders, including Scotia, which had been 
in violation of three orders at the time of the first explosion. Another inspector said a Scotia 
miner had threatened him with a pair of heavy pliers and told the inspector he would pull a rock 
down on him. Lucas also said that at the larger mines, the inspectors were at the mercy of the 
company for transportation into and out of the mine and that their rides in on man-trip "jeeps" 
travailing on rail tracks would often be held up until a work crew had time to "spruce up" the 
section.38 
 A letter to the editor from Harry Smith, a Blackey coal operator, accused MESA of using 
the explosions for its own purposes and stated that he had been issued an order in Pikeville 
federal court in April of 1976 to refrain from denying federal inspectors access to his mine, but 
the inspectors had not returned until August. Smith said MESA's accusations against him and 
other Letcher County coal operators were self-serving and that he had consistently run a safe 
mine "despite MESA's attempts to grind me down." He added that several inspectors had told 
him his mine had been targeted by their supervisors for closure, and he was beginning legal 
action against MESA.39 
                                                 
38 "Letcher County mines refused to allow federal inspections," The Mountain Eagle, May 6, 1976, 4. 
39 Harry Smith, Letters to the Editor, "Facts distorted," The Mountain Eagle, September 16, 1976, 2. 
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 As the investigations wound down and efforts to reach the bodies of the 11 men killed in 
the second explosion started to show some signs of success, the United Mine Workers continued 
their slow but steady move toward self-destruction. Arnold Miller had promised to clean up the 
welfare fund when he was elected, but the promise of reform had proven to be slow in coming 
and the result was not satisfying to many miners. The new program, the United Mine Workers 
Health and Retirement Fund, announced late in the summer of 1976 that it had mailed 300,000 
Health Service Cards to individuals listed in its rolls as being eligible for the benefits. The new 
cards were the result of the union switching over to computers to keep track of its biggest 
program, but Fund Chairman Harry Huge later revealed that some of the cards had gone out to 
people who were not eligible to use them and admitted that union officials had known that their 
database was rife with errors. His solution to the problem was to ask union members to inform 
on other union members if an ineligible person was found to be using the card. As the rank and 
file learned about the situation with the cards, the roving pickets started up again.  These 
unauthorized pickets had already badly damaged the union's ability to provide a steady work 
force, and Miller's ability to control his union came into question. Mines throughout Appalachia 
were closed by the pickets, even though their complaint was with the union. The Mountain Eagle 
called it a sad day for coal miners. 
 In November, eight months after the explosions rocked Scotia, the bodies of the eleven 
men killed in the second explosion were recovered. The process had been slow and dangerous as 
the rescuers had to proceed through extreme levels of methane gas and move forward in stops 
and starts as each section had to be ventilated as they went. Advance teams working in 
unventilated sections and using self-contained oxygen apparatus had fought gas and bad top 
before getting close enough to start the final recovery by building new ventilation stops to flush 
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the gas out with fresh air. The bodies were finally removed from the mine the week before 
Thanksgiving 1976, and the families were allowed to conduct funerals for each man. Their 
obituaries appeared in the November 25 edition of The Mountain Eagle.40 
 Two weeks before the final recovery, a federal inspector revealed that Scotia had recently 
been issued new safety violations very similar to the violations that had led to the explosions 
eight months before. The two Scotia mines had been cited for ventilation violations at least 52 
times and inspectors found that two ventilation stoppings had been removed without filing a 
report with MESA. Other revelations included failure to check the calibration on a methane 
monitor on a continuous mining machine and two instances where escape ways were either not 
identified or blocked by mud and water.41 
 In the same edition as the eulogies for the eleven men killed in the second explosion, an 
editorial excoriated the inequities in federal law enforcement and the federal judicial system. 
When UMW President Arnold Miller wrote to U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi complaining 
that penalties for mine safety laws were not being enforced in federal courts, Levi replied that an 
enormous backlog of cases had built up in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia, as operators 
had taken advantage of MESA's lack of actual enforcement power and had fought every order in 
court. The three U.S. Attorneys' Offices in eastern Kentucky, Southwest Virginia and West 
Virginia had received a total of 4,300 cases, and in most rural districts there were only a handful 
of Assistant United States Attorneys and at most, three district judges. And despite repeated 
requests by the U.S. Attorney, the three judges in the eastern Kentucky District had refused to set 
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41 "New Scotia safety violations resemble ones before blasts," The Mountain Eagle, November 11, 1976, 1. 
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trial dates for any of the cases. So, as a result, "if an operator files an answer to a complaint he is 
effectively insulated, at least for the present, from future collection efforts."   
 Levi's explanation led to the conclusion that the federal court system couldn't handle the 
case load. Gish's editorial noted "you get the feeling that Levi and the judges think that if they 
seriously get into trying mine safety citations, nothing else could ever be tried." U.S. Attorney 
offices were also deluged with black lung and social security suits and the federal judiciary had a 
serious problem with the backlog. "Clearly the enforcement system which presumably guards the 
life of a hundred thousand miners is not working," Gish wrote. The editorial closed by saying 
that if there was a breakdown in law and order, it was clear that it was as much a breakdown on 
the part of the system as on the part of the criminal and could produce nothing but indifference to 
the law and contempt for the judicial system. "A just, functioning court system is one of the 
cornerstones the country has been built on over the past two centuries. The need has not lessened 
as the country grows older."42 
 Ultimately, very little was done to Blue Diamond or Scotia for their negligence and 
willful violation of the law. The 900-foot portion of the mine where the initial explosion had 
occurred was re-ventilated in March 1977 and scheduled to be re-opened in June after an 
inspection and a memorial period for the 26 men who had died there the previous year. Joe Cook 
of the newly chartered Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration said the in-mine 
investigation would be finished by March 20, just over a year after the first explosion. No 
definite cause for the explosion had been determined, although several "possible ignition sources 
were spotted." 43 
                                                 
42 "The short arm of the law," The Mountain Eagle, November 25, 2. 
43 "Fatal mine section opened: Hearings to resume in Washington in June," The Mountain Eagle, March 10, 1977, 1. 
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 In September 1977, Federal Judge David Hermansdorfer ordered the Scotia report to be 
sealed until a $60 million lawsuit against Blue Diamond could be settled. The action came after 
Blue Diamond Attorneys sought to delay the release of the final report on the explosions from 
MESA, saying that the release would prejudice the jury that was charged with determining if the 
company was responsible for the explosions. Blue Diamond Attorneys, including former 
Kentucky Governor Bert Combs, attacked the objectivity of the report and said it was designed 
to exonerate MESA from any of the blame.44 
 By 1980, Blue Diamond had paid no penalties and the widows and survivors of the dead 
miners were still waiting on the result of their lawsuit against the company. New safety laws had 
been passed but not yet implemented and attorneys had sufficiently clogged the courts to 
guarantee a lengthy process. Scotia resumed operations in the sections where the explosions had 
occurred. An article co-authored by Bill Bishop in The Pittsburg Press stated that Appalachian 
History was repeating itself, "the coal comes first, miners and widows last." Harry Caudill was 
quoted as saying that the Scotia situation "reflects the complete inability of the United States to 
challenge culpable conduct." The article also pointed out that U.S. District Court Judge David 
Hermansdorfer, who had considerable holdings of his own in eastern Kentucky coal operations, 
continued to preside over the criminal trial against Scotia, although he had recused himself from 
the negligence suit. The Department of Justice had taken three years to bring criminal charges 
and had neither challenged Hermansdorfer over his close relationship to the industry nor his 
ongoing supervision of the MESA report. The article also revealed that Blue Diamond chairman 
Gordon Bonnyman, a devout Catholic, was in a board fight with the Sisters of Loretto, a group of 
Catholic nuns who had purchased 81 shares of Blue Diamond stock and had then sued the 
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company in state court to attain the status of "shareholders of record." That status would give 
them the right to attend meetings and influence company policy.45   
 In Letcher County, justice was sketchy as well, as F. Byrd Hogg continued to dispense 
his own particular brand of jurisprudence from his bench in the Circuit Court. He ruled against 
striking teachers in a lawsuit against the Letcher County Board of Education and persisted in 
using his position to protect members of the financial and political elite of Letcher County. Hogg 
used his position to harass anyone who sought to drag the county kicking and screaming into the 
20th Century. But Hogg, Estill Blair, Blue Diamond and the strip miners and truckers could not 
stop the efforts of the reformers or the relentless tide of change. The Kentucky General 
Assembly passed legislation that kept non-attorneys from dispensing "justice" from the bench, 
which meant that county judge executives and magistrates could no longer adjudicate 
misdemeanors and traffic violations. The federal oversight that came in with federal money in 
the War on Poverty began to have some effect on the schools and the state agencies responsible 
for overseeing highway contracts. And change began move into Letcher County. It moved 
slowly but it moved, and The Mountain Eagle finished its first 20 years with the victory that 
simple survival against enormous odds brings. There were still threats and boycotts, along with 
continued shunning of the Gish family and Eagle employees and another attempt to deny the 
paper's status as newspaper of record, but in the end The Mountain Eagle persevered. By 
surviving, and by continuing to operate and expose wrongdoing and corruption, the paper won. 
All the power, legal and otherwise, that the forces aligned against them, the coal companies and 
truckers, the fiscal court, the school board, and others had brought to bear against Tom and Pat 
                                                 
45 Ward Sinclair, and Bill Bishop, "Scotia Mine Disaster, a Story of Justice Denied," The Pittsburg Press, March 14, 
1980, B-1. 
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Gish and The Mountain Eagle had failed to silence their voices or to quell the freedom of the 
press. 
   Copyright © William Farley 2017
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Conclusion 
The advent of the 1980s didn’t change attitudes in the strip mining community, or the 
Fiscal Court and school board about The Mountain Eagle, but the strip mine operators had made 
it through the congressional efforts to regulate them pretty much unscathed, and they had other 
issues besides the newspaper. President Carter had big plans for Appalachian coal as a remedy 
for the nation’s energy problems, but Ronald Reagan was much more inclined toward oil, and 
the big oil companies had started buying heavily into the coal industry in the late 1970s. The 
1980s also marked the decline of the American steel industry and the big captive mines that had 
kept a steady supply of metallurgical coal coming north on the coal trains. 
In 1979, Beth-Elkhorn experienced its first big workforce reduction that was not related 
to closing a worked-out mine. Up until then, the only time the company had laid a significant 
number of miners off was when a mine was worked out, and they had always had a new mine 
underway, so the miners were soon absorbed by the new site. But this time the layoff was more 
ominous, when around 100 contract (union) and salaried personnel were laid off at Mine 29 in 
Pike County.  Beth Elkhorn was mining steam coal for the electrical power market by then, and 
for the first time, a Beth-Elkhorn mine had suffered from the boom and bust cycle that had 
plagued the industry in Central Appalachia. It was the beginning of a cycle of workforce 
reduction that eventually saw Beth-Elkhorn sell its holdings by the late 1980s. 
The Hall Brothers, Pike County operators who had no experience operating anything 
much larger than truck mines or small surface operations bought most of Beth-Elkhorn’s Pike 
County holdings, and part of the Letcher County reserves, but they lacked the manpower to 
really capitalize of them. The other reserves were sold off piecemeal and none of the buyers had 
a BCOA contract. This set of a series of lengthy and sometimes violent strikes that did nothing to 
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restore the old order. By the time Tampa Electric (TECO) bought most what had been Beth-
Elkhorn’s Letcher and Pike County reserves, the UMW no longer represented any miners in 
Letcher County and the numbers in Pike County were dwindling fast. At the same time, Tackett 
and Manning dissolved after Calvin Tackett had a massive heart attack and sold out to Don 
Manning. Manning was attracted to the potentially higher profits on the spot market and declined 
to continue mining Beth-Elkhorn’s reserves.  Manning Coal obtained a portion of the U.S. 23 
road project, with the caveat they could mine whatever coal they came across in the roadbed, and 
continued to mine in Letcher County on privately owned land. 
The long-promised highway construction finally came to fruition too, and work began on 
U.S. 23, which would finish in the next century with a four-lane highway from the Virginia state 
line at the top of Pine Mountain in Jenkins to the Ohio State line near Ashland. Contracts were 
also let for Kentucky 15 from Whitesburg to Jackson, and for the expansion of U.S. 119 from 
Jenkins to Cumberland. With all the new road construction, overweight coal trucks were 
regulated by laws passed by the Kentucky General Assembly for state roads, and enforced by the 
Kentucky Department of Transportation Vehicle Enforcement Division. 
While overweight trucks continued to be a problem on county roads in eastern Kentucky 
for the next 30 years, the controversy over enforcement moved from local courts to the state 
legislature and coal truckers and mine operators focused their efforts on lobbying. Strip mining 
changed as well, and as the big northeastern mining companies broke up, regional and locally 
based companies moved in to fill the void. The new companies mostly operated mountaintop 
removal jobs, and while they had smaller payrolls, they still exercised a lot of influence in 
regional and state politics. They played a large role in the eastern Kentucky economy, which 
gave them a strong local political presence. While The Mountain Eagle continued its efforts to 
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inform the public about problems related to MTR, the codification of the practice in the 1977 
Surface Mine Bill left the operators free to mine as long as they stayed close to the limits of the 
law. When strip mine operations in Letcher, Perry, and Knott County damaged private property, 
The Eagle reported it, and the articles were accompanied with photographs and editorials, but 
they lacked the teeth they had before the federal law was passed. 
The newspaper and staff were no more popular with local truckers or coal operators than 
they had been before the fire, but while there were still attempts to damage them financially by 
advocating boycotts and getting advertising withdrawn, there were no more physical attacks on 
the paper or the staff. Beth-Elkhorn and many of the other coal operators threw as much of their 
advertising business as they could legally do to The Community Press, and gave Superior 
Printing, which owned The Community Press most of their printing business, which was more 
lucrative than advertising at any rate. The Gishes lived securely in their new homes at Phoenix 
Drive in Thornton and while Tom and Pat were not beloved, there was no real threat to their 
persons. And The Mountain Eagle still had the largest circulation in the county, so they still 
carried the government mandated postings for mine openings, bonds, and other mining related 
legal statements. 
The departure of the large captive mines that were owned by steel companies or other 
manufacturing companies was the death knell for the United Mine Workers in eastern Kentucky. 
The last big union operation in eastern Kentucky was Pittston Coal, with its regional 
headquarters in Lebanon Virginia, and one operation at Eastern, in Pike County. Pittston was a 
Connecticut company and the UMW’s last big successful strike was aimed at them in the early 
1990s. With that victory and the subsequent closure of the mine in Eastern, the United Mine 
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Workers ceased to represent working miners in eastern Kentucky, but many of the locals carried 
on to represent retired miners. 
Most of the larger mines were broken up into smaller units and re-organized as non-union 
companies. When the market was good, they generally paid higher wages and offered more 
overtime than the union jobs had done, but when the steam coal market dropped, they suffered 
the inevitable lay-offs. Safety at the non-union mines was monitored by the Kentucky Office of 
Coal Mine Safety and the Mine Safety and Health Administration, which operated under the 
auspices of the U.S. Department of Labor. Dave Zegeer, former General Superintendent of Beth-
Elkhorn Corporation, served as the Director of MSHA from 1983 – 1987 and started MSHA’s 
first program aimed at ending substance abuse in the workplace. MSHA also encouraged 
specialized training courses on safety for areas such as mine supervision, coal mine ventilation, 
and roof falls.  
Little success came from efforts organize the new mines in eastern Kentucky. The strip 
mines had always been harder to organize, because while the miners were happy to claim any 
benefits available to coal miners, most of them were heavy equipment operators with no 
underground experience or union connections. The new underground mine operators were 
generally opposed to signing union contracts and the miners were either intimidated or were 
interested in being able to work more overtime than the union would allow The newly re-
organized underground mining companies in the region understood that it was more profitable 
for them to offer their employees good hourly wages, either the same or higher than union 
miners, and give them lots of overtime, instead of hiring a workforce of sufficient size to produce 
the amount of coal their contract called for. By doing this, they could produce what they needed 
to make a profit, and avoid paying additional benefits, which had always been the greatest source 
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of labor related expense. With the union out of the picture, miners could work all the overtime 
they wanted and many of the younger ones were not interested in joining a union.  
On the local government front, however, few things had changed, except that the fiscal 
court had changed administrations. Both the Letcher County Fiscal Court and School Board were 
pretty much unchecked throughout the 1980s and The Mountain Eagle continued to report and 
editorialize on both. The court made another fruitless effort to decertify The Eagle as the 
newspaper with the greatest circulation, and the Board of Education continued its frosty 
relationship with the paper, but in the 1990s, new laws, better state audits, and a renewed interest 
in reform brought both the court and school board to their knees.  
In 1982, not long after graduating from the University of Kentucky, Ben Gish initiated a 
feature that allowed readers to call in anonymously and leave messages concerning any issue that 
wasn’t libelous or obscene. Gish had seen a similar feature in a small Michigan newspaper, and 
because of the long history of retaliation by the county elites against anyone who spoke out 
against them, he decided it was perfect for The Mountain Eagle. “Speak Your Piece” was born as 
a “back fence” where people could exchange gossip and information, but to Ben Gish, it was the 
only safe way people could criticize public officials or report perceived wrongdoing without the 
fear of being punished if they went public with a letter to the editor. “Speak Your Piece” quickly 
became the newspaper’s most popular feature and although many of the calls were gossip, some 
dealt with substantive issues. 
In 1993, an investigation grew out of a comment in “Speak Your Piece” that accused 
County Judge Executive Rueben Watts of fixing coal prices for county purchases. Watts was 
eventually indicted for 28 counts of theft in office and removed from office. The Eagle covered 
Watts’ fall from grace from the initial charges to his arrest and conviction in 1994. Then, in a 
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rare endorsement of a candidate, The Eagle supported a coal miner named Carroll Smith, who 
ran on the slogan that “Honesty Counts” for Judge Executive against the county Democratic 
Party’s anointed successor to Watts in 1995 and held the office until 2006.  
In 1989, in its ruling in Rose versus the Council for Better Education, Inc., the Kentucky 
Supreme Court declared that the state's schools were inefficient and inequitable, and in violation 
of the Kentucky State Constitution. The Court struck down the entire state school system after 
concluding that every child in the Commonwealth was not being provided with an equal 
opportunity to have an adequate education, as required by the Constitution.   
Tom Gish was appointed to the Kentucky Board of Education after it was established by 
Governor Wallace Wilkinson as part of the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA). Gish was 
a long-time advocate for school reform and the overall improvement of Kentucky’s schools. 
KERA  also established the Office of Educational Accountability. In 1994, Letcher County 
Schools were deemed dysfunctional by the Office of Educational Accountability, and KBE took 
control of the system after an audit showed endemic corruption in the system in almost every 
area, including handing out bids, hiring teachers and staff, and allowing district employees to 
purchase supplies from relatives and friends.  The take-over period featured high turnover rates 
with teachers and administrators, and the entire school board was replaced with members 
appointed by the KDE. 
Gish was a strong advocate for KERA and worked to implement it as a member of the 
KBE.  In a 1996 article in The Courier Journal, Gish was referred to as State School Board’s 
conscience, after he accused the state board of ducking tough school issues and becoming the 
KDE’s “amen chorus,” betraying the public trust by only dealing with easy issues. Gish was 
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bluntly critical of the progress of school reform in eastern Kentucky after scores on the American 
College Test fell in mountain Schools.  
While Gish and other educational reformers were not fully satisfied with the scope of 
reform, the state’s schools did improve, and Letcher County Schools eventually returned to local 
control. The county schools were consolidated in the early part of the new century and Letcher 
County Central High School opened in 2005, partly as the result of increased state funding made 
possible by KERA. The consolidation combined Whitesburg High, Fleming Neon High, and 
Letcher High School, and centralized county funding as well as the student body, which allowed 
for more academic programs and better pay for teachers. Since consolidation, test scores and 
graduation rates have been raised, although county schools still lag the rest of the state.  
The relationship between The Mountain Eagle and the school board never really 
improved and during the take-over period, the paper often took a confrontational stance as local 
officials and former board members sought to re-take control. Recently Ben Gish was forced to 
ask for opinions from the Attorney General’s office over Executive Sessions at board meetings 
which were found to be in violation of the Kentucky Open Records Act. 
Relations with the fiscal court did improve, and before his death, Tom Gish commented 
that the court would inquire if there was a problem at the paper, if it missed covering a meeting. 
In the 2006 Judge Executive’s election, following accusations from the still powerful Letcher 
County Democratic Party that the newspaper editorially supported Judge Carroll Smith, a 
number of unnamed individuals bought up all the newspapers at the customary outlets as soon as 
they hit the stands on election day.  First District Magistrate Jim Ward unseated Smith and still 
holds the office. 
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By far the biggest recent changes to affect the county and The Mountain Eagle are the 
result of a near total collapse in coal production in the eastern Kentucky Coalfields. The coal 
market had experienced degrees of decline since World War II, but stabilized as stream coal 
powered the nations electrical power generating plants. However, as the effects of climate 
change became increasingly obvious, other sources of power became more desirable and the 
increase in natural gas production made possible by the hydraulic fracturing (fracking) of rock 
formations that held the gas in the ground resulted in a steep drop in the price of gas (per BTU) 
in the new century. That was accompanied by a precipitous increase in the cost of mining coal in 
the Central Appalachian coalfields, and particularly in eastern Kentucky and southwestern 
Virginia, which had both been subject to large scale underground mining since before the turn of 
the 19th Century. By the first decade of the 21st Century, the decreased availability of easily 
minded coal in eastern Kentucky drove the price per ton to between two and three times the cost 
of coal mined in the Illinois Basin, which includes the Western Kentucky Coalfields. The cost of 
mining in the Western states like Montana and Wyoming is considerably lower than the Illinois 
Basin or other parts of Central Appalachia.  
While conservatives and coalfield politicians blamed most of the decline in mining jobs 
on a fictitious “War on Coal” prosecuted by the Obama Administration and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, market forces were mostly to blame for the loss of mining jobs and for that 
reason, it is unlikely they will be coming back. The dreams of a diverse economy for eastern 
Kentucky harbored by Tom Gish and Harry Caudill never came to fruition and the collapse of 
the single industry economy hit the coalfields hard. Letcher County was no exception. By 2017, 
job losses in the declining economy have returned the county to the diasporic state of the 1960s, 
as young miners who have lost their jobs leave the area in hopes of finding employment 
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elsewhere, and take their families with them. Enrollment in the Letcher County Schools has 
dropped considerably.  Jenkins Independent Schools now has a total enrollment of around 450 
and the City of Jenkins, which once boasted the largest number of engineers per capita of any 
city in American now has the lowest average income in the county. 
The decline in the economy has affected The Mountain Eagle as well, and advertising 
revenues are down. The loss of state and federally required advertising of mine bonds and 
permits also caused a steep loss in revenue. The paper continues to hold on, but Ben Gish is the 
last Gish family member on the staff, so it will almost certainly not stay in the Gish family after 
he retires. But just like it has in the past, The Eagle continues to publish every Wednesday and 
the people of Letcher County never really know if local news is true until they see it in The 
Mountain Eagle. And, It Still Screams. 
The Mountain Eagle is one of the most honored community newspapers in America. In 
2005, the University of Kentucky based Institute for Rural Journalism and Community Issues 
created the Tom and Pat Gish Award to recognize rural journalists who “demonstrate courage, 
tenacity, and integrity.” The Society of Professional Journalists awarded the Helen Thomas 
Lifetime Achievement Award to the Gishes in 2002 and they received the Hugh M. Hefner First 
Amendment Award in 1983. They were profiled in “100 American Heroes” in a special edition 
of Newsweek in 1986, and in Studs Terkel’s 1983 book, “American Heroes: Lost and Found.” 
Tom Gish received the John Peter Zenger Award in 1974 from the University of Arizona 
following Katherine Graham of the Washington Post in 1973 and preceding Seymour Hersh of 
the New York Times in 1975. He was also honored twice in the name or Elijah Parish Lovejoy, 
once by the University of Arizona in 1975 and once by Colby College of Maine in 2001. Colby 
College was originally known as Waterbury College, and Lovejoy graduated from Waterbury in 
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1826. Elijah Parish Lovejoy, an anti-slavery newspaperman in the antebellum era who edited the 
St; Louis Observer before he was driven out of Missouri for his ant-slavery editorial stance. 
After moving to Alton Illinois, he resumed publishing his abolitionist views as editor of the 
Alton Observer. The newspaper offices were attacked by a pro-slavery mob on November 7, 
1837, and Lovejoy was killed in an exchange of gunfire. The Mountain Eagle also received the 
Environmental Policy Institute’s Recognition for Coverage of Coalfield Issues in 1987. 
The Gishes fought their battle mostly in the pages of The Mountain Eagle, but their 
struggle was real and the tactics of those who wished to silence the voice of The Mountain Eagle 
included arson, threats of violence, attempts to ruin the paper financially, and the business 
community of Whitesburg turning their backs on the family at the time of their greatest need. 
They understood the vital place of the free press to a democracy because they paid the price for 
their insistence on reporting the news honestly. They spent most of their professional lives in a 
sometimes futile attempt to provide a true picture of local news and events to people who at 
times either didn’t care or didn’t want to know. 
After experiencing failing health, Tom Gish died in 2008 and Pat Gish died in 2014. At 
Tom’s funeral, the presiding minister echoed the statement of Jesus to the people of Nazareth 
when he said, “a prophet is not without honor, save in his own country.” Perhaps the most 
treasured of their many awards, and the only one that is on conspicuous display in the 
newspaper’s office is a plain framed poster that reads “Speak Truth to Power,” presented by the 
alumni of The Mountain Eagle. 
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